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Philipp W. Stockhammer and Corinna Forberg
Introduction
What is a copy? What would be a correct response? One might agree at 
once, that the answer is much too complex to be given in a few sentences. 
With this volume, we would like to suggest a basis for a better understand-
ing of both the potential of the copy and the act of copying, by revealing 
the network of interaction between humans, notions, perceptions, objects, 
and practices that underlie them from an interdisciplinary and transcul-
tural perspective. The individual contributions in this book emerged from 
an interdisciplinary workshop by the same name that took place in Hei-
delberg, Germany, on February 14 and 15, 2014. The workshop aimed 
to bring together as broad a range of academic disciplines and individ-
ual positions as possible. Stimulated by the rich and fruitful discussions 
that have emerged from this venue, we decided to share our ideas and 
results with the broader audience by translating them into this volume. In 
its introduction, we first discuss possible understandings of the copy and 
copying, and then argue for the necessity of both an interdisciplinary and a 
transcultural approach. Subsequently, we summarise the different contri-
butions of the volume by embedding the “copy” within a network of asso-
ciated concepts and liberating it from temporal or disciplinary boundaries. 
Finally, we attempt to merge the different lines of thought in order to lay 
the basis for a more integrated understanding of the “copy” and “copying”.
Conceptualizing the “copy” and “copying”
There has never been a consensus of what constitutes a “copy”. What we 
perceive as a “copy” is very much bound to our individual experience and, 
therefore, depends on individual perceptions of the world.1 The ascribing of 
“copy” to something has always been dynamic and contextual. Therefore, 
definitions of terms such as “copy,” “imitation,” “original,” and “authent i- 
city,” to name several, have been continuously redefined and re-estab-
lished in societal discourses since antiquity, and even earlier. Neither in the 
public nor the academic discourse has there ever been an agreement on 
how to define the “copy”—even though this subject and the related prac-
tice of copying have been the topic of several recent volumes in a broad 
1 Schütz and Luckmann 1979; Habermas 1981.
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range of disciplines.2 There is no particular understanding associated 
with any geographical (e.g. “Western” or “European”) or assumed cultural 
boundaries, or within any temporal or disciplinary frame. The replacement 
of “copy” with related terms like “imitation,” “mimesis,” “reproduction,” or 
“series” depends on the linguistic choice of the individual user. So far, no 
attempts to systematically differentiate these terms have been success-
ful. As a consequence, studies have focused on the development of the 
understanding of a specific term through time, or its contemporary use in 
different contexts across the globe. Several disciplines, be it art history,3 
classical archaeology,4 anthropology,5 aesthetic theory,6 philosophy,7 soci-
ology,8 or even politics have produced important contributions with regard 
to the definition and differentiation of the copy.9 Klaus Junker and Adrian 
Stähli have even defined the discourse on the “copy” and the “original” as a 
key constituent of classical archaeology.10 The same is true for philosophy, 
where debates on “mimesis” are almost as old as the discipline itself, and 
still have not been solved.11 Susanne Knaller’s study of the understanding 
of “authenticity” in (Early) Modern European thinking is a good example of 
this kind of current research. She aims to understand and define the term 
by exhibiting temporal dynamics.12 Modernity seems to have led to a rather 
negative idea of the copy in many parts of the world, especially in Europe 
and the Americas. As for art history, the pejorative meaning of the copy still 
dominates the discourse, despite numerous excellent studies over the last 
thirty years that have convincingly argued in favor of the copy’s creative 
and transformative potential.13 Moreover, translation studies have had an 
important conceptual impact on the entanglement between the copy and 
translation.14 Hillel Schwartz reveals the narrow definition of the copy in 
Europe and North America as being rooted in a cult of the copy that gets its 
life from a striving for uniqueness and ends with a moral appeal to West-
ern societies: “Whatever we come up with, authenticity can no longer be 
2 E.g. Schwartz 1996; Fehrmann et al. 2004; Bartsch et al. 2010; Boon 2010; Wong 
2013.
3 E.g. Haverkamp-Begemann 1988; Preciado 1989; Naredi-Rainer 2001; Bartsch et 
al. 2010; Müller et al. 2011; Cupperi 2014.
4 E.g. Barbanera 2005; Junker and Stähli 2008a; Settis and Anguissola 2015.
5 E.g. Taussig 1993; Schwarz 2000; Kalshoven 2010; Küchler 2010.
6 E.g. Sörbom 1966; Bhabha 1994; Bachmann-Medick 1997; Knaller 2006.
7 E.g. Plato, Republic; Plutarch, Vita Thesei; Benjamin (1933) 1966; (1936) 2002.
8 E.g. Tarde 1903; Gebauer and Wulf 1992.
9 E.g. Mitchell 2011.
10 Junker and Stähli 2008b, 1.
11 Plato, Republic.
12 Knaller 2006.
13 E.g. Preciado 1989; Wong 2013; Cupperi 2014; cf. Haverkamp-Begemann 1988, 
13: “[E]ach copy constitutes a dialogue between the interpreter and the inter-
preted; this dialogue fosters new solutions to problems shared by the two artists 
and creates new ideas.”
14 Cf. Bachmann-Medick 1997 defines (literary) translations as a creative process of 
interpretation and contextualization (cf. also Forberg 2015, 10–12; Hutter 1980; 
Bartsch et al. 2010).
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rooted in singularity, in what the Greeks called the idion […] [The impostors] 
may call us away from the despair of uniqueness toward more compan-
ionate lives.”15 In an ethnohistoric case study, Michael Taussig elaborates 
on the dialectics between the practice of copying and the construction of 
alterity in the framework of managing otherness.16 Without a doubt, the 
discourse on the copy has had a strong impact on the social, cultural, polit-
ical, and economic aspects of our lives, surpassing mere academic debate. 
The diversity of the concept seems to prevent generally-accepted defini-
tion—with the exception of UNESCO’s aim to achieve common definitions 
within the heritage discourse on a global scale. However, it is worth noting 
that the members of these international organisations represent different 
modern nation states and, as such, are steeped in national discourses that 
are almost impossible to overcome.
Many of the relevant studies on this subject are characterised by an 
approach that aims to transgress disciplines, times, and regions. Never-
theless, most of them are written from a single discipline’s perspective. 
We, the editors, are completely aware that our selection of disciplines for 
the workshop and the subsequent publication as well as our knowledge 
of disciplinary approaches to the “copy” is very much determined by our 
own disciplinary backgrounds (namely, archaeology and art history). We 
are neither able to oversee all disciplinary discourses nor to do justice to all 
those authors who have contributed to the topic until now. Nevertheless, 
we are convinced that the different perspectives exemplified in the contri-
butions to this volume are able to reinforce ongoing disciplinary discourses 
by stimulating the transgression of disciplinary and cultural boundaries to 
obtain an open, dynamic, and transcultural perspective.
It is not the aim of this volume to present, contrast, or even assess 
different understandings of the “copy” in temporal or spatial perspec-
tives. This book is not written as a reader on the “copy.” Instead, it should 
inspire and incite ongoing discussions by presenting new perspectives on 
the topic. The contributors of this volume were free to define their own 
understanding of the term and all related practices and were not asked to 
adhere to terms used by the editors. As a consequence, this volume pre-
sents a variety of interpretations, rather than a common understanding of 
the relevant terms. We, the editors, are aware that we use the term “copy” 
to mean phenomena that might be termed “reproduction” or “imitation” 
by others. By using “copy,” we create a topic from an etic perspective (i.e. 
the analytical perspective of the scientist). In our view, this usage does not 
run the risk of oversimplifying or homogenising very different, complex 
phenomena and practices, as long as the individual understanding of the 
term is explicitly presented. It is the task of the different contributors to 
shed light on emic perceptions (i.e. that of the past or present actors) of 
what we chose to discuss under the framework of the “copy.” Even if critical 
15 Schwartz 1996, 17.
16 Taussig 1993.
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voices against the use of the term have been raised and alternative terms 
proposed, we are convinced that studying practices of the secondary or 
derivative requires the use of the term “copy.”17 Moreover, as will be shown 
below, an integrated interdisciplinary and transcultural approach is neces-
sary both to do justice to the “copy” and to understand its potential. 
Defining something as a “copy” always requires something else to be 
defined as the “original.” The definition of both phenomena is always rela-
tional. Both aspects are linked to each other within a network and it is 
only the introduction of notions of authenticity and originality that can 
lead to different assessments of value. From an analytical point of view, 
the definition of the copy always requires the designation as something 
secondary or derivative, even if the primary, i.e. the so-called original, is 
more or less fictitious and only established at the same instant at which 
something is perceived as a copy. For example, anyone visiting a museum 
can experience this dependency of original and copy, whenever (s)he is 
told that what (s)he perceives to be a unique “original” is just the “copy” 
of a lost “original.” In this very moment, the copy and the original are con-
stituted simultaneously in interdependence. The designation of the copy, 
as well as its analysis, therefore always requires a diachronic and contex-
tual perspective. It is the permanent change of human perception, in all 
its dimensions, that gives the copy and its related practice, i.e. copying, 
such an interesting inherent dynamic.18 The situational dependence of the 
dynamics of the copy also points to the necessity to embed every analysis 
of notions of the “copy” in a particular (historical, geographical, etc.) con-
text. Without that context, concepts and dynamics of the “copy” cannot be 
understood. To sum up, we use “copy” to denominate a phenomenon that 
is—in all or at least some of its features—related to something else (i.e. 
the original). It was created later than the original and assumes (through 
an intentional act by the one who copies) one or several features of the 
original. It can exist without the spectator being aware of its secondary 
position, but only the realisation of the relatedness and temporal differ-
ence enables the understanding of something as a copy.
This is equally true of copying as a social practice, i.e. as the practi-
cal realisation of something that might be deemed a “copy.”19 In our own 
understanding, “copying” means intentionally (re-)producing an object, 
practice, sound, movement, or idea that is perceived by oneself and/or 
others as having a secondary position to another object, practice, etc. that 
is—at the same time—understood as the “original.” Basically everything 
can be copied: mimetic behaviour is a fundamental trait of human learn-
ing. From childhood through education to professional practice: all are 
informed by the practice of copying. Copying means perceiving and 
defining something as original and, at the same time, translating it and 
17 Cf. Fehrmann et al. 2004.
18 Merleau-Ponty 1966; Olsen 2006; Stockhammer 2015.
19 Cf. Ortland 2015.
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mastering its traits, in order to make it one’s own and thereby opening up 
the potential to transform the copy into a new original The perception of 
original and copy and the practice of copying are indistinguishably entan-
gled, as practice always means perceiving20 and vice versa21. Copying is, 
therefore, an intimate act based on the intense engagement with another 
person, object, or practice. Copying has the potential to shape both the 
copy and the original; concept and practice condition each other.
The “copy” and “copying” from a transcultural and 
interdisciplinary perspective
The dynamics of the “copy” and “copying” constitute their crucial role in 
transcultural studies. We understand the concept of “transculturality” in a 
twofold way: the concept can be used to refer to both a concrete object of 
investigation as well as an analytical method.22
First, a transcultural approach is a research agenda that aims to over-
come disciplinary, national, or “Western” discourses and to do justice to 
manifold understandings of the world. The term relates explicitly and 
critically to a notion that defines culture as being ethnically bound and 
contained within a territorial frame, i.e. the traditional, container-like 
understanding of culture.23 Basing our work on the concept of trans-
culturality enables us to emancipate it from such traditional notions of 
culture. Instead, we argue that cultures are invariably constituted by inter-
action, entanglement, and reconfiguration.
By using transculturality as an analytical approach, we attempt to shed 
light on past and present understandings of “copy” and “copying” in differ-
ent contexts, as well as from a broad range of disciplinary perspectives. 
So far, related discourses have been almost entirely bound to cultural, 
scientific, or political distinctions and are both rooted in and constrained 
by national scholarly discourses. A transcultural approach is by definition 
interdisciplinary. When organising the workshop on which this volume is 
based, we aimed to foster our conceptual awareness by bringing together 
scholars from very different disciplines who could only communicate with 
each other on a conceptual level, as they all have worked with very dif-
ferent sources and materials. It became clear during the workshop that 
the very different disciplinary traditions and achievements did not present 
an obstacle to our goal, but rather forced the contributors to break down 
their complex discipline-specific discourses into their constituent concepts 
for the benefit of the interdisciplinary audience.
20 Gatewood 1985; Knoblauch and Heath 2006; Richardson 2009.
21 Frers 2009, 188; Hofmann 2015; Stockhammer 2015, 35.
22 Eibach, Opitz-Belakhal, and Juneja 2012; Juneja and Falser 2013.
23 Eibach, Opitz-Belakhal, and Juneja 2012; Juneja and Falser 2013; Flüchter and 
Schöttli 2015.
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From an analytical perspective, we are also aware that speaking of cul-
tural encounters involves the risk of reintroducing that which we aim to 
overcome, i.e. the definition of cultural entities and borders. It is an episte-
mological consequence that every analytical approach to the study of trans-
culturality requires the distinction and definition of cultures first, if only to 
be dissolved and transgressed in the analytical approach that follows.24 The 
same holds true for the notion of the copy. How should we speak about the 
“secondary” without having first defined the “primary?” Every study of the 
dynamic processes triggered by practices of the secondary means acknowl-
edging—or, more precisely, defining—the primary. Therefore, even if we 
aim to overcome the mere binary differentiation between the “original” and 
the “copy” we have to reintroduce this distinction at the beginning of our 
analysis, even if it is only for the subsequent demonstration of the fact that 
both classifications and the practice of copying in particular constitute each 
other and are permanently (re-)negotiated within social practice. We are 
therefore conscious that we tend to initiate our thoughts with notions that 
need to be overcome in the discussion that follows.
Second, a transcultural approach aims to analyse the transformative 
potential of intercultural encounters and the processes of transcultura-
tion and entanglement (which again comprise manifold individual actors’ 
practices of appropriation, copying, translating, and rejection) related to 
it. Therefore, the focus is on shifting designations and social practices and 
not on the definition of seemingly stable symbols, functions, or structures.
The dynamics of perception, and the resultant attribution and change 
of meanings to objects and practices, are the basis for the transformative 
power of the copy and copying. Ultimately, it is not the copy that has an 
agency and exerts power to change us. It is our shifting perception and 
re-evaluation of the copy and, therefore, the copy’s virtual changeability 
that has the power to transform.25 In other words, it is not the copy itself 
that changes, but our perception of it. The copy, therefore, has “effectancy” 
rather than “agency.”26
Moreover, a copy’s transformative potential for re-interpretation and 
re-evaluation has an inherent dynamic and it can increase in the course 
of its itinerary, e.g. when an object is transported over large distances. As 
an itinerant copy, it can provide a link with distant actors, due to its sup-
posed sameness with the original. It can also be understood as an original 
when its viewers are ignorant of the original or other copies, or if it is the 
product of conscious re-interpretation—in which case it can become even 
more valuable in its new context than the presumed original was in the old 
context.27 Thus the copy has the potential to be a very influential actor in 
the transcultural field.28
24 Stockhammer 2012; Stockhammer 2013.
25 Cf. Stockhammer 2015.
26 Stockhammer 2015.




In contrast to “copy,” ”copying” has a direct transformative power as a 
practice that shapes our own lifeworld and, at the same time, helps us to 
link ourselves to other actors in the field. Copying enables the expression 
of similarity and difference at the same time since, during the act of copy-
ing, the actor decides what to meticulously imitate in his/her own work 
and what to translate and transform according to his/her own lifeworld. 
Copying therefore involves deciding between three different choices that 
are possible in a situation of contact: acceptance (trying to get as close to 
the original/other as possible), appropriation (transforming the original/
other according to one’s own lifeworld), and rejection (re-emphasizing oth-
erness and difference). When copying an object, for example, one has to 
permanently decide between the three choices in the process of perceiving 
the object in order to be able to copy it. Therefore, copying involves both 
deciding on and performing practices with the other that subsequently 
open up the space for very different methods and results. It enables copy-
ing to become part of a strategy to react to, to question, to challenge, to 
manage, and even to overcome what is perceived as the original.
The diversity of human perception can best be understood with the 
help of a transcultural approach which welcomes, but does not enforce, the 
inclusion of Asian, African, or other non-European perspectives. A transcul-
tural approach must not be confused with a postcolonial approach, which 
explicitly aims to involve scholars and perspectives from non-European, 
postcolonial contexts. As mentioned before, transcultural studies focuses 
on the transformative potential of intercultural encounters realised in prac-
tices of copying, appropriation, and hybridisation—and those practices can 
take place with differing intensity at all times and in almost all locales.
To sum up, the “copy” and “copying” as its related practice are com-
ponents of the transformative dynamics of intercultural encounters. Per-
ception and practice are intrinsically linked when defining one thing as 
an original or a copy or while copying the other. The question “what is 
a copy?” is permanently re-negotiated between one’s lifeworld and one’s 
momentary perception of the copy, as well as during the practice of copy-
ing. The kinds of transformations connected with—and triggered by—the 
understanding of something as a “copy” and the process of copying are 
manifold. These transformations can happen very locally, on an individual 
level, but can also affect a large group of actors (e.g. a particular society) 
on a regional or even global level. They may concern human perceptions 
of the world (e.g. ideas, cosmologies, or knowledge) as well as the shape, 
functions, and meanings of objects and/or practices.
The individual contributions in this volume exemplify a transcultural 
approach, but with differing intensities and emphases. Such an understand-
ing guided the discussions during the workshop, but is more implicit in some 
of the contributions than others. Nevertheless, it has shaped our discus-
sions, the selection process, and the presentation of these studies to such 
an extent that we chose to use the term “transcultural” along with “interdisci-
plinary” in order to characterise the approach and aims of this volume.
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The copy in a network of notions
The contributions to this book span a wide evaluation period, from the 
Bronze Age to modern times. Rather than sequencing the contributions 
temporally, we have grouped the articles by concept into six different 
parts. From the large number of possible conceptual groupings, we have 
selected “anthropology,” “reality,” “original,” “materiality, “power,” and 
“competition.” There is no doubt that the attributes of these conceptual 
divisions are sometimes very closely related, and that one contribution can 
refer to more than one of the aforementioned terms. However, each part 
identifies a line of thought that runs through its articles. In the last part of 
this introduction, we bring these lines together, to provide a starting point 
for further cross-referencing by the reader.
Part I: The copy and anthropology (Ribeiro, Ladwig)
What’s in a copy? Gustavo Lins Ribeiro poses this question in his intro-
ductory article while examining the topic “copy” through the eyes of an 
anthropologist. This contribution is less about the characteristics of a copy 
than its inherent potential. Within the categories of academia, cultural 
life, and economics Ribeiro examines the Western concept of the copy, 
which can be traced back to Plato’s philosophy. The author highlights the 
copy’s necessity to all three categories and determines the origin of its 
negative and diminutive evaluation in the West, which cannot be found, 
for instance, in China or other regions of the world. Moreover, he portrays 
how the terms “original” and “authenticity” are both instrumental to politi-
cal and economic purposes and challenged by new technologies.
Also from an anthropologist’s perspective, Patrice Ladwig describes 
how the centuries-old concept of “copy” or “mimesis/imitation” affected 
later anthropological research. Ladwig begins by reflecting on the prim-
itivism of non-literate societies, which has been directly connected to 
mimetic practices by early anthropologists like James Frazer. These prac-
tices were considered underdeveloped and were classified as belonging 
to an early evolutionary stage of human society. This evaluation is based 
on a fundamental, negative assessment of copying that has its origins in 
Plato’s reflections on mimesis. Due to religious scepticism and philosoph-
ical criticism during the Enlightenment, the distance between object and 
subject became wider and found expression in a reduced and pejorative 
understanding of imitation. The understanding of imitation is not, as Kant 
put it, epistemologically universal, but culturally specific. Walter Benjamin 
therefore bemoans the loss of the possibility of mimetic practices in mod-




Part II: The copy and reality (Knaller, Schröter)
From the Early Modern Age to the nineteenth century, the idea that art was 
the imitation of nature prevailed. According to Susanne Knaller, a crucial 
question in aesthetics until now has been to what extent reality reveals 
itself in art objects, on the one hand, and in empirical objects/objects of 
nature, on the other. In order to answer this question, the concept of the 
copy and the original is helpful. However, this concept is stretched to its 
limits when it is confronted with avant-garde art—especially from the post-
1950 era—which consciously mixes aesthetic categories. Knaller therefore 
introduces the term “authenticity” to the discourse—a term closely related 
to the concepts of original and copy, as well as art and reality, but offering 
a more comprehensive and more flexible approach to a definition of the 
relationship between art and reality.
The seemingly endless reproducibility of things which, without an obvi-
ous original, occasionally leads to the opinion that the difference between 
original and copy is obsolete. There seems to be only a world of copied 
copies (c.f. Ribeiro, Knaller and Mersmann). If this were true, our politi-
cal, economic, and social worlds would collapse, as Jens Schröter argues in 
his article. The danger of anarchy inevitably evokes the necessity of some-
thing unreproducible—banknotes and ID cards are prominent examples. 
Extending Schröter’s idea, this means that we need the uncopiable original 
in order to maintain social order.
Part III: The copy and the original  
(Graulund, Sanchez-Stockhammer, Schwan)
From a point of view of literary studies, Rune Graulund does not discuss 
the concepts of the original and/or copy as being a matter of debate. For 
him, there is little doubt that one can exist without the other. His criticism 
is directed at the perception of an original—more precisely an original 
text—as an independently existing entity. Graulund does not see the copy 
as a work referring to an isolable entity (original), but rather as the many 
conditions of a creative process that does not have any natural, authentic 
origin. In this way, the copy is not only perceived as a creative process, but 
as an original as well. According to Graulund, the original in literature is 
not an entity, but a variety of concepts, such that several versions of a text 
can possess status comparable to the original.
From a linguistic point of view, Christina Sanchez-Stockhammer dis-
agrees with Graulund. Linguistics shows that the original and the copy fol-
low a chronological process that schedules the original’s existence before 
the copy. According to Sanchez-Stockhammer, it is not clear how much 
similarity to the original something has to display to be called a copy. To 
conceptualise this, the author uses Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic, 
dichotomous language model, which states that language is composed 
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of langue (the meaning of a word and its grammatical characteristics) and 
parole (language use in specific utterances). In both oral and textual lan-
guage, an exact copy, labelled an “absolutely faithful copy” by the author, 
would not be possible; only what she calls a “functionally faithful copy”—
even in the case of academic quotations—is achievable.
Alexander Schwan’s proposition is located between those of Grau-
lund and Sanchez-Stockhammer. In order to explain the complicated 
structure of the original and the copy in the field of the performing arts, 
especially dance, he postulates a paradox caused by the combination of 
choreographic performances and the body’s anatomy. On the one hand, 
the alleged original—the performance of a choreographic idea—turns 
out to be an ephemeral phenomenon vanishing in the very moment of its 
production and therefore preventing the copying process. On the other 
hand, the possibilities of human movement are clearly limited due to the 
body’s anatomy. Similar to linguistics (e.g. Sanchez-Stockhammer), where 
individual words or phrases can only rarely be traced to their origin, it is 
impossible to detect a master pattern in a seemingly perpetual repetition 
of moves. By implication, this means that a dance cannot exist without the 
copy, and dancing without copying. The paradox of dancing arises from 
the double-premise that copying, strictly speaking, is not possible due to 
the original’s ephemeral character, but motion is solely based on the pro-
cess of copying.
Part IV: The copy and materiality  
(Stockhammer, Schreiter, Ortland)
While the previous contributions concentrated first and foremost on 
immaterial and abstract phenomena such as ideas, language, and motion, 
the essays by Stockhammer, Schreiter, and Ortland focus on the relation-
ship between copy and materiality. An object’s materiality and substance 
hold a special position in the copying process because they shape human 
practices through the dynamics of their perception.
Philipp Stockhammer’s article focuses on the Bronze Age in Central 
Europe. He shows how innovations in bronze casting enabled a completely 
new form of copying. The characteristics of bronze, especially its ease of 
casting, along with the use of casting moulds, allowed for the serial pro-
duction of quasi-identical objects, particularly weapons and tools, for the 
first time in human history. It seems that this new technology had initially 
been considered a threat. Copying as a transformative practice enabled 
the appropriation as well as the management of the new technology at the 
same time. Moreover, the new technology of reproduction fundamentally 
changed the human perception of objects.
Charlotte Schreiter’s contribution reflects the more recent past and 
focuses on the various copies of ancient statuary from the late eighteenth 
century. She shows that plaster casts of different materials were highly 
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appreciated among contemporary customers. These sculptures were not 
exact copies, as art historians later determined, but creative imitations 
which were upgraded by material and technological innovations as well as 
sophisticated contextualisations. However, the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries were preceded by continuous examinations of ancient times, 
in which this “foreign” culture—contrary to non-European cultures—was 
widely reinterpreted and instrumentalised again and again.
Another form of copying ancient artworks is at the centre of Eberhard 
Ortland’s article. He analyses the copies of famous European and East 
Asian paintings on porcelain panels in Kyoto. From a philosophical point 
of view, he questions the hegemony of European art and illustrates what is 
perceived as famous and original and therefore worth copying. Moreover, 
the medium’s transfer from canvas or fresco onto ceramics guarantees a 
special durability—possibly longer than that of the original. According to 
Ortland, the copy’s material, surroundings, and mise-en-scène are key to 
accessing a copy’s transformative power.
Part V: The copy and power (Mersmann, Brumann, Falser)
The phenomena of endless reproducibility in the digital world and of the 
disappearance of the original, which Ribeiro, Knaller, and Schröter focus 
on, are also Birgit Mersmann’s topics of study. Global networking, thanks 
to the Internet and the possibilities posed by digital technology, has led to 
the notion of a global copying culture. Mersmann discusses the patterns 
underlying these phenomena with the help of two case studies: an individ-
ual sculpture and an institution that were both placed on UNESCO’s World 
Heritage lists. These cases generate a complex network of global and local 
power, political interests and strategies—from local tourism industries to 
international committees such as UNESCO.
Christoph Brumann investigates UNESCO’s concept of authenticity and 
its political interwovenness from an anthropological point of view. He out-
lines the development of the term “World Heritage” and the understand-
ing of “original” and “authenticity” that is related to it from a European, 
restricted definition to a very broad term that adequately addresses the 
concerns and perspectives of all countries involved. Nevertheless, Bru-
mann points out the fact that this development was more likely to have 
been based on rather inconsistent decisions and the negotiation of politi-
cal interests than on a consistent conceptual progression.
According to Micheal Falser’s historical remarks, this concept of World 
Heritage is based on the colonial practice of transferring sculptures and, 
especially, monumental buildings such as Angkor Wat, into the museum 
context of European colonialists with the help of plaster casts. This 
copying practice does not only indicate a change of the meaning of a 
non-European object, but also the evaluation standard of a building in its 
cultural context. Like Mersmann, Falser emphasises that the notions of 
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the copy and copying have to be discussed in the light of global and local 
strategies.
Part VI: The copy and competition (Prien, Weber, Forberg)
Archaeological-protohistoric and art historical analyses reveal the impor-
tance of copying within the scope of social competition. Roland Prien’s 
example of the so-called Carolingian Renaissance, or Renovatio, shows 
to what extent the contemporary idea of “orginal” and “copy” even hin-
ders our understanding of historical phenomena. He concludes that the 
long-dominating idea that Charlemagne took the Roman Empire and 
Rome as examples of the creation of his own empire and the construction 
of his capital, Aachen, has no factual basis.
Julia Weber’s analysis focuses on Meissen porcelain. With the ability to 
produce porcelain, Augustus the Strong’s main motivation was to acquire 
treasured “white gold” at a reduced rate. This is primarily why new tech-
nology was employed to copy vases and other vessels from China and 
Japan. These copies—being deprived of their mark by a French dealer—
were transformed into forgeries. By the discovery of their production site 
in Saxony they were later re-identified by contemporary connoisseurs as 
originals of European fabrication. At Augustus’s court, therefore, the idea 
of competing with the Emperor of China arose.
Corinna Forberg’s contribution stays at the court of Augustus the Strong 
and concentrates on copies of Indian models which were employed as a 
means of absolutist self-representation in Dresden. The Saxon court jew-
eller Johann Melchior Dinglinger presented his famous Thron des Großmo-
guls (Throne of the Great Moghul) to Augustus the Strong and creatively 
transformed Indian models into semiotic vehicles that delivered political 
messages to European rulers. The singularity and inimitability of absolute 
power was in the centre of these representations.
Entangling the strings
Copying stands at the beginning of human life. Speaking, singing, and 
dancing, all require the perpetual repetition of what has been spoken or 
performed before (Sanchez-Stockhammer, Schwan). It is only the copy of 
a particular pattern of words or movements that can be defined as some-
thing original, not because of its particular components, but because some-
one defines the particular combination of the components (be it a certain 
literary phrase or sequence of body movements) as something extraordi-
nary, something original. But what happens when the realisation of such 
an idea—understood as something original—is perpetuated? Over and 
over, a certain theatre play or ballet can create an aura of uniqueness and 
authenticity, although it has been performed many times before (Schwan). 
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The same movement, sentence, or body pose can be understood as a copy 
and an original at the same time, depending on the individual knowledge 
and expectations of the listener or spectator (Sanchez-Stockhammer, For-
berg). The copy becomes original and the original’s right to exist as such 
is cast into doubt. Our globalised digital age forces us to radically re-think 
and re-conceptualise the original and the copy on an even larger scale. As 
several of the contributions in this volume show, the possibilities of digi-
tal reproduction have severe consequences (Ribeiro, Mersmann). Current 
copying techniques allow for the creation of copies of such quality that they 
are indistinguishable from the original and can even evoke the same aura 
as the original (Knaller). Even live digital copies of drama and music per-
formances are now possible and are accessible to more people than ever 
before. The original seems to get lost or become obsolete, as it is nothing 
more than a dataset that is later printed out in countless copies. While 
the original cannot exist without the copy (Graulund), it almost seems that 
the copy can exist without the original. The disappearance of the original 
has been possible for a long time—since the beginning of refined casting 
technologies in the Early Bronze Age at the latest (Stockhammer)—but has 
become increasingly pervasive and challenging due to the digital revolu-
tion. It has become clear that the original is always defined by actors who 
have the power to force their normative world views onto other actors. 
Obtaining the power to define the original has often been a power strat-
egy in human history (Prien, Forberg). The copy has always had the power 
to challenge individual world views as well as political systems and existing 
power structures. As a result, copying was long understood as the back-
ward practice of primitive people (Ladwig). Maintaining power positions 
requires the management of copying (Schröter) and the transformation 
of powerful copies into originals by reinterpretation or recontextualiza-
tion (Weber, Schreiter). The original can be defined, classified, and thereby 
tamed. The copy is more difficult to tame: the copy is wild. In every soci-
ety, past and present, the transformative power of the copy leads to ever 
new reinterpretations of the world and the destabilisation of normative 
ideas of the world. Freedom to copy thus runs the risk of provoking anar-
chy (Schröter). Today, more than ever before, copying is becoming easier 
and easier due to the relevance and dominance of virtual data without any 
materialisation. In order to obtain norms and order, those in power—in 
politics as well as in the fields of law, economics, art, and science—try to 
define the authentic and original like a canon of what is still “worthy” to be 
kept, seen, and preserved in a globalised world that is both changing and 
challenging (Brumann, Ortland). The power to turn a copy into an origi-
nal means the ability to create additional value in a very monetary sense 
of the word (Weber). The current topic of defining and debating UNESCO 
World Heritage, for example, gives a vivid impression of these efforts (Bru-
mann). At the same time, it unveils the utmost colonial character of the 
practice of attributing authenticity (Falser) and the political power play 
whereby the most powerful actors finally define what is authentic and 
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what is not—irrespective of the advice of all (so-called) specialists. Com-
ing to terms with our world also means accepting different notions of the 
copy and the original, in the past as in the present. We must not take our 
individual, scholarly, and analytical understanding of the relevant terms as 
the basis from which to explain what we determine as practices of copying 
in the past or in the present around the globe. However, we also do not 
argue for the acceptance of every possible understanding of these terms 
as a basis for further reflection. Taking a transcultural approach seriously 
does not mean embracing relativism, but reflectivity and openness toward 
different approaches to examining the world without devaluating one’s 
own or the other’s view. It means taking the other seriously, and seeing it 
as a crucial factor for defining oneself.
What is a copy, then? It seems as if this question cannot easily be 
answered by taming the copy and presenting a clear-cut taxonomy with 
global applicability that functions across all scientific disciplines, or by 
re-defining copies as originals in order to increase their particular value. 
This is also not the aim of this volume. Instead of presenting a comprehen-
sive discussion of the history and present state of our understanding of 
the copy in different disciplines, we wish to inspire an ongoing discourse 
by bringing together disciplines and discourses that have not been con-
nected so far, and by promoting the transcultural approach as a new way 
of thinking and analysing a relevant phenomenon like the copy. We do 
not question or devalue (political) efforts to define originality or authenti-
city, as we acknowledge these concepts as necessary for creating stability 
in a changing world. We wish to shed light on the potential of the copy 
and copying, re-evaluating and defining the copy and the original, and 
the dynamic processes which result from these practices in a world where 
absolute distinctions between the two are narrowing.
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What’s in a Copy?
Abstract What is in a copy? I will answer this question by considering 
the importance of the copy in three related areas: academia, cultural life, 
and the economy. In academia, the ease with which copies can be made 
is challenging pedagogical practices and the trust of its members, with 
plagiarism being the most immediate problem. The notion of authorship 
is also undergoing changes provoked by a proliferation of authors and by 
possibilities opened recently by cyberspace. In cultural life, imitation and 
mimesis have long been fundamental engines of socialization. Our en-
hanced capacity of copying problematizes, with new intensity, the relation-
ships between homogeneity and heterogeneity, between the genuine and 
the spurious. In the economic world, the digital era is threatening some of 
the fundamental tenets of capitalism, especially of its variant, the “knowl-
edge society,” which concerns the control of intellectual property rights. 
The gap between normativity and social practices is widening. The many 
dilemmas and tensions identified in this text are therefore understood as 
symptoms of two major characteristics of the current times: hyperfetish-
ism and hyperanimism.
Keywords Copy, digital era, knowledge society, imitation, plagiarism, 
fetishism, animism, property rights
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“Copying makes us what we are. Our bodies take shape from the transcrip-
tion of protein templates, our languages from the mimicry of privileged 
sounds, our crafts from the repetition of prototypes. Cultures cohere in  
the faithful transmission of rituals and rules of conduct. To copy cell for cell, 
word for word, image for image, is to make the known world our own.”1
In academic life, it is rather common to begin looking an issue that one 
supposes to be familiar with only to find out—after successive approxima-
tions—that the issue at hand is enormous and intriguingly complex and 
needs to be further explored.2 This is, once more, the case. I first thought 
of writing about copies as an opportunity to present my latest findings 
concerning the breadth of issues that the term “piracy” poses for our con-
temporary economic reality. Indeed, I entered this fascinating world in the 
late 1990’s by asking a simple question while looking at the Made in China 
goods sold by hawks in downtown Brasilia, in a crowded street market 
called the Paraguayan Fair: how did these things get here?
I then started a line of research that has lasted for more than ten years 
and ended up coining the phrases “economic globalization from below” 
and “non-hegemonic world system” in the process. I will certainly present 
my ideas about these topics here, but I will also explore new ground and 
new issues that posing the question “what’s in a copy?” made me think of.
A few initial considerations are in order. The English word copy comes 
from the Latin word “copia,”3 the meaning of which (that is “abundance, 
plenty, multitude”) already insinuates a vast semantic universe. The world 
has always been full of copies, the Industrial Revolution only accelerated 
the multiplication of objects and images while the Digital Era made copy-
ing easier, more exact, and ubiquitous. Copies always imply several points 
of tension: between essence and appearance, the particular and the uni-
versal, the unique and the many, the original and the replica, the authentic 
and the fake/spurious, sameness and difference, production and repro-
duction, homogeneity and heterogeneity, and creativity and commerce.
What’s in a copy, then? At this point, I could well answer this question 
with a simple “everything.” Indeed, according to Canadian philosopher 
Marcus Boon, in his thought-provoking book In Praise of Copying, copying 
“rather than being an aberration or a mistake or a crime, is a fundamen-
tal condition or requirement for anything, human or not.”4 Succumbing 
to the temptation of answering “everything” would certainly grant me 
the world record of the shortest article ever, but the answer’s astonishing 
generalization would amount to nothing more than a refusal to face the 
complexity underneath the subject. Therefore, I will answer this question 
1 Schwartz 1998, 211.
2 Keynote speech of the congress of German speaking anthropologists, Austrian 
Academy of Sciences, Vienna, September 14, 2011. I thank my colleagues in Aus-
tria, especially Andre Gingrich, for the honor.
3 Boon 2010, 41.
4 Boon 2010, 3.
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by considering three sets of related issues in which the copy is equally 
important: academia, cultural life, and in the economic world. It goes with-
out saying that these are not separate universes.
Copying and academia
It is impossible to think of a university existing without copies, since it is a 
place designed for the production, reproduction, storage, exhibition, and 
reverence of knowledge. We find copies everywhere: in the libraries or in 
the copy shops, in the uploaded PDF files of scanned texts, or in the term 
papers downloaded from virtual firms that may even write customized 
monographs for their clients. Copying is also at the center of the class-
rooms, at the heart of pedagogy and learning, not only because profes-
sors repeat other authors’ works while teaching but because students are 
supposed to show how they have understood them by copying and repro-
ducing their thoughts. Furthermore, isn’t the academic ethos itself heavi-
 ly based on the admiration and mimicry of certain role models, at times 
displayed and incorporated in theories, and at other times in behavioral 
styles and political leanings?
At the university, the contradictions between copying and originality 
abound. At the same time that copyrights are praised by many as a mod-
ern right, they are constantly disrespected in the name of education. While 
students need to know and copy other people’s work, they are also sup-
posed to add something new. At the same time that they admire and often 
emulate their masters or their mentors, they are supposed to make origi-
nal contributions to knowledge. Originality here means aggregated differ-
ences between the student’s work and that which he/she cites. Perhaps, 
in the pragmatics of the academic world, we (most often unconsciously) 
accept the fact that there is no such thing as 100 per cent originality and 
that there will never be a perfect copy, that copying always means adding 
something different, a fact that is especially clear in art history.5 In the end, 
creation and innovation mean an addition to previously known things or 
processes resulting from copying exercises and from the imperfections of 
memory and reproduction. But since academics also need to be authors, 
our tendency, as in any other realm, is to abhor copies and praise origi-
nality, something made clear by the use of expressions such as “my own 
theory is” and “in my view.”
In academic life, nowhere is the scorn for copying greater than when 
the issue is plagiarism, a problem that has consistently grown since “cut 
and paste” became a popular jargon. Cut and paste problematizes the 
pedagogical role of copying. One thing is a handwritten copy of a pub-
lished text, the other is its digital copy. A handwritten copy demands a 




about how to appropriate and criticize interpretations. The digital copy is 
an almost instantaneous action in which the content being copied may 
remain completely unknown. I am not so interested in the ethical problems 
triggered by plagiarism and forgery which, most of the time, are related to 
moral and professional deceptions and to frustrated economic interests. 
In fact, deception never yields a good feeling. What interests me is the idea 
that the current spread of plagiarism is embedded in major changes in the 
technology used in teaching, publishing, reproducing, and using informa-
tion within academia. These changes impact traditional work routines in 
the academic milieu in ways that are still difficult to understand, but will 
certainly generate radically different scenarios and practices in the future. 
According to Hillel Schwartz,
Lexicographers responsible for defining plagiarism have been 
accused of plagiarizing definitions. A University of Oregon book-
let plagiarized its section on plagiarism. Given this compulsion to 
repeat that which bears on repeating, plagiarism in our culture of 
the copy appears inevitable. […] Our culture of the copy tends to 
make plagiarism a necessity, and the more we look for replays to 
be superior to originals, the more we will embrace plagiarism as 
elemental.6
The scorn for plagiarism is intimately related to the Western idea of author-
ship, a notion that is central to the modern academy. Marilyn Strathern 
considers “the eighteenth century idea that persons are the natural own-
ers of both themselves and their labour” a “notion of singular ownership/
authorship [that] also sets up the conceptual possibility of one author sup-
planting or displacing the other.”7 In a productivist era, in which competi-
tion is taken to its limits, Strathern’s statement is self-explanatory. 
At the same time that authorship reinforces authenticity and originality 
as major academic values, it depreciates copying. Considering copying a 
problem is far from a universal position. The importance of copying as a 
way of learning has long been acknowledged in Buddhism, and in China, 
where “the multiplication of nearly identical images is understood not as 
the degradation of an original but the invocation of an impermanent, pro-
visional form with the goal of training the mind to recognize its own true 
nature.”8 Interestingly enough, authorship developed in the eighteenth 
century alongside the regulation of copyrights in Europe, an offshoot of an 
established and growing book industry. 
But in the digital era, with the advent of the World Wide Web, the notion 
of authorship may well undergo dramatic changes—if not disappear 
entirely. As Michel Foucault anticipated, a concept that came into being at 
6 Schwartz 1998, 313.
7 Strathern 1986, 21–22.
8 Boon 2010, 63.
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a given moment in history may well disappear in the future. The notion of 
“author,” as Foucault put it, is intimately related to a “privileged moment of 
individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy 
and the sciences.”9 On the internet, there are experiments that use the 
immense collective creativity found in global fragmented spaces that may 
now be articulated online. The global cooperation that now exists within 
this virtual public space,10 which is practiced by political collectives such as 
the free software movement, provides an interesting example of global 
creativity enacted by a great number or persons that are not interested in 
individual authorship and copyright, but in the collective perfecting of a 
common good that is free for all. 
Such collective online creation may concretely challenge the notion 
that the relationship between creativity and commerce is always mediated 
by individual authorship and copyrights. This does not amount to saying 
that we are on the verge of discovering an alternative to capitalist appro-
priation of creative work, as some activists of the open source and free 
software movements would like to believe.11 It is not impossible to sup-
pose that a corporation, such as Google, is likely to profit from an environ-
ment free of copyrights, a sort of global fragmented creative mind, where 
global hackers would provide, for free, the work and information needed 
to improve the company’s products. If such a scenario develops fully in the 
current juncture of computer electronic capitalism’s hegemony, we should 
add Googleism as a new label to classify capitalist production, after Tay-
lorism and Toyotism.
Authorship may also radically change in the face of other types of online 
cooperation. Here, the main example is Wikipedia. Although Wikipedia is 
no panacea (in the end, there is always an editor who controls what is pub-
lished), it allows us to speculate about the possibility of a radical wiki-an-
thropology, for instance. Such on-line text construction would excel over 
the format of traditional journals with their referee system—which, at the 
core of the world system of anthropological production, more often than 
not replicates the styles and agendas of the Anglo-American academic 
milieu.12 The possibility of writing with myriad other known or anonymous 
cyber-colleagues may also point to the emergence of post-authorial aca-
demic texts. Are we ready to make global wiki experiments in academic 
writing and theoretical production? Are we ready to go beyond the notion 
of authorship in academia, one of the bases of inequality reproduction in 
a world full of individualism and individual power seekers? I don’t know. 
Perhaps my generation is not. Perhaps younger scholars, natives of digital 
culture who are completely immersed in cyberspace, are.







There are several possible explorations of the relations between copying 
and culture. I will tackle with but a few here. How one acquires or learns 
a culture and a language, that is, how a person becomes human or a 
member of a culture and a society, has been a much-debated subject in 
philosophy, sociology, and anthropology. Learning is presumed central 
to Homo sapiens evolution. Indeed, if every hunter and gatherer had to 
invent arrows and bowls again and again, the human capacity for adap-
tation and evolution would have been seriously affected. Mimesis, social-
ization, enculturation, diffusion, and borrowing are recurrent concepts in 
this universe. Discussions often resonate with questions of structure and 
agency in ways that resemble the attribution of positive characteristics to 
authenticity, originality, and authorship and of negative characteristics to 
copying and imitation. 
A relatively recent revisionist perspective on enculturation by Cindy Dell 
Clark provides an interesting illustration of a position that emphasizes chil-
dren’s agency. Dell Clark considers enculturation “not so much a straightfor-
ward mature-on-immature imposition of practices” but “a many-laned and 
multi-directional matrix in which children and elders interact.”13 Following 
Jean Briggs,14 Dell Clark asserts that “enculturation entails a complex, shift-
ing assortment of ingredients to be actively selected and interpreted by the 
child.” Dell Clark takes a critical stance of “cultural reduplication” and con-
cludes that a “revisionist notion of enculturation implies a dynamism and 
fluidity to cultural learning, rather than a cloning like social reproduction 
process.”15 Once more, what seems to be at stake are the tensions among 
creativity and inventiveness versus repetition, copying, and imitation. 
The notion of imitation has enjoyed a greater visibility in the past 
in the social sciences. Perhaps we are at the forefront of a return of its 
influence caused by a growing interest in the work of French sociolo-
gist Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904), who published his book Les Lois de l’Imi-
tation in 1890 (the English version, The Laws of Imitation, was published 
1903). Matei Candea, the editor of a recent volume entitled The Social 
After Gabriel Tarde, speaks of a Tardean revival.16 Tarde’s mimetic para-
digm is also an exercise on the value of difference; in his view, repetition 
provokes difference. His thinking has informed disparate but influential 
works, including Everett Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations, which was first 
published in 1962 and later became a classic on the subject.17 Rogers’ 
theoretical approach is radically different from those of authors such as 
Gilles Delleuze and Bruno Latour, who were also influenced by Tarde. It 
is not my intention to summarize Tarde’s rather complex production nor 
13 Dell Clark 2005, 182.
14 Briggs 1992 and 1998.
15 Dell Clark 2005, 183.
16 Candea 2010, 2.
17 Rogers 2003.
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the equally elaborate current appropriations of his work. Rather, I am 
more interested in looking at the renaissance of his influence as another 
indication of the increased awareness of the importance of copying and 
the challenges it brings. 
If imitation entails complex theories and arguments, mimesis, simula-
tion, and mimicry do not lag far behind. Suffice it to mention the lasting 
influence of the Platonic interpretation of the relationship between out-
ward appearance and essence in Western philosophy, the echoes of which, 
in anthropology, could be heard in hot debates about identity, authenti city, 
and essentialism in the 1990’s.18 Or we could also mention Jean Baudril-
lard’s well-known contribution on the role of simulacra and simulations in 
the constitution and reproduction of current social life.19 The digital age, 
in which copies do not have originals, may perforce witness the death of 
the original, clearly subverting the Platonic gaze. In this environment, we 
are inevitably drawn to a discussion on virtuality and the status of reality. 
Virtuality creates confusion about the phenomenological status of the real 
world at the same that it magnifies our life experience. This principle is cer-
tainly behind the choice of the name “Second Life” for the popular virtual 
“place” in cyberspace. 
I myself wrote that, in order to understand current public space, we 
need to make a distinction between the virtual public space and the 
real public space that, together, make up public-space-in-general.20 The 
increased political use of the internet since the Rio 1992 Earth Conference, 
and of cell phones since at least the anti-globalization 1999 Seattle battle, 
as well as the work of groups such as Avaaz, to mention three out of myr-
iad examples, clearly illustrate the intertwinement between the real and 
the virtual public space, something that intensifies what I have referred to 
as “political activism at a distance.”21 The intertwinement of virtuality and 
reality may derive from the division of the sign into signifier and signified, 
and is thus necessarily embedded in all symbolic systems that depend on 
the linguistic sign. 
Avatars insinuate the possibility of virtual cloning—something not as 
disturbing as the possibility of the genetic cloning of human bodies, a sub-
ject that immediately spurs waves of technophobic reactions. At present, 
human cloning is a limit imposed on bioengineering’s copying capacity. 
Nature and culture, a preferred anthropological topic, now needs to be 
considered through other lenses as the capacity to manipulate the natural 
world is extended to more fundamental dimensions such as the very code 
of organic life. In an age of technoculture, it is not by chance that anthro-
pologists have become involved with science and technology studies to 
18 Boon 2010.





understand “emergent forms of life,” an allusion I make to the title of a 
2003 book by Michael Fischer, a leading scholar in this field.22
Owing to their interest in diffusion and dissemination, and in the 
exchange between local and supralocal settings enmeshed in flows of peo-
ple, knowledge, and things, anthropologists know that the relationships 
between sameness and difference, between homogeneity and heteroge-
neity are central to human life and to our understanding of the complex 
symbolic umbrella we all live under. In the past, some influential anthro-
pological visions of culture were strongly informed by a nostalgic ethos as 
well as by the search for an organic, harmonious, totality within which gen-
uine links between location, history, and individuality might thrive. A classic 
reference here is Edward Sapir’s well-known 1924 piece “Culture, Genuine 
and Spurious.”23  From this perspective, “internal” factors are highly valued 
to the detriment of “external” ones, and to the detriment of what Sapir 
described as a “spiritual hybrid of contradictory patches, of water-tight 
compartments of consciousness that avoid participation in a harmonious 
synthesis.”24 This position has long been accompanied by another, which 
stresses that cultural life is an amalgamation of several borrowings. Think, 
for instance, of Ralph Linton’s equally classic piece, the 1936 article “One 
Hundred Percent American,” in which he stresses how Americans use and 
copy objects and behaviors of many different origins.25 Almost a century 
later, we surely are far from Sapir’s position not only because hybridity and 
fragmentation are no longer seen in a negative way,26 but also because—
for many of us—it is clear, as Eric Wolf put it, that “in a majority of cases the 
entities studied by anthropologists owe their development to processes 
that originate outside them and reach well beyond them, […] they owe 
their crystallization to these processes, take part in them, and affect them 
in turn.”27
However, resonances of the genuine/spurious tension still seem to 
interfere in current political ideologies and in the pragmatics of identity 
politics, especially when interethnic politics is at stake. “Strategic essential-
ism,” a concept in postcolonial theory coined by Gayatri Spivak, refers to 
the strategic political use of a supposedly unified social identity. In a differ-
ent mode, postcolonial approaches also make clear the political role of imi-
tation and of “spurious” culture in settings where subalternity is a hallmark 
of the relations between different ethnic segments. Here, a good example 
is Homi Bhabha’s well known essay “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence 
of Colonial Discourse,” on the role of mimicry in colonialism.28 For him, 
mimicry is at once resemblance and menace, since the discourses that 
22 Fischer 2003.
23 Sapir (1924) 1949.
24 Sapir (1924) 1949, 315.
25 Linton 1936.
26 See, for instance, García Canclini 1990 and Ribeiro 1992.
27 Wolf 2001, 312.
28 Bhabha 1994.
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reproduce imperial dominance carry a weakness that destroys domina-
tion from within. The subversive force of imitation imposes itself because 
nothing is pure replication and new critical interpretations and practices 
may always arise. The realization that borrowing symbols and discourses 
from the dominant colonizer always involves re-readings and the agency 
of native populations has its own tradition in anthropology, as the clas-
sic 1958 essay by Eric Wolf, “The Virgin of Guadalupe: A Mexican National 
Symbol,” testifies.29
But what exactly is at stake in the several facets and implications of the 
relationship between culture and copying that I have been exploring? Why 
are imitation and copying criticized when they are so necessary? Always 
living in a hall of mirrors, in a multiplicity of social relations and representa-
tions, we fear losing our uniqueness, losing control of who we think we 
really are and being dissolved in an amorphous and imagined mass of other 
beings like us. We fear becoming avatars in a world without flesh and bone. 
Even worse, the fear of losing one’s authentic being and capacity of being 
a human subject is also a fear of becoming a puppet or a drone, of falling 
under someone else’s spell, or falling prey to their desires and power.
Somewhat less dramatically, I will explore another angle to conclude 
this section. Can you imagine the amount of time it would take just to 
move around and complete our everyday activities if each object were 
unique? Copying, repetition, and imitation serve previsibility, something 
fundamental to the reproduction of what Anthony Giddens calls “practical 
consciousness,” or our ability to reproduce patterned daily life.30 Without 
this ability, and given the enormous amount of energy we would have 
to expend to constantly monitor extraordinariness and randomness, the 
human subject and social life as we know them would not exist. In view of 
this reasoning, I can also conclude that uniqueness and authenticity are 
highly valued because they represent a rupture in the chain of repetitions, 
thereby bringing extra-ordinariness and novelty to light. It is failure in rep-
etition, in a series of events or objects, it is the unexpected—in a word, ser-
endipity—that constitutes a privileged mode of creation and innovation. 
In the end, copying and creativity depend on each other because without 
copying—and the flaws it implies—there could be no extraordinariness.
Copying and economy
There would be no economy without copying. Labor processes and tech-
nologies rely on repetition, replication, and predictability. Production relies 
on re-production. Consumption relies not only on innovation but on the 
capability of predicting an object’s usefulness. The multiplication of copied 





this mass production) is not new. Coins and bottles, for instance, have been 
mass produced in the West since ancient times.31 However, the Gutenberg 
Revolution and, later, the Industrial Revolution, dramatically increased the 
mass production of objects. More importantly, the Industrial Revolution, 
with its accelerated production of copies, imposed the hegemony of com-
modification as a regime of social (re)production that impacted not only the 
economy but all aspects of human life, in a process well captured by Karl 
Marx’s seminal work, The Capital (and especially by his notion of commodity 
fetishism). Hereafter, social actors would be mesmerized by commodities 
and the market in ways that hindered them from understanding the social 
forces and processes responsible for the re-production of their own lives.
If capitalist commodity production in the nineteenth century was already 
so powerful as to commodify the lives of the inhabitants of industrial 
nations, imagine the extent to which this pattern has developed today—
when even the unconscious has been colonized by capitalism. The digital 
era, with its tremendous copying capacity, dawned when Fredric Jameson 
published his prescient 1984 essay on the cultural logic of late capitalism 
(and from which I derived my last assertion about the unconscious).32 The 
proliferation of copies of creative works granted by digital technologies 
also makes Walter Benjamin’s classic 1936 essay “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction” appear somewhat dated.33 It couldn’t be 
any other way. Benjamin’s writing reflects the analogue logic of reproduc-
tion of his day. Currently, we are under the hegemony of electronic and 
computer capitalism. Mechanical reproduction no longer sets the pace of 
social life. But Benjamin is a great thinker. He anticipated, for instance, that 
the notion of authenticity does not make sense for reproductions as well as 
that “technical reproduction can put the copy of the original into situations 
that would be out of reach for the original itself.”34 Also, from his work, we 
can imply that there are no Benjaminian originals in the world of commodi-
ties. Originals suppose an aura that withers in systems of mass production. 
More than eighty years later, notwithstanding Benjamin’s work of 
genius, it is possible to see some of its limits. This limitation, as a matter 
of fact, does not disallow the brilliance of the essay. Quite the contrary, 
such limits can only be seen because their potential existence was already 
in the text. For instance, his comments about the power of photography 
to accelerate “the process of pictorial reproduction”35 could not suppose 
the digital convergence that made photography and videography from a 
mobile phone possible. Now, taking pictures or making videos is so easy 
and accomplished so en masse that it is impossible to calculate how many 
pictures and videos are made and shared in a year. With the popularization 
of cell phones, soon every person will carry a camera. Concurrently, the 
31 Boon 2010.
32 Jameson 1984.
33 Benjamin (1936) 1975.
34 Benjamin (1936) 1975, 13.
35 Benjamin (1936) 1975, 12.
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internet has become a fantastic treasure hoard of images. Consider, for 
instance, what Facebook and YouTube mean as repositories of testimo-
nies. The scope of the YouTube archive is so immense that it makes me toy 
with the idea that, now, researchers in the social sciences and in psychol-
ogy have the Jungian “collective unconscious”—a notion I was never truly 
comfortable with—available for inquiry on their computers. In the same 
vein, Benjamin saw that, with the “increasing extension of the press,” “an 
increasing number of readers became writers,” and what “began with the 
daily press opening to its readers space for ‘letters to the editor’” resulted 
in such a state that “the distinction between author and public is about to 
lose its basic character. […] At any moment the reader is ready to turn into 
a writer. […] the reader gains access to authorship.”36
What would Benjamin write if he could see today’s proliferation of 
authors on blogs, websites, Facebook, and Twitter? A world where every-
one is potentially (or de facto) an author is a world so saturated of authors 
that the very notion of authorship seems senseless. But it is not only writers 
that proliferate on the internet: there are also crowds of photographers, 
filmmakers, and musicians that publicize their work online. YouTube is 
actually functioning as a screener for the discovery of new talents by the 
entertainment industry. The number of views a video gets is a free-of-
charge global poll. YouTube is a virtual mega impresario and employment 
agency for artists of all kinds on a global level.
But, at the same time, the internet also represents the greatest present 
challenge to copyright. If, on the one hand, the economy depends on copy-
ing, then economic agents also need to control copying, since retaining 
rights to certain commodities means having a monopolistic niche in the 
market. Such control is increasingly more complicated to exert—especially 
over transactions involving digital culture.
Notions of originals and authenticity have long been formulated to 
help control economic competition. Indeed, coins have been falsified since 
ancient times and the history of the term piracy, meaning the antithesis 
of civilization, is associated with the rise of Athens.37 However, according 
to Adrian Johns in his book on piracy, “although appropriators of ideas 
may always have existed, societies have not always recognized a specific 
concept of intellectual property. […that concept] owed its origins to the 
cultural transformations set in train by Johann Gutenberg’s invention of 
the printing press.”38
Although patents were already being granted in Italy and England by 
the fifteenth century, and “patents controlling the ‘rights in copies’ of books 
can be dated to 1563 in England,”39 people started to refer to “intellectual 
purloining as piracy […] sometime in the mid-seventeenth century,”40 and 
36 Benjamin (1936) 1975, 24.
37 Johns 2009, 33–34.
38 Johns 2009, 8.
39 Boon 2010, 48.
40 Johns 2009, 23.
32 
GUSTAVO LINS RIBEIRO
the first copyright law only emerged in 1709. However, intellectual property 
as a regulatory mode of economic activity developed only in the nineteenth 
century. Currently, as Brazilian anthropologists Ondina Fachel Leal and 
Rebecca Henneman Vergara de Souza show, intellectual property is intrin-
sically linked to the 1994 legally-instituted global regime on “Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (or “TRIPS”) administered by the 
World Trade Organization, an agency of global governance.41 This interna-
tional agreement legitimates a “power structure that gives support to an 
emerging knowledge and information economy.”42 Globalization and the 
digital age thus brought copyrights and trademarks to the center of eco-
nomic conflict. This is why many analysts view piracy as the greatest threat 
to national and global economies, or believe that the regulatory frame-
work needs to change.43 Lawrence Lessig’s Free Culture, for instance, is a 
well-known book on new scenarios that the internet has generated regard-
ing copyrights and the free exchange of ideas.44 For him, current laws are 
used by corporations to “lock down culture and control creativity.”
At the same time, the production of unauthorized copies is a highly 
stigmatized activity.45 Nevertheless, it is a major economic force every-
where and not only in the so-called “developing nations.”46 Here we enter 
the realm of the appropriation of flows of global wealth by the grass roots, 
by people who participate in what I call “economic globalization from 
below” and “the non-hegemonic world system.”47 What is behind the unau-
thorized copies of a Louis Vuitton purse or of DVDs sold in street markets 
almost everywhere?
“Trader-tourists” and street vendors of global gadgets, for instance, 
are but the tip of the iceberg of economic globalization from below which, 
in turn, is part of the non-hegemonic world system. I call their activities 
non-hegemonic because they defy the economic establishment every-
where. Their occupations are considered illegal, as “smuggling.” In conse-
quence, these trading networks and markets are seen as illegitimate and 
are confronted with repression in the name of legality. The commodities 
traded are usually classified as piracy. Sometimes, they are simulacra of 
“superlogos,” i.e. highly desired global brands controlled by major trans-
national corporations in order to retain monopolistic niches in the global 
market.48 The difference between the prices of original superlogo items 
and fake ones is the source of a profit margin that makes working in the 
non-hegemonic world system worthwhile. Economic globalization from 
41 Leal and Souza 2010.
42 Leal and Souza 2010, 15.
43 See for instance Johns 2009.
44 Lessig 2004.
45 See for instance Naím 2005.
46 Johns 2009, 14.
47 Ribeiro 2007 and 2011; see also Mathews, Ribeiro, and Vega 2012.
48 Chang 2004.
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below provides access to flows of global wealth that otherwise would not 
reach the more vulnerable ranks of any society.
Economic globalization from below is made up of 1) nodes, i.e., of 
markets where global gadgets and copies of superlogos are sold, 2) flows 
among such nodes, typically connected by way of migratory networks and 
diasporas such as the Chinese and Lebanese ones, and 3) of production 
centers. Larger nodes of the system feed smaller ones in a trickle-down 
fashion. The totality of the activities within these markets, routes, and 
production centers of globalization from below comprises what I call the 
“non-hegemonic world system.”49 One may find nodes of this non-hege-
monic world system as large as the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este, or 
in the city of Dubai—both markets that move billions of dollars annually—
or in areas of major cities such as China Town in New York and in small 
street markets scattered on the sidewalks and squares of major metro-
polises of the world.50 These are (i)llicit activities, i.e., they are considered 
illegal by the state and the economic establishment, but they are socially 
accepted and viewed as legitimate by their practitioners, who do not con-
sider themselves criminals.51 The main production centers that feed these 
global networks are located in Asia, in countries such as Malaysia, Singa-
pore, South Korea, Taiwan, and especially China. The province of Guang-
dong, China, is the center of the non-hegemonic world system.
What’s in a copy?
Campaigns against piracy are expressions of a crisis of the notion of prop-
erty and of related normative frameworks that are central to the repro-
duction of capitalism.52 This is why copying is taken so seriously by the 
economic and political establishment. Unauthorized copies of commodi-
ties are subversive forces. They denounce the arbitrariness of the extraor-
dinary profits that trademark and copyright allow; they make the promise 
of consumption to everyone more feasible through unregulated means 
and defy the monopoly and privilege that the largest corporations in the 
world hope to maintain. In the end, copying is also a political issue as the 
expressions “copyright” and “copyleft” make clear. Indeed, the struggle to 
free copies and innovation processes from the hold of powerful corpora-
tions is basically a political struggle.53 
Ultimately, the main issue at stake is whether we want to live in a world 
completely colonized by flexible capitalism, with its tremendous copying 
capacity and voracious desire to control intellectual property. It seems 
we are almost there. I see two possible outcomes, both of which are, in 
49 Ribeiro 2007.
50 Ribeiro 2006a, 2006b.
51 Abraham and Van Schendel 2005.




one way or another, related to the efficacy of commodification. The first 
could be called “hyperfetishism,” meaning the hyper efficacy of fetishism 
in a world completely colonized by copies without originals, and by their 
central role in accumulation within the cutting-edge sectors of electronic 
and computer capitalism. In such a realm, no one would really care about 
alienation. The current almost complete disappearance of this term is 
an indication of what I just said. The other outcome is what I would call 
“hyperanimism,” or a return to the metaphysics of animism among the 
moderns.54 One expression of hyperanimism is the prestige currently 
enjoyed by some theories that attribute agency to things. Perhaps it is 
a reaction to a world where copies have no originals but algorithms, a 
reaction to the possibility of a shallow world, finally and completely disen-
chanted, in which human clones may exist.
There are other dilemmas brought on by the enhanced capacity of 
copy ing. I argued that the very notion of author as originator,55 as some-
one who gives existence to something, is being challenged by the rise of 
collective and anonymous global forms of creation. I also argued that the 
notion of authenticity is being challenged by the disappearance of the 
original and of genuineness. It is hard to anticipate what a world without 
authors and authenticity would be like. Would it be a world with a more 
collective sense of membership?
Finally, copies compel us to think about the dialectics between differ-
ence and similarity as necessary features for perceiving and acting in the 
world. On the one hand, if everything were the same, it would be impos-
sible to distinguish any particular part of the real world from another—it 
would be something akin to experiencing a void space where recognition 
through contrast would be nonexistent. On the other hand, if all things were 
different from each other, it would be impossible to predict form, function, 
and process—it would be something akin to experiencing an overwhelm-
ing chaotic space where all our energies would be spent on understanding 
the uniqueness of everything and where recognition through resemblance 
would be nonexistent. In short, I consider copying a total social fact, to bor-
row Marcel Mauss’s terms.56 It is an activity that has economic, sociologi-
cal, psychological, cultural, artistic, scientific, legal, academic, and political 
implications. Indeed, mimesis is a fundamental quality of human life in 
every regard. If it is true that copying has always been central to social, cul-
tural, and economic life—and is becoming increasingly more so—it is hard 
54 I am aware of Fabian’s (1983) critique about the use of “animism.” My use of the 
term does not imply a negation of the coevalness, nor is it meant to be an invec-
tive. For me, what is at stake here is not the notion of time nor its political and 
ethnographic usage. Rather, what is at stake are the different understandings 
of humankind’s capabilities of changing natural and social realities by means of 
human labor.
55 Schwartz 1998, 248.
56 Mauss 1973.
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not to conclude that we are on the verge of a great change in the way we 
perceive and react to the role of copying in the reproduction of our lives.
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Mimetic Theories, Representation, 
and “Savages:” Critiques 
of the Enlightenment and 
Modernity Through the Lens 
of Primitive Mimesis
Abstract This essay explores the “primitive” sources of mimetic theory. 
With a focus on concepts of imitation and representation, it discusses how 
ethnographic and imaginary depictions of allegedly primitive and tribal so-
cieties influenced the theorizing of mimesis in different historical periods. 
The first part argues that, during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, 
understandings of mimesis and representation evolved that put an em-
phasis on their mechanical, and potentially deceptive, features. Discourses 
on the fetishist and imitative practices of indigenous societies were based 
on these assumptions, and in the course of colonial expansion, substanti-
ated claims of civilizational superiority. With reference to late nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century anthropology, the following part of the essay 
explores James Frazer’s theory of imitative magic and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s 
concept of mystical participation. Whereas differences regarding notions 
of imitation and representation here still mark the evolution from primitive 
to modern society, later developments turn these ideas on their heads: 
critiques of modernity and the Enlightenment, especially in the works of 
Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno of the Frankfurt School of critical 
theory before WWII, postulate that mimesis and animist representations 
have been repressed. Like other accounts of primitivism, these theories 
suppose that they are still present in primitive societies, but that their 
vanishing in modernity have lead to alienation. The final part argues that 
claims of civilizational superiority on the one hand, and anxiety over in-
creasing alienation on the other, have now been critically reviewed in the 
theorizing of mimesis and representation, but that current discussions on 
authenticity and originality are still marked by traces of primitivism.




Side by side with the view of the world as pervaded by spiritual forces, 
primitive man has another conception in which we may detect a germ 
of the modern notion of natural law […] The germ of which I speak is 
involved in that sympathetic magic, as it may be called, which plays 
a large part in most systems of superstition. One of the principles of 
sympathetic magic is that any effect may be produced by imitating 
it. To take a few instances: If it is wished to kill a person an image of 
him is made and then destroyed; and it is believed that through a cer-
tain physical sympathy between the person and his image, the man 
feels the injuries done to the image as if they were done to his own 
body, and that when it is destroyed he must simultaneously perish.1
When James Frazer—considered one of the founding fathers of anthropol-
ogy—published The Golden Bough in 1890, the book became a large suc-
cess and was widely read beyond purely academic circles. Intellectuals like 
T. S. Elliot and Sigmund Freud were inspired by the work, which surveyed 
a huge mass of historical and ethnographic accounts from all around the 
world.2 The aim of Frazer’s undertaking was to compare customs and 
beliefs on a global scale, and to investigate their common logics. Primarily 
referring to ancient societies and ethnographic reports from “primitive” 
and “savage” societies,3 he presented the modern reader with an array of 
seemingly bizarre customs, rites, and beliefs. His account of various forms 
of magic also included many references to imitation that became part of 
his famous definition of sympathetic magic. By referring to rain-making 
ceremonies, voodoo dolls, the making of effigies, and so forth, he pointed 
to their common features and postulated that mimesis and imitation were 
essential for their understanding.
1 Frazer 1894, 9.
2 I thank Corinna Forberg and Philipp Stockhammer for their invitation to Heidel-
berg, but especially for their patience. Christoph Brumann’s final reading of the 
text and his funny comments helped me to correct many mistakes and unclear 
formulations. Many of the ideas developed in this essay are based on discus-
sions with colleagues from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 
(MPI), Halle/Saale, Germany, and the Institute of Social Sciences, University of 
Lisbon (ICS-UL), Portugal. The joint project ‘Colonialism and Mimetic Processes 
in Historical and Anthropological Perspectives’ was funded by the German Aca-
demic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Portuguese Acções Integradas Luso-
Alemãs (FUP/CRUP) (project reference A-07/2011). Finally, thanks to the German 
Agentur für Arbeit for unemployment benefits that enabled me to meander 
around and get lost in the writings of Lévy-Bruhl, Benjamin, Kant, Adorno, and 
others.
3 Throughout this essay, I will use the terms “primitive” and “savage” without 
quotation marks. From anthropology’s beginnings as an academic subject, 
as well as in public discourse, this designated small-scale, mostly non-literate 
tribal societies that are today variously labeled as “indigenous peoples,” “ethnic 
minorities,” etc. As will become clear in the course of this essay, many of the 
accounts of these societies, especially in the time frame under discussion here, 
were products of the Western ethnographic imagination, which at times has 
little to do with the societies in question.
39
MIMETIC THEORIES, REPRESENTATION, AND “SAVAGES”
At the end of the nineteenth century, these societies were, on the one 
hand, deemed primitive for their practices of imitative magic and their 
belief in fetishes or effigies. Early anthropology, comparative religion, and 
scholars such as Edward Tylor and James Frazer postulated that these cul-
tures represented mankind in its early stages, similar to European prehis-
toric cultures.4 In this view, the savages had a limited capacity for logical 
thinking and were undeveloped types of the civilized mind. Magical think-
ing and its imitative rites were considered to be the lowest evolutionary 
stage of mankind. On the other hand, images of the noble savage had 
been part of the public imagination for a long time, and the numerous 
accounts show that the trope was essential for constituting modernity in 
opposition to a primitive “other.”5 Some of these accounts argued that this 
other was still capable of mimetic and animistic thinking, allegedly lost 
among civilized societies. Consequently, indigenous populations and their 
mimetic cultures were also used as a contrast to modern life, marked by 
alienation, social fragmentation, and the disappearance of mimesis.
Despite the diversity of these encounters and their distorted repre-
sentations in the context of colonialism, missionary work, travel accounts, 
and early anthropological research, the information and imaginaries 
attached to the primitive also fed into Western theories of mimetic behav-
ior. Confrontations with different systems of thinking in which mimetic 
processes could be observed spurred wider discussions on what imitation 
might mean in human culture beyond the “West.” Mathew Potolsky pro-
poses that, through this encounter, remarkable differences to the West-
ern Enlightenment and its ideas of mimesis and representation became 
apparent. The mimetic behavior attributed to indigenous people was con-
sidered foreign to the scientific world-view of the Enlightenment, as in 
these systems of thinking “magical copies have real properties and gen-
uine powers on their own. They belong to a network of reciprocal sym-
pathies and material embodiments, not a hierarchical ladder of rational 
forms and material embodiments.”6 Like Birgit Mersmann’s essay in this 
volume, which explores the relations of particular cultures to the concepts 
of copy and original in the field of art and heritage, I understand imita-
tion and mimesis as processes that are subject to remarkable shifts under 
the conditions of modernity that also re-negotiate these concepts and the 
relationships between cultures.
4 For the process of “othering” based on ideas of time and progress, see Fabian 
(1983).
5 Although the simple opposition of the “West” and the “other” is a simplifica-
tion of sorts, I think it makes sense in the context I will discuss here. See Eric 
Wolf (1982) for a seminal account of the relationship of European expansion 
and primitives, and Huhndorf (2001) for the idea of the Indian “noble savage” 
in American culture. Numerous studies have also analyzed the impact of these 
images on European intellectuals and artistic culture. See Torgovnick (1991).
6 Potolsky 2006, 139. 
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Although mimetic theory has been a prominent topic in recent and cur-
rent anthropological studies7, this essay sets out to explore the “primitive 
sources” of mimetic theory and their link to early anthropological accounts 
of indigenous societies. Focusing on a period stretching from the Enlight-
enment to the critical theory of the early Frankfurt School, this essay will 
take a somewhat selective perspective. However, by following the thread 
of the two interrelated questions of mimesis and representation, I hope to 
show that the reflection on, and appropriation of, descriptions of primitive 
mimesis and representation were essential for both the constitution and 
later critique of the Enlightenment project. I argue that we deal here with 
what Christoph Wulf has called (with reference to Wittgenstein) the “family 
resemblance” of theories of mimesis, describing the changing understand-
ings of mimesis in different contexts and historical eras.8 This implies that 
the reception, interpretation, and subsequent theorizing of descriptions of 
mimetic behavior among primitives are strongly embedded into moderni-
ty’s ambivalent self-reflections. On the one hand, it is a discourse of supe-
riority and progress and, on the other hand, a melancholic self-critique 
circling around ideas of loss and alienation.
In order to explore the reception of primitive mimesis, the first part 
of this essay will discuss some basic definitions of mimesis, especially its 
Platonic and Enlightenment genealogies. Here, I will show that the evolve-
ment of the hierarchical relationship of original and copy and the nega-
tive connotations of imitation and representation are based on important 
epistemic shifts linked, for example, to the Reformation and the Enlight-
enment. I largely remain in the domain of conceptual history (Begriffs-
geschichte), but will then, in the following part, embed these views into 
social developments of the time, which I will approach from two angles: 
first, I shall start with the understanding of primitive “fetishes” in the eigh- 
teenth century, and I will then move on to early anthropological theories 
of magic and their reference to imitative behavior. James Frazer’s notion 
of sympathetic magic and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of mystical partic-
ipation will be discussed with reference to several ethnographic exam-
ples. The final part will explore to what extent certain forms of primitivism 
become crucial for critiques of the Enlightenment and modernity. Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s account of mimesis in the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment and Walter Benjamin’s work on the “mimetic faculty” will 
here serve as examples that use a specific reading of the ethnography 
7 See Lempert (2014), for an excellent overview for imitation and its various uses 
in social anthropological theory, and Roque (2015) for a very useful overview 
of studies employing mimesis in a colonial context. See also the now seminal 
works of Michael Taussig (1992; 1987) on colonialism, mimesis, and resistance. 
Recent approaches have also emphasized constructions of identity via mimetic 
processes (Harrison 2006).
8 Information taken from the website of Christoph Wulf. Last modified July 24, 
2012. Accessed February 20, 2017. http://www.christophwulf.de.
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of primitive mimesis, in order to reevaluate and radically question the 
Enlightenment and modernity.
Mimesis, representation, and the shift toward ambivalent 
meaning
Mimesis has a long genealogy in theorizing art and society; several excel-
lent studies that give an overview of the diverse histories of the concept 
have been published.9 For centuries, the concept was dominant in discus-
sions relating to art, theatre, painting, and literature.10 The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines mimesis as “imitative representation of the real world 
in art and literature,” and as “the deliberate imitation of the behavior 
of one group of people by another as a factor in social change.” Behind 
these seemingly straightforward definitions lingers a history that covers 
an intellectual terrain reaching from classical Greek philosophy, in Plato’s 
and Aristotle’s works, to issues of copyright and originality in the contem-
porary digital age. But with every inclusive concept that has such a long 
and diverse history, its application and use have also changed consider- 
ably and are therefore subject to a certain fuzziness. According to Chris-
toph Wulf,11 the term mimesis has its roots in Sicily (the place of origin 
of the mimos) and only later entered Greek thought. He proposes that 
originally, it probably referred to burlesque and clownish performances of 
scenes taken from the everyday life of peasants that were performed for 
the entertainment of the wealthy.
If Alfred North Whitehead’s exaggerated dictum that “the safest general 
characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists 
of a series of footnotes to Plato” contains at least some truth,12 then a crit-
ical reflection on the concept of mimesis and its various transformations 
has to take Plato’s essentially ambivalent understanding into account. Pla-
to’s view of mimesis is manifold and not as reductionist as I might depict 
it here. It operates on several levels, and at times with contradictory impli-
cations.13 Generally speaking, in Plato’s Republic we are told that positive 
mimesis has educational and socializing functions.14 However, uncon-
trolled and chaotic mimesis (unnecessary craft-making, imitating nature 
9 Potolsky 2006; Gebauer and Wulf 1992. 
10 For literature, see Erich Auerbach’s (1953) classic account.
11 Wulf 2015, 15.
12 Whitehead 1979, 39.
13 See also Gebauer and Wulf (1992, 25–30) on the plurality of meanings of mime-
sis in Plato. They state that “in addition to imitation, representation, and expres-
sion, there is also emulation, transformation, the creation of similarity, the 
production of appearances, and illusion” (Gebauer and Wulf 1992, 25). 
14 See Plato’s Republic (Plato 1992), especially Books II and III on the basic and 
vague definition of imitation. The ban of certain forms of poetry from the polis 
is treated in Book III. In Book X, this ban is extended to all poetry. 
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sounds, etc.) is seen critically.15 Homer’s images of gods and demi-gods 
are seen as blasphemous, and chosen as an imitation of bad examples that 
have to be controlled by the guardians of the polis.16 Here, the link between 
mimesis and ideas about representation becomes relevant: like in Plato’s 
allegory of the cave, art is seen as an imitation of an imitation in the sense 
that art copies the world of phenomena, which in itself is already an imita-
tion of the “real.”17 Art and its imitative representations of “original reality” 
are therefore subject to a double removal, and the illusion produced by art 
is seen as potentially deceptive and therefore inferior.18 Hence, mimesis is 
understood as an act that potentially corrupts and deceives the real, and 
therefore has to be controlled.19
I think that some of Plato’s “negative” features of mimesis have had 
a crucial influence on Enlightenment discourses, and were and still are 
present in modern disguise. Mathew Potolsky has detected traces of this 
understanding of mimesis in a variety of modern theories, and rightly 
points out that mimesis is, in some of these approaches, still a slave to 
its (at times distorted) Platonic genealogy. The implicit assumption is that 
mimetic behavior produces inferior copies of something else more origi-
nal, and that it results in misrepresentations. In Marx’s view, for example, 
Potolsky argues that “the accounts of social mimesis […] remain within the 
Platonic tradition of treating mimesis as a source of deception and a false 
representation of reality.”20
How were these Platonic features of mimesis transmitted, and in which 
social and philosophical context did this transmission take place? While 
the Aristotelian-inspired view of mimesis remained crucial until the Mid-
dle Ages,21 traces of Plato’s account of mimesis and its negative conno-
tations resurfaced later in a variety of approaches. Especially with the 
coming of the Renaissance, we witness a turn to Plato and a reevaluation 
of mimetic behavior. The translation of mimesis into the Latin imitatio puts 
the focus on the mechanical and “fake” character of mimesis,22 and Renais-
sance writers discover imitation as a central concept but not as original 
and creative behavior. Imitation becomes a topic of parodies of outdated, 
mechanical behavior such as in Cervantes’s Don Quixote. This and other 
works explore “the failure of imitation” in an age where old social orders—
like knighthood in Cervantes’s case—became destabilized and gave way 
15 Plato 1992, Book II, 395c–397e; also Gebauer and Wulf 1995, 25–30.
16 Plato 1992, Book II, 377e–392c; see also Wulf 1997, 1017.
17 For the allegory of the cave, see Plato 1992, Book VII.
18 Plato 1992, Book X, 596e–602c.
19 On the corrupting features of mimesis see Plato 1992, Book X, 602c–608b.
20 Potolsky 2006, 138.
21 We find Aristotle’s work on “poesies” a more positive account of mimesis. Aris-
totle understood mimesis as a natural behavior and considered representations 
as essential for processes of learning and socialization in general, as for exam-
ple in the cathartic functions of theater; it is conceptualized as a natural human 
inclination or instinct.
22 Wulf 1997, 1020.
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to new ideas and values.23 Michel Foucault interprets Don Quixote’s mad 
behavior in epistemic terms. In the context of the great epistemological 
shift of the late sixteenth century, when the interplay of resemblance and 
sign was redefined, “language breaks off its old kinship with things and 
enters into that lonely sovereignty.”24 Don Quixote still acts according to 
the old order of things and epistemes,25 and therefore appears as a mad-
man. Stephen Halliwell argues that the translation to imitation (and, one 
might add, its embeddedness into the ruptures of social orders and new 
epistemes) changed the concept to such a degree that, for several centu-
ries, its negative connotations became emphasized: “No greater obstacle 
now stands in the way of a sophisticated understanding of all the varieties 
of mimeticism, both ancient and modern, than the negative associations 
that tend to colour the still regrettably standard translation of mimesis as 
‘imitation,’ or its equivalent in any modern language.”26
In an over-generalizing manner, one could state that, especially with 
the coming of Enlightenment, many of the negative features of imitation 
again come to the fore. The Enlightenment and modernity put emphasis 
on an independent, rational subject,27 which has itself freed from supersti-
tion and the bonds of tradition. According to Immanuel Kant, who in 1784 
famously defined Enlightenment as “the escape of men from their self-im-
posed immaturity, especially set in matters of religion,”28 one of the main 
reasons for the regrettable condition of mankind is the habit of imitating 
the traditions of previous generations.29
During the Enlightenment, however, it is not the transformation of 
the understanding of mimesis that signals a change; the shift primarily 
becomes visible in new ideas about representation and perception. A 
self-conscious subject that surveys the outer world arises, and sets new 
standards for how the world as an objectified entity is perceived. Concom-
itantly, representation evolves as a separation of essence and external 
23 Potolsky 2006, 60.
24 Foucault 1994, 49.
25 Foucault defines episteme as a priori knowledge, a matrix on which knowledge 
and discourses becomes possible is always only one episteme that defines the 
conditions of the possibility of all knowledge (Foucault 1994, 168).
26 Halliwell 2002, 13.
27 Modernity here acts as a term defining a period that, depending on one’s per-
spective, starts with the French Revolution and the Enlightenment. In this essay, it 
also comes to take on meanings that delineate modernity from primitiveness and 
act as a specific narrative to legitimize Western domination. Similar to the idea of 
civilization, the term has now become pluralized in order to weaken its Eurocen-
tric associations. See Eisenstadt (2003) for the idea of multiple modernities.
28 Kant 2013, 8. In this understanding, a large part of humanity was still marked by 
their “minority of age” (Minderjährigkeit) and “legal or civil immaturity.”
29 Kant’s account of innovation and genius in Western history here serves as a 
good example: imitation is seen as the antidote to innovation, as true innovation 
progresses through the genius who, in an authentic manner, advances through 
his own reason without imitating others. See Potolsky 2006, 67. 
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form, of truth and its various appearances. In Kant’s philosophy,30 the 
things in themselves (Dinge an sich) are now unknowable:
In reinterpreting the cognitive subject, Kant extends the modern 
causal loop between things and ideas at the cost of introducing a 
distinction between what appears and what is. In calling attention 
to the difference between objects of experience and knowledge on 
the one hand, and things in themselves on the other, Kant formu-
lates a new and very powerful version of the old Platonic dualism 
between objects of experience and knowledge, between the world 
in which we live and the world we invoke to explain the world. This 
results in a new conception of the subject, the object, and the rela-
tion between them.31
In this view, objects are basically of interest because they “materialize and 
express otherwise immaterial or abstract entities, organizing subjects’ 
perpetual experiences and clarifying their cognitions. The very materiality 
of objects, their availability to the senses, is of interest primarily as the 
condition for the knowability of otherwise abstract or otherwise invisible 
structures.”32 This binary dimension of representation implies the division 
of truth and appearance.33 Therefore, imitation is also bound up here with 
the question of representation, and again viewed as potentially corrup- 
ting, as it is in Plato. The anthropologist Johannes Fabian widens this focus 
on objects and includes a number of other points:
Taken as a philosophical issue, the idea of representation implies the 
prior assumption of a difference between reality and its “doubles.” 
Things are paired with images, concepts, or symbols, acts with rules 
and norms, events with structures. Traditionally, the problem with 
representations has been their “accuracy,” the degree of fit between 
reality and its reproductions in the mind.34
30 Philosophers and experts of Kantian and Platonic thought would probably dis-
miss my superficial reading here. Whether Kant returned to certain aspects of 
Plato’s ideas (e.g. noumenon) has been discussed with much controversy. For 
a position that conforms to my understanding, see Rockmore (2011). For an 
opposing perspective that reads Kant in terms of his Erkenntnistheorie as essen-
tially anti-Platonian, see Walter Patt (1997, 38–39). 
31 Rockmore 2011, 45.
32 Keane 2006, 198.
33 Michel Foucault has traced this development and its shifts in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century in terms of the relationship between signifier and signi-
fied: “This new arrangement brought about the appearance of a new problem, 
unknown until then: in the sixteenth century one asked oneself how it was 
possible to know that the sign did in fact designate what it signified; from the 
seventeenth century, one began to ask how a sign could be linked to what it 
signified. A question to which the Classical period was to reply by the analysis 
of representation, and to which modern thought was to reply by the analysis of 
meaning and signification.” Foucault 1994, 43.
34 Fabian 1990, 753–754.
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I think, however, that the Kantian stance described above can rather be 
seen as one of the endpoints of century-long problematizations that had 
very concrete, historical implications. Whereas my reading of the changes 
that mimesis and representation underwent from the perspective of 
Enlightenment epistemology has been rather limited and selective due 
its focus on philosophical questions, those previous changes were not 
present in discourses among philosophy experts alone. The question to 
what extent, if at all, images could actually represent gods, holy objects, 
etc. is of an earlier date. Historically speaking, the numerous theological 
discussions that circle around the problem of imitation and representa-
tion were part of major shifts in the understanding of religion in Europe.35 
An important point of crystallization of these questions can be located, 
for example, in the transformations that came with the Reformation. In 
some interpretations of Protestantism, the outer world, and especially 
its religious iconicity as in Catholicism, becomes devalued and belief is 
increasingly defined as an inner condition located in the subject.36 Some 
Protestant movements (led by Calvin or Zwingli, for example) developed 
strong forms of iconoclasm. In the years following the initial Reformation 
(especially between 1520 and 1570), iconoclastic riots took place all over 
Europe.37 Likewise, discourses for or against consubstantiation and tran-
substantiation in the context of the Eucharist focused the problem of rep-
resentation to a specific debate and were important points of controversy 
in the development of Christian theologies. Are bread and wine really the 
body of Christ, or are they just representative and symbolic of it? Is the 
rite of participating in the Eucharist a mimetic act in which, through an 
exchange, the believer can participate?38 As Corinna Forberg’s discussion 
in this volume with reference to courtly representations of kings in Europe 
and emperors in Asia shows, art was another field in which these discus-
sions became central.
35 Carlo Ginzburg (1991) gives a very interesting overview of the changing con-
notations of representation to which I will return later. On the practical level 
of ritual, see Ralph Giesey’s (1960) excellent discussion on changes in the 
understanding of effigies as representing the king in the royal funeral cere-
monies in France. This also relates to the discussion of the notion of the “king’s 
two bodies” in Ernst Kantorowicz’s (1997) work on representation in medieval 
political theology. See also Corinna Forberg’s contribution in this volume on 
the portrait of Louis XIV and her discussion of Kantorowicz and concepts of 
representation. 
36 See, for example, the discussions on belief and their applicability in anthropol-
ogy in Needham (1972) and, more recently, in Linquist and Coleman (2008).
37 See Besançon’s (2009) study on the intellectual history of iconoclasm.
38 Proponents of consubstantiation—often arguing in the context of the Refor-
mation—advocate that, during the sacrament, the substance of the body and 
blood of Christ are present alongside the bread and wine, which remain present 
through their taste, smell, etc. Transubstantiation postulates that, through con-
secration by the priest, one set of substances (bread and wine) is substituted 
(or exchanged) for the body and blood of Christ. Positions on this concept vary 
among churches. See Wandel (2005) for a historical study of this controversy 
since the Reformation. 
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Although these processes were never overarching, complete, or fol-
lowed a simple teleology, one could state in general terms that, at the end 
of these complex developments, we arrive at a rather new epistemology: 
after centuries of religious quarrels and wars, new ways of conceptuali- 
zing the relationship between external world and the subject evolved with 
the Enlightenment. The subject has to be overcome in order to free itself 
from the bonds of tradition and belief, and the gap between subject and 
object widens. Objects can still “symbolize” meanings and “stand for some-
thing.”39 However, the notion of an active presence of a living entity in, for 
example, an effigy gradually disappears. Concomitantly, mimesis under-
goes a similar shift, namely from a term that at the beginning denoted an 
act of creatively forging links between subject and object, to a more reduc-
tionist, even pejorative understanding of imitation. Although this devel-
opment was by no means universal, it laid the groundwork for cultural 
encounters with primitives that were still clinging to mimetic practices and 
said to believe in the living qualities of certain objects.
Images of the primitive: Mimetic thinking and its savage 
sources
Many of the discussed intellectual and religious developments were paral-
leled by an increasing European domination in various parts of the world. 
With a very selective focus on the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twen-
tieth century, I want to explore in this part how depictions of indigenous, 
allegedly primitive societies were worked into a variety of European ideas 
surrounding mimesis and representation. First, I shall discuss how a dis-
course on fetishism as a form of illogical imitation and representation 
evolved in the context of the Enlightenment and European expansion. 
Secondly, I will discuss how early anthropology as a discipline interpreted 
these mimetic practices in the context of James Frazer’s theory of magic 
and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s idea of a primitive mentality.40 Here, both by 
delivering ethnographic data and actively theorizing mimesis and imita-
tion, anthropology became one of the mediators between the European 
Enlightenment and a primitive other.
The work of mimesis as an intercultural process itself is marked by 
encountering cultural “others” (in texts or in “reality”); information about 
them is partially appropriated and set into a new context. The other’s imita-
tive practices become part of the European way of theorizing mimesis and 
39 See Ladwig (2012) for different understandings of symbols and representations 
in modernity. 
40 I will here take a rather generalizing perspective on anthropology as a subject. 
What the subject had in common in its early phase was its focus on allegedly 
primitive societies in non-Western societies. This focus has been largely lost 
in contemporary anthropology and the subject has developed a multiplicity of 
agendas that involves work on modernity and urbanity, kinship, genetics, etc. 
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representation. Ideas of nineteenth and early twentieth-century anthro-
pology entered into a range of academic disciplines and the arts. E.  B. 
Tylor’s Primitive Culture, Frazer’s Golden Bough, and Lévy-Bruhl’s How 
Natives Think were widely discussed, and influenced literature, the arts, the 
humanities, and the social sciences.41 The theorizing of mimesis on the 
basis of accounts of cultural “others” is exposed to power relations which 
are already visible in the production of ethnographic information itself and 
its reception among European thinkers and artists. The overwhelming part 
of the data was drawn from travel descriptions and missionary reports, 
and not from ethnographic fieldwork. Fritz Kramer has coined the term 
“imaginary ethnography” in relation to nineteenth-century accounts. He 
sees in them “moments of a naive metaphysics, that in some respects con-
tinue the fantasies of heaven and hell of European Christianity.”42 How-
ever, after the rise of the natural sciences and the Enlightenment he also 
locates in these ethnographic narratives a longing for a counterpart to the 
“radical rational culture of Europe.”43
One of the best examples of establishing a distinction between enlight-
enment civilization and its primitive antipodes is the discourse that was 
constructed around “fetishes.” Taken to be emblematic of the pre-logical 
thinking of, for example, “Africans,” fetishism was, in the popular evolution-
ary schemes, located at the lowest level of development, with polytheism 
and monotheism being later stages of development. Fetishes were taken 
to be “false” copies of something they could not be. Objects such as stones, 
Voodoo dolls amulets, and so forth were, in indigenous conceptions, seen 
as active and living “copies” of persons. They were produced through acts 
of imitation, in which mimesis created a lasting link between original and 
copy. Often replicating not external forms but their “spiritual essence,” 
enlightenment thinking understood them as false representations that 
were grounded in the illogical thinking of the natives. William Pietz has 
traced the genealogy of the idea of the fetish to the sixteenth and seven- 
teenth century, in the context of Portuguese and Dutch expeditions to 
West Africa. He defines the fetish as “the problematic of the social value of 
material objects as revealed in situations formed by the encounter of radi-
cally heterogeneous social systems,”44 but also works out a history-of-ideas 
approach to fetishism, and speaks of the “fetish theory of enlightenment” 
that evolved at the end of the eighteenth century. Interestingly, the belief 
in fetishes was not only attributed to primitives, but also delivered fodder 
for the protestant critiques of idolatry in Catholicism that I already briefly 
alluded to in the previous part:
41 For the status and impact of early British social anthropology, especially Tylor 
and Frazer, see George W. Stocking’s (1992, 40–41) excellent reflection on the 
history of anthropology. 
42 Kramer 1981, 111.
43 Kramer 1981, 111.
44 Pietz 1985, 7.
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The discourse of the fetish has always been a critical discourse about 
the false objective values of a culture from which the speaker is per-
sonally distanced. Such was the negative force of revaluation when 
Portuguese Catholics named African religious and social objects 
“feiticos,” and such was the force when commodity-minded Dutch, 
French, and English Protestants identified African religious objects 
and Catholic sacramental objects equally as fetishes, thereby pre-
paring the way for the general fetish theory of the enlightenment.45 
The reports of travelers, merchants, slave traders, and missionaries also 
found their ways into the philosophical writings of the enlightenment, and 
accounts of fetishism became one of the preferred markers of distinction 
between civilization and primitiveness. Immanuel Kant gives an excellent 
example: first, he discusses the alleged lack of development among “the 
negroes of Africa” due to their racial inferiority. One implicit assumption 
here is, I think, that the reproduction of traditions through imitation pro-
duces a kind of stasis. Secondly, he postulates that the difference regarding 
mental capacities produces a kind of cognitive distortion in which “things” 
are taken for living entities (fetishes) worthy of veneration. In Observations 
on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime from 1764, Kant elaborates:
The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above 
the trifling. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example 
in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the 
hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere 
from their countries, although many of them have even been set 
free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything 
great in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality […] So fun-
damental is the difference between these two races of man, and it 
appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in colour. 
The religion of fetishes so widespread among them is perhaps a 
sort of idolatry that sinks as deeply into the trifling as appears to 
be possible to human nature. A bird’s feather, a cow’s horn, a conch 
shell, or any other common object, as soon as it becomes conse-
crated by a few words, is an object of veneration and of invocation 
in swearing oaths. The blacks are very vain but in the Negro’s way, 
and so talkative that they must be driven apart from each other with 
thrashings.46
In a similar way, G.W.F. Hegel proposed in his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
World History, given between 1821 and 1831, that Africans are not capa-
ble of imagining anything greater than man, and therefore concluded that 
45 Pietz 1985, 14.
46 Kant 1960, 110–111.
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fetish worship was the only religion they were able to develop.47 Closely 
linked to the idea of the fetish, magic became another favorite topic of 
analysis, and also marks the beginning of the anthropological theorizing 
of religion under the influence of evolutionism and colonialism.48 James 
Frazer surveyed a mass of ethnographic reports and mythologies from all 
around the world, and a great number of descriptions related to beliefs 
and rituals in which a created image (effigies, puppets, etc.) is thought to 
catch the essence of an object it represents, so that what is done to the 
image is thought to be done to the object. Through mimetic enactment, 
the object “represents” what is perceived as absent (from the perspective 
of the Enlightenment thinker); it gives the object a sort of life and real-
ity, invoked through mimesis. Frazer subsumes them in his major work 
The Golden Bough under the notion of “sympathetic magic.” He proposes 
that, in these magical practices, imitation and similarity play a key role.49 
He elaborates: 
If we analyze the principles of thought on which magic is based, 
they will probably be found to resolve themselves into two: first, 
that like produces like, or that an effect resembles its cause; and, 
second, that things which have once been in contact with each other 
continue to act on each other at a distance after the physical con-
tact has been severed. The former principle may be called the Law 
of Similarity, the latter the Law of Contact or Contagion. From the 
first of these principles, namely the Law of Similarity, the magician 
infers that he can produce any effect he desires merely by imitating 
it: from the second he infers that whatever he does to a material 
object will affect equally the person with whom the object was once 
in contact, whether it formed part of his body or not.50
Frazer’s work was one of the first efforts to systematize a large body of eth-
nographic and historical accounts, and also included an exegesis of Greek 
mythology. However, its perspective on magic was still close to accounts 
of fetishism. From the standpoint of the Enlightenment, Frazer concluded 
that “magic is a spurious system of natural law as well as a fallacious guide 
of conduct; it is a false science as well as an abortive art.”51 He saw magic 
as the most basic level in the evolution of mankind. Religion was already a 
sign of a higher complexity of thinking, superseded by the scientific view 
of the world. As a “dispassionate observer” who studied these customs 
47 On Hegel’s images of Africa in these lectures, see Susan Buck-Moriss (2009). On 
Hegel’s extensive treatment of fetishes, see Teshale Tibebu’s study on Hegel and 
his role in the making of Eurocentric world history (2011, 192–193). 
48 The history of social anthropology as an academic and applied subject is closely 
linked to the colonial project (Asad 1973; Said 1978). See also Fabian (1983, 
11–12) on notions of time and evolution in early anthropology. 
49 Frazer 1894, 52.
50 Frazer 1894, 48.
51 Frazer 1894, 39.
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and myths, he still concluded that one “can hardly regard it otherwise than 
as a standing menace to civilization.”52 Sigmund Freud later used some of 
Frazer’s ideas and descriptions, and incorporated them into his Totem and 
Taboo (1913) with the telling subtitle Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives 
of Savages and Neurotics, comparing the level of consciousness among 
primitives with that of children.
Whereas parts of the British school of social anthropology still adhered 
to an evolutionary paradigm, the French philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl 
(1859-1939) had a somewhat different agenda. Trained as a philosopher, 
but also active in French sociology and anthropology, he is mainly known 
for his works on the “primitive mentality” and concepts such as “mystical 
participation.” His major publications such as Les fonctions mentales dans 
les sociétés inférieures (1910) and La mentalité primitive (1922) seem to sug-
gest a strong evolutionary bias, which later anthropologists described as 
“a horrific example for the miscomprehension of a scientific discourse.”53 
As an armchair anthropologist, he assembled (similar to Frazer) a huge 
mass of ethnographic reports and tried to explore the mental functions 
at the base of a wide range of phenomena such as totemism, magic and 
magically-loaded objects, shamanism, belief in ghosts and effigies, and 
the return of the dead. He understood his work not as an effort to classify 
primitives into an evolutionary scheme like Frazer, but as an attempt to 
compare modern ways of thinking about the world with primitive ones. 
The latter also included references to Chinese, ancient Greek, and Hindu 
traditions. Postulating a great gap between primitive and scientific think-
ing, he especially referred to phenomena of non-distinction and sug-
gested that primitive man lives in a non-dual, animistic universe in which 
matter and mind are not divided—a standpoint which has been heavily 
criticized due to its generality and exoticizing effects.54 These “pre-logi-
cal” systems of thinking, as he labeled them, constitute the “collective rep-
resentations of the primitive” that “differ profoundly from our ideas or 
concepts; nor are they the equivalent of them.”55 Unlike in societies where 
scientific thinking has become the dominant way of seeing the world, 
these collective representations are based on animistic principles, and do 
not distinguish between dream and reality, subject and object, and mind 
and matter. Although missionaries, travelers, and anthropologists had 
crafted reports on these beliefs from all around the world, Lévy-Bruhl’s 
starting point is that the facts described mostly remain alien to our form 
of thinking:
52 Frazer 1894, 53.
53 Muenzel 2001, 250–251. Lévy-Bruhl proclaimed at other occasions: “Let us aban-
don the attempt to refer their mental activity to an inferior variety of our own” 
(1985, 76). See also the account of Edward Evans Pritchard (1971) for a more 
balanced view of Lévy-Bruhl’s works. 
54 For an overview of critiques of Lévy-Bruhl and re-interpretations, see Mousali-
mas (1990, 40–41). 
55 Lévy-Bruhl 1923, 7.
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In the collective representations of primitive mentality, objects, 
beings, phenomena can be, though in a way incomprehensible to 
us, both themselves and something other than themselves. In a 
fashion no less incomprehensible, they give forth and they receive 
mystic powers, virtues, qualities, influences, which make them-
selves felt outside, without ceasing to remain where they are.56
As in Frazer’s account, things can become “doubled” via imitation, and 
mimetic behavior and representation play an important role in Lévy- 
Bruhl’s theorizing.57 I will here discuss two sets of examples analyzed by 
Lévy-Bruhl: The first relates to his extensive treatment of ritual and reli-
gious dance performances that imitate ancestors and the departed. The 
second group of examples discusses the use of objects such as amulets 
that imitate the qualities of other objects or persons. Both discussions also 
relate to the concept of “representation” and ideas about fetishes. 
In his chapters “Ceremonies and Dances” and “The Worship of Ances-
tors and the Dead,”58 Lévy-Bruhl focuses on a notion of mimesis that today 
would be labeled “performative.”59 As an example, he takes an annual fes-
tival performed by the Kiwai (of Papua New Guinea), in which the masked 
males dress up as animals. Lévy-Bruhl cites the ethnography by Gunnar 
Landtman, who states that, among the Kiwai, “nearly all the outdoor 
dances can be called mimetic, inasmuch as they imitate actions from real 
life” and they display “great ingenuity, for the dancers do not just copy the 
various movements in a mechanical way.”60 In opposition to Frazer and 
other accounts of mimesis, imitation is not seen as mechanical here but 
as a kind of aesthetic expression. Lévy-Bruhl then explores another exam-
ple of a dance ritual in more detail, taken from Theodor Koch-Grunberg’s 
study of the Baniwa in Northwest Brazil:
The idea of magic influence is at the basis of all these mimetic rep-
resentations. They are destined to bring to the village and its inhab-
itants, their plantations, and to all the surrounding nature, blessing 
and fertility. From the circumstance that the dancer in his move-
ments and gestures imitates, as faithfully as it is in his power to do, 
the being whom he endeavors to represent, he identifies himself 
with him. The magic power dwelling in the mask is transferred to 
the dancer, makes him a masterful “demon,” capable of subduing 
“demons” or making them favorable to him.61
56 Lévy-Bruhl 1984, 76–77.
57 In his posthumously-published notebooks, Lévy-Bruhl also makes more explicit 
references to Greek philosophic notions such as mimesis (Lévy-Bruhl 1975). 
58 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 113–114 and 134–135, respectively.
59 Gebauer and Wulf (1995, 316) have linked performativity to mimesis and focus 
on body-related motions, rhythms, gestures, and sounds.
60 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 122.
61 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 127.
52 
PATRICE LADWIG
The performance of the rite demands an effort to copy the movements of 
other beings, and the mask worn during the rite gives the dancer a new 
identity via mimetic transfer. Moving on to his analysis of this and simi-
lar rites, Lévy-Bruhl states that “by imitating what their mythical ancestors 
have done in certain circumstances, and reproducing their gestures and 
their acts, these natives are in communion with them and actually partici-
pating in their substance.”62 He elaborates further: 
Is it possible to penetrate yet further into the significance of these 
ceremonies and these magico-propitiatory dances? For there seems 
to be no doubt that in nearly all such dances the wearers of these 
masks represent “ghosts,” that is, save in exceptional cases, the 
dead or the ancestral spirits. Now the word “represent” must be 
understood here in its literal etymological sense—that in which 
the primitives would take it if they used it: to re-present, to cause 
to reappear that which has disappeared. As long as the actors and 
dancers wear these masks, and from the mere fact that they cover 
their faces, they are not only the representatives of the dead and the 
ancestors whom these masks portray: for the time being, they actu-
ally become these dead and these ancestors. To primitives, as we 
know, bi-presence is not an inconceivable, or even unnatural idea.63
Here, imitating the moves of ancestors is not just a mere representation 
or performance but a kind of immersion into a role that does not allow 
for any distance between past and present, self and other, the living and 
the dead. Mimesis here mediates between these (at least to our percep-
tion) separate domains. In the quote above, Lévy-Bruhl alludes to the fact 
that representation has, etymologically speaking, an interesting double 
meaning, which Carlo Ginzburg and Raymond Williams refer to as well: on 
the one hand, it describes in an older translation “the efficacious presence 
of something,” and on the other hand its “standing for something that is 
actually not present.”64 Lévy-Bruhl deems the first meaning as more suited 
to his case. Then, pace the concept of representation that evolved during 
the enlightenment and the reformation,65 imitative acts as ritual perfor-
mances have an efficacious character according to Lévy-Bruhl, and are not 
mechanical acts that produce inferior copies of originals. 
Coming back to the discussion of the fetish as a living object, we can 
note that a similar conclusion is drawn by Lévy-Bruhl in relation to mag-
ically charged objects and the principle of what he (somewhat mislead-
ingly) labels mystical participation. Imitation here is not necessarily a copy 
62 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 115.
63 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 123–124.
64 Ginzburg 1991, 1219–1220; see also William 1983, 267.
65 Carlo Ginzburg (1991, 1226–1227) has argued that the evolvement of the second 
meaning (absence) can, in general, be attributed to the Jewish-Christian vision of 
icons even before the Reformation. 
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of another object’s exterior form, but the act of copying aims at the force 
inherent to that object. Giving the example of the production of amulets 
among the Eskimos of Greenland,66 in which certain qualities of animals 
are copied into an object, he notes,
The amulet does more than merely represent the animal or human 
being which it imitates or by which it is made. The amulet is alive, 
because it has been made during the recitation of a charm or spell, 
when the dominating qualities of the animal or the part of the body 
have been invoked; the power of these qualities is at any rate poten-
tially present in the animal. It evidently makes no great difference 
whether it is the thing (animal) itself or an imitation which is used as 
an amulet; it has the same power.67
Lévy-Bruhl gives numerous other examples which are comparable to 
the relationship between an “original” human being and its effigy-copy. 
He understands them as expressions of the mentalité primitive in which 
“the reality of the similitude is of the same kind as the original—that is, 
essentially mystic.”68 Christopher Bracken refines the explanation given by 
Lévy-Bruhl and states: “The likeness does not stand in for what it imitates, 
it participates in what it imitates. The thing contains its likeness, and the 
likeness, the thing for both contain a force communicated along the path-
way of mimesis.”69 Significant here is that Lévy-Bruhl did not consider imi-
tative representations as mere “symbols” that “stand for something”—an 
approach that was dominant in anthropology for several decades.70
66 Lévy-Bruhl here cites the ethnography of William Thalbitzer, who spent two 
years in an isolated Inuit settlement around 1900. Like in the previous case, 
Lévy-Bruhl in my opinion actually draws on ethnographies that expose a much 
higher level of refinement than those of Frazer some decades earlier. This might 
be based in the fact that he—as an armchair anthropologist—seems to have 
had a different agenda than Frazer and puts more emphasis on detail. Frazer 
was, however, a better storyteller. The second explanation might be that, in 
the course of two decades, the amount of reliable ethnographic material had 
increased tremendously.
67 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 339–340.
68 Lévy-Bruhl 1935, 52.
69 Bracken 2002, 335.
70 I have outlined in another paper (Ladwig 2012, 429–430) that the anthropologists 
of different generations have usually followed one of the following methods for 
understanding these representations: Either there is a purpose connected to 
these transformations (functionalism), they show how the brain works (cogni-
tivism), they have to be interpreted (interpretivism); or these transformations 
are of a metaphorical nature (symbolism). Recent approaches see this as a way 
of domesticating “otherness” into our frameworks of analysis, and advance a 
reading of representation that is actually very close to that of Lévy-Bruhl. See 




Despite the evolutionary tendencies of his theory, and the over-
stretched, generalizing distinction between the modern mind and primi-
tiveness,71 Lévy-Bruhl can be credited for pointing out that Western ideas 
about “rationality,” and certain divides that were emerging in the context 
of the Enlightenment and Reformation, are far from general. Lévy-Bruhl 
understands his own modern and scientific culture and its understand-
ings of imitation and representation as being culturally specific, and not, 
like Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers, as epistemological universals. 
This theme was picked up by one of his pupils and actually has regained 
importance in recent discussion in anthropology.72 Although Lévy-Bruhl 
does not theorize mimesis explicitly, his concept of participation shows 
that he understood these practices of imitation and representation as a 
challenge to, and extension of, Western mimetic theory. In opposition to 
Enlightenment discourses on fetishism and to Frazer’s pejorative account 
of imitative magic as a “false science as well as an abortive art,” Lévy-Bruhl 
implicitly recognized that the negative connotations of mimesis and rep-
resentation were only of limited value when trying to understand systems 
of thinking positioned outside the context of modernity.
Primitive mimesis: The Frankfurt School’s critique of the 
Enlightenment
It is rather easy to detect in Lévy-Bruhls’ notions of the primitive men-
tality and mystical participation, with their non-dualistic features, a form 
of extreme primitivism. Do such theories, in the end, tell us more about 
“our” desires than explain the logics of other cultures? It is rather obvious 
that the contrast between the rationality of modernity, and that of true 
representation and mimetic thinking, can easily become a sort of lament 
about what has been lost through the enlightenment and modernity. As 
I will outline in this part, the enlightenment and its move to an objecti-
fied world surveyed by an interior subject, have indeed been critiqued by 
several theorists from the perspective of mimetic theory. Some Neo-Marx-
ist propagators of the Frankfurt School have suggested that we witness a 
71 Lévy-Bruhl, however, saw the primitive mentality also at work in our own cul-
ture. The British social anthropologist Evans-Pritchard writes: “For him, Christi-
anity and Judaism were also superstitions, indicative of pre-logical and mystical 
mentality (‘primitive mentality’), and on his definitions necessarily so. But, I think 
in order not to cause offence, he made no allusion to them” Evans-Pritchard 
(1965, 90).
72 Maurice Leenhardt (1979) continued some of these themes in his anthropolo- 
gical accounts of Melanesia, in which the socio-cosmic principles animating the 
body are described as an essential part of the concept of the person. This princi-
ple makes it possible to transform the body and actually become another being, 
as is, for example, often encountered in shamanism. 
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decrease of mimetic practices in modern, industrial society, and that that 
one consequence of this process is increasing alienation.73
It is this kind of reverse perspective that Theodor W. Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer suggest in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Written during World 
War II and originally published in 1947, the work can be seen as an effort 
of critical theory trying to come to terms with high modernity’s inherent 
barbaric and exploitative dimensions, exemplified by Nazi Germany and 
the Holocaust one the one hand, and by mass production and the cul-
tural industry on the other. Adorno and Horkheimer undertake a polem-
ical reading of the Enlightenment and argue that we witness a decline 
of mimesis in modernity. In a world in which the self becomes more and 
more an inner property of the individual, and in which the outer world 
and nature are reduced to the analytical reason of modernity, mimesis, 
animistic, and magical beliefs become repressed. In their account, “the dis-
enchantment of the world means the extirpation of animism,”74 and “for 
civilization, purely natural existence, both animal and vegetative, was the 
absolute danger. Mimetic, mythical, and metaphysical forms of behavior 
were successively regarded as stages of world history which had been left 
behind.”75 They argue that the Enlightenment and the spread of scientific 
worldviews “flatten” the world, thereby disenchanting it:
The whole ambiguous profusion of mythical demons was intel-
lectualized to become the pure form of ontological entities. Even 
the patriarchal gods of Olympus were finally assimilated by the 
philosophical logos as the Platonic Forms. But the Enlightenment 
discerned the old powers in the Platonic and Aristotelian heritage 
of metaphysics and suppressed the universal categories’ claims 
to truth as superstition. In the authority of universal concepts the 
Enlightenment detected a fear of the demons through whose effi-
gies human beings had tried to influence nature in magic rituals. 
From now on matter was finally to be controlled without the illusion 
of immanent powers or hidden properties. For Enlightenment, any-
thing which does not conform to the standard of calculability and 
utility must be viewed with suspicion.76
However, in their view, modernity does not progress towards greater free-
dom, but to a pure immanence-based rationality, paving the way for dom-
ination and totalitarian rule. Magic is linked to deeper truth, but it is not a 
universal and dominant truth.77 Mimesis becomes controlled and bureau-
73 For the wider context of the Frankfurt School of critical theory, see the seminal 
work of Rolf Wiggershaus (2010) and Jay Bernstein (1994).
74 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 2.
75 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 24.
76 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 3.
77 Horkheimer and Adorno (2002, 7) state that “magic is bloody untruth, but in 
it domination is not yet disclaimed by transforming itself into a pure truth 
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cratic, cutting off the subject from objects under the pretext of rationality.78 
In order to contrast this disenchanted world of “fake Enlightenment” with 
that of magic and animism among primitives, Adorno and Horkheimer do 
not discuss ethnographic examples but make several references to the 
anthropological research of, for example, Robert H. Lowie, Marcel Mauss, 
Emile Durkheim, and Edvard Westermarck. As I outlined before with refer-
ence to theoreticians of mimesis, the question of representation also takes 
a central position in these arguments. With reference to language, they 
state:
The manifold affinities between existing things are supplanted by 
the single relationship between the subject who confers meaning 
and the meaningless object, between rational significance and its 
accidental bearer. On the magical plane, dream and image were 
not mere signs for the thing in question, but were bound up with 
it by similarity or names. The relation is one not of intention but of 
relatedness. Like science, magic pursues aims, but seeks to achieve 
them by mimesis—not by progressively distancing itself from the 
object.79
When mimesis is understood as a process of appropriation and as an 
exchange, as it is here, it has the capacity to bridge the gap between 
world and consciousness, between subject and object. The loss of mimesis 
therefore implies a larger distance between these dualities. Consequently, 
a hierarchy of rationalities, in which cultures that still believe in mimesis 
supposedly occupy a lower position in the civilizational scale, is introduced:
The superseding of the old diffuse notions of the magical heri- 
tage by conceptual unity expresses a condition of life defined by 
the freeborn citizen and articulated by command […] long with 
mimetic magic it tabooed the knowledge which really apprehends 
the object. Its hatred is directed at the image of the vanquished pri-
meval world and its imaginary happiness. The dark, chthonic gods 
of the original inhabitants are banished to the hell into which the 
earth is transformed.80
Although mimesis and imitation are conceptualized as positive features, 
Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s image of pre-modern societies still follows 
a similar trope as that of other evolutionists. Their concept of natural or 
animistic mimesis is embedded into a “schematic version of the history 
of modern consciousness” in which “human understanding progresses 
underlying the world which it enslaves.”
78 See Potolsky (2006, 144) on the notion of mimesis in this work. For further explo-
rations of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s notion of mimesis, see Michael Cahn (1984).
79 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 7.
80 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 10.
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in three stages, from magical to mythic/epic to modern/scientific.”81 By 
depicting modernity, similar to Max Weber, as an iron cage (stahlhartes 
Gehäuse) in which formal-procedural rationality (Zweckrationalität) and effi-
cacy progress,82 it seems that Adorno and Horkheimer were in need of 
a counter-image. They found this in allegedly pre-modern, non-capitalist 
societies that had not yet undergone Enlightenment and rationalization. 
One the one hand, this view might be seen as having rather romantic under-
tones that postulate a non-alienated form of existence, in which mimesis 
can give access to authentic experience. Ernesto Verdeja thinks that “Ador-
no’s idea of mimesis […] relies on a problematic, unmediated conception 
of authenticity.”83 On the other hand, recent discussions in philosophy and 
anthropology have raised similar topics with reference to ontology. Bruno 
Latour’s idea of purification and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s emphasis on 
ontologies are not that far away from Adorno’s reasoning.84
The understanding of mimesis in the Dialectic of Enlightenment partially 
also resonates with the thoughts of another member of the Frankfurt 
School, Walter Benjamin. Benjamin has a less coherent account of mimesis 
and actually changes his definition according to the context of its applica-
tion. This tendency reflects his methods of working and thinking, which are 
marked by fragments, collage, and the simultaneity of past and present.85 
In his 1933 essay “On the Mimetic Faculty” (a revised version of the “Doc-
trine of the Similar”), Benjamin defines language in terms of mimesis, but 
already sees language as evolving from another stage of development, 
that of non-sensuous similarity: “Language may be seen as the highest 
level of mimetic behavior and the most complete archive of non-sensuous 
similarity: a medium into which the earlier powers of mimetic production 
and comprehension have passed without residue, to the point where they 
have liquidated those of magic.”86 Benjamin postulates that, in pre-historic 
times and among “druids, brahmins and shamans,”87 words and names 
did not refer to things (as in Saussurian linguistics), but magically partic-
ipated through sound in things, a capacity that is inevitably lost. But for 
81 Miller 2011, 24.
82 Weber 1992, 123.
83 See Verdeja 2009, 494.
84 Bruno Latour’s work takes a central role in these discussions about the value 
of ontology for understanding not only science and technology, but also prim-
itive societies. Latour (1993, 11) suggests that modernity enforces a distinction 
of various ontological spheres “Purification creates two entirely distinct ontolo- 
gical zones: that of human beings on the one hand; that of non-humans on the 
other.” The anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro adds, in a tone that is 
close to that of Adorno’s analysis of the disappearance of mimesis, “Modernity 
started with it: with the massive conversion of ontological into epistemological 
questions—that is, questions of representation […] After objects or things were 
pacified, retreating to an exterior, silent and uniform world of ‘nature’ subjects 
began to proliferate and to chatter endlessly” (Viveiros de Castro 2012, 152).
85 On Benjamin’s notion of mimesis and its contextualization in his working meth-
ods and development of ideas, see Taussig 1993, 19–32. 
86 Benjamin  (1933) 1999, 722. 
87 Benjamin 1996, 274.
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Benjamin, this is a process that has been at work for ages, not only since the 
encroachment of modernity. Generally speaking, through any expression 
in a language, an original state of total immersion into nature becomes 
fragmented. It is not the unity of word and thing, of subject and object that 
is at the center of his interest in language, but the process of becoming 
the subject in the course of acquiring a language. What we are left with 
today is the gift of seeing resemblances, only a “rudiment of a powerful 
compulsion in former times to behave and become like something else.”88 
In Benjamin’s other works we find examples where the mimetic and magic 
capacities of the primitives are equated with that of children. In Berlin 
Childhood Around 1900, the child mixes dream, fantasy, and reality, and the 
differentiation of self and external world is not yet accomplished.89 He also 
refers to primitive forms of play, ritual, and dance.90 Children and primi-
tives still have a sense for magical correspondence. Benjamin sees—like 
Adorno—a decline of mimesis: “The perceptual world of modern human 
beings seems to contain far fewer of those magical correspondences than 
did that of the ancients or even that of primitive peoples. The question is 
simply: Are we dealing with a dying out of the mimetic faculty, or rather 
perhaps with a transformation that has taken place within it?”91
How can we contextualize Benjamin’s use of the primitive in his phi-
losophy of language and his account of mimesis? In 1915, Benjamin had 
already attended the lectures of Walter Lehmann on ancient Peruvian 
art in Munich. Lehmann presented clay heads that resembled decapi-
tated heads. He interpreted them as trophies from headhunting; it was 
not an exact likeness that was crucial, but the strength of the victim that 
one could absorb while holding the head imitation.92 So it was not only 
representation, but the belief in efficacy that Lehmann emphasized. 
Another speculative hint might be that some of Benjamin’s best friends 
(like Siegfried Kracauer) employed ethnographic methods,93 and his work 
at times has ethnographic features, too. Benjamin’s interest in anthropo-
logical accounts and his primitivism surfaced again, according to Gershom 
Sholem, in the summer of 1918, when he immersed himself in history and 
anthropological accounts that later formed the groundwork for his essay 
on the mimetic faculty. Nicola Gess has argued that Benjamin’s ideas on 
language are little, if at all, influenced by Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of primitive or 
mystic participation.94 In contrast, Christopher Bracken explicitly links Ben-
jamin’s philosophy of language to Lévy-Bruhl without, however, delivering 
88 Benjamin (1933) 1999, 720.
89 See Gess (2007) on Benjamin’s primitivism and the context of its time.
90 Benjamin 1990.
91 Benjamin (1933) 1999, 721.
92 Brodersen 1996, 81.
93 Perhaps Benjamin was also inspired by his good friend Sigfried Kracauer, who 
studied white-collar workers in 1920s Berlin with ethnographic methods learnt 
under his studies with Georg Simmel. Benjamin used ethnographic approaches in 
several of his writings, but they were rarely made explicit, as in Kracauer’s work. 
94 Gess 2009, 308.
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direct proof. Benjamin was well aware of the works of Lévy-Bruhl, and a 
review of the sociology of language discusses the concept of mystic partic-
ipation at length.95 One finds in Benjamin’s idea that the process of naming 
things once contained the magical capacity of language, a strong parallel 
to Lévy-Bruhl’s extensive treatment of this question. Paolo Gabrielli men-
tions that one of Benjamin’s central ideas, namely “non-sensuous similar-
ity” had already been used by Lévy-Bruhl in 1927.96
Although primitivism was widespread in intellectual circles in Benja-
min’s times,97 I think that his version is rather complex. In 1917, Benjamin 
wrote On the Program of the Coming Philosophy, in which he attacks Kant’s 
theory of knowledge. Referring to Kant’s subject-object distinction, he picks 
up a thread that was already discussed in a previous part of this essay and 
lists “examples” that contradict Kant’s thesis:
We know that primitive peoples, at the stage of so-called pre-ani-
mism, identify themselves with animals and plants, and take their 
name from them; we know that madmen at times identify them-
selves in part with objects of their perception, which are thus no 
longer “objects” standing before them; we know of sick persons 
who attribute the sensations of their bodies to beings other than 
themselves; and of visionaries who at least claim to be able to feel 
the perception of others as their own.98
Although his analogies between primitive people, madmen, and vision- 
aries might be disturbing, Benjamin wants to develop a form of “magical 
critique” from these cases. Countering Kant, Benjamin sees in ritual, mad-
ness, drug-induced states of mind, and in surrealist art possibilities for a 
return of mimetic capacities.99 He “conjures up the specter of the primitive 
neither to condemn it, nor to advise those whose job is to civilize it, but 
to imitate it. He develops the term magical critique for his thinking.”100 In 
opposition to Adorno and Horkheimer, he does not only lament the dis-
appearance of mimesis in modernity, but also sees opportunities for its 
return. His work therefore “celebrates and mourns […] the liquidation of 
tradition”101 at the same time.
This stance is also deducible from his account of mimesis that is implic-
itly contained in one of his more famous essays, The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction, originally published in 1936. He proposes that 
modern technologies such as film and photography change the way we 
95 Benjamin 1991.
96 Gabrielli 2004, 323.
97 On Walter Benjamin’s use of certain images of the primitive, see the excellent 
analysis of Gess (2013).
98 Benjamin 1989, 2.
99 See Cheng (2009) on Benjamin’s relation to surrealism. 
100 Bracken 2002, 344.
101 McCole 1993, 8.
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perceive the world: While a painting as an original has, according to Benja-
min, an “aura” (substituting the “magic” of his language philosophy), mod-
ern techniques of reproduction (the capacity to produce infinite copies) 
and mass consumption are not able to incorporate this aura. However, 
Benjamin here exposes not a simple melancholia for older times and other 
cultures, but also sees opportunities opening up through this concept. The 
cinema itself, with its fast-moving images and overstimulation, can, first, 
create a shock that frees the subject from its routines. Secondly, Benjamin 
proposes that, through these technologies, the masses develop a greater 
desire to get closer to the image, and to annihilate the uniqueness of the 
object by mimetically appropriating it.102 I agree with Taussig, who pro-
poses that it is not only melancholia and loss that surround Benjamin’s 
notion of mimesis, but “instead, modernity provides the cause, context, 
means, and needs for the resurgence—not the continuity—of the mimetic 
faculty.”103 This differentiates Benjamin’s idea of mimesis from Adorno’s 
account, which simply sees its decline in modernity.
Conclusion
I began this essay with an overview of the genealogies and transforma-
tions of concepts of mimesis and representation. By postulating a close 
link between mimesis and representation, I argued that, with the Renais-
sance and the Enlightenment, the negative connotations of mimesis (first 
pronounced in Plato’s philosophy) became dominant. These also laid the 
groundwork for understanding the reception of descriptions of mimetic 
practices of primitive societies. Theories of fetishism and Frazer’s notion 
of primitive imitative magic were interpreted as proof of the illogical think-
ing of the natives, of their lack of rationality. This understanding also pro-
vided substance for the evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century, 
and, moreover, a legitimation for colonial expansion through civilizational 
superiority. The alleged barbarism of the primitives was conceptualized 
as “‘the reversal of what we may call the project of the eighteenth century 
Enlightenment, namely the establishment of a universal system of such 
rules and standards of moral behaviour, embodied in the institutions of 
states dedicated to the national progress of humanity.”104
With Lévy-Bruhl’s theories, I outlined an approach that exoticizes the 
mimetic and representational thinking of primitives, and draws a divid-
ing line between modernity and primitiveness, but nevertheless seriously 
tries to understand the difference between systems of thinking. With an 
emphasis on the capacity of objects and rituals to make “something pres-
ent anew” through mystical participation, Lévy-Bruhl actually employs a 
102 Benjamin (1936) 2002, 105.
103 Taussig 1993, 20. 
104 Hobsbawm 1994, 46.
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notion of representation that has been attested to have parallels with West-
ern concepts before the Enlightenment. Due to the apparent but exag-
gerated contrast between mimesis and representation in primitive and 
scientific thinking, Lévy-Bruhl’s ideas also appealed to theorists that for-
mulated critiques of modernity. With Adorno and Horkhheimer, and finally 
Walter Benjamin, primitive mimesis is transformed into a counter-image 
of the Enlightenment and modernity. The objectification of nature, the 
increased bureaucratization of society, and the repression and disappear-
ance of mimesis in modernity was made visible by pointing to societies 
in which mimesis was still alive. Whereas Adorno and Horkheimer mainly 
accused modernity and Enlightenment thinking of oppressing mimesis, I 
argue that Benjamin has a somewhat less pessimistic perspective. In both 
approaches, however, “Mimesis sounds a muted and half-forgotten, but 
still optimistic tone in that it signals a force both primitive and irrational, 
prior to and resistant to the encroachment of full-on modernity.”105
The encounters between Western theories of mimetic behavior and 
more or less fictional ethnographies of primitives can in this sense be 
understood as an appropriation of a cultural “other,” as a process of mime-
sis itself. Depending on a multiplicity of factors such as reception, power 
constellations, and so forth, I argue that these appropriations create dis-
courses that move between two poles: one the one side, a strengthening 
of European superiority and hegemony, and on the other side a critique of 
modernity and rationality.
It is rather obvious that, in the case of critiques of modernity and the 
Enlightenment, we deal with a form of primitivism expressed as a lack 
of real mimesis and representation. Primitivism was a popular trope of 
the nineteenth and twentieth century, and has been well documented in 
art history and literature. This is even more valid for Orientalism.106 It is 
interesting to note that, between 1900 and World War I, primitivism was 
frequently used without reference to tribal societies, but could contain a 
plethora of figures that stood outside or at the periphery of society such 
as madmen, children, or the uneducated peasants. Here, “the myth of the 
artist expressed kinship with marginal groups in his own society.”107 In this 
light, the associations made between primitive mimesis and the mimetic 
capacities of children and madmen, in, for example, Walter Benjamin’s 
thinking comes as no surprise. Here, in a somewhat romantic approach 
to art and artists, the outside of society can be occupied as a position that 
allows for a de-centering of perspectives.
The question, however, why certain accounts of primitive mimesis held 
such an attraction for Adorno, Benjamin, and others probably has many 
answers. There was need for a counter-image, but to be more specific, one 
105 Miller 2011, 23.
106 See Flam and Deutch (2003) for a history of primitivism in twentieth-century art. 
The classical reference to Orientalism is Said (1978).
107 Grijp 2012, 134.
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could argue that this image had to embody a certain kind of authenticity. 
Charles Lindholm suggests that the “pervasive desire for authenticity is a 
consequence of a modern loss of faith and meaning,” a proposition that 
resonates very well with critical stances on the Enlightenment and moder-
nity.108 Another anthropologist, Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, states that 
there is often a “presupposition that authenticity lies at an inaccessible 
level below the surface of social life, deep within oneself or among socie-
ties ‘uncontaminated’ by modernity.”109 Moreover, he argues that “authen-
ticity encodes the expectation of truthful representation.”110 With a return 
to an older notion of mimetic representation in Lévy-Bruhl, Adorno, and 
Benjamin, a return to something more “real” and original was imagined. 
However, according to Gustave Ribeiro, this longing for authenticity is in 
the current age again exposed to shifts. Living an in age where the original 
is increasingly disappearing, he imagines two outcomes of this process:
The first could be called “hyperfetishism,” meaning the hyper effi-
cacy of fetishism in a world completely colonized by copies with-
out originals, and by their central role in accumulation within the 
cutting-edge sectors of electronic and computer capitalism. In such 
a realm, no one would really care about alienation. The current 
almost complete disappearance of this term is an indication of what 
I just said. The other outcome is what I would call “hyperanimism,” 
or a return to the metaphysics of animism among the moderns. 
One expression of hyperanimism is the prestige currently enjoyed 
by some theories that attribute agency to things. Perhaps it is a 
reaction to a world where copies have no originals but algorithms, a 
reaction to the possibility of a shallow world, finally and completely 
disenchanted, in which human clones may exist.111
So, in the end, the same things are still with us: the fetish, the magical 
agency of objects, animism, and the disenchanted world haven’t left us, 
despite all our mimetic appropriations of the primitive.
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PART II




Always Dealing with Reality  
but Never Too Close to It: Original 
and Copy in Modern Aesthetics
Abstract The following essay deals with the idea that 1) the concept of 
copy is a most basic one in Western epistemology and still forming the 
ground of artistic and aesthetic notions up to today. Furthermore, the the-
sis that 2) the discourse of copy is always a discourse on the quality of re-
ality of artistic and aesthetic works. Therefore, the notion of copy can give 
insights into the precarious but unavoidable relationship between art and 
the ideas of reality at its basis. While departing from a very contemporary 
point of view regarding this relationship and taking into consideration new 
techniques and theories, it can be demonstrated that the question of copy 
(and original) can be of help to overcome concepts of binarity as, for exam-
ple, underlying the dichotomy of materiality-immateriality, material-form, 
thing-representation etc.—an approach dominating discourses through-
out Modern aesthetics.
Keywords Original, originality, reality, authenticity, facsimile
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Art and reality: Preliminary remarks
The question concerning traits (or the quality and levels) of reality of an artis-
tic object in relation to traits (or the quality and levels) of reality of empirical 
objects ranks among the most challenging questions in aesthetic theories, 
representing the hinge which connects—and, at the same time, highlights 
differences among—realism, idealism, phenomenology, constructivism, 
avant-gardism, and Modernism.1 Hans Blumenberg suggests that aes-
thetic materiality can unfold in an aesthetic existence exemplary of one of 
many worlds, which thus reveals the structures of a “primordial essence of 
nature with new persuasive power” (Urgrundes der Natur in neuer Über-
zeugungskraft).2 However, Alain Robbe-Grillet’s realism is an alternative 
possibility. For Robbe-Grillet, the world is neither exemplary, nor mean-
ingful, nor absurd. It simply “is.”3 The material of a film, hence, remains 
limited and indefinitely repeatable: “It is a world without a past, a world 
which is self-sufficient at every moment and which obliterates itself as it 
proceeds. […] There can be no reality outside the images we see, the words 
we hear.”4 Despite their historical proximity, Blumenberg’s and Robbe- 
Grillet’s assessments of aesthetic material could not differ more. The dis-
similarity of their approaches shows that the position of verbal and pic-
torial arts can be determined according to how one answers questions 
pertaining to the quality of reality of the aesthetic as such. After all, the 
real, nature, and reality have been points of reference for images and texts 
since before the nineteenth century Realism. An interest in the semiotic 
relationship between empirical reality and the artistic medium—which also 
implies an interest in relations of perception and of portrayal—was already 
ingrained in the classical notion of mimesis, as well as having been perti-
nent to the invention of central perspective. The interest in this semiotic 
relationship has provided the basis for aesthetic theories of mimesis since 
the eighteenth century, as well as for genre- and media-theoretical dis-
cussions during the Enlightenment and Romanticism, to name but some 
points of reference. We are thus concerned with a question of aesthetic 
theory that has been of relevance until the twenty-first century.
Original and copy are suitable metaphors for scrutinising—analytically 
and in a historicising manner—these relationships as an interplay of epis-
temological-ontological and immanently aesthetic issues. In the following, 
I will restrict myself to outlining this problem.
1 Cf. Knaller 2015, 11–18.
2 My translation, “‘Nachahmung der Natur’. Zur Vorgeschichte der Idee des schöp-
ferischen Menschen,” Blumenberg 1981, 54–103, 92, and 93. Blumenberg refers 
to the example of Paul Klee, who sought to escape the contingency of reality 
through artistic essence. 
3 Robbe-Grillet 1963, 18.
4 “C’est un monde sans passé qui se suffit à lui-même à chaque instant et que 
s’efface au fur et à mesure. […] Il ne peut y avoir de réalité en dehors des images 
que l’on voit, des paroles que l’on entend.” Robbe-Grillet 1963, 131. 
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The notion of the original
In the context of modern aesthetic theory, the term “original” is highly 
ambivalent.5 On the one hand, it denotes a unique, evidently authentic 
object, attributed with so high an actual value of reality that it can also be 
regulated by a strict legal and economic framework. On the other hand, 
the original has to be constantly redefined as to its quality of reality: what 
determines the status of a fine-art photograph, a film, an installation, a 
performance, a painting from a fifteenth- or sixteenth-century workshop, 
or a multiple-times restored oil painting as “original?” Despite being fre-
quently dealt with in economic and legal discourse, the idea of original and 
copy has an extensive impact on the nature and function of all the levels 
and traits of reality within and outside of an art work. That this is not least 
due to the fact that the notion of original and copy is dependent on general 
concepts of reality shows the example of early modern aesthetics and its 
notion of original. The eighteenth-century concept of modern art as “origi-
nality/original” was specified by a metaphysical notion of nature, which for 
the artists and authors served as an “original” model. Yet, the artistic inter-
pretation and representation of this model, the art works, engender new 
models of originality which, in turn, encourage imitatio by other works of 
art. This is a key to any understanding of classicism or ideal ism—that is to 
say, art for them always implies a copy. To sum up, art in general involves 
questions of traits of reality on various levels. Two of these will be dealt 
with in detail:
a) The conceptual level, between art and general models of reality which
unfold through different terminologies, conceptualisations, and modes 
of procedure; this is the field of the epistemological purpose of original
and copy and
b) The practical level of artistic and literary artefacts with their periodically
changing modes.
In said contexts, traits of reality for one thing play a part insofar as the 
relevance of a work as an original or a copy—which is informed by artistic 
programmes and aesthetic theories—strongly depends on the epistemo-
logically marked metaphors of original and copy discussed under point a) 
above; and for another, traits of reality are of relevance in that they also 
channel attributions, rejections, or acceptance.
5 Cf. Knaller 2015, 162–163.
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The epistemological purpose of original and copy
The postulate of mimesis (imitatio naturae) is certainly the most prominent 
concept of copying in Modernism. In the eighteenth and also in the nine-
teenth century, nature’s character in terms of originality was still undis-
puted and art was always (strictly speaking) nothing but a copy. The value 
of art resided in the influence it wielded on areas of cognition and action 
predetermined by nature. This postulate to imitate goes beyond specific 
aesthetic and artistic positions, as Friedrich Schiller shows in his descrip-
tion of “sentimentalischer Dichtung” and “naiver Dichtung”—sentimental 
as idealistically and naïve as realistically copying poetry—when both—
their differences notwithstanding—are held up to copy human nature as 
such.6 Original, originality and copy bear a close relation to one another. 
All modern forms of realism and all media with strong representative and 
realistic features, such as photography or film, deal with this model of the 
copying original and artistic originality.
Twentieth century modernism’s attribution of an autonomous and 
constructive quality to art that exceeds a representative, referential, or 
realistic character obliterates (or at least renders precarious) the qualita-
tive difference between original and copy, between a model and its rep-
resentation. In that sense, despite their constructive characteristics, the 
arts’ quality of reality can be only gradually differentiated from that of 
empirical, non-artistic dimensions. In their most radical form, art’s qual-
ity of reality is identical to those of non-art. This is the aim, for instance, 
of “pure” modernist art; art that only knows “originals” when it comes to 
the relationship of art to reality, insofar as artistic originals are meant 
to engender ever-new, autonomous forms. Also in the context of the 
avant-gardes and their idea of the de-differentiation between art and real-
ity—or rather between art and life—the opposition of original versus copy 
does not apply. Both modernism and avant-gardism only know originals. 
However, this approach has been consistently upended since the 1950s 
in the wake of new media, cultures, and notions of signs, images, and 
language. It appears more apt to speak of copies as lacking an original. 
Art plays with mediality, reproduction, and seriality (of which Pop Art and 
Photorealism may serve as examples).
6 As an example: “Dem naiven Dichter hat die Natur die Gunst gezeigt, immer 
als eine ungeteilte Einheit zu wirken, in jedem Moment ein selbstständiges und 
vollendetes Ganzes zu sein und die Menschheit, ihrem vollen Gehalt nach, in 
der Wirklichkeit darzustellen. Dem sentimentalischen hat sie die Macht verlie-
hen oder vielmehr einen lebendigen Trieb eingeprägt, jene Einheit, die durch 
Abstraktion in ihm aufgehoben worden, aus sich selbst wieder herzustellen, die 
Menschheit in sich vollständig zu machen, und aus einem beschränkten Zustand 
zu einem unendlichen überzugehen. Der menschlichen Natur ihren völligen 
Ausdruck zu geben ist aber die gemeinschaftliche Aufgabe beider, und ohne 
das würden sie gar nicht Dichter heißen können;” Friedrich Schiller, “Beschluß 
der Abhandlung über naive und sentimentalische Dichter nebst einigen Bemer-
kungen einen charakteristischen Unterschied unter den Menschen betreffend,” 
Schiller 2008, 776–791, 776–777.
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At the beginning of the twenty-first century, new challenges have to be 
confronted. This can be demonstrated by comparing the ground-breaking 
Documenta 5 of 1972 with the no less provoking Documenta 11 of 2002.7 
While the first dealt with the reality of ever-present mass media and its 
enormous production of overall images,8 the latter confronted globaliza-
tion, postcoloniality, and the post 9/11 era with a strong artistic impact on 
documentary and realistic forms borrowed from non-artistic contexts. The 
curator Okwui Enwezor wanted to face the following problem:
In the past, institutional forms of exhibition practices à la Docu-
menta were employed to devise a narrative context which was 
meant to either provide the backdrop for a homogenous under-
standing of art or to come to conclusions concerning the visual 
arts’ distinctive formal features which set them apart from all other 
practices. This was a vital aspect of understanding the institutional 
parameters of modern contemporary art. […] If there is one thing to 
be stated about Documenta 11’s spectacular quality of being differ-
ent, it is this: The exhibition’s critical spaces have no aim to normal-
ise or to make uniform all artistic visions on their way to institutional 
beatification.9
The modes of institutionally, economically, and politically domesticated 
avant-gardes are meant to be replaced by postcoloniality’s model of oppo-
sition: “In postcoloniality we are constantly confronted with counter mod-
els used by those who are marginalised, that is those who are practically 
excluded from comprehensive global participation and who utilise counter 
models to shape new worlds by generating experimental cultures.”10
On the occasion of Documenta 11 (2002) and its prevalence of docu-
mentary art, Boris Groys discusses the possible twenty-first-century 
relationships between and validity, respectively, of original and copy: in 
documentary art, a relationship between original and copy would indeed 
exist.11 The copy, however, is endowed with the value of an original in that 
it need not become a reflexive “work” but instead remains or becomes 
a thing or object which is dependent of narratives and medial modes. 
Documentary installations offer an example of this necessity to perceive 
the relationship between reality and art in terms of materiality and not 
of ontology. Like in bio-politics,12 the differentiation between original and 
7 Cf. Knaller 2015, 158.
8 Brock 1972, 2.1–2.19.
9 Enwezor 2002, 43.
10 Enwezor 2002, 45.
11 Groys 2002, 107–113.
12 Michel Foucault, who invented this notion in lectures at the Collège de France 
in 1978/79, describes—among other things—the control over biological life and 
sexualty with the help of economical and political measures and manipulations. 
For Groys, bio-politics is embedded in the present discussions about aritificial live, 
artificial creation, and the artificial maintainance of life (Foucault 1997, 73–79). 
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copy—or between reality and construct—no longer characterises the dif-
ferentiating metaphor of fiction (an ontological quality); rather it indicates 
a modal dissimilarity: “The documentation inscribes the existence of an 
object into history, endowing such an existence with a life span and thus, 
in turn, giving life as such to the object—regardless of whether said object 
“was originally animate or artificial.”13 A precondition for this concept is a 
willingness to abandon the idea of a basic opposition between reality and 
art—which was still the case with Documenta 5—or between original and 
copy while at the same time accepting the differentiation as an everyday 
tool and to play with it.
The practical level of original and copy
The arts’ quality and traits of reality also determine intra-systemic relation-
ships in the sense of relations between original and copy, which are situ-
ated within the specific context of production and reception. A notion that 
is essential for the aesthetic value of original and copy and which therefore 
helps to elucidate the relationship between a) and b) is authenticity. In the 
following, I will give a very short historical overview of the changeful his-
tory of original and copy in the context of authenticity.
The meaning of the term “original,” in its earliest documented occur-
rences (in the twelfth century), was that of “not deri vative” or “that [which] 
existed at first.” At the same time, it also means “archetype,” which pre-
supposes the process of copying and denotes the notion of a model.14 
In Latin, the term “authentic” was used synonymously, while an original 
(authenticum) was also an authenticated, certified document as well as an 
autograph, a manuscript. The term “original,” furthermore, refers to the 
model depicted in a painting—for instance, a real person or an object. As 
of the end of the seventeenth century, the term was occasionally used 
in the arts, while it became permanently established in the artistic con-
text as of the end of the eighteenth century.15 Thus the original is a con-
structed as well as an autonomous entity. Unsurprisingly, in the course of 
historical development, the terms “originality” and “original” (as an adjec-
tive), derived from the noun “original,” have additionally reinforced the 
elements of novelty, individuality, and ingenuity independent of a model. 
Here, the French language, where the term has been documented since 
the end of the seventeenth century, holds a pioneering position.16 Denis 
Diderot’s Encyclopédie states a connection between original and génie, 
which makes apparent the semantic field of the term original, spanning 
13 Groys 2002, 109.
14 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “original”; Allgemeine deutsche Real-Enzyklopädie für 
die gebildeten Stände, s.v. “Original, Originalität, Originell”.
15 Antoine Furetière, in his dicctionary of 1690. Cf. Häseler 2002, 640.
16 “Diesen Einfluss des Französischen bestätigen alle gängigen Wörterbücher.” Cf. 
Häseler 2002, 640.
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connected terms important for the arts such as “derived from nature,” 
“exemplary,” “new,” and “creative”: “It is used for things one copies. It is 
said that nature is my original; this drawing, this painting, despite being 
a copy, is my original. Original also denotes a drawing, a painting which a 
painter creates from imagination, from genius. Even when all of its parts 
are copied after nature.”17
This combination of creativeness, uniqueness, and exemplariness 
makes the paradoxical relation of original to mimesis justifiable. This is 
the case in Immanuel Kant’s famous dictum that “Genius is the talent (or 
natural gift) which gives the rule to Art. Since talent, as the innate produc-
tive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to Nature, we may express the mat-
ter thus: Genius is the innate mental disposition (ingenium) through which 
Nature gives the rule to Art.”18
Despite its quality of copy, art then becomes unique in the sense 
of being matchless and inimitable. Or, as Umberto Eco puts it, art is its 
own original.19 In that sense, the original work of art has to be validated 
multiple times. Hence the act of authentication is divided among several 
authorities: the author/artist, the connoisseur, art history, the art market, 
the media, and scholarship. However, it was only toward the end of the 
nineteenth century that a stricter opposition between original and copy 
developed; namely when the postulate of imitation (of both nature and 
artistic models) was abandoned, the autonomous, creative artist gained 
complete acceptance—also in the legal and economic field—and new 
technical means of reproducing artefacts (such as photography) had been 
invented. As long as the notion of imitation justifies art, original and copy 
are not mutually exclusive. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries still 
distinguished between a bad copy and a good copy, between the mere 
reproduction of a model and an imitation which came close to the ideal. 
At the same time, the nineteenth century is considered—and often also 
considered itself to be—an age of copy and reproduction. Despite all crit-
icism levelled against technological innovations and their application in 
the arts, photography, for example, caused the enthusiastic incorpora-
tion of reproduced images into everyday life. In the face of these devel-
opments in the media-related context, original and copy needed to be 
re-discussed.
17 My translation,“On dit: la nature est mon original; ce dessin, ce tableau, quoique 
copie, est mon original. Original ce dit encore d’un dessin, d’un tableau qu’un 
peintre fait d’imagination, de génie, quoique chacune de leurs parties soit 
copiée d’après nature,” Diderot and D’Alembert 1777, 29–30. 
18 Kant 2007, 112. “Genie ist das Talent (Naturgabe), welches der Kunst die Regel 
gibt. Da das Talent, als angebornes produktives Vermögen des Künstlers, selbst 
zur Natur gehört, so könnte man sich auch so ausdrücken: Genie ist die ange-
borne Gemütsanlage (ingenium), durch welche die Natur der Kunst die Regel 
gibt,” Kant 1991, 235.
19 Eco 1988, 13–18.
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Therefore, twentieth century aesthetic theories were in need of a cat-
egory for legitimation, which could be found in authenticity: On the one 
hand the term denoted a trait of reality which depended on the work’s 
status of original or copy and which was legitimised through various 
instances of authentication/certification like the law, science, or expert 
opinion. On the other hand, authenticity expressed a reality and validity 
peculiar to art. Clement Greenberg, the theoretician of American Mod-
ernism, for instance, locates the peculiar authenticity of art in its peculiar 
historicity: “Nothing could be further from the authen tic art of our time 
than the idea of a rupture of continuity. Art is—among other things—
continuity, and unthinkable without it. Lacking the past of art, and the 
need and compulsion to maintain its standards of ex cellence, Modernist 
art would lack both substance and justification.”20 This concept can be 
termed Kunstauthentizität (art-informed authenticity).21 The latter is based 
on the idea of a creative, autonomous subject and does not face opposi-
tion, even in Andy Warhol’s artistic coup, which is to employ the copy as 
a provocation in the face of the differentiation between art and non-art, 
in that it excludes neither subjective artistic nor conceptual authenti city. 
The concept of authenticity retains its validity even when craftsmanship 
and creativity no longer constitute any basis for art.22 In spite of the 
delegation of manufacturing work from the artist to professionals and 
industry (Jeff Koons, for example, has an enormous workshop hall with 
numerous assistants in New York), the demand for the work and the art-
ist to be unique and original is upheld. A group of Minimalist artists who 
worked with industrial materials rejected the replication of their works, 
which were collected for an exhibition at the Guggenheim Museum at 
the beginning of the 1990s, with the following argument: neither the 
objects themselves nor the plans were sufficient to create replicas equal 
in value to the originals because circumstances can unexpectedly change 
the appearance of a piece during production. Therefore the materiality of 
the individual work has significance and the necessary authenticity is only 
attributed by the artist.23
This authority of the artist can be supplemented by the contextual 
authenticity of the convention, the attribution whereby a work is made 
into a work of art. Arthur C. Danto confronted the dilemma of art criticism 
in the face of an art that is no longer determined by external characteris-
tics such as technical accomplishment, material, and objects, and inter-
nal characteristics such as genre and style, in response to Andy Warhol’s 
20 Greenberg 1993, 93.
21 As proposed in Knaller 2007, 8–9, 21–22.
22 Cf. Knaller 2012, 51–75.
23 Tietjen 1998, 31–43. “dass weder die Objekte selbst noch die Pläne ausreichten, 
um den Originalen gleich wertige Repliken herzustellen, da bei der Produktion 
der Zufall das Erscheinungsbild unvorhergesehen verändern könne, damit die 
Materialität des einzelnen Werkes Bedeutung habe und sich die notwendige 
Authen tizität des halb allein vom Künstler zuschreiben lasse.”
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exhibition of the Brillo Box, in 1964.24 Given the perceptually indistin-
guishable difference between art and everyday objects, the philosopher 
is confronted with a previously neglected philosophical question about 
art, namely, what is it that constitutes art and how are completely identi-
cal objects to be distinguished in terms of art and non-art? This question 
stands in the same problematic context as questions about falsification 
and the original: to design a Brillo box means nothing for the art market 
(although the designer was an artist who accepted the contract due to 
financial exigency), but to exhibit one may impart lasting renown.
This dissolution of classifications is further radicalised in multi-media 
performances of situations and actions, as in Daniel Spoerri’s eating-ac-
tions, for which galleries are turned into restaurants. The work is a series 
of specific events, an “excerpt from a situation of direct day-to-day living,”25 
that is neither original nor copy, nor is it falsifiable.26 Art is actionist in all 
kinds of ways, a search for traces in everyday life, playing out patterns 
of actions, and performing and documenting everyday situations.27 The 
extent to which the art expert too can cling to the longstanding division 
between original and copy is demonstrated by Francis V. O’Connor:
It used to be that an “original” work of art was understood to have 
been created by the artist, its originality proved with documents, 
signatures, and the informed opinion of experts. […] More recently, 
there has been a disturbing tendency to denigrate the authority of 
both artist and expert, to confuse truth with dogma, and to treat 
all created objects as “texts” which can be used as pretexts for new 
texts based on the free associations of their relativistic authors. […] 
Taken to extremes, such a point of view denies the objectivity of 
historical truth, and would deem a fake to be as culturally significant 
as an authentic object.28
24 Danto 1981. Arthur C. Danto takes the most important innovations in art since 
Duchamps Ready-Mades, Pop Art, Conceptual Art and Minimal Art as the start-
ing point of his inquiry. He therefore neither presumes a creative genius nor a 
closed character of the work of art (geschlossenen Werkcharakter) that demands 
originality. At a time when the copy/reproduction of everyday items and the use 
of industrially produced material admit of art, for Danto the artistic character 
of works can no longer lie in the perceptual, but rather only in the conceptual 
(Danto 1981, 44). Cf. Knaller 2012, 51–75.
25 “Aus schnitt aus einer Situation unmittelbaren Lebensvollzugs“
26 Metzger 1995, 11.
27 Schmidt-Wulffen 1995, 29–36.
28 O’Connor 2004, 4.
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The original in the digital age, or, the perfect copy:  
Paolo Veronese and Adam Lowe’s Le Nozze di Cana (1562–63 
and 2007)
As a contemporary example for a further stage of the original-to-copy 
relation, I would like to examine the digitally-produced facsimile of Paolo 
Veronese’s large painting, Le Nozze di Cana, and the discussion concerned 
with it.29
Veronese’s original painting, executed between 1562 and 1563, has 
been exhibited at the Louvre since 1798, when it was brought to Paris by 
Napoleon as war loot. It was originally kept in the refectory of Isola San 
Giorgio Maggiore, a building designed by Palladio, where it was exhib-
ited in such a perfect manner that it soon became famous and was fre-
quently visited. Over the centuries, various attempts to return it to Italy 
were undertaken.30 On September 11, 2007—exactly 210 years after the 
Veronese painting had been removed—a facsimile was installed in San 
Giorgio Maggiore’s refectory, which since Palladio had also undergone 
extensive reconstruction (fig. 1).
The facsimile created by Adam Lowe is a technically elaborate piece, 
which takes into account the conditions from which Veronese’s painting 
originated, as well as Palladio’s spatial construction, that is the conditions 
of light and materials. Lowe’s piece, executed in the artist’s Madrid studio 
Faktum Arte, has not only made it possible to re-stage a historical situa-
tion, it also allows for the animation of the painting’s particular history, 
in which we find united a congenial artistic cooperation between archi-
tect and painter, combined with political rivalry (Napoleon and Venice) 
and matters of loss and restitution. Bruno Latour focused on this com-
plex situation in the essay “The Migration of the Aura.”31 With Lowe, Latour 
elaborates on the modifications determined by digital media and comes 
to the conclusion that attributing, as well as differentiating between, the 
status of original and copy ultimately depends on the given technical 
means and situation. This is because those factors determine an artwork’s 
history, which is always one of reproduction and reworking. To describe 
this process, Latour uses the term “trajectory,” that is, the line/abstraction 
which permits tracing a sequence of events, changes, etc. in the history of 
a piece—in short, a biography of the work. It is such a line that the “perfect 
copy” of Veronese’s painting exhibited in Venice supposedly draws. The 
fact that it is a highly accurate reproduction, which considers both matters 
of colour and of three-dimensionality, is merely one aspect of its overall 
success. In Latour’s and Lowe’s view, there is a version n of artistic and 
literary artefacts, which is succeeded by respective versions n1, n2, etc. 
29 Cf. Knaller 2015 184–188.
30 During the twentieth century, André Malraux, Vittorio Branca, and Vittorio Cini 
were involved; Pasquale Gagliardi and Bruno Latour have recently taken up this 
endeavor.
31 Latour and Lowe 2010, 2–18. On Latour’s position in this, see Neubert 2012, 53.
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However, the configurations in which the latter appear, as well as the con-
sequences they have upon the original, depend upon the given technical 
situation and conditions, and on how those are dealt with. The conceptual 
authenticity of an image is thus a quality that cannot be diminished in 
terms of its distinctiveness when art works are being copied, transformed, 
or even when they reproduce everyday objects. This is, for instance, the 
case when Rubens considers black-and-white drawings or engravings 
of paintings legitimate media to enable the beholder to understand the 
image, when Diderot in his Encyclopédie distinguishes between the copy 
of an original as original and the copy of a copy as copy, or when Arthur C. 
Danto declares Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box to be “art,” due to its unconditional 
conceptuality. 
In its turn, digital technology is able to play with, simulate, and produce 
all kinds of medial formats For Latour, dividing the arts into repeatable 
and unique forms or classes32 becomes obsolete in light of the dissolution 
of analogue image semiotics caused by digital technology. Like a play or 
32 The division into repeatable and unique forms is the base of Nelson Goodman’s 
widely cited categorization of art into autographic and allographic systems “Let 
us speak of a work of art as autographic if and only if the distinction between 
original and forgery of it is significant; or better, if and only if even the most 
exact duplication of it does not thereby count as genuine,” Goodman 1976, 113. 
Figure 1: Paolo Veronese / Adam Lowe: Le Nozze di Cana, 1562–63 and 2007.
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a musical score, an image becomes “stageable” and repeatable, and can, 
time and again, be newly fashioned in its originality, provided the respec-
tive copies are of high quality, capable of changing, and offer ever new 
approaches to the (immaterial) quality of originality. The aesthetic inter-
relatedness of materiality and immateriality thus appears as a variable 
and non-hierarchised form. Lowe’s image becomes as much Veronese’s 
image as Veronese’s image becomes Lowe’s image. Original and copy are 
mutually dependant in a constructive way via modal formations (narra-
tion, technology/technique, installation, interpretation, etc.). Latour’s con-
clusion concerning a good copy is that it extends the original in terms of its 
originality. A good copy “adds originality to the original version by offering 
it new dimensions without jeopardizing the penultimate version—without 
ever touching it, thanks to the delicate process used to record it.”33
Nevertheless, this very aspect of the trajectory is in need of specifica-
tion. The notion of originality disregards the question as to where and how 
aesthetic conceptuality (immateriality) arises—or should arise—and as to 
how it can and should be receptively experienced. The concept of original-
ity privileged by Latour does not embrace the operating modes of newer 
and most recent arts. For this a short resume of original and copy in their 
respective relation to authenticity.
Conclusion: Authenticity, original, and copy
The relationship between the arts and reality, which has been defined 
as a relationship between original and copy since the age of Humanism 
and the Renaissance, is determined by epistemological-ontological and 
intra-systemic relations. In mediaeval art and literature, by contrast, it 
marks a dilemma in need of constant processing, as it touches upon ques-
tions concerning the possibilities and the legitimisation of human produc-
tion, on the significance of authors versus a divine creator, and of creative 
form versus hierarchically-structured and analogously related res and indi-
viduum. By harkening back to classical models, the Renaissance employs 
mimesis—the creative production of a likeness (copy) from a model (orig-
inal)—as the basis for the development of the modern era’s notion of 
art. Since the nineteenth century, the relational complex of original and 
copy within the mentioned epistemological-ontological and intra-systemic 
premises of the modern era has formed the background for the arts while 
developing the idea of a strictly differentiated relationship between original 
and copy, a wish that develops alongside the possibility of creating exact 
reproductions, the emergence of an elaborate art market, and its related 
legal framework. Since the advent of the avant-garde, and even more so 
On the contrary to this allographic arts like music, dance, theater, or literature 
allow for or even imply repetition. 
33 Latour (2010), 11
81
ALWAYS DEALING WITH REALITY BUT NEVER TOO CLOSE TO IT
since the 1950s, the arts have increasingly abandoned strictly binary struc-
tures and—to the confusion of audience and critics alike—there no longer 
appears to be a preference. Adam Lowe writes on this matter: “In a world 
of genetic modification notions of originality may not be as obvious as they 
once seemed. It is becoming clear that originality does not exist in a quasi- 
religious notion of ‘aura’ but it lies in more physical things. It lies in the 
intrinsic qualities of an object. It is not fixed and it can be bestowed and 
removed.”34 Like “aura,” “originality” has become a historical term. “Authen-
ticity” is certainly a term which, more aptly than “original,” subsumes the 
arts’ physical and intrinsic traits of reality as mentioned by Lowe.
Contrary to originality, the notion of authenticity is more comprehen-
sive in operational terms. Like originality, authenticity basically displays 
a paradoxical structure situated between self-validation and validation 
through others, between autological and hetereological significance.35 
However, other than originality, authenticity encompasses normative, 
evaluative, interpretative, and descriptive modes of application. Moreover, 
the term is gradable, extendable by attributes, and makes it possible to 
describe poetics and approaches beyond traditional notions of art; yet, the 
term primarily refers to the various constellations of empirical and con-
ceptual conditionality of art and literature. What is respectively at stake 
are sources of certification such as author, witness, media, law, and econ-
omy.36 Objects are authentic when they are authenticated by a legitimising 
source or authority. Subjects are authentic when they are authenticated 
either as their own authors or creators or through objects, media, and 
works. Authenticity is shaped by a complex of individual perspectives and 
objectifying authentication.
This ongoing processuality between various categories of certification 
and validity, of mise-en-scène and notions of truth-determining concepts 
of authenticity, illustrates that both general and individual moments as 
well as performative and empirical moments are inherent to the notion 
of authenticity. Combined, these moments form a complex which, in turn, 
can fulfil legitimising, interpretative, explanatory, referential, and repre-
sentative functions. Therein lies the attraction of authenticity in modernity: 
the authentic is the outcome of a time- and place-specific process of cer-
tification that has to be continually reestablished. In their complex facets, 
copy versus original is but one example of the relevance of authenticity to 
the modern era, and especially as a term used for defining the relationship 
between art and reality.
34 Lowe 2007, 113.
35 Cf. Knaller 2007, 21–22.
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Limiting the Power of the Copy
Abstract The extensive debates in twentieth century media theory are 
hardly something which lends itself to succinct summary. One striking fact, 
however, is that “reproducibility” is a recurring theme. The ease with which 
content can be reproduced is seen as a distinguishing feature of technical 
media (since the emergence of photography and film, and in particular 
of new, i.e. digital, media). What is more, such content is designed to be 
reproducible; it seems as though the very difference between original and 
copy is becoming obsolete. This observation has been described by various 
theorists with varying emphasis as a specific feature or objective of media 
development. Part I of this text will briefly present a few relevant positions. 
The mere existence, however, of terms such as “piracy” or “pirated copy,” 
and of campaigns against “copyright pirates,” shows that reproducibility is 
not a phenomenon that is welcomed unreservedly. Reproducibility clashes 
with the economic imperative of scarcity, and therefore with legal regula-
tions. Thus judicial, technical, and didactic procedures work together to 
prevent unauthorized reproduction, a process that is outlined in Part  II. 
Part III offers a short conclusion.
Keywords Counterfeiting, commodity, holography, piracy, reproducibility
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Theories of reproducibility and simulation
The obvious association evoked by the term “reproducibility” is Walter Ben-
jamin’s well-known text The Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechanical Repro-
duction, which was first published in French in 1936.1 It should be noted 
that Benjamin, thinking to diagnose a whole epoch, describes an “age of 
technological reproducibility” (which would be a better translation) which, 
however, initially refers mainly to works of art. He does stress that the 
work of art has always been manually reproducible, but that the “[t]ech-
nological reproduction of the work of art is something else, something 
that has been practiced intermittently through history, at widely separated 
intervals though with growing intensity.”2 Thus it seems that reproducibil-
ity has at least intensified in the modern period.
According to Benjamin, the result of this intensification is, firstly, “the 
most profound changes” in the impact of “traditional artworks.”3 Repro-
duction detaches the artwork from tradition and makes it “come closer 
to whatever situation the person apprehending it is in;”4 the exhibition 
value supplants the cult value. Secondly, he underlines this diagnosis by 
pointing to the emergence of two art forms—photography and cinema—
that are already structurally designed to be reproducible: “From a photo-
graphic plate, for instance, many prints can be made; the question of the 
genuine print has no meaning. However, the instant the criterion of genu-
ineness in art production failed, the entire social function of art underwent an 
upheaval.”5
Benjamin’s suggestion has been taken up repeatedly in recent debates 
on the subject. Rosalind Krauss, for example, writes that “The structural 
change effected by photography’s material base is that it is a medium of 
direct copies, where there exist multiples without an original.” She takes 
this as evidence of a “totally new function of art,”6 arguing that the art of 
modernity cannot be understood without this recourse to viewing pho-
tography as a “multiple” without an original (and the art of so-called post-
modernity even more so). She thus regards the appropriative art forms of 
the 1980s, which made intense use of the concept of the copy, as particu-
larly important, pointing to the work of artists such as Sherrie Levine, who 
famously photographed the photos of Walker Evans and presented them 
as her own work.
1 This essay came out of a research project that was part of the framework of 
TÁMOP 4.2.4. A/2-11-1-2012-0001 “National Excellence Program—Elaborating 
and operating an inland student and researcher personal support system.” The 
project was subsidized by the European Union and co-financed by the European 
Social Fund.
2 Benjamin 2008, 3.
3 Benjamin 2008, 5.
4 Benjamin 2008, 7.
5 Benjamin 2008, 12. Emphasis in original.
6 Krauss 2001, 1002. Emphasis in original.
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Benjamin had already noted that the “significance [of reproducibility] 
points beyond the realm of art.”7 Indeed, even without explicit recourse to 
Benjamin, comparable diagnoses were made elsewhere. Günther Anders, 
for example, remarked on television reporting in his 1956 text Die Welt als 
Phantom und Matrize (The World as Phantom and as Matrix), noting that 
“When the event in its reproduced form is socially more important than 
the original event, this original must be shaped with a view to being repro-
duced: in other words, the event becomes merely a master matrix, or a 
mold for casting its own reproduction.”8 Again, reproduction seems to be 
the signature of an epoch, replacing the “original,” whatever that might be, 
and/or cancelling out the difference between original and reproduction. 
Admittedly, Anders was referring to television rather than to photogra-
phy and film, and his attitude towards this change was marked by much 
greater cultural pessimism than Benjamin’s.
A similar but more affirmative diagnosis is found in the work of Jean 
Baudrillard, whose work from the mid-1970s onwards formulates—partly 
with reference to Benjamin—a history of simulacra. He argues that “West-
ern” societies, after a phase of imitation in the Renaissance and a phase 
of industrial production of identical objects, entered an era of “hyperreal 
simulation” at some point (he does not specify when) in the twentieth cen-
tury.9 By “simulation”—insofar as it is possible to determine this precisely 
in his sometimes confusing texts—Baudrillard does not mean (or only 
means in a metaphorical sense) the construction of performative models 
in computer simulation, which has become increasingly important since 
1945 (and particularly in the military, technology, and science).10 Instead, 
his main contention, rather like Anders,11 is that reproduction has already 
secured a conclusive victory over the real, and that original and copy can 
therefore no longer be distinguished from one another. He seems to 
argue that, today, no substantial depth of reference can be assumed to 
exist behind chains of signifiers pointing exclusively to other signifiers. In 
such a case, political attitudes, for example, become interchangeable life-
style accessories. Kramer summarizes as follows: “simulation thus levels 
out the differences between original and copy, between the real and its 
reproduction, and in the end eradicates all references to the referent.”12
Whatever one may think about individual aspects of this strident diag-
nosis, Baudrillard’s texts were extensively discussed in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. It is probably no coincidence that a series of further publi-
cations on related issues followed in the 1990s and early 2000s, such as 
Hillel Schwartz’s Culture of the Copy (1996) and Originalkopie: Praktiken 
des Sekundären (Originalcopy: Practices of the Secondary), published in 
7 Benjamin 2008, 7.
8 Anders 1956, 20.
9 Cf. Baudrillard 1993, especially 70–76. On Benjamin, see 55–57.
10 Cf. Schröter 2004a. 
11 Cf. Kramer 1998, on Baudrillard and Anders.
12 Kramer 1998, 259. 
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Cologne at the research center for “Media and Cultural Communication” in 
2004, which describes the diverse forms and processes of reproduction.13 
We can see, even beyond the question of originality and its relationship 
to the copy in art, an increasingly firm diagnosis that we live in an “age 
of technological reproducibility,” (Benjamin) and a “culture of the copy,” 
(Schwartz) or even the “era of simulation” (Baudrillard). This diagnosis does 
seem plausible. Just a few examples, deliberately taken from a wide range 
of spheres, highlight the pervasiveness of this phenomenon:
1.  Science: the sciences relevant for modernity are based on an episte-
mology of experiment (however problematic this may be), in which the
validity of a theory can only be confirmed if an effect is reproducible.
Baudrillard wrote: “The very definition of the real is that of which it is
possible to provide an equivalent reproduction.”14 In this sense, reality
depends on reproducibility.
2.  Material production: The industrial manufacturing of goods surrounds
us with an abundance of largely identical copies, e.g. of common house-
hold items such as chairs. These items obviously follow a reproducible
prototype. Andy Warhol provided a well-known, ironic commentary
on this development with his series on Campbell’s soup tins and Brillo
boxes.
Here an interesting problem emerges: although the “prototype” for
an industrially-produced line of products seems to be “original” in the
sense that all specimens comprising the series (e.g. all the produced
chairs) resemble it and are constructed according to its “pattern,” sig-
nificant differences exist between the two different relations—of proto-
type to specimens on the one hand; of original to copies on the other:
Firstly, the prototype is very seldomly exhibited as such, whereas the
original in other art forms (e.g. painting) is the central object of attrac-
tion—although prototypes can become originals, such as when the
prototype of a famously designed chair is exhibited in a show on a star
designer.
Secondly, no one would see a mass-produced chair as a kind of
“degraded” version of the prototype; normally, one doesn’t even think
about this relation at all. The question if one chair is a “better” or “worse” 
copy of the prototype than another makes no sense—and this obviously
has something to do with the process of production—a point which
Baudrillard also makes.15 Industrial production is, by its very definition,
a serial process, characterized by standard technological procedures,
whereas in other forms of production (let’s say in painting) copies may
be made from an original, but that is not necessarily the case. The aim
of industrial production is to produce a series: the prototype is only the
13 Cf. Fehrmann et al. 2004. 
14 Baudrillard 1993, 73. Emphasis in original.
15 Cf. Baudrillard 1993. 
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necessary pattern, but the important thing is the series itself, because 
it contains the commodity to be sold. The aim of an art form like paint-
ing (at least in the Western tradition), however, is different: here it’s 
the singular original, touched by the hand of the artist (often glorified 
as “genius”), that is the important commodity, and to copy this “work” 
is at best an exercise in emulating and understanding the “genius.” At 
worst, it’s simply a crime. But in any case, the copy is normally created 
not though a standardized technological process, but by hand, such 
that different people will make different copies of one original. Here, 
the question of whether there is a “better” or “worse” copy does apply. 
One perhaps could say that the more standardized routines to produce 
(nearly) identical specimens are put in place (and this need not only 
apply to industrial modernity, since such processes were established 
long time ago16), the more the difference between original and copy 
transforms into a difference between prototype and specimen.
Thirdly, this points to another interesting difference: normally, original 
and copy have nearly the same materiality. A copy of a statue made 
of marble may not be marble, but let’s say made of bronze, and may 
not even be to the same scale, but it’s still a three-dimensional object. 
A painting of a statue (or a photo of it) would normally not be called 
a “copy” of the statue, but a reproduction. A prototype and a speci-
men can also differ in materiality. Although the prototype of a series 
of chairs may also be a chair, normally prototypes should give precise 
information on how to produce the specimen, meaning that prototypes 
are normally highly complex drawings, scaled down three-dimensional 
models, or computer models (or an assemblage of all three of these) 
containing exact quantitative measurements and so on. In sum, a pro-
totype is not an object (like an original), but a kind of “set of instruc-
tions” on how to produce an object. While a copy is an object imitating 
another object (the original), a specimen is a material instantiation of 
the instructions enclosed in a prototype.17 In this sense, Baudrillard was 
correct: industrial production, with its distinction between prototype 
and specimen, lies halfway between modes of production not centered 
around a series18 (and therefore having a strong sense of an “original”) 
and digital modes of production in which even the difference between 
16 With thanks to Philipp W. Stockhammer for his highly interesting talk at the con-
ference “The Transformative Power of the Copy.”
17 See Meretz 2010. On the problems of defining “copy,” see also the contribution 
by Philipp W. Stockhammer in this volume.
18 See Baudrillard 1993. An interesting point is that Baudrillard suggests, in his 
teleological model, that “imitation” (and therefore the “copy”) belongs to a phase 
before industrial production. However, the ongoing importance of the role of the 
original in the art system (in keeping with Luhmann) until today suggests that 
different regimes of production now exist side-by-side and cannot be described 
in a historical sequence alone. On the problem of the history of the copy, see the 
contribution by Philipp W. Stockhammer in this volume. On the role of original 
and copy in the art system, see the contribution by Susanne Knaller.
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prototype and series seems to make no sense anymore because a 
“copy” of a finished software product is simply identical to its predeces-
sor (though there are limitations to that, too, as we will see below).
3.  Production of signs: Reproducible photography covers the world with
identical-looking photos. We all use photocopiers to duplicate written
documents or pictures, a development Benjamin could not have fore-
seen, and the emergence of digital media really seems to have brought
about the collapse of the difference between original and copy, as
already hinted at above. Digital data is, on a basic level, just a sequence
of zeros and ones, and if one simply copies this sequence (or if a com-
puter does), the resulting file is exactly the same as the original. Unlike
analog processes, copying no longer causes a loss in quality that would
differentiate the copy from the original. The difference becomes obso-
lete. Indeed, the argument initially seems more convincing for digital
data than for photography (the focus of Benjamin’s and subsequently
Krauss’s theses); most photographic procedures, after all, still distin-
guish between an original negative and positive prints.
This, then, is the grand narrative recounted by certain representatives 
of media theory: we are entering an “age of reproducibility” in which 
everything and everyone will soon be able to be reproduced—and the dif-
ferences between original and copy will thereby collapse. Thus, for exam-
ple, Geoffrey Batchen also claims: “We are entering a time when it will no 
longer be possible to tell any original from its simulations.”19 Cinema and 
television are full of corresponding phantasms, particularly in the case of 
science fiction. There are the fantasies of genetic reproduction, which sug-
gest that we will soon be able to create clones of dinosaurs or humans, or 
phantasms of virtual simulation, in which future computers will be able to 
reproduce the world in its materiality—just think of the “holodeck” from 
the Star Trek series, or the premise of the film The Matrix.20 The simulations 
shown there are (almost) as real as reality; the difference between original 
and copy becomes meaningless.
Stabilizing the reproductive difference
Having followed this idea to its final, phantasmatic climax, a critical com-
mentary on this grand narrative is pertinent, and several points of depar-
ture offer themselves here. From a historical point of view we can ask 
whether culture has not always been based on reproducibility (take lan-
guage as an example: to learn it means to reproduce the spoken or written 
signs of language); thus reproducibility does not exclusively correlate with 
technical or new media. One should also draw attention to the historical 
19 Batchen 2000, 10.
20 Cf. Schröter 2004b, 152–276.
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contingency of reproducibility as an attribute of certain technical media: 
photography, for example, is not reproducible “in itself” and non-repro-
ducible photographic processes (daguerreotype, polaroid, etc.) do exist.
The thesis that we live in an age of technological reproducibility can be 
criticized from another angle, too. One could argue that the expansion of 
reproducibility—regardless of whether the principle has always existed or 
not—into an increasingly broad range of subject areas inevitably entails 
the emergence of strategies to counter it. The description of modernity as 
an age of ever-increasing reproducibility is not false, but one-sided: it can 
also be argued that modernity is also an age of technological non-repro-
ducibility. Especially if, as Anders and Baudrillard have done, one takes the 
ever-increasing reproducibility as evidence that the difference between 
original and copy is imploding—or has already imploded.
It is obvious that this difference still exists on an everyday level, despite 
the expansion of analog and digital technical media. The reproduction of 
money, confidential documents, and identity documents for example is 
prohibited for all but certain institutions. Otherwise their “authenticity”—
and this means nothing less than their operability—would be nullified. 
These types of documents function on the basis of a distinction between 
original and copy—a copied banknote is no longer a banknote. Of course 
there is a history of “unauthorized reproduction,”21 as it is explicitly called 
in the relevant guidelines in the European central bank, and the counter-
feiting of coins, for example, has long resulted in severe penalties.22 There 
are legal regulations against certain forms of reproduction—regulations 
which find expression in pejorative terms such as “pirated copy” or “piracy.”
But the legal penalty always comes after the fact. When it comes to 
the currency system, the damage must be prevented in advance, since 
large-scale counterfeiting would lead to inflation and could even bring 
about economic collapse. Because of these dangers, increasing efforts 
were made in the twentieth century to develop technical—and sometimes 
legally protected—processes, simply to preclude reproduction.
For example, the spread of photocopiers since the 1960s has resulted 
in increased ease of reproduction. Parallel to this increase, new types of 
non-reproducible markings have been devised, and older techniques such 
as the watermark (as found on bank notes),23 have been resurrected to 
prevent counterfeiting. But such technical processes only work if the sub-
jects concerned—i.e. all of us—know how to decipher the mark denoting 
authenticity. Hence information about techniques of observation which 
help to detect forgeries has been widely distributed.
The German police advice website, www.polizei-beratung.de, gives 
information on a holographic “special patch” on the lower right-hand side 
21 EZB/2003/4. Accessed March 31, 2014. http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/l_0782 
0030325de00160019.pdf, last modified March 25, 2003.
22 Cf. Voigtlaender 1976. 
23 Cf. Gerstengarbe, Lang, and Schneider 2010. 
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of the 50 Euro note: “On the right side of the front of the note is a holo-
graphic patch. If you move the banknote, depending on the angle of view-
ing, either the value of the note or the architectural motif will be visible. 
Concentric circles of rainbow colors wander inwards and outwards through 
the hologram.”24 One is supposed to learn how to view a banknote, and 
what to pay attention to in order to distinguish genuine from fake, orig-
inal from copy. The hologram added to the banknote, which changes its 
appearance in the light and which cannot be photocopied (with a modern 
color copier), helps achieve this.25
The source of the non-reproducibility of holography lies in its epistemol-
ogy. The intention here is not to reconstruct the history of holography in 
detail. That would go beyond the scope of this essay.26 It is enough to state 
that a central condition of holography is the (re)discovery of wave optics 
in the nineteenth century.27 The underlying idea of holography, namely to 
record the interference pattern between the wavefronts of two coherent 
light beams, assumes the understanding of interference as a property of 
light. The recording of the interference between object waves and refer-
ence waves permits the exact reconstruction of the object wave. The idea 
of recording these interferences was formulated in 1948 by Denis Gabor, 
for the purpose of decreasing limitations to electron microscopes: “It is 
known that the spherical aberration of electron lenses sets a limit to the 
resolving power of electron microscopes at about 5 Å. [5 × 10-10 m] … The 
new microscopic principle described below offers a way around this diffi-
culty, as it allows one to dispense altogether with electron objectives.”28 
This is the central point of Gabor’s early considerations—it is possible to 
avoid lenses, lens systems, and their limitations. This accounts for the 
unique status of holography in the history of technological imaging meth-
ods: it is the only procedure that can depict objects without their having to 
be projected through a lens.29 The hologram does not underlie geometri-
cal optics or linear perspective projection and the 1:1 correlation of image 
and object points.30 In fact, every object point is correlated with every pixel, 
which is why each sliver of a broken hologram contains the entire image.31 
Nevertheless, visual media utilizing lenses and therefore being technologi-
cally based on the principles of geometrical optics (perspective) are clearly 
in the overwhelming majority: photography, film, television, video, and 
24 Accessed March 31, 2014. http://www.polizei-beratung.de/medienangebot/de 
tails/form/7/189.html. Translated by the author.
25 For a detailed account of the very different optical technologies used to prevent 
counterfeiting, see Renesse 2005. 
26 See Johnston 2006. 
27 See Buchwald 1989. 
28 Gabor 1948, 777. 
29 Photograms do not need a lens either, but offer no image of the object. Instead, 
they are only records of its shadow.
30 See Carter 1970. 
31 Albeit with a resolution that decreases in proportion to the part size.
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even many digitized and digitally-generated images belong to this para-
digm.32 The fact that holography arises from a knowledge of wave optics, 
while all other imaging technologies (relying on the level of the projection 
of objects on the image sensor) follow geometrical optics (i.e. perspective), 
has important implications.
Historically, geometrical optics, i.e. the conceptualization of light in the 
form of straight rays—as in linear perspective—is the older knowledge. It 
is, as an approach, still a firm component of optics. A contemporary text-
book on optics says: “In many situations, the great simplicity arising from 
the approximation of Geometrical Optics more than compensates for its 
inaccuracies [in comparison with wave optics].”33 One of these situations 
is the calculation of optical systems on the basis of lenses. Wave optics 
describes phenomena such as diffraction, polarization, and interference of 
the light, phenomena that cannot be described by geometrical optics—but 
that’s not problematic for the efficiency of geometrical optics. Refraction 
and reflection as descriptive categories are sufficient because the struc-
tures that interact with light (mirrors, lenses, etc.) are large in comparison 
to the wavelength of light. If the relation between our macro-world and the 
wave length of light were different, it would be possible to see around cor-
ners, as light would flow around them in a wave-like manner (like water). 
This actually happens to a small degree—the effect is known as diffrac-
tion—but such wave-optical phenomena occur in the field of geometric-op-
tical technology only as disturbances. Diffraction restricts the resolution of 
lenses (exactly the problem Gabor tried to solve in his early paper), but 
such disturbances were historically the starting point for new knowledge 
and, consequently, new wave-optical technologies like holography.
Wave-optical knowledge encompasses geometric-optical knowledge; 
the latter is only an approximation of the former. This means that a) the 
wave-optical imaging technology of holography can include the phenom-
ena of geometrical optics but b) this property is not possible in reverse.
In concrete terms, a) means that a holographically recorded lens still 
works like a lens and a holographically depicted mirror still works as a mir-
ror.34 Today, the construction of such holographic-optical elements is an 
important branch of research and industry, as space-saving optics can be 
created for very special purposes.
Just as precisely, b) means that no geometrical-optical technology—
such as the photographic optics of a photocopier—can copy holographic 
images because the information saved in wave-optical images exceeds the 
potential of the geometrical-optic image.35 A holographic image contains 
more information about the object than a photograph of the object, simply 
32 For computer generated imagery, see Schröter 2003.
33 Hecht 2002, 149. 
34 For one of the first Soviet experiments on holography in the early 1960s, during 
which Yuri Denisyuk holographed a mirror, see Johnston 2006, 69.




because holography can record both the amplitude and the phase of light, 
thanks to the recording of interference patterns. A photocopy of a holo-
gram no longer appears captivatingly three-dimensional and no longer 
changes when the viewing angle is changed (iridescence). For this reason, 
imaging technology based on wave optics is well suited when applying 
safeguards to items such as printed money:36
The first banknote with a hologram patch was the 1988 Austrian 
500 Schilling note. In 1994, Kuwait integrated a hologram patch 
onto three of its banknotes and Bulgaria issued the first bank-
note in the world with a hologram strip, the LEAD® strip. The first 
banknote with a hologram window strand was issued in Finland, 
in 1985, followed by the Latvian 5 latu note, which was issued in 
1996. In Germany, the first banknotes were equipped with holo-
grams during the last appreciation of the D-Mark series in 1996. At 
that time, the 50, 100, and 200 D-Mark notes were enhanced with 
a hologram patch as an additional security measure. By 2000, 80 
different denominations from over 30 countries were in circulation 
with a hologram. In 2003, 150 denominations were equipped with 
various optical features, such as in the thread, as a foil strip, or as a 
patch. Currently, approx. 350 denominations are in circulation with 
a hologram element.37
The whole point of such non-reproducible markings is that they cannot be 
copied without significantly changing their appearance—but this implies 
that someone has to look at the markings and register the differences. 
To support this aim, the website www.polizei-beratung.de provides a Java 
applet with the name Euro-Blüten-Trainer (“fake euro trainer,” or some-
times translated as “funny money advisor”—fig. 1). Here, applying com-
parative visual analysis in a way Heinrich Wölfflin would surely never have 
imagined, one can learn to recognize the crucial security markings on 
banknotes. “Train your gaze to ‘incorruptible inspector’ standard.”38 Similar 
training software with corresponding short films can be found on the web-
site of the German Federal Bank.
This didactic endeavor also includes film and poster campaigns featur-
ing phrases such as “Copyright pirates are criminals” (fig. 2). These and 
similar disciplinary paratexts are important since—and this brings us back 
to the legal side—there are severe penalties (prison sentences of up to ten 
36 Pizzanelli discusses the various attempts and processes created to forge safety 
holograms and comes to the conclusion that holography is a very effective copy 
protection method, which is in contrast to occasional claims to the contrary 
(at least, given the state of the art in 1998 when Pizzanelli wrote his text), see 
Pizzanelli 1998. 
37 Wikipedia, s.v. “Hologramm.” Accessed April 11, 2008. http://de.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Hologramm.
38 Accessed April 11, 2009. http://bluetentrainer.polizei-beratung.de/blueten_euro/
trainer_d.html.
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years in Germany) even for unknowingly passing on counterfeit money. 
These paratexts alert us to our responsibility to learn techniques of obser-
vation that will help us recognize legally-protected technical effects—the 
absence of which signal the criminal offence of unauthorized reproduction 
of money or documents. For this reason, counterfeiters try to distribute 
their fake notes in chaotic, hectic situations where there is too little time 
and/or light for a thorough examination. 
In summary, the aim is to prevent unauthorized reproduction with a 
heterogeneous combination of three components:
1.  Legal threats and the institutional conditions which allow them to func-
tion, i.e. the legal-institutional complex.
2.  Technical effects that cannot be reproduced by the general public (e.g.
holograms).
3.  Techniques of observation focused on the special effects provided by
the processes in 2) that enable one to recognize the differences between
authorized and unauthorized reproduction as defined according to 1).
This heterogeneous configuration, designed to stabilize what one might 
call the reproductive difference between original and copy, appears in a 
wide variety of areas. I will outline just a few examples:
Figure 1. Euro-Blüten-Trainer (“funny money advisor”), screenshot. 
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Figure 2. Raubkopierer sind Verbrecher (“Copyright pirates are criminals”). 
1.  Product counterfeiting is a concern in the area of material commodi-
ties. At the beginning of 2009, a group of secondary school students
from Lübeck, Germany, went on a fatal drinking spree in Kemer, on
the Mediterranean coast of Turkey, drinking raki laced with metha-
nol. Following this incident, the April 3, 2009 issue of the Süddeutsche
Zeitung reported on problems with the counterfeiting of raki in Turkey,
and more precisely on “2005, the year of the raki crisis,” in which one
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incident stands out in particular: “First of all, 500,000 holograms, which 
were supposed to be attached to bottles to guarantee the authenticity 
of the liquor, were stolen from a raki distillery in Izmir […].”39 Two points 
can be deduced from this.
First, even if Baudrillard may be right in thinking that the industrial 
mass production of goods has led to an unprecedented spread of iden-
tical series of objects, this does not necessarily nullify the distinction 
between original and copy.40 Legitimate and illegal specimens should 
be distinguishable—at least in principle.
Secondly, holograms are mentioned again here, as in the discussion of 
banknotes above. As was said, holography is one of a number of irre-
producible photographic processes, designed to curb reproducibility 
in conjunction with corresponding legal institutions and observation 
techniques for assessing validity. The fact that there are small, iden-
tical holograms on many banknotes or on “original products” shows 
that holographs can be reproduced in certain circumstances, but not 
by the general public. Reproducibility is not something that exists or 
does not exist; it is present in a graduated and variously distributed 
state.41
2.  As already mentioned, one of the most important areas in which repro-
ducibility must be contained and reduced is that of documents pertain-
ing to governmental and economic structures. Money and personal
identification documents (of the kind general found in wallets) must
only be duplicated or produced by appropriate institutions. Readers
will undoubtedly understand the basis for this restriction: you likely
have, in your wallet, both identity documents and money or cards with
which you can access money. You can easily verify the vital importance
of this archive of non-reproducible elements for your economic and
political existence, i.e. your existence—to use Marx’ terminology—as a
bourgeois and citoyen. If you go to a bank without a credit card or iden-
tity card and try to get money, or try to travel to another country with-
out a passport, you will soon run into trouble—especially if you reach
a checkpoint. You can claim that you are creditworthy but no one will
believe you unless you can present a real credit card or a real passport.
You would be considered highly suspicious if you dared to present a
photocopy of your passport (or your credit card). You are only “your-
self” by virtue of your original documents.
A clear difference does emerge here, though: in the case of money,
you have to be able to recognize a fake 50 euro note, i.e. you have to
learn to distinguish it from real 50 euro notes. But you come across
a lot of 50 euro notes, which means you have to learn to tell genuine
copies from fake copies. With your ID card, the situation is somewhat
39 Translation from Strittmatter 2009, 10. 
40 Cf. the example of machine construction in Paul 2010. 
41 Cf. Schröter 2009. 
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different. It is only allocated to you, and of course it would make no 
sense to distribute numerous copies of it. I can scarcely use a copy of 
someone else’s ID card to prove my identity, however good the copy 
may be. Here the non-reproducibility of the ID card is connected to the 
prototype of my signature and face. My signature and the photo of my 
face connect me and my identity document indexically (this also applies 
to biometric data).42 My face and my signature have to match the face 
and signature on the document—and vice versa. Thus the prototype 
has to be reproduced, but it is fixed on a document that is rigorously 
protected against unauthorized reproduction by security features that 
cannot readily be reproduced. This shows that it is not a matter of play-
ing reproducibility and non-reproducibility against each other, but of 
observing their actual configurations, historically, culturally, even situ-
ationally. This essay is just a preliminary attempt to chart this difficult 
terrain. The ID card, which I cannot validly produce myself, assigns my 
face, and therefore my body, to my name. And this ID card can only be 
allocated to a specific, i.e. addressable, person by an approved govern-
mental body. In this sense, a person can be defined as a living body + 
an identity document.43 Much the same can be said for employee or 
military ID cards. Access to certain institutions or resources can only be 
obtained through such processes of identification; this is why “identity 
theft”44 is now a key crime in the areas of espionage, industrial espio-
nage, illegal immigration, and emigration.
While every banknote in a series shows the same reference, e.g. a value 
of 50 Euros, the singular reference is the difference between ID cards, 
meaning every ID card shows a different person. The issue with ID cards 
is therefore one of being able to distinguish a fake card from a genuine 
one. Strictly speaking, every banknote is also an original, since it has a 
singular number, but here the question is whether a given banknote is 
a valid copy of its prototype. In practice, we as users do not really have 
the opportunity to check whether the serial number on a banknote 
is correct—e.g. by visiting a bank. Hence we can and generally must 
disregard this singularity and differentiate, in the case of banknotes, 
42 The indexicality of the signature is also demonstrated by the fact that erasable pen-
cil is not “acceptable for use on official documents,” since the trace can be deleted 
or changed. (See Wikipedia, s.v. “Dokumentenechtheit.” Accessed March 31, 
2014. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dokumentenechtheit.) A particularly strange 
phenomenon that we cannot go into here is the so-called “facsimile signature 
stamp,” a stamp that imitates a hand-written signature as closely as possible.
43 It is not customary to possess ID cards in every country or culture—though this 
could be the subject of a comparative cultural study on the production of identity. 
In the conditions of modern mass societies, however, some sort of mechanism 
of identification is generally necessary. See a very detailed overview at Wiki-
pedia, s.v. “Identity document.” Accessed March 31, 2014. http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Identity_document.
44 Cf. Hoofnagle 2007. 
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between fake and genuine copies.45 This strange expression may cause 
discomfort—perhaps it would be better to say “authorized” and “unau-
thorized”—but, from the point of view of the authorizing bodies, this is 
the same as the difference between genuine and fake.46
3. In the art system, of course, the distinction between original and copy
is still maintained.47 This is particularly evident in the “vintage print” in
photography, a practice which would undoubtedly have seemed very
peculiar to Walter Benjamin, and would probably also strike Rosalind
Krauss as odd. The first print made from the negative by the pho-
tographer is valued higher than every subsequent reproduction, and
there are always conflicts about the reliability of the documentation
of these processes. It is, furthermore, standard practice today for pho-
tographers to make just a few prints of their photos—sometimes even
destroying the negative after producing the prints—to ensure that
only a small number of copies are in circulation. Thus even the works
of Appropriation Art which Krauss valued so highly have now become
expensive originals.
4.  In the digital field, especially, reproductive differences are continually
being reconstructed. Precisely because a loss-free reproduction could
theoretically diminish the difference between original and copy,48 fran-
tic efforts to rebuild this distinction have been redoubled. Increased
reproducibility seems liable to break down the object’s nature as a com-
modity and thus the very conditions which make a capitalist economy
possible. A digital commodity—whether software, a film, or music—can
be reproduced any number of times. This has a huge negative impact
on its commercializability if the digital commodity is reproduced by
users rather than producers. But this problem is even more fundamen-
tal: whether I hand over a piece of software for money or for free, I
always keep a copy. No exchange takes place, and thus the object’s
nature as a commodity seems questionable.49 Again, strict laws and
45 Both Jochen Venus and Timo Schemer-Reinhard have raised the question of 
whether it would be better to speak of banknotes as “specimens” or “exam-
ples” (German: Exemplare) rather than “copies.” This question is quite justified, 
but it raises the further question of how to distinguish between “example” and 
“copy”—a difficult question that can only be suggested but not answered here. 
The first problem is that the distinction between an example and a copy may 
only be possible in certain languages—what is referred to as an Exemplar of a 
book in German is simply called a “copy” in English. 
46 Jochen Venus, in an email to the author, objected: “The distinction between a 
‘genuine copy’ and a ‘fake’ one seems to me to be contrary to the meaning of 
the term copy. I don’t think you would talk about a fake imitation either.” And 
yet clearly this difference does exist, as one can see from the phenomenon of 
“certified copies” of documents issued by administrative bodies. Cf. Wikipedia, 
s.v. “Beglaubigung.” Accessed March 31, 2014. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Beglaubigung.
47 See the contribution of Susanne Knaller in this volume.
48 If one disregards the frequent need to compress data (and thus entail losses). 
See Salomon 2008. 
49 Cf. Grassmuck 2004. 
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their institutions of enforcement, whether through complicated tech-
nical processes—think of digital rights management50 or copy pro-
tection systems for DVDs51 and audio CDs52—as well as techniques of 
observation of validity are designed to prevent the digital technology’s 
technical potential for mass production from being usable; this is done 
because this potential is not compatible with the economic principles 
that are currently in place. 
Conclusion
Reproducibility presents a fundamental threat to the existing governmen-
tal and economic structures of modern societies; I believe Benjamin saw 
this correctly, albeit in a different way.53 Hence the emergence of dramatic 
terms to describe acts such as “piracy.”54 To combat these threats, a het-
erogeneous ensemble of special technological processes (such as holo-
graphy), legal regulations, and observational techniques is constructed, 
which I call the “heterogeneous ensemble of reproductive difference.” It is 
intended to stabilize the differences between genuine and fake originals, 
and between genuine and fake copies.
The heterogeneous ensemble of reproductive difference is a mode 
of—to borrow Foucault’s use of the term—“rarefaction,”55 without which 
neither the circulation of money or goods, nor of personal identity can be 
maintained. Such rarefaction seems, depending on the individual practice 
or subsystem, to be a more or less urgent necessity. It is nonsense to claim 
that the difference between original and copy is now obsolete. Whole 
industries earn their money by preventing copies from being produced—
and thus stabilizing originals. To sum up, there is indeed a transformative 
power of the copy—it is so transformative that it threatens the economy 
and the state. And that is why there are so many mechanisms to contain 
its power and to tame it.56
50 On DRM, see the wealth of information at the website of Humboldt University’s 
Institut für Informatik. Accessed March 3, 2014. http://waste.informatik.hu-
berlin.de/Grassmuck/drm/. On the problem of law relating to digital media, see 
Boehme-Neßler 2008. 
51 Cf. Heilmann 2010. 
52 Cf. Wöhner 2005. 
53 Benjamin hoped that reproducibility would encourage socialist transformations 
of society.
54 Cf. Yar 2005. 
55 Foucault 1981, 58. 
56 In a sense the taming of the copy provides a very good example for what Winston 
calls the “law of the suppression of radical potential” (1998, 11).
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Figures
Fig. 1: Accessed March 31, 2014. http://bluetentrainer.polizei-beratung.de/blueten_ 
euro/ trainer_d.html.
Fig. 2: Accessed February 16. 2017. http://images.mediabiz.de/newspics/032/1450 
32_1/b279x396.jpg. 
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The Hegemony of the Copy: 
The Manuscript, the Book, and 
the Electronic Text in the Age 
of Limitless Digital Storage
Abstract This essay questions when the creative process leading to 
the original can be said to be complete. When does the series of a pupil’s 
botched attempts at perfection leading to “the” singular and unique ob-
ject, text, tool, or artwork we recognise as the original expression of the 
master craftsman stop? Where is the cut-off point between the different 
versions (copies) of earlier inferior iterations in the gestation process that 
lead to the original, and final, superior original? This essay chiefly exam-
ines the manner in which text has been copied and stored in one particular 
type of object, namely that of the book, in order to provide some fairly 
well-known arguments regarding pre-mechanical as well as mechanical re-
production. In particular, it examines the differences between manuscript 
culture and print culture as we see them expressed in the production (and 
reproduction) of master copies and subsequent copies, of handwritten 
manuscripts, and mechanically printed books. Finally, it asks what the im-
pact of digital memory and digital copying has had in terms of our current 
conception of copy and original and, in particular, examines the manner in 
which an increase in memory storage capacity can be seen to go hand in 
hand with digitisation’s increased role in diluting the differences between 
original and copy—not only in the excessive copying of the original, but 
in the creative process itself. For in a world in which objects, information, 
and text can be copied cheaply in vast quantities, and to a degree of verisi-
militude that even the creator of such may no longer know the difference, 
does it make sense to speak of a distinction between the two any longer? 
Has the copy turned original, and the original turned copy? How do we 
discern between the two in a world in which all “copies,” the master copy 
as well as copies of the master copy, are indiscernible?
Keywords Artefact, aura, authenticity, book, copy, deletion, forgetting, 
frailty, manuscript, memory, mimesis, original, replica, safekeeping, text
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In his seminal study “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduc-
tion,” Walter Benjamin begins by the admission that “in principle, a work 
of art has always been reproducible.”1 As long as there have been art and 
craft, Benjamin explains, there have been attempts at trying to capture the 
essence of the original, of replicating the outstanding quality of the work 
of a master craftsman or a genius artist. Indeed, in the very pursuit of the 
eventual perfection of skill required to create a master artefact worthy to 
be copied by others, all master craftsmen and genius artists will them-
selves have had to go through endless repetitive acts of copying in order to 
attain the experience necessary for the production of the master copy that 
others would then themselves desire to imitate and replicate.
In this, in the arduous process leading to the supposed perfection and 
completion of an original master artefact, the superior original from which 
all subsequent, and subsequently inferior, copies are to compare them-
selves, we see the root question of the argument which is to follow. I will 
in general terms be working towards an examination of some fundamen-
tal questions pertaining to the relationship between copy and original, as 
to the creative act leading up to the supposedly complete unique object 
we term “original.” The questions to be asked, and hopefully answered, 
are therefore as follows: When can the process leading to the original be 
said to be complete? Where is the cut-off point between different versions 
(copies) of earlier, inferior iterations in the gestation process leading to the 
original, and final, superior original?
Obviously, any attempt at answering such questions fully would consti-
tute a Herculean task. Consequently, what I intend to do in the following 
is to pose some broad questions regarding the tangled and often highly 
confusing relationship of copy with original, but to do so through an anal-
ysis of a selective range of material. In this, I intend to give an overview 
of at least some (but by no means all) of the general challenges posed by 
pre-mechanical as well as mechanical reproduction. The main thrust of the 
argument, however, points towards a discussion of the digital techniques 
of reproduction, the introduction of which have led to a revolution not only 
in the price and accuracy of copying, but to a questioning of some of the 
basic questions regarding the relationship between copy and original. Nev-
ertheless, while I am admittedly interested in querying these questions in 
fairly broad terms, I have picked most of my examples from one particular 
medium, namely text. Furthermore, I will be looking chiefly at the manner 
in which text has been copied and stored in one particular type of object, 
namely that of the book, in order to provide some fairly well-known argu-
ments regarding pre-mechanical as well as mechanical reproduction. In 
particular, I will be looking at the differences between manuscript culture 
and print culture as we see it expressed in the production, and reproduc-
tion, of master copies, and subsequent copies, of handwritten manuscripts 
and mechanically printed books.
1 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 212.
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In the final section, as we move up to present day, I will however once 
more move away from the question of text and the object of the book 
in order to query the questions of digital memory and digital copying in 
terms broader than those of text and the book. In particular, I want to 
examine the impact this relatively new technology has had on our cur-
rent conception of copy and original, as well as the relationship between 
them. Returning to the initial question posed above regarding the process 
leading up to the supposed complete and final state of the authentic orig-
inal, I will be looking at the manner in which an increase in memory stor-
age capacity can be seen to go hand in hand with digitisation’s increased 
role in diluting the differences between original and copy, not only in the 
excessive copying of the original, but in the creative process itself. For in 
a world in which objects, information, and text can be copied cheaply, in 
vast quantities, and to such a degree of verisimilitude that even the crea-
tor may no longer know the difference, does it make sense to speak of a 
distinction between the two any longer? Has the copy turned original, and 
the original turned copy? How do we discern between the two in a world 
in which all “copies,” master copy as well as copies of the master copy, are 
indescernible?
Mimesis, copy, text, and book
In literary studies, the conundrum of original and copy are as old as the 
discipline itself. Indeed, language, the base subject matter from which lit-
erature, oral as well as written, originates, is to some extent defined by 
this troubled relationship between original and copy through concerns 
regarding the notion of “mimesis.” The question of mimesis, of putting a 
mirror to nature, is of great importance to all forms of art and not just of 
language and literature. As Plato argued in The Republic (ca. 380 BC), all art 
rests upon the ability to imitate, to act “as a representation of something 
else.”2 As Matthew Potolsky argues in Mimesis, Plato’s notion of art as copy 
“is so fundamental to the way we understand art that it is no exaggeration 
to claim that art itself, as a distinct human product, is a Platonic inven-
tion.”3 Nevertheless, as Potolsky also makes clear, the very idea of “art” as 
being somehow at a remove from the natural, of art being somehow “arti-
ficial” in that it is of a second order to nature, is a problem that becomes 
compounded several times over once we move from visual artistic rep-
resentations on to language and literature: “The movement from visual to 
linguistic imitation is problematic. Language does not imitate in the same 
ways that images do.”4
2 Potolsky 2006, 15.
3 Potolsky 2006, 16.
4 Potolsky 2006, 26.
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Even in this seemingly simple distinction between visual representa-
tion and textual representation, we begin to encounter a host of prob-
lems. First of all, before we even begin to discuss the differences between 
visual and textual representation, there is the question of exactly what one 
means by “mimesis.” As anthropologist Michael Taussig puts it in Mimesis 
and Alterity, mimesis is a concept that is not easy to pin down and define 
in that it is a process and “a relationship, not a thing in itself.”5 The title of 
Taussig’s study implies as much, for in his claim that “the faculty to copy, 
imitate, make models, explore difference, yield into and become Other,”6 
we see the constant flux mimesis instigates between sameness (copy) and 
alterity (originality). “Pulling you this way and that, mimesis plays this trick 
of dancing between the very same and the very different. An impossible 
but necessary, indeed an everyday affair, mimesis registers both sameness 
and difference, of being like, and of being Other.”7 As Gunther Gebauer 
and Christoph Wulf conclude in Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society,8 to ask the 
question “what is mimesis?” is therefore asking the wrong question. Such 
a question, they propose, inevitably “leads to error [in that it] presupposes 
that mimesis is a largely homogenous concept that undergoes continu-
ous development in a historical space.” Rather, they suggest, we should 
consider mimesis “a highly complex structure in which an entire range of 
conditions coincide.”9
Taking up Gebauer and Wulf’s admonition, I too will refrain from any 
attempt to pin down an exact definition of what mimesis may or may not 
be. What I do intend to do in the following, however, is to take a closer look 
at the manner in which one specific process of mimetic behaviour, namely 
that of copying, has been theorised in one specific discipline, namely that 
of literary studies. In particular, I will be looking at the manner in which the 
vehicle through which literary meaning was, at least until fairly recently, 
usually carried. I am referring, of course, to the book.
In a discussion regarding the relationship between original and copy, 
the book has certain advantages over “language” or “text.” Unlike a letter, 
a word, a sentence, or a paragraph, the book is, or at least it was until fairly 
recently, a tangible object. While we may arguably also encounter words 
and sentence written down on a page, which is to say on physical matter, 
and while we may indeed also discuss the book in abstract terms (the idea 
of the book), at least the first couple of thousand years of the history of 
the book largely focussed on tangible physical objects consisting of paper, 
glue, cardboard, leather, ink, and so on. Accordingly, at least for our intro-
ductory argument, it is simpler to view the book in terms of a physical 
entity that can undergo various stages of copying and reproduction.
5 Taussig 1993, 130.
6 Taussig 1993, xiii.
7 Taussig 1993, 129.
8 Gebauer and Wulf (1992) 1995.
9 Gebauer and Wulf (1992) 1995, 309.
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Pre-mechanical reproduction: Manuscript, frailty, 
and safekeeping
The history of the book is long, complex, and contested. From Lucien Febvre 
and Henri-Jean Martin’s The Coming of the Book to Marshall McLuhan’s The 
Gutenberg Galaxy on to Walter Ong’s Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing 
of the Word, a range of influential thinkers have attempted to chart the 
history and influence of the book from its early origins and up until pres-
ent day.10 The impact of the book is momentous, book historians agree. 
Yet they do not always see eye to eye as to what the exact impact of the 
book may have been. Similarly, there is some confusion as to what exactly 
we may usefully term a “book” in the first place, a distinction that has not 
exactly been made easier by the fact that we are now seemingly living in 
“the late age of print.”11 Accordingly, whereas book historians could for-
merly at least agree on the fact that the book was a physical object, even 
this quality is now rapidly fading with the introduction of various forms of 
e-books, novel digital text formats, and so on.
While there is some uncertainty as to how far we need to go back in
history in order to encounter the first book,12 most book historians tend to 
agree that the book underwent a major change once print and print tech-
nologies were introduced. Obviously, this is a distinction of some impor-
tance when we have Benjamin’s concept of mechanical reproduction in 
mind. Indeed, the difference between manuscript culture and print culture 
is one of Benjamin’s first examples of the transformation brought about by 
mechanical reproduction.
Written and illustrated by hand, manuscripts differ significantly from 
printed books in that a considerable amount of time and energy must be 
invested in their production, as well as in their re-production. The original 
manuscript of a given text, the very first version penned by one or sev-
eral authors, would have taken a long time to produce, not only in terms 
of the creative process, but in the actual process of producing the first 
physical manuscript. Similarly, the subsequent reproductions of those 
original manuscripts required a great deal of expenditure. As Febvre and 
Martin point out in The Coming of the Book, the claim that “the production 
of a single book involved a colossal amount of work” may at times have 
been stressed too strongly,13 but there can be no doubt that there was a 
world of difference between the world of manuscripts produced by hand 
and the world of print. Indeed, if “the technique of reproduction detaches 
the reproduced object from the domain of tradition [and that by] mak-
ing many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique 
10 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998; McLuhan (1962) 1997; Ong (1982) 2000.
11 Striphas (2009) 2011.
12 E.g. whether scrolls, papyrus, clay tablets, runestones, and so on should be 
included in the history of the book or relegated to an earlier period. 
13 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998, 27.
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existence,”14 it should be obvious that the ability of print to reproduce the 
written word over and over again, and at a massive reduction in energy 
and cost, puts the printed book at a “colossal” remove from the handwrit-
ten manuscript.15
Now Benjamin famously bemoaned the arrival of mechanical repro-
duction due to the fact that it helped undermine the “aura” of a work of art 
and lead to “a tremendous shattering of tradition.”16 As Benjamin argues, 
the “authenticity” of the original is therefore eventually eroded, to the 
point where there is hardly any trace left of the original in the mechani-
cally reproduced copy. Mechanical reproduction technologies like printing 
may therefore have enacted an erasure of “all that is transmissible from 
[the original’s] beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testi-
mony to the history which it has experienced,” hence diluting the “essence” 
of the original.17 We will return to this dilution of aura below, when we 
engage with the question of digitization. For now, though, the lack of easily 
reproduced copies eventually enabled by mechanical reproduction poses 
another question regarding the question of original and copy, and that is 
the questions posed by frailty and safekeeping. Ironically, the very rarity 
that Benjamin and others would bemoan the loss of in the age of mechan-
ical reproduction is precisely also the Achilles heel of what Benjamin terms 
“artifacts.”18 Namely, that they are unique and therefore do not, by defini-
tion, exist in any great numbers (indeed that they do not exist in numbers, 
plural, at all); hence they are highly likely to perish. 
The Italian semiotician, philosopher, literary scholar, and novelist 
Umberto Eco has written widely on original and copy, manuscript and print 
culture, and language and mimesis. One text in particular stands out in 
regard to the discussion presented here, though, and that is his novel Il 
nome della rosa. Subsequently translated into English as The Name of The 
Rose, the novel remains Eco’s most well-known work, not least due to the 
fact that the book was later, in 1986, adapted into a highly popular film 
of the same name.19 Novel as well as film revolve around a deceptively 
straightforward murder mystery in a fourteenth century monastery. It 
soon evolves beyond this fairly simple premise, though, to take on a wide 
range of philosophical, theological, textual, and cultural conundrums. 
While many of Eco’s themes in The Name of The Rose touch on questions 
of copy and original, one plot point in particular is of relevance for our 
discussion of copy, manuscript culture, frailty, and safekeeping. For, as it 
turns out, the murders committed at the monastery can all in some way or 
14 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
15 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998.
16 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
17 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
18 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 212.
19 Used for citations in this paper is an edition published in 1986 (Eco [1980] 1986). 
The original Italian version of the novel was published in 1980. The first English 
edition was published in 1983.
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other be traced back to the resurfacing of a copy of a book the world has 
for centuries presumed lost. The second part of Aristotle’s Poetics (ca. 335 
BCE), The Book of Comedy, previously believed to have been lost to human-
ity, is discovered to still exist, a single copy of the book having somehow 
been safely kept in the labyrinthine library of the monastery. Indeed, as 
the two protagonists of the book, Adso and William, eventually discover, 
the murders in the monastery can all be attributed to the existence of this 
one copy of a text that had supposedly perished.
The central plot around which the book revolves thus turns out to be a 
question of copy and original, original idea, and subsequent dissemination 
of such through the physical copy of a handwritten manuscript. Specifi-
cally, the murders in the monastery have all—in some way or another—
been orchestrated by the blind head librarian Jorge, a man who will go to 
any length to prevent what he considers to be a dangerous text falling into 
the wrong hands. Indeed, so bent is Jorge on barring access to Aristotle’s 
text that he has, at the end of the novel, managed not only to destroy the 
copy of the book itself, but also the entire library in which it was stored. As 
a librarian, then, which is to say as a custodian (safe-keeper) of books, Jorge 
fails miserably, a fact that is mirrored in terms of plot by his own demise as 
he perishes alongside his library as it all goes up in flames. At the end of 
The Name of The Rose, the one extant copy of Aristotle’s The Book of Comedy, 
presumed to have been lost for centuries only to have been temporarily 
rediscovered, has once again been wiped from the face of the earth.
Through Eco’s swashbuckling tale of detective monks, burning librar-
ies, and grisly murder, we are offered a telling parable on the frailty of 
the copy in the age of non-mechanical reproduction. Before the age of 
mechanical reproduction, manuscripts existed in one copy only, or at 
most in a couple handfuls of copies. Accordingly, as was the case with 
Aristotle’s The Book of Comedy, many texts have been lost forever because 
the only copy in existence at one point or other disappeared, or was, as 
it is the case in The Name of the Rose, wilfully destroyed.20 In addition to 
being a murder mystery, a meditation on religion, and a philosophical 
musing on the state of literature, language, and laughter, Eco’s novel is 
therefore also a piece of alternative history, albeit one that ultimately 
leads to a state of affairs resembling the history we are already familiar 
with. How different the world would have looked, Eco suggest, and how 
different Christianity, had the world possessed a copy of Aristotle’s con-
troversial The Book of Comedy. His two monks-cum-detectives work tire-
lessly to solve the crime and gain possession of the book in order for the 
truth to come out so as to challenge the hegemony of church dogma. Yet 
20 The writings of Plato, for instance—documents that would prove so vital to 
Western civilization—were for a time believed to have been lost, until it was 
discovered that copies of his writings had in fact survived, safely tucked away 
in Constantinople. Without such extra copies, Western philosophy would have 
looked very different today. One could have wished, too, that more copies of 
Aristotle’s works had been made.
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in the end, with the library and the book gone up in flames, they end up, 
towards the close of the novel, without proof. Without actual copies of 
Aristotle’s work, they are helpless to effect change. All they have left is “a 
library made up of fragments, quotations, unfinished sentences, ampu-
tated stumps of books.”21
We do not, of course, have access to any copy of Aristotle’s work on 
comedy. Indeed, like Eco’s protagonists, we possess only fragments. We 
know of Aristotle’s second book from mention of it in other sources, of 
short passages that have survived more or less intact in other texts, of 
summaries of what the book was supposed to have been about, and so on 
and so forth; as for any actual copies, though, original or otherwise, they 
have long ago been lost. Eco’s novel therefore reminds us of the impor-
tance of preserving the original as best we can: to copy it as widely and as 
flawlessly as we possibly can so as to preserve it for future generations. 
Because the copy, of course, is to some extent intended as a means of 
safekeeping. A reading of The Name of the Rose could therefore be that 
hegemonies will prefer to destroy dangerous information, or dangerous 
copies, rather than let it fall into the wrong hands and let their authority 
be challenged. Another important lesson to be learned here, though, is 
that copies are an excellent means of safeguarding the original, and also 
that, prior to the age of mechanical reproduction, copies were frail things 
simply because they were so difficult to produce in great numbers. 
Mechanical reproduction: Print, numbers, and aura
The problem facing Eco’s protagonists in The Name of the Rose is of course 
an obsolete problem. No longer do we need to worry about the disappear-
ance of all single copies of a given text, or at least not of the very important 
ones. It is rare in the age of mechanical reproduction that books disappear 
altogether. Various repressive political systems have tried, as did Jorge 
(a representative of Church dogma) in The Name of the Rose, to repress 
particular books. Since the introduction and dissemination of mechan-
ical reproduction of text via the printing press, however, such attempts 
of silencing dissenting voices have, generally speaking, met with limited 
success. Accordingly, while we may to some extent have lost the Benja-
minian “aura” and the “authenticity” of uniquely handcrafted artefacts like 
the manuscript, at least we now possess the major works of literature in 
seemingly indestructible numbers. Barring some sort of earth shattering 
cataclysmic event, it is highly unlikely that each and every copy of, say, 
Dante Alighieri’s Divine Comedy (ca. 1308–1321) or William Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet (ca. 1599–1602) would be lost forever. Accordingly, while the shift 
from manuscript culture to print culture may be said to have eroded tradi-
tion and the particularity of craftsmanship, at least it has given us safety in 
21 Eco (1980) 1986, 291.
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numbers. Never again will a central document like The Book of Comedy be 
lost forever to flames, floods, or censorship. 
The problem I want to address in the following, however, is one of num-
bers as much as of fidelity. After all, how many copies does one need? What 
is the point at which copying the original for safekeeping tips and becomes 
overwhelming? Is there a finely balanced point between safeguarding the 
essence of the original so that future generations too may gain access to 
it, and that of a countless repetition of the original that somehow corrupts 
and diminishes it? Also, does a copy need to be an exact copy of the origi-
nal or can it be something in-between? What is the difference between an 
imperfect imitation of the original, as indeed all acts of craftsmanship must 
ultimately be, and that of the perfect copy one cannot distinguish from the 
original? Finally, and this is of course vital for Benjamin’s argument, what 
is the point at which increasing orders of copying, as of the increasingly 
accurate degrees of fidelity to the original, will impact the value—and the 
meaning—not only of the copy, but of the original itself? Once again, the 
object of the book, the original and its copy, may help us consider such 
questions in further detail.
The quality of the copy in the age of the manuscript was never perfect. 
As Ong points out in Orality and Literacy, “manuscripts, with their glosses or 
marginal comments (which often got worked into the text in subsequent 
copies)” were a constant process, a “dialogue” with the original rather than 
an exact and definite copy of it.22 With the age of print, however, the relation-
ship between original and copy changed. For while it will arguably always 
be possible to detect some sort of anomaly in a given print copy of a book, 
to anyone but the expert, copies of the same edition will in practice seem 
interchangeable. The print version of the first 1983 English translation of 
Eco’s The Name of the Rose, for instance, will seem to be indistinguishable 
from the first, the fifth, or the fiftieth copy to any standard reader. While, 
in the time of the manuscript, various techniques and regulations were 
already in place in order for copies to be “scrupulously checked for textual 
correctness so that no errors may slip in, distorting the sense,” there were 
nevertheless much greater risk of a “corruption of the text” prior to the 
invention of mechanical reproduction of text.23 The further we move into 
the age of mechanical reproduction, though, and the more the techniques 
of reproduction perfect the process of producing the perfect copy, we see 
an increasing concern that the ability to produce ever better, and ever 
more copies, may in fact itself act as a source of corruption.
The second parable from the world of literature illustrates this conun-
drum pointedly. Published the year after Eco’s Il nome della rosa had been 
translated into English in 1983, American novelist Don DeLillo’s White 
Noise addressed similar questions of copy and original, the fake and the 
22 Ong (1982) 2000, 130.
23 Febvre and Martin (1958) 1998, 21.
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authentic, and appearance and aura.24 Like Eco’s protagonists, DeLillo’s Jack 
Gladney, a college professor in a nondescript college town somewhere in 
a nondescript part of North America, is concerned about authenticity and 
originality. Unlike Eco’s monks, however, Jack is not on a quest to expose 
deceit and fallacy. On the contrary, Jack is himself somewhat of a poser. 
Which is to say a person posing as something he is not, hence a person ter-
rified of being ex-posed. As director of Hitler Studies at College-on-the-Hill, 
Jack is arguably in a position of power that legitimises him as an authentic 
Hitler scholar. What is more, as the man who in fact invented the discipline 
of Hitler Studies in the first place, he is also, as the wellspring and origi-
nal creative source of the discipline itself, the originator of all other Hitler 
scholars. Compared to other Hitler scholars, Jack can therefore be said to 
be the real deal, the original, the authentic and unique superior ideal to 
which all inferior Hitler scholars must compare themselves unfavourably.
Yet Jack suffers from a major defect as a Hitler scholar: he does not 
know German. As the novel progresses, Jack desperately tries to remedy 
this imperfection by taking German lessons, but he never quite manages 
to get it right. “I had long tried to conceal the fact that I did not know Ger-
man,” Jack remarks to the reader, which has been troublesome enough 
due to the stipulation (presumably Jack’s own) that “no one could major in 
Hitler studies at the College-on-the-Hill without a minimum of one year of 
German.”25 Ironically, and somewhat absurdly, the director and inventor of 
Hitler Studies, the man who requires that his students learn German so as 
to be properly versed in their subject, is himself ignorant of the language 
he is supposed to be an expert in. At the beginning of the novel, while 
living precariously “on the edge of a landscape of vast shame,” Jack has 
still successfully managed to hide this deficiency, and this despite the fact 
that “I could not speak or read it, could not understand the spoken word 
or begin to put the simplest sentence on paper.”26 Yet Jack is a haunted 
man, well aware of the eventual end of his masquerade as he is about to 
host a Hitler conference: “Three days of lectures, workshops and panels. 
Hitler scholars from seventeen states and nine foreign countries. Actual 
Germans would be in attendance.”27 Jack the poser, the man always afraid 
of being ex-posed, is about to have the rug pulled out from under him 
by the real deal, actual Germans who can speak actual German, and who 
threaten to prove the originator of Hitler Studies the fraud he really is.
White Noise is brimming over with juxtapositions of deceptive surfaces 
and inner truths, copy and original, authenticity and fakery. One scene in 
particular, however, is of particular importance to the questions posed 
here. Murray Jay Siskind, a colleague of Jack’s, invites Jack to accompany 
24 The 1999 edition was used for the citations in this essay (DeLillo [1984] 1999). 
The book was originally published in 1984. 
25 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 31.
26 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 31.
27 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 33.
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him to the tourist attraction “The most photographed barn in Ameri-
ca.”28 In one sense, the barn is a standard tourist attraction in that it has 
achieved the status of being a tourist attraction through the process all 
other tourist attractions undergo.29 Yet it is different from older, more tra-
ditional types of tourist attractions like the Eiffel Tower, The Empire State 
Building, or the pyramids in that it possesses no immediate quality that dif-
ferentiates it from other examples (copies) of its general type. Indeed, the 
barn is exactly like all other barns but for the fact that it is “the most pho-
tographed.” The barn itself, then, the particular object, is not particular at 
all. It is only through its mediation, through the mechanically reproduced 
photographs of the barn, that it gains meaning as a tourist destination.
Unremarkable as it may seem, the barn is however the ultimate mani-
festation of touristic logic, which is at heart all about copy and reproduction. 
For unlike the Eiffel Tower, The Empire State Building, or the pyramids, all 
of which have become tourist attractions due the fact that they are archi-
tectural and engineering wonders as well as being extremely large, the 
barn possess no unique qualities whatsoever, but for the fact that other 
tourists have verified its existence by mediating it via photographs. The 
barn is neither the largest nor the smallest barn, the most peculiar, or the 
greenest or reddest or bluest of barns. Its quality as a tourist attraction 
relies solely on the fact that other tourists have been here to verify its exist-
ence via that most Benjaminian of mechanical reproductive techniques, 
the camera. Consequently, Murray argues, it has become impossible to 
see the barn itself any longer:
“No one sees the barn,” he said finally.
A long silence followed.
“Once you’ve seen the signs about the barn, it becomes impos-
sible to see the barn.”
He fell silent once more. People with cameras left the elevated 
site, replaced by others.
“We’re not here to capture an image, we’re here to maintain one. 
Every photograph reinforces the aura. Can you feel it, Jack? An accu-
mulation of nameless energies.”
There was an extended silence. The man in the booth sold post-
cards and slides.
“Being here is a kind of spiritual surrender. We see only what 
the others see. The thousands who were here in the past, those 
who will come in the future. We’ve agreed to be part of a collective 
perception. It literally colors our vision. A religious experience in a 
way, like all tourism.”
28 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 12. Tellingly, Murray befriends Jack because he wishes to 
copy Jack’s supposed (yet hollow) success by establishing his own original field 
of study by becoming an expert on Elvis.
29 For more on this, see Dean MacCannell’s The Tourist ([1976] 1999) or John Urry’s 




“They are taking pictures of taking pictures,” he said.
He did not speak for a while. We listened to the incessant click-
ing of shutter release buttons, the rustling crank of levers that 
advanced the film.
“What was the barn like before it was photographed?” he said. 
“What did it look like, how was it different from the other barns, how 
was it similar to other barns?”30
Significantly, Murray argues the very opposite of Benjamin here. “Every 
photograph reinforces the aura,” Murray remarks, in effect claiming that, 
rather than detracting from aura, rather than to “wither” it down,31 pho-
tographing the barn over and over again “reinforces” its aura. Arguably, 
Murray and Benjamin likely do not mean quite the same thing when they 
speak of “aura.” Yet the paradoxical chicken and egg conundrum posed by 
Murray (Why was the barn first photographed? When did it change from 
being simply a barn to being the most photographed barn? What was the 
barn like before it became known for being the most photographed barn 
in America?) leads him to some interesting observations regarding copy 
and original that Benjamin’s essay tends to elide. As Murray points out, the 
problem is that the “authenticity,” the “uniqueness,” and the “aura” of the 
original barn no longer exists since the quality of “The most photographed 
barn in America” identifying it as such relies solely on its relation to all 
other copies like it, to all other barns, and to the reproductions of such 
barns through the technology of photography. Not only is the barn a tour-
ist destination precisely because it is not original, in that it is a standard 
and utterly typical manifestation (copy) of a certain type of building, a barn 
that is “in itself,” as a type, as unremarkable and typical as buildings go. It 
is also a tourist destination because this very unremarkable type has been 
copied over and over and over again in reproductions that look exactly, or 
at least almost exactly, alike.
It is telling that, unlike Benjamin, Murray sees nothing in this to be 
worried about. For if Benjamin’s 1936 essay points to some of the basic 
problems facing modernity, and in particular modernism, in the face of 
an almost perfect reproduction that can be reproduced many times over, 
DeLillo’s 1984 text exemplifies the postmodern conundrum of entering a 
world in which there is no recourse to the original left, not even as Benja-
minian nostalgia. As such, the problem confronting Jack and Murray is, in a 
sense, the problem facing Benjamin squared. How was it different from the 
other barns, how was it similar to other barns” is no longer the question, 
really. The real, and only question, is now that of the copy itself. A copy that 
has been repeated so many times there is nothing left but the copy itself. 
The original, if there ever were one, has long since been forgotten.
30 DeLillo (1984) 1999, 12–13.
31 Benjamin (1936) 1999, 215.
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Digitisation I: Copy and cost, memory and deletion
As we have entered the digital age, the question of craftsmanship as well 
as of mechanical reproduction seems to have retreated further and further 
into history. Here, then, we are about to complete the journey that has 
taken us from the techniques of pre-mechanical reproduction, to mechan-
ical reproduction, and all the way up to post-mechanical techniques. The 
latter, as we saw it hinted at in DeLillo’s White Noise, may perhaps be said 
not to be “reproductive” at all, simply because the very notion of an authen-
tic original disappears somewhere in the process of copies being taken of 
copies of other copies. Hence, as we shall see in the following, the ability to 
produce almost perfect copies, and in seemingly infinite numbers, can blur 
the distinction between original and copy to such an extent that we can no 
longer tell the two apart.
If the late age of mechanical reproduction as it is parodied in novels 
like DeLillo’s White Noise seemed about to effect this transition, we would 
have to wait for the age of digitisation, I would argue, before we would 
truly see this come into effect. As I will demonstrate in the following, digital 
(re)production is radically different from both pre-mechanical and mechan-
ical reproduction in that it has provided us with the capability to document 
every single stage of the creative process that leads to whatever it is we 
consider to be the unique (singular, authentic, or auratic) master copy we 
classify as being “the original.” Digital (re)production is also different from 
all former reproductive techniques, as will become clear, in that it is the 
first reproductive technique that can produce one hundred per cent exact 
copies of the original.
As a technique, there can be little question that digital reproduction is, 
in and of itself, radically different from mechanical and non-mechanical 
reproductive techniques. The question in this and the following section, 
however, is whether this revolutionary technology has introduced a new 
state of affairs in terms of the manner in which original relates to copy and 
vice versa. Or whether, as may also be the case, that digital (re)production 
has simply made clear what should perhaps have been obvious all along; 
namely, that we may in fact never been able to tell the two, copy and orig-
inal, clearly apart.
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, whose book Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting 
in the Digital Age presents us with some useful observations on this conun-
drum.32 As I will attempt to show in the following, the core argument put 
forth by Mayer-Schönberger regarding copy, memory, and forgetting has 
significant importance for both abstract and specific claims made in the 
above regarding both physical and philosophical aspects of the book as 
copy as well as original.
The prime object of Delete, as stated on the book’s cover, is to provide 




the digital age.” What happens, Mayer-Schönberger asks, once “forgetting 
has become the exception, and remembering the default?”33 In this , he 
argues, we are witnessing a revolution in the manner in which we deal 
with information, such that we are entering an age in which, for the first 
time in human history, forgetting has required greater expenditure than 
remembering.
In the past, Mayer-Schönberger claims, memory was special. In oral 
societies, those who were especially good at remembering were consid-
ered to possess exceptional gifts. Later, as script was invented, an invention 
that “fundamentally changed our human capacity to preserve information 
and enhance our recollection,”34 the wonder at superior individual memory 
subsided somewhat. Nevertheless, the “admiration for superior human 
memory continued into the Middle Ages and persists in modern times.”35 
We are still be awed by individuals who can remember, say, the sequence 
of an entire deck of cards after just a few minutes, or the first thousand 
digits of pi. The difference between now and then, however, is that such 
memory has little practical application. There is no real need, after all, to 
remember a thousand, one hundred, or even ten digits of pi when the 
cheapest of calculators can do it for us at the single push of a button.
As the technologies of script developed further, information could be 
stored in greater and greater amounts, and at increasingly lower costs. In 
the time that manuscript culture had developed into the sort of assem-
bly lines one sees in, for instance, the medieval monasteries in which the 
plot of Eco’s The Name of the Rose unfolds, the cost of storing information 
dropped markedly. Nevertheless, even as we move past early organised 
pre-mechanical reproductive processes of the kind seen in medieval mon-
asteries, up to and beyond the introduction of print technologies, and all 
the way to the invention of a whole new range of media and reproductive 
techniques in the age of Benjamin, “fundamentally remembering remained 
expensive.”36 Compared to the painstaking time and costs of producing a 
manuscript, when it could take a scribe several years to produce a single 
copy, it may have been one hundred, a thousand, perhaps even ten-thou-
sand times cheaper to produce a paperback book by the time Benjamin 
published his essay. And yet for all their apparent differences in expendi-
ture, both these objects, both these types of copies, share with one another 
the fact that it cost more to remember than it did to forget. It may have 
been cheap to produce copies in the early twentieth century, but it was 
never free. “Until recently, […] remembering has always been a little bit 
harder than forgetting.”37
In this, we are today are faced with an unprecedented revolution in 
information technology, Mayer-Schönberger claims, so that it is only 
33 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 2.
34 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 34.
35 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 28.
36 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 39.
37 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 49.
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recently that “remembering has become the norm, and forgetting the 
exception.”38 As we see it exemplified via the concerns expressed by Benja-
min, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a rapid increase 
in the ability to provide ever more and ever cheaper copies. The further 
we move through the twentieth century, as exemplified by the parody pro-
vided by DeLillo’s characters, this tendency only increased as mechanical 
reproduction became ever more refined and optimised and new—and even 
cheaper—technologies became available. Yet even so, as Mayer-Schön-
berger makes clear, the ability to store information, to produce, store and 
distribute copies, was fundamentally different than it is today: 
There is no question that the amount of information people cap-
tured and committed to various types of external memory drasti-
cally increased over the last quarter century, but in the analog age, 
effective remembering was still complex and time-consuming, and 
thus costly. Remembering still remained quite a bit harder than 
forgetting.39
In the digital age, this is however no longer the case, a fact that Mayer- 
Schönberger argues through what he terms “the economics of storage.” 
Tellingly, as was the case with Benjamin and DeLillo, Mayer-Schönberger 
likewise decides to illustrate this shift with an example chosen from 
photography:
The truth is that the economics of storage have made forgetting bru-
tally expensive. Consider digital cameras: When you connect your 
camera to your computer to upload the images you took into your 
hard disk, you are usually given a choice. You can either select which 
images to upload, or have you computer copy automatically all 
images from you cameras. Reassured perhaps by the soothing idea 
that one can always go through them later and delete the images 
one does not like, invariably most people choose the latter option.40
There is a significant difference, here, though, between the photography 
of Benjamin’s early twentieth century photography, as well as DeLillo late 
twentieth century phenomenon of tourists snapping away, reproducing, 
and reifying “The most photographed barn in America” over and over again.
The difference between the mechanical reproductive techniques dis-
cussed by Benjamin and employed by DeLillo’s characters on the one 
hand, and that of Mayer-Schönberger’s digital reproductive technique 
on the other, is that nothing is lost in the former. For while mechanically 
reproduced photographs would become better and better in the period 
38 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 52.
39 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 48.
40 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 68.
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between Benjamin’s essay and DeLillo’s novel, the digitally reproduced 
photographs referred to by Mayer-Schönberger are fundamentally differ-
ent in that they cost us nothing, or almost nothing, and that we have the 
storage capacity to keep an almost infinite amount of them. A photograph, 
once a costly commodity that would take time and money to develop, and 
usually only available in quantities of 24 or 36 per roll of film, now takes up 
just a couple of megabytes of storage, with standard memory cards able 
to stock a thousand or more and at negligible cost (and with standard hard 
drives able to easily store hundreds of thousands of such images). Mem-
ory, and therefore also copying, have become cheap. So cheap, in fact, that 
forgetting has grown costlier than remembering.
Digitisation II: Perfect replicas and total recall
“Four main technological drivers have facilitated this shift: digitization, 
cheap storage, easy retrieval, and global reach,” says Mayer-Schönberg-
er.41 Of these, the first two have substantial impact on the manner in which 
we view the relationship between original and copy, especially in regards 
of quality and quantity. Accordingly, I will deal here only with the first two, 
digitisation and cheap storage.
First of all, we need to take a closer look at digitisation and the question 
of quality, similarity, and exactitude. Whether in text, image, or sound, dig-
itisation is different from analogue copying, Mayer-Schönberger claims, 
because we can now, for the first time ever, make an “exact replica; every 
bit is the exact copy of the original. Hundreds of generations of copies of 
copies of the digital original later, the resulting copy is still as perfect as 
the original. Quality does not diminish, and copying carries no penalty.”42
Accordingly, unlike the scribes in Umberto Eco’s scriptorium, copyists 
who copied original works in order to safeguard them, adding in their 
copy ing—whether intentionally or unintentionally—little variations or 
imperfections to these copies , digital copies are exact copies of the orig-
inal. When faced with the original and its copy, it is therefore no longer 
possible to tell the difference between the two.
Arguably, as mechanical reproduction became ever more refined, and 
as we saw it exemplified with DeLillo’s barn, it would become increasingly 
difficult to tell original master copy and copy apart. Yet no matter the 
medium, close scrutiny will always reveal tiny differences between master 
and copy. Or even for that matter between copy and copy. Two analogue 
copies that have been mechanically reproduced from the same master, 
whether that would happen to be a book, a photograph, or a record, are 
never exactly alike. They may be highly similar, which is to say analogous, 
to one another, as they are to the master. But all three objects, Copy 1, 
41 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 52.
42 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 56.
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Copy 2, and Master Copy are really, when scrutinised in detail, slightly 
different from one another. There never was an exact copy made, either 
in the days of pre-mechanical reproduction, or in the age of mechanical 
reproduction.
With digitisation, however, we have now entered the age of the exact 
copy. Accordingly, in the digital age it is no longer a case of diminishing 
returns on the original’s aura. Rather, it is a question of there being no 
diminishment whatsoever, no discernible difference, between original and 
copy in that they are one and the same. Ultimately, then, “the notion of 
originals and copies is rapidly becoming an outdated concept. All digital 
copies are indistinguishable from the original.”43
Secondly, Mayer-Schönberger makes us reconsider the concept of orig-
inal and copy in terms of the question of the process leading to the sup-
posedly final, unique, and authentic state of “the original” itself. While the 
argument I present in the following is not something that Mayer-Schön-
berger’s own argument about memory and data dwell on directly, his anal-
ysis of the influx of cheap storage is rather telling concerning the creative 
process that leads to the production of an “artefact” that we tend to view as 
the unique and final form of “the” original. For just as we are now getting 
used to keeping every single photograph we take rather than deleting the 
ones we do not like, something similar can be said to be the case regarding 
the creative process leading to the formation of “the original.”
Again, however, rather than ushering in a brand new relationship 
between original and copy, digitisation has perhaps helped us see what has 
perhaps always been the case, rather than introduced something which is 
truly novel. Or that is to say, the technologies of digitisation have no doubt, 
as Mayer-Schönberger convincingly argues, fundamentally changed the 
manner in which we copy and store information. Yet in terms of the cen-
tral question of this paper—and indeed of this entire volume, namely of 
the transformative power of the copy—digitisation has cleared the way 
for some basic truths about the relationship between original and copy, as 
well as what these terms mean in isolation. These truths, as I argue in the 
following concluding section, were as valid in the days of Benjamin and the 
photograph as they were in the age of the medieval scriptorium. That is to 
say these are perhaps truths that may have always been valid, but perhaps 
not always so evident.
43 Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 60.
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The original and the copy: First, last, and always 
transformative
Allow me one final analogy from the world of literature and (print) books 
before I conclude. I wish here to revisit a famous literary case of the origi-
nal and the copy, namely that of Franz Kafka and his authorship, surely one 
of the most important of the twentieth century.
Famous as he was to become, Kafka enjoyed only a modicum of success 
as a writer in his lifetime. While he managed to get some of his short sto-
ries published, none of his longer works, like the novels Der Prozess (1925), 
Das Schloss (1926) and Amerika (1927), were published while he was still 
alive. Indeed, but for the obstinacy of his close friend Max Brod, they very 
well never would have been, seeing as Kafka had informed Brod that all of 
his unpublished works were to be incinerated. Fortunately, Brod decided 
to ignore this request, subsequently publishing as much as he could make 
sense of from Kafka’s sprawling notes and notebooks. With this example, 
we return to the question posed at the beginning of this paper, namely the 
question of safekeeping and frailty discussed in the section on manuscript 
culture and of the works of Aristotle (partially recovered) and Plato (initially 
thought lost but eventually recovered). To the initial question of somehow 
safeguarding the surviving original copy, we may now add the question of 
the different iterations (plural) leading to the single authentic copy that we, 
at some point, somewhat arbitrarily decide is the authentic and therefore 
unique (singular) copy that constitutes the artefact, or the master copy, 
from which all subsequent copies are made.
Now when Kafka died, all Brod had to rely on for publication were Kaf-
ka’s notes, which is to say handwritten copies of his as yet unpublished 
works. While some of these, especially the shorter works, were more or 
less ready for publication, many of the longer texts remained in a state 
of incompletion. Consequently, it would be up to Brod to decide what to 
leave out and what to leave in as he took it upon himself to arrange for 
publication such literary classics as Der Prozess and Das Schloss, texts which 
have proven of almost incomparable significance to twentieth-century lit-
erature. The irony here, though, is of course that these classics, these truly 
original pieces of literature, the likes of which had never been since before 
or since, only exist in a state of undeniable incompletion. Accordingly, this 
state of incompletion is the only form in which we, the readers, have ever 
known them. Indeed, it is the only state in which they ever have existed. 
Unlike the works of Aristotle or Plato, it is not a case of originals that 
have been lost, but of originals that were never complete. Texts like these 
therefore cannot be said to be authentically original in the usual sense of 
the word, because we have no authority, no author, to sanction them as 
authentic originals. Texts like Der Prozess and Das Schloss therefore exist 
only—and always—as copies and as originals (plural), simply because we 
have no way of verifying what the final version of “the” original, singular, 
was supposed to look like.
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This is where we can tie up the questions put forth at the beginning of 
our argument to the arguments in Delete in terms of the question of digital 
text and digital storage. For what Kafka’s surviving texts and his literary and 
editorial heritage tell us about original and copy, and especially about the 
process leading to the supposed authentic finality of “the original” (singu-
lar), is not dissimilar to the problematizing posed by the breakdown of the 
barrier between original and copy introduced by digitisation as described 
by Mayer-Schönberger. Namely that the distinctions between original and 
copy were never entirely clear; hence we have in fact always needed to see 
the two as being engaged in am interlinked and always transformative pro-
cess that is never quite at rest. Consequently, there never was such a thing 
as “the” original, but only varying versions of a constantly-evolving process. 
What a case like Kafka’s proves is the concept that the original, too, is 
a copy: one copy out of many, of the many stages of the creative process. 
For imagine that every single iteration of Kafka’s creative process had been 
available to us, as indeed it would have been had Kafka used a modern lap-
top to type up his novels, stored various backups on the cloud, occasionally 
transferred parts of it to an external hard drive or to Dropbox, logged them 
on Google’s servers as he sent drafts via email for his friends to read, and 
so on. If every randomly-jotted note, every daily—nay, hourly—correction 
to his manuscripts was available to us, what would we do? Figuring out the 
original intent and meaning of a work like Das Schloss has already proven 
difficult enough, even without the interfering white noise of digitisation. 
Imagine if we had almost infinite amounts of information available on 
Kafka, almost infinite copies of the various stages of his texts, his thoughts, 
his everyday concerns and problems. Where to begin? Where to quit?
Due to the proliferation of digital memory now available, and the inces-
sant hoarding of information, it would at least in theory be possible to do 
just that. In and of itself, this is nothing new. Published texts, in digital 
or in printed format, have always existed in different draft versions and 
different copies, before they have been released to the world as the final, 
original edition. At this basic level, there is little or no difference between 
pre-mechanical, mechanical, and digital techniques of producing an orig-
inal. Indeed, the very sense of the revolution in information technology 
that we are now experiencing may not be that revolutionary when viewed 
in light of history. The shift from manuscript culture to print culture that 
Gutenberg ushered in by the fifteenth century, or for that matter the “mid-
twelfth century [which] was probably the most important watershed in 
medieval European book production” and with “some parallels with the 
information explosion of the twenty-first century,”44 have likely felt as new, 
fresh, and potentially intimidating as digitisation does today.45 Again, when 
44 Hamel 2013, 64.
45 Indeed, as Umberto Eco remarks it in This is Not the End of the Book: “This is not 
a new debate. The invention of printing created the possibility of storing all the 
cultural information one does not wish to be burdened with “in the fridge”—
that is to say in books—whilst knowing that the information could be found 
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viewed on a very basic level, the creative process itself has not at heart 
changed, nor has the relationship changed between original and copy—
regardless of what sort of reproductive technique we have happen to have 
available. What has changed, however, and indisputably so, is the sheer 
amount of information, the amount of copies, available—and the speed at 
which these copies proliferate.
The final lesson taught, then, by this immense proliferation of copies 
into every nook and cranny of our everyday lives, is that the original has never 
been anything but a copy; a copy from one of the many stages of a creative 
process that has no natural, authentic conclusion. The original is not the 
original. The original is a process: a process that, like the copy, is transform-
ative. Whether mechanical or digital reproductions, a handful of crafted 
copies or endlessly-reproducible digital duplicates, whether copies patiently 
constructed by hand or speedily stamped out by a machine, the conclusion 
must inevitably remain the same: Original as well as copy cannot exist in iso-
lation. Original as well as copy are never complete, and never final. Original 
as well as copy are always in process; indeed they are a process.
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Copy and Write:  
The Transformative Power 
of Copying in Language
Abstract This contribution explores what can be considered an original 
and what can be defined as a copy in language. To this end, it elaborates 
on the role of the classical Saussurean dichotomy langue/parole and fac-
tors such as the size and frequency of prefabricated chunks. Furthermore, 
it discusses how similar linguistic copies can be to a supposed original. 
After considering briefly whether copying is possible in the oral mode, 
this paper focuses on the question of what constitutes a copy in written 
language and, more specifically, quoting in academic writing. It concludes 
with a discussion of the importance of copying for processes of language 
change.
Keywords Original language use, plagiarism, copying in academic quo-




Instances of copying occur in many contexts, as is shown throughout this 
volume. As a consequence, it is understandable that speakers of any lan-
guage should also talk and write about the process of copying as such. In the 
British National Corpus, a digital collection of 100 million English words, the 
word copy (as a noun or verb) can be found in contexts such as the following:
• Objects: People were always coming into the shop looking for
things to copy. [A6E 864]
• Movements: Cherzeel scored with a close copy of England’s goal.
[A9H 529]1
• Organisms: It replicates itself, and each new copy, which is
inde pendent of the original, goes on to carry out the task for
which the virus was designed. [A5R 720]
• Painting: On my final day at Berkeley, my fourth-form pupils
presented me with some flowers and a small mounted copy of
Claude Lorrain’s ‘Hagar and the Angel’. [A0F 632]
• Film: IT IS amazing how few critics seem to have been able to
recognise Dennis Potter’s Blackeyes for what it is, just another Anglo-Aus-
tralian copy of Neighbours. [AA9 46]
• Music: Consequently, a mechanical royalty arises each time a
record company makes a copy of an album, cassette or compact
disc. [A6A 2422]
While this list is definitely not exhaustive, what can be noted is that, very 
frequently, the linguistic expression copy is employed to talk or write about 
copying in the domain of language, e.g. in the following examples from the 
British National Corpus:
• Every document that goes through them [photocopiers] is
recorded. Each copy is numbered and registered. [A2X 426]
• Her partner reads the magazine, too, and sometimes she lends
a copy to a friend. [A17 722]
• Anne sent him a signed copy of her first book, Remembering
Judi. (sic) [ALJ 1967]
The corpus hits even suggest that the word copy most often refers to 
instances of language use. Note, however, that the individual, language-re-
lated uses of the word copy listed above still differ considerably. While the 
first is a synonym of photocopy (instances of which may also be effected 
of pictures), examples two and three do not refer to photocopies of books 
and magazines, respectively, but to individual examples from among a 
1 For a discussion of copying with regard to a specific type of movement, namely 
dance, see Schwan, this volume.
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series of printed items. This appears to be by far the most frequent use of 
the word form copy in the British National Corpus.
However, one must not forget that these are everyday uses of the word 
copy in language. In dictionaries of linguistic terminology, such as Brown’s 
2006 Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, the term copy is not listed 
as an entry. Instead, the word copy (both as a noun and as a verb) may 
occasionally appear in linguistic texts in its general usage. It is then used 
to refer to reproduced texts, and particularly manuscripts that were repro-
duced by handwriting, e.g. by monks during the Middle Ages.2 In uses such 
as copy-editing, one finds the additional meaning of a manuscript being 
prepared for printing.3 While the ideas represented by the term copy are 
usually expressed in linguistics by the terms reproduction or imitation, these 
are no central terms for the discipline, either. By contrast, actual copies of 
texts do play an important role in linguistics, insofar as they relate to the 
empirical study of language by means of corpora. Corpora are collections 
of texts that are usually deemed representative of a particular language or 
variety and can be searched for patterns. For instance, the British National 
Corpus was designed to represent the English language in general. Since 
many different aspects of language may be the focus of linguistic research 
(e.g. vocabulary, grammar, or spelling), corpus texts need to be faithful 
copies of the original texts. While they may be modified by adding informa-
tion such as demographic details about authors, sentence numbers, part-
of-speech tags etc., such coding is frequently restricted to a meta-level, so 
that the text as such remains unchanged.
Since copy is mainly used in its general meaning in linguistics, it is 
essential to define what is meant precisely by the term in the context of the 
present contribution. It makes sense to use the common meaning as the 
starting point for such a definition. The Longman Dictionary of Contempo-
rary English, which uses a limited defining vocabulary, paraphrases the con-
cept as “something that is made to be exactly like another thing,” thereby 
capturing the essence of copying. According to this definition, a copy of an 
object is therefore expected to be an object,4 a copy of a process is likewise 
a process,5 and a copy of a linguistic entity is also an element of language. 
Some concepts can be defined without having recourse to other, 
related, concepts. For instance, an adult can be defined as a person of a 
certain age without the need to explicitly refer to the concepts child or teen-
ager. However, this is not possible for the idea of the copy, since it neces-
sarily presupposes the idea of an original, upon which the copy is based. 
This aspect introduces a very strong chronological element. Consequently, 
it will be assumed in the following that it is only possible to produce a copy 
of an original with prior existence. This view differs from that maintained 
2 Spencer and Howe 2001.
3 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “copy.” 
4 Cf. the examples in Stockhammer, this volume.
5 Cf. Schwan, this volume, on copying in dancing.
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by Goodman and Latour, and by Lowe, who state that literary works of art 
do not go back to one original version, thereby implying that all versions of 
such a text have the same status.6 In the same vein, the Oxford English Dic-
tionary claims that individual examples (i.e. copies) of manuscripts or prints 
do not refer back to an original and uses the supporting argument that 
“the original draft is called the rough or foul copy.”7 According to Latour 
and Lowe, who discuss works of art, the relationship is even reversed, and 
the concept of originality presupposes the existence of copies: “No cop-
ies, no original.”8 Alternatively, one might wish to argue that this condition 
could be extended from the actual existence of copies to the quality of 
permitting to be copied—which would, in turn, raise the question of how 
similar something has to be in order to qualify as a copy rather than as 
a mere imitation or effigy, e.g. a small-scale model of a mountain which 
necessarily differs in size from the original. In a directly opposed view, 
however, one might want to argue that everything that is not a copy is an 
original. When the original undergoing copying in a secondary process is 
a copy itself, it would thus become a type of secondary original (e.g. when 
a student makes a copy of a worksheet he has received from his teacher, 
which is already a copy of an old original worksheet).
In linguistics, the term original is used in relation to texts which are 
translated into other languages.9 It is also used to designate the steps that 
a word undergoes in the borrowing process: thus the English lexeme chaos 
was borrowed from Latin (as a so-called proximate language) but it is ulti-
mately of Greek origin (its original language).10 
Another aspect included in the simple definition above is the impli-
cation of an agent who deliberately attempts to achieve a likeness. This 
wording also leaves it open how similar the copy is in the end (e.g. due to 
the limitations discussed below). This is also true of the definition of copy 
found in the Oxford English Dictionary, one of whose meanings is “A tran-
script or reproduction of an original.” To sum up what emerges as com-
mon ground in the various definitions of copying, a copy is an entity which 
is deliberately created with the aim of being exactly like an original.
The original and copy in language
Let us now focus on copying in language and begin by considering an 
example sentence:
(1) Linguistics is fun!
6 Goodman 1969, 114; Latour and Lowe 2009, 281. See also the discussion on 
“original” and “copy” with regard to texts in Graulund, this volume.
7 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “copy.”
8 Latour and Lowe 2009, 278.
9 Lembersky 2012.
10 Cf. Hillebrand 1975, 224, and the Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “chaos.”
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Compare this to the next example sentence:
(2) Linguistics is fun!
The two sentences are identical, with regard to both their form and their 
meaning. Since language consists of both form and meaning,11 proper-
ties on both levels emerge as the prerequisite for copying in language. 
Sentences (1) and (2) would therefore seem to qualify as an instance of 
copying. If one of the two conditions does not apply, by contrast, we are 
definitely not dealing with a copy: for example, it is possible to reproduce 
the meaning of a linguistic entity relatively closely for a specific context by 
using various synonymous expressions. The utterance
(3) I find the study of language entertaining!
may thus fulfil the same pragmatic function as sentences (1) and (2) in 
certain contexts, but this is not an instance of copying, since it differs with 
regard to the formal side of the message. For the same reason, transla-
tions are not considered copies, since the target text differs in form and 
also, to a certain extent, in meaning from the original.12
Conversely, two sentences or utterances may be formally identical but 
have different meanings in the contexts in which they are used. Since the 
noun plane can refer either to an aircraft or to a surface, sentences (4) 
and (5) are different in spite of their formal identity, because the differ-
ing contexts (signaled by the sentences in parentheses) result in differing 
meanings.
(4) Look at that plane! (It is coming in our direction.)
(5) Look at that plane! (It intersects with line B.)
Sentence (5) can therefore not be considered a copy of sentence (4). How-
ever, this is a constructed example. In everyday language use, such instances 
that only superficially resemble copies are extremely unlikely to occur.
Another aspect that may be considered in discussions of copying 
related to language is how to treat co-occurring potential copies. This is 
the case in example sentences (1) and (2) above, but more commonly in 
cases such as 
(6) Come in, come in!
11 Cf. e.g. de Saussure (1916/1959, 66–67) on the twofold nature of the linguistic 
sign.
12 E.g. because some linguistic associations or plays on words cannot be conserved 




(7) All right, all right!
which result in an intensification of the meaning.13 When repetition occurs 
on the lexical level, that is inside a word, we speak of reduplication, e.g. in 
ha ha or fifty-fifty. Ghomeshi et al. present an interesting instance of this, 
namely contrastive focus reduplication, e.g. in 
(8) That’s not AUCKLAND–Auckland, is it?
This unusual juxtaposition “restricts the interpretation of the copied ele-
ment to a ‘real’ or prototypical reading”14—in the example, to the famous 
city in New Zealand as against other places bearing the same name. Repe-
tition and reduplication can thus be considered special instances of copy-
ing in language.
The first impulse in these cases is to claim that the original and the copy 
are used next to each other, just as one might want to argue that example 
sentence (2) is a copy of (1). However, the notion of copying in language 
is complicated by the twofold nature of language: one of the tenets of the 
school of structuralism is the necessary distinction between the levels of 
langue and parole in language. While langue represents the system of a 
language in the sense of an inventory of lexemes and a set of grammatical 
rules,15 parole is defined as language usage in concrete utterances.16 This 
is a very important distinction, since it affects whether linguistic entities 
should be evaluated as originals or copies. If we consider sentence (1) in 
this new light, we find that it consists of three words, namely linguistics, is, 
and fun. All of these words are established in the community of speakers of 
English and they are consequently part of the English langue. The question 
that now emerges is whether to consider each instance in which a lan-
guage user uses a word like linguistics as a copy. After all, one might argue 
that each of these entities in the parole is the realisation of an element of 
the langue in actual usage. Langue and parole are related to each other 
via the minds of individual speakers. However, in view of the difference 
between the two systems, it is argued here that this is not an instance 
of copying but rather of some other transformative process, comparable 
to the way in which a spoken and a written sentence with the same con-
tent are not copies of each other. By contrast, all concrete realisations of 
a linguistic item in the same modality—e.g. linguistics in sentences (1) and 
13 Ghomeshi et al. 2004, 318.
14 Ghomeshi et al. 2004, 307.
15 De Saussure (1916/1959, 9) defines langue as “both a social product of the faculty 
of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by 
a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty.”
16 De Saussure (1916/1959, 13) characterizes parole as the “executive side” of 
language.
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(2)—could be considered copies. Yet, strictly speaking, linguistics in sen-
tence (2) is not a copy of linguistics in sentence (1). Rather, they share a 
common matrix in the langue that is in a certain way comparable to cast-
ing, in which a (quasi-)identical series of objects is produced by using the 
same mould.17 While one might be tempted to argue that there is a differ-
ence between words and cast objects in that the production of a mould 
usually requires the prior existence of a positive model from which the 
negative mould is created, one should not forget that new words are used 
by an individual speaker on a singular occasion in that speaker’s parole, 
and that it is through their use by other speakers that new words spread 
and finally enter the langue of a language.18
Copying as we shall consider it in the following sections thus primarily 
affects the parole. Note that some larger linguistic entities such as Good 
morning or I am sorry can be considered fixed expressions that are stored 
as single units in language users’ minds, in spite of the fact that they can 
be analysed grammatically (e.g. Good morning as a noun phrase with a 
premodifying adjective). These complex units are therefore treated in a 
similar way to individual lexemes. Example sentence (1), by contrast, forms 
no common chunk but is the result of combining language-system-inher-
ent words and rules (e.g. a singular verb form with the superficially plural 
noun linguistics). In this sense, sentence (1) is new and could be consid-
ered an original, and sentence (2) would be a copy of it. It is therefore 
arguable that linguistic copying, in the strictest sense of the word, only 
takes place if complex entities in the parole that are not single-unit enti-
ties in the langue (or at least not yet) are reproduced in parole again. It 
is in this sense that one may argue against Goodman,19 and Latour and 
Lowe,20 to claim that even prints of literary works go back to an original. 
That the copied entities usually follow the rules of the langue is a common 
correlation but not necessary, since it would also be possible to imitate 
nonsense words in the parole, or ungrammatical sentences contradicting 
the system of the langue.
However, the classification of a linguistic entity such as Linguistics is fun! 
as an original needs to be called into question if—as is the case here—it 
has been used before by the same author on another occasion, e.g. in a 
script prepared for teaching. Yet even if one were to retrieve the text in 
which a particular author wrote Linguistics is fun! for the very first time, one 
could only be certain to have come across the original with regard to pro-
duction but not with regard to perception. After all, the author may have 
17 Cf. also Goodman (1969, 112–113), who describes a similar relationship 
regarding music when stating that “all accurate copies […] are equally genuine 
instances of the score” and calls music an allographic system contrasting with 
autographic painting, in which “even the most exact duplication” does not “count 
as genuine” (113).
18 Cf. de Saussure 1916/1959, 9.
19 Goodman 1969.
20 Latour and Lowe 2009.
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read the sentence Linguistics is fun! before that occasion, without being 
aware of it now or then. This raises the question whether one can ever 
accept a linguistic utterance as an original, since any utterance may repro-
duce some other utterance that the language user or observer is currently 
unaware of. Therefore, in the context of this contribution, the indepen- 
dent production of the same novel utterance by different language users is 
defined as resulting in two originals, and one may even extend the notion 
of linguistic originality to the production of a linguistic utterance that is 
identical to another one produced previously, by the same language user, 
if that person is unaware of the earlier utterance.
The production of language will always require, at least to a certain 
extent, the reproduction of previously-used linguistic material (e.g. sounds, 
words, and grammatical rules) which, in their new combination, yield new 
instances of parole. Without potential reproducibility, a code such as lan-
guage cannot function.21 Linguistics is fun! is a relatively short utterance 
that observes the usual grammatical rules of English. As a consequence, 
the likelihood that one or more language users may have produced that 
sentence before is very high. In the past, it was assumed that language 
worked according to a slot-and-filler model, in which any grammatically 
suitable word may be inserted into the slots provided by syntax.22 Modern 
linguistics, by contrast, recognizes the importance of chunks and prefab-
ricated units,23 and the open-choice principle has been largely replaced 
by an idiom principle.24 As a consequence, one may expect that, in any 
given utterance, a certain proportion of chunks will be identical to chunks 
that have occurred in other utterances by the same speaker or by other 
speakers. While this would seem to suggest a very large degree of overlap 
between individual texts or utterances, there are also various factors that 
contribute to their potential uniqueness:
• increased length of the text or utterance
• infrequent vocabulary
• unusual collocations.
The longer a sentence (in terms of the number of words it comprises), the 
less likely it is to be produced as an original by different speakers on dif-
ferent occasions, e.g. 
(9) Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing
a bowl of lather on which a mirror and a razor lay crossed.
21 Cf. Derrida 1999, 333.
22 Cf. the critical discussion in Sinclair 1991, 109.
23 Cf. Granger and Paquot 2008; Erman and Warren 2000.
24 Following Sinclair 1991, 110–115.
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This sentence, the first from James Joyce’s novel Ulysses, also fulfills the 
other two criteria: if a sentence contains infrequent words (e.g. stairhead 
with 14 hits in the 100-million-word British National Corpus), it also becomes 
more distinctive. The uniqueness of word combinations (so-called collo-
cations) can be determined by using statistical measures such as mutual 
information, which compares the probability of encountering two lexemes 
in combination to the probability of encountering each individually in a 
corpus.25 Thus lie is very frequent and crossed is relatively frequent, too, 
with 19,268 and 122 hits, respectively, in the British National Corpus, but 
their combination is quite unusual. A Google search for the sequence “lay 
crossed” on 7 November, 2016 yielded 44,500 hits, of which the majority of 
those viewed were quotations of Joyce’s sentence. The more factors coin-
cide, the more distinctive and original a text or utterance becomes and, as 
a consequence, the more likely its precise reproduction is to be a deliber-
ate copy rather than mere coincidence. Where the boundaries should be 
drawn is, however, a matter of gradience. This is of particular importance 
in the detection of plagiarism. In their test of various types of plagiarism 
detection software, Weber-Wulff et al. find that some systems classify orig-
inal texts as plagiarism “if the text uses many common phrases and the 
system reacts to four or five words in sequence as being plagiarism with-
out examining a wider context.”26 Such false positives were returned, for 
example, for a text containing the sequences Stieg Larsson was born in 1954 
as well as The rest of his childhood he lived and For the next birthday he got 
a. Since most researchers would presumably agree that this is not original
language use deserving to be protected by copyright, more refined algo-
rithms are desirable to help decide what constitutes originals and copies in 
language, to support teachers in the detection of plagiarism.
Everything said about copying so far has been aimed at describing how 
it relates to language in general. In the next step, we will focus on modality- 
specific particularities. In principle, it is possible to copy orally, but this is 
less likely to occur than it is in written language, since long sequences in 
particular are harder to memorize and reproduce, due to the transitory 
nature of speech. According to Bakhtin, a large proportion of language 
users’ communication consists of the re-telling of the text of others in their 
own words, but the formal modification combined with a certain semantic 
difference prevents such instances from being actual copies.27 In the oral 
tradition, copying in the strictest sense mainly affects short utterances, 
such as slogans. The copying of whole texts in an oral tradition is most 
likely to occur with rhymed texts such as songs or poems, because these 
are easier to remember and reproduce verbatim.28 However, even in these 
25 Cf. Church and Hanks 1989.
26 Weber-Wulff et al. 2013.
27 Bakhtin 1981, 338–341.
28 The situation described in Ray Bradbury’s novel Fahrenheit 451, in which 
individuals memorize whole books, is therefore highly uncommon. Another 
interesting situation is provided by acting: stage actors usually attempt to 
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cases, one may ask how similar two texts need to be in order to count as 
legitimate copies. In the oral reproduction of text, identity can hardly ever 
be achieved, since many features vary for the following reasons:
• Each speaker has their own voice. An identical spoken copy would
therefore need to be produced by the same speaker. Furthermore, the
speaker’s voice quality may vary due to age, illness, etc.
• Every time a linguistic unit is reproduced, even by the same speaker, a
difference in loudness, speed, intonation, accentuation, or structuring
by means of pauses may occur.
• The perceived vocal quality also depends on the situation where the
speaking takes place, e.g. in a small room vs. a staircase.
We may therefore conclude that a copy may be quasi-identical on the level 
of the linguistic system, but that this can hardly ever be achieved on the 
level of concrete realization in oral speech. Every time an artist recites a 
poem, the result will slightly differ. The best auditory copies in this sense 
are produced by means of sound recording and subsequent copying to 
other data carriers. Note, however, that not even digital copies are one 
hundred percent identical: while the acoustic realisations of the same 
recording through the same loudspeaker in the same context will presum-
ably be indistinguishable from each other (in contrast to gramophones, 
which produce a variety of accompanying noises), digital copies are at 
least distinct on the meta-level. Every time a file is copied, information on 
the copying process is encoded in the file’s details, because the time at 
which a new file is created in the copying process is part of the dataset. 
Each copy is thus unique in a certain aspect, like a banknote with its serial 
number.29 One may, however, argue that this aspect of the copy is irrele-
vant to its functionality and only applies on the meta-level.
While it would seem that it is almost impossible to copy longer stretches 
of spoken language with exactitude, written texts seem to lend themselves 
far more readily to copying. Indeed, two exemplars of an article in two 
hard copies of the same newspaper are virtually indistinguishable from 
each other. However, even written texts may differ with regard to a num-
ber of fine nuances:
• Handwritten texts pose the same problems as noted above: two identi-
cal sentences written by the same person are hardly ever one hundred
percent identical formally. They will differ with regard to the material
(the size of the paper, the writing instrument, the ink color, etc.), the
reproduce the scripted version of a play word for word—thereby copying 
between modalities if one were to recognize this as copying—but note that their 
interpretation is considered an important aspect of the acting process.
29 Cf. Schröter, this volume.
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amount of pressure used in writing, or the size of the letters. No two 
signatures are identical, either.
• The medium will even change the visual impression of a typed text.
There is thus a difference between a digital text on the author’s com-
puter (even as a PDF) and the same text as a printed version using
paper, toner, and printer ink.
Most of the time, however, most language users will happily perceive 
printed texts as identical copies of each other. On a general level, one may 
therefore distinguish between an absolutely faithful copy and a function-
ally faithful copy. While absolute identity between various copies of a text 
can arguably never be achieved in language because there will always be 
some differences (even on the atomic level of the paper used for print-
ing), functionally faithful copies abound, particularly in writing. These are 
the copies Goodman has in mind when he states that “correct copies” of 
literary works are based on “sameness of spelling” and consist of “exact 
correspondence as sequences of letters, spaces, and punctuation marks,” 
further asserting that “any sequence […] that so corresponds to a correct 
copy is itself correct, and nothing is more the original work than is such a 
correct copy.”30
Copying in academic quotations
Printed copies of a text are made in order to expand its potential reader-
ship. If a whole text is copied very frequently, this can be regarded as an 
indication of its popularity and/or importance. In academia, a subtype of 
copying is frequently observable within texts: quoting does not involve 
the copying of complete texts but merely of passages from texts by other 
researchers. The beginning and ending of a quoted passage are usu-
ally indicated by the use of quotation marks.31 Quoting, which is usually 
defined as a verbatim reproduction of an original text, contrasts with para-
phrasing, which implies the use of the paraphrasing author’s own words to 
convey the paraphrased author’s idea(s). Both in quoting and in paraphras-
ing, the source is indicated in order to make it clear that a specific idea is 
attributable to another author. In quoting, this extends to the wording as 
well. The reason for quoting rather than paraphrasing another author may 
be respect for that particular author, as well as the feeling that a specific 
wording is the best possible way to express an idea. Other reasons may 
30 In this sense, copies of literary texts differ from copies of paintings, whose 
correctness in copying is more difficult to determine due to the fact that the 
properties of pictures cannot be broken down into discrete features so easily 
(see Goodman 1969, 115–116).
31 This use of inverted commas in order to mark stretches of text as quotations is 
a relatively recent convention (Moore 2011, 1).
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be the wish to state precisely a view that contradicts the author’s,32 or the 
necessity to provide the reader with a statement that will be analyzed in 
more detail (as when various definitions of a concept are contrasted with 
each other).33 Since quotations are directly attributed to other authors, it 
is the quoter’s responsibility not to modify the original text in any way.34 
Otherwise, the authors of the original text might be presumed responsible 
for the distorted ideas in supposed quotations of their text. As a conse-
quence, it would seem that there is an opposition between identical repro-
ductions—i.e. quotations—at the very extreme end of the scale of copying 
and a large degree of variation in the extent to which the original wording 
and order of ideas are modified in paraphrases, e.g. through replacement 
with synonyms, rearrangement of the clause elements, or the passiviza-
tion of active sentences.35
Yet contrary to expectations, quotations in academic texts are not neces-
sarily one hundred percent identical to the original passage. Not all features 
of the original are conserved, and in some cases, modifications are even 
required. The following collection of noteworthy aspects of quotes permits 
determining what is necessary in order to accept a text as a quasi-identical 
copy of another text in the context of academic quotations. It thus provides 
information on what constitutes the essence of language in the copying 
process:
• Any quotation necessarily conserves the meaning of a quoted passage.
This is usually reflected in the reproduction of its letters, numbers, sym-
bols, punctuation marks, spacing, capitalisation, small capitals, bold
print, italics, and line breaks.
• By contrast, a quotation does not usually conserve the font type. A text
in Arial may be quoted in Times New Roman without the need to men-
tion this change. Font type is thus regarded as part of the standard
formal background of a text. However, if an original text were to use
various fonts in order to transmit a message, e.g. in a (constructed)
original sentence such as
(10) Short passages are easier to read if typefaces without serifs are
used (e.g. in This is a serif typeface as opposed to This is a sans serif
typeface).
32 Booth, Colomb, and Williams 2008, 97.
33 Cf. Schneider 2015 for a discussion of quoting as a positioning strategy, e.g. in 
order to express criticism.
34 Achtert and Gibaldi (1985, 71) demand that “in general, a quotation—whether 
a word, phrase, sentence, or more—should correspond exactly to its source in 
spelling, capitalization, and interior punctuation.”
35 See also Booth, Colomb, and Williams 2008, 192–195.
139
COPY AND WRITE: THE TRANSFORMATIVE POWER OF COPYING IN LANGUAGE
one would expect a stricter observance of formal aspects in quoting 
than usual—at least for the self-referential text passage printed in the 
font type under consideration. 
• Similarly, font size is disregarded in quoting. Once again, the stand-
ard of the original is legitimately captured by any standard of the copy.
However, in word-processed texts, longer quotations are often sig-
nalled by indentation and sometimes also by a smaller font size and
spacing between the lines than is present in the remainder of the text,36
e.g. in the following passage:
(11) The unity of the chain of letters between two spaces in solid com-
pounds can be regarded as an indication of how strongly they
belong together.37 Thus Haiman writes that
The distance between linguistic expressions may be an iconically 
motivated index of the conceptual distance between the terms
or events which they denote. But the length of an utterance may
also correspond to the extent to which it conveys new or unfa-
miliar information. Reduced form may thus be an economically
motivated index of familiarity.38
To sum up, copied passages which are not framed by quotation marks are 
obligatorily modified in their formatting. If there is a marked difference in 
font size between parts of the quoted text, this is presumably conserved 
if it matters, e.g. in the case of self-referentiality. However, one aspect 
that is not usually conserved in quotations is the use of special initials. 
Thus, the edition of Ulysses used for the example quoted above actually 
extends the first letter of the first word <S> over two lines and spells the 
remaining sequence <TATELY> (in capital letters) as a continuation of that 
special style. Quoting this precise formatting would be very difficult. Since 
this formatting convention applies to all beginnings of all the parts into 
which the book is divided, one may also interpret this as a purely edito-
rial decision, and one therefore lying outside the “original” text by Joyce. 
This supposition is supported by the numerous quotations of the sentence 
online, of which only a minute proportion uses capitalisation (and none 
the extra-large initial letter), possibly because they refer to some other 
version, but more probably in order to arrive at format that is easier to 
produce technically.
36 These are defined in the 2009 APA style guide as quotations consisting of at least 
40 words.
37 Cf. Erben 2007, 112.
38 Haiman 1983, 781.
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• Line length plays no role in the production of a faithful quotation,
either. Usually,39 copied passages are quoted as flow text.40 This raises
the question of how to proceed with the end-of-line hyphenation
present in the original text. Interestingly, the MLA Style Manual, which
demands that “the internal punctuation of a quotation must remain
intact,”41 does not mention this aspect at all. In the majority of cases,
the end-of-line hyphen is simply deleted, and a hyphenated original like 
wa-ter becomes water in the copy. Keeping the hyphen in a place other
than at the end of the line in the target text would result in an unusual
sequence and thus an unintentional variation from the original, e.g. in
the unconventionally spelled
(12) The isle was surrounded by wa-ter.
The opposite strategy of conserving the hyphen’s place at the end of a 
line would require the insertion of an additional paragraph break in most 
text layouts. However, this would disrupt the usual formatting of the quot-
ing text, and it is possibly for that reason that this strategy seems to be 
highly unusual. Copying may therefore require the deletion of a sign (i.e. 
the hyphen) in order to conserve the intended form of the original text 
and thus to produce a functionally faithful copy. This task is made more 
difficult by the fact that some texts contain prefixations such as co-operate 
or compounds such as bitter-sweet, which are frequently but not always 
hyphenated.42 In these cases, the copyist has to guess the original spelling 
preferred by the author in order to observe the principle of formal repro-
duction. In linguistics, this aspect is of particular importance to compilers 
of corpora, who must copy long passages from texts. In a forthcoming 
publication, I have found references to copying strategies in various manu-
als from the Brown corpus family: one strategy to resolve such ambiguous 
cases is to use the spelling of other instances of the same compound in the 
same text; another is to use an authoritative reference work.43 Note that 
the copy-pasting of texts from PDF files into MS Word files deletes end-of-
line hyphens by default. This is problematic if the end-of-line hyphen in 
the original coincides with the hyphen of a compound that is almost exclu-
sively hyphenated in linguistic usage (e.g. hard-working).44 If the hyphen 
39 Note, however, that up to three lines from poems (a genre in which the ends of 
lines play an important role) may be quoted by representing the line breaks by 
means of slashes with spaces on each side (Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 73) and that 
turnover lines in quoted poems (which are too long for the format of the quoting 
text’s lines) are indicated by using the code [t/o] (Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 75).
40 The idea that this is no new phenomenon is supported by Wetzel (1981, 28–29), 
according to whom the scribes of earlier times did not reproduce original line 
length, either. 
41 Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 80.
42 Cf. Sanchez-Stockhammer, forthcoming.
43 Sanchez-Stockhammer, forthcoming.
44 Cf. Sanchez-Stockhammer, forthcoming.
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is deleted by default, the result (in the example, hardworking) will most 
certainly contradict the spelling intended by the author of the original text. 
As a consequence, end-of-line hyphens should only be deleted after indi-
vidual consideration, and one cannot always be certain of having captured 
the intention of the original author, because some compounds or prefixa-
tions permit variation. 
• If a feature of an original text cannot be preserved in a quotation due
to some restriction of the medium (e.g. in typewriting or handwriting),
there are usually conventions which permit the creation of an alterna-
tive that counts as a legitimate copy:
 — Italicisation may be represented by underlining,45 bold print 
by framing a word or expression with asterisks (e.g. in This is 
*great*!), and small caps by using normal capitals.
 — Herbst and Klotz, for example (whose work is printed in 
black-and-white), indicate the use of color in quoted diction-
ary headwords by employing underlining accompanied by 
an explanation in parentheses.46
 — If an en dash < – > or em dash < — > is unavailable, either 
can be represented with a hyphen.47 Note, however, that the 
replacement of an em dash (which is surrounded by letters) 
by an en dash or a simple hyphen may result in the insertion 
of spaces so as to distinguish it formally from a word-internal 
hyphen (which is surrounded by letters).48 This needs to be 
considered in the analysis of text-only corpora, since attach-
ing a hyphen to the end of a word may prevent it from being 
found by a search pattern that utilizes standard spacing.
 — Yet another issue to consider is the use of diacritics such as 
the cedilla <ç> or the hacek <ě>. Since these are distinctive 
and potentially lead to differences in meaning, their omis-
sion in the target text would reduce the accuracy of a copy. 
As a consequence, diacritics in typed texts have often been 
manually added to the paper copy of a quotation. Corpora 
frequently use special codes to represent diacritics.
• Since quotations need to be verbatim copies of the original text, this
means that mistakes also have to be copied. However, it is possible
to add the commentary [sic]—Latin for “thus”—in square brackets,49
in order to show that a spelling mistake was not inserted by the copy- 
ist (which would be the reader’s usual assumption). Such brackets
45 Cf. Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 78.
46 Herbst and Klotz 2003.
47 Cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002, 1725–1726.
48 Cf. Sanchez-Stockhammer, forthcoming.
49 Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 78.
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can also be used to mark explanatory additions (e.g. who a personal 
pronoun in a passage refers to), omissions (signalled by […]50), or 
modifications (e.g. if capitals are changed to lower case or inflec-
tions are adapted in number or tense). Consequently, a legitimate, 
functionally faithful copy may deviate from the original as long as 
all changes are indicated in square brackets. These modifications on 
the meta-level do not make the quotation a paraphrase but simp- 
ly a modified quotation. However, style guides differ in the extent 
to which they accept unmarked changes in a quotation: thus the 
American Psychological Association’s style guide permits the con-
version of the first letter of the first word in a quotation to upper 
or lower case and even states that “[t]he punctuation mark at 
the end of a sentence may be changed to fit the syntax” and that 
“[s]ingle quotation marks may be changed to double quotation marks 
and vice versa.”51 The MLA Style Manual, by contrast, demands the 
modification of capitalisation in square brackets, as exemplified in the 
preceding two quotations.52 A problematic situation occurs if an origi-
nal passage already contains square brackets. In such cases, a copyist 
may feel the urge to add a comment in another pair of square brackets 
in order to state that the first pair of brackets was already present in 
the original.
• Quotation marks also provide an interesting case. If a passage contain-
ing quotation marks is quoted, the usual convention is that the type of
quotation mark inside the copied passage contrasts with the type of
quotation mark used in the quoting text: if the meta-text uses double
quotation marks, all quotation marks inside the quoted passage are
rendered with single quotation marks, and if the meta-text uses single
quotation marks, all quotation marks inside the quoted passage are
rendered with double quotation marks.53 This prevents confusion as
to where the quoted passage begins and ends. When the quoting and
the quoted text use the same type of quotation mark, this requires an
adaptation of the quotation marks; if they use different types anyway,
there is no conflict. An interesting question in this context is how to
treat foreign quotation marks (e.g. from German or French original
texts) in English texts. In contrast to English quotation marks < “ > < ” >,
the opening German quotation mark < „ > is at the bottom, while the
closing mark < “ > corresponds to the English opening mark, and French
quotation marks look completely different < « > < » >. As a consequence,
50 Note, however, that neither the APA style guide (2009, 176) nor Achtert and 
Gibaldi (1985, 76) demand the use of brackets around omission points, which 
means that the readers will have to infer that these represent an alteration by 
the author of the quoting text and are not part of the quote itself.
51 American Psychological Association 2009, 176.
52 Achtert and Gibaldi 1985, 79. 
53 Cf. Achtert and Gibaldi (1985, 80), who only consider their own standard case of 
double quotation marks for the main quotation and single quotation marks for 
the embedded quotation.
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these foreign quotation marks could remain unchanged—but most of 
the time, they will presumably be replaced with the standard quotation 
marks of the quoting text.
All of the above examples suggest that a copy of a linguistic utterance in 
the highly formal context of academic quoting may differ in certain ways 
from the original. Paradoxically, in some cases, the conservation of all 
original features—i.e. an absolutely faithful copy—would even result in 
a deterioration of the copy’s functionality (e.g. in the case of end-of-line 
hyphenation).
The role of copying in language change
We have seen above that copying in language rarely leads to identical cop-
ies. At the same time, it is commonly recognized that variation in language 
represents the basis for linguistic change.54 This raises the question of to 
what extent copying—and particularly imperfect copying—contributes to 
linguistic change.
A certain proportion of the variation observed in copies is the result of 
reduced cognitive ability (e.g. due to tiredness or inattentiveness). In chil-
dren and language learners, failing memory regarding the precise form of 
an expression that has not yet been mastered completely may also play a 
role.55 The proportion of language use affected by these obstacles must, 
however, not be overestimated.
According to Lass, “language transmission is replication” and language 
as such is “a replicating information system,” in which “variance is ‘copying 
error.’”56 He states that some of the errors that “creep into the replication 
process” may be “stabilized by selection,” while others are not.57 However, 
the concept of error presupposes the existence of an alternative which is 
evaluated as being more correct (or at least as more appropriate) in a par-
ticular context than the variant used. Since the question of who can legit-
imately make such evaluative judgments is highly controversial, linguistic 
variation is frequently discussed on more neutral grounds in linguistics. 
In many cases, variation in the copy is deliberate, e.g. because the copyist 
wishes to make a particular point or to introduce his or her own view. This 
is for example the case when the title of a famous book, song, film, etc. 
is modified to make a pun.58 As we have seen above, most instances in 
54 Cf. e.g. Holmes 2008, 205–206.
55 This finding was supported by an experiment by Kirby, Cornish, and Smith 
(2008), in which the imperfect reproduction of artificial linguistic stimuli was 
found to lead to systematic changes.
56 Lass 1997, 112–113.
57 Lass 1997, 112.




which language users refer to other language users’ texts or utterances 
are therefore not copies in the strictest sense, but comprise form-mean-
ing modifications of some kind and would therefore rather be classified as 
paraphrases, according to the definition used here.
Since language change on an abstract level presupposes change in the 
language of individual speakers, it makes sense to consider the role of 
copying in language change by adopting a cognitive linguistic perspective. 
One might be tempted to assume that the storage of identical copies of 
words (e.g. regarding denotative meaning, spelling, and pronunciation) in 
all speakers’ mental lexicons is a prerequisite for successful communica-
tion. However, this is not the case: not only will the words in individual 
language users’ minds differ with regard to the unique biographical expe-
riences with which they are associated, but in a commonly-used analogy, 
the mind is compared to a corpus in which all previously encountered lan-
guage is stored in some way or another.59 Since every language user has 
experienced a unique combination of linguistic input, individual mental 
corpora must therefore necessarily differ from each other as well. It is only 
in the sense of a shared common ground for each lexeme that we can 
speak of some kind of copy (in the widest sense) existing in the minds of 
different speakers at all.
By contrast, the concept of copying also plays another role: accord-
ing to Bybee’s exemplar- and usage-based linguistic model of emergence, 
“certain simple properties of a substantive nature, when applied repeat-
edly, create structure.”60 The frequency of usage of linguistic expressions 
encountered in linguistic input—i.e. the occurrence of linguistic copies—
thus shapes the mental corpora of the language users. Since individual 
language users base their own linguistic decisions (e.g. whether to use 
whom or who) on the frequency of linguistic phenomena in their mental 
corpus, the frequently repeated perception of copies in the past will con-
sequently influence the future linguistic behaviour of individual speakers. 
The frequency-dependence of change is also true for language in 
general. This is comparable (but not identical) to repeated photocopy-
ing: if an original text is inserted into a photocopier over and over again, 
the material on which the text is printed will deteriorate in the course 
of time, and this will influence future photocopies of the text, which will 
then differ from earlier photocopies in that they will also reproduce an 
increasing number of smudges, creases, etc. When transferring this prin-
ciple to language, we can observe that if a word is frequently repeated 
59 Cf. Taylor (2005, 3), who also notes (13) that there are differences regarding the 
amount of detail presumably stored in memory compared to a linguistic corpus 
(e.g. regarding the context in which linguistic forms were encountered), the 
possibly different format (linear text vs. an assumed hypertext-like format in 
memory), and the differing temporal dynamics (involving the inclusion of new 
linguistic forms and the potential decay of memory traces compared to a stable 
conventional corpus).
60 Bybee 2003, 3.
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in discourse, this leads to a reduction of its form in the pronunciation.61 
In some cases, such as evening (/ˈiːvnɪŋ/), this has already resulted in a 
standard pronunciation that drops the second syllable.62 Similarly, Eng-
lish uses so-called weak forms for the majority of frequent grammatical 
words (i.e. pronouns, prepositions etc.):63 thus the third person singular 
verb form has is hardly ever pronounced /hæz/ with a full vowel (with the 
exception of when it is used as a full verb, e.g. in He has a car). Usually, it 
is pronounced as /həz/, /əz/, or even /z/ or /s/, e.g. in He has been here.64 
This change is even reflected in the use of the contracted spelling He’s 
been here.65
While it is possible to observe instances of imperfect copying in lan-
guage use, the influence of copying errors in shaping language should not 
be overestimated. Instead, it is copying in the sense of repetition (which 
results in the increased frequency of use of linguistic expressions) that 
plays the most important role as a transformative power. This is also true 
of new language uses, i.e. the basis for linguistic change, which need not 
be imperfect copying but may rather represent alternative creations by 
different language users.
Conclusion
While this contribution is limited to observations concerning English, one 
may assume that many of the aspects touched upon are not language-spe-
cific and can be transferred to other languages without claiming universal 
status a priori.
To sum up, copying in language needs to consider two levels: that of 
the linguistic system and that of the concrete realization of language in 
utterances. This might distinguish copying in language from copying in at 
least some other systems. Depending on the size of the entities under con-
sideration and the desired level of similarity, we find that, while function-
ally faithful copying in language is extremely frequent (e.g. if we consider 
that almost all words in a text have been used before in a language), it is 
practically impossible to create an identical copy of language use, due to 
situation-dependent variation, particularly in the spoken reproduction of 
longer passages.
Academic quoting represents a special case of copying in language. 
While absolute identity between the original passage and its reproduction 
61 Bybee 2003, 8–9; 58.
62 Cf. Wells 2008 at evening.
63 Cf. Eckert and Barry 2005, 215–216.
64 Wells 2008 at has.
65 Interestingly, for levels of language other than pronunciation, the failure to copy 
a particular expression frequently enough may also lead to its changing: thus 
infrequent irregular verbs, such as weep/wept, are more likely to be regularised 
(to weeped) than frequent irregular forms (e.g. keep/kept), which are more stable 
due to their stronger representation in memory (Bybee 2006, 715).
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is explicitly demanded, the presence of certain features in a text—particu-
larly punctuation marks—actually requires deviations from the original, in 
order to produce a functionally faithful copy.
Even if the influence of copying errors on language change should 
not be overestimated, we can still observe that copying as such plays an 
important role in language change: since repeated exposure to a linguistic 
pattern in communication incites language users to modify their own lin-
guistic production, we can conclude that copying in language has strong 
transformative potential indeed.
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“Beyoncé is Not the Worst 
Copycat:” The Politics of 
Copying in Dance
Abstract Beginning with the example of Beyoncé’s music video for her 
song “Countdown,” which copied movements from Anna Teresa De Keers-
maeker’s early choreographic work, this article explores the role of plagia-
rism, reconstruction, and recreation in contemporary dance. With regard 
to theories of repetition (such as those of Søren Kierkegaard and Giorgio 
Agamben), a particular focus is placed on the ephemerality and corporeal-
ity of movement, arguing for the convergence of copying and repetition in 
dance. While, due to the restrictions of human anatomy and the respond-
ing characteristics of movement, dancing is always already interwoven 
with the process of copying, it is, however, the inevitable inexactitude of 
these copies that guarantees the non-iterability of dance, as well as its al-
teration and innovation.




“The irreconcilable elements of culture, art, and amusement have been  
subjected equally to the concept of purpose and thus brought under a single 
false dominator: the totality of the culture industry. Its element is repetition.”1
Stolen dance moves
Beyoncé’s video “Countdown,”2 released in October 2011, provoked an 
extensive public discussion on the role of copyright in contemporary dance 
that began in social media and spread to newspapers, radio, and television 
before choreographers and performers countered with their response.3 
The discussion arose when Beyoncé and Adria Petty, the director of the 
video for “Countdown,” were harshly accused of having stolen, plundered, 
or at least copied dance moves created by the Belgian choreographer Anne 
Teresa De Keersmaeker, namely from her two pieces Rosas danst Rosas 
(1983) and Achterland (1990), two of the most important choreographic 
works of European dance in the 1980s and 1990s, and which are now easi- 
ly accessible on DVD and YouTube.4 Compilation videos juxtaposing the 
so-called original movement material in De Keersmaeker’s pieces and the 
allegedly copied moves were uploaded to YouTube shortly after Beyoncé 
released her video for “Countdown.”5 Finally, De Keersmaeker herself com-
mented on Beyoncé’s and Adria Petty’s appropriation of her dance moves, 
judging it “rude” and stating that “what’s rude about it is that they don’t 
even bother about hiding it […] this is pure plagiarism.”6 In the following, 
Beyoncé attempted to defend herself from these accusations by confess-
ing that she was inspired by De Keersmaeker’s work but also, ironically, 
extending her source of inspiration to many other artists as well:
Clearly, the ballet Rosas danst Rosas was one of many references for 
my video “Countdown.” It was one of the inspirations used to bring 
the feel and look of the song to life […] I was also paying tribute 
to the film Funny Face with the legendary Audrey Hepburn […] My 
biggest inspirations were the ‘60s, the ‘70s, Brigitte Bardot, Andy 
Warhol, Twiggy and Diana Ross. […] I’ve always been fascinated by 
the way contemporary art uses different elements and references 
to produce something unique.7
1 Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 108.
2 “Beyoncé - Countdown,” YouTube video, 3:32, posted by “beyonceVEVO,” Octo-
ber 7, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/2XY3AvVgDns.
3 See for example La Rocco 2011.
4 “Rosas | ROSAS DANST ROSAS,” YouTube video, 8:23, posted by “Kaaitheater,” 
October 10, 2008, https://youtu.be/oQCTbCcSxis; “Danza Contemporanea / 
“Achterland” - Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker,” YouTube video, 1:08:54, posted by 
“Ana Moyano,” November 19, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/mTCIVAXDstk; see 
also Keersmaeker and Cvejić 2012. For a recent, in-depth analysis of this contro-
versy, see Kraut 2016, 263–280.
5 See for example https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3HaWxhbhH4c.
6 Keersmaeker, quoted in McKinley 2011.
7 Beyoncé, quoted in McKinley 2011.
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While Beyoncé insisted on the uniqueness of her appropriation—she nev-
ertheless released an alternative video for “Countdown” a few weeks later, 
which excluded the copied dance moves—De Keersmaeker published 
another statement that extended the accusation of plagiarism against 
Beyoncé by also comparing her video to the film-version of Rosas danst 
Rosas shot by Thierry De Mey in 1996:
When I saw the actual video, I was struck by the resemblance of 
Beyoncé’s clip not only with the movements from Rosas danst Rosas, 
but also with the costumes, the set and even the shots from the film 
by Thierry De Mey. Obviously, Beyoncé, or the video clip director 
Adria Petty, plundered many bits of the integral scenes in the film 
[…] People asked me if I’m angry or honored. Neither. […] I am glad 
that Rosas danst Rosas can perhaps reach a mass audience which 
such a dance performance could never achieve, despite its popu-
larity in the dance world since [the] 1980s. And, Beyoncé is not the 
worst copycat, she sings and dances very well, and she has a good 
taste! […] And, what does it say about the work of Rosas danst Rosas? 
In the 1980s, this was seen as a statement of girl power, based on 
assuming a feminine stance on sexual expression. I was often asked 
then if it was feminist. Now that I see Beyoncé dancing it, I find it 
pleasant but I don’t see any edge to it. It’s seductive in an entertain-
ing consumerist way.8
But is it possible to plunder choreography, to steal a dance move, or take 
a dance movement from someone else when dance—as is often said—is 
highly ephemeral? Dance does not last, but vanishes almost instantly, and 
this ephemerality is one of the main reasons why the question of copy-
ing in dance is so precarious and delicate. The implicit understanding of 
dance as a highly transient art also influenced discussions about Beyoncé’s 
video. By stressing the peculiarity of her alleged plagiarism rather than 
the hard facts of copyright infringement and its legal consequences, the 
critics, choreographers, and performers re-sparked historical debates on 
the “inferior” nature of dance, due to its temporal and ephemeral nature.
It is intrinsically difficult to connect dance with copying because danc-
ing does not last. When a single movement or a series of movements is 
imitated, or “copied” one might say, the object of imitation has already 
vanished.9 This transient character makes dance inherently un-copyable; 
it comes as no surprise that the world of contemporary dance rarely uses 
the exact term “copying.” In fact, it negatively suggests an inauthentic and 
mechanical repetition of someone else’s movements, without implying that 
this someone has ownership on his or her movements and could reclaim a 
8 Keersmaeker, quoted in La Rocco 2011.
9 On the related case of non-reproducibility in performance art, see in particular 
Phelan 1993, 146–66. 
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copyright. Rather, the “copier” would refrain from calling this reproduction 
a copy mostly because of the cultural history of Western dance aesthetics 
since the rise of Modernism advocated for individual expression in move-
ment. Instead of the term “copying,” dancers, choreographers, and dance 
scholars would rather speak of “mirroring,” “quoting,” “imitating,” and 
“repeating.” Dancing primarily prefers the latter term in the rehearsal pro-
cess (which in French is even called répétition) as well as in performances, 
when a dancer repeats a single movement or a group of movements sev-
eral times. One may also speak of repeating a movement when several 
dancers perform the same step, twist, turn, or leap synchronically or one 
after the other.
Copyright of dance
Copyright of dance does exist, however, and various politics of copying in 
dance reflect the economic and political circumstances of these copyright 
laws. Beyond the obvious differences between the contemporary politics 
of copying dance in the US and Europe that culminated in the Beyon-
cé-De Keersmaeker controversy, the history of copyright in dance reveals 
the entanglement of choreography with political, economic, and juridical 
aspects.10 Choreography, from its outset, has been linked to the politics 
of power, due to the way that choreographic movements were literally 
prescribed: Dance moves were written down in dance notations that then 
distributed in order to restage or, as one may put it, “copy” the same chore-
ography at another place and time.11 This applies particularly to the Beau-
champ-Feuillet notation, the most influential dance notation for Baroque 
dance. Commissioned by Louis XIV, devised by Pierre Beauchamp in the 
1680s, and published by Raoul-Auger Feuillet in 1700, its main aim was not 
to capture evanescent movements, but to guarantee a similarity between 
realizations or copies of the same choreography. On the one hand, this 
similarity was sought between the different versions that were realized in 
different cities. On the other hand, it was perhaps even more crucial that 
each of these versions shared a visual congruence of distinctive similar-
ity with the authorized master-choreography developed around the royal 
court in Paris. Only through this congruence could the imperative charac-
ter of a royal choreographic work be guaranteed and realized.12
With the background of this copyright strategy, it would only be a 
few decades later, that the Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Drama-
tiques (SACD), a copyright collecting society for authors initiated in 1777 
by the French playwright Beaumarchais, extended the performing rights 
10 On the history of copyright in dance, with a particular focus on the Northern 
American context, see Kraut 2016.
11 See Lepecki 2004, 126.
12 See Jeschke 1983.
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to theatrical and choreographic works. Theoretically, from then on, there 
was the option to register a choreographic work for copyright. Neverthe-
less, a famous historical example of a denial of copyright for dance reveals 
the precarious relationship between movement-based performances and 
the claim of authorship. This is the case of the American dance pioneer 
Loïe Fuller, who wanted to prevent the illegal imitation of her Serpentine 
Dance and whose juridical invention against Minnie Renwood Bemis was 
dismissed by the US Circuit Court in 1892. This decision even set a prece-
dent “that remained in place in the United States until the 1976 Federal 
Copyright Law explicitly extended protection to choreographic works.”13
The court’s argument reiterated the alleged inferiority of dance, histor-
ically constructed because of its increased evanescence that transcended 
even the transience of music and theatre performances which, unlike 
dance, could mostly rely on a written score or dramatic text. In the par-
ticular case of Loïe Fuller, the ephemerality of dance was even paired with 
a lack of narrative and a decisive tendency towards abstraction, both of 
which played leading roles in the court’s decision. If nothing like a story 
or a dramatic structure exists, it is hard to define what the object of copy-
right actually consists of, when this very object—a movement or a series 
of movements—vanishes at the moment it is produced. Considering this 
alongside the notion of pleasure that this ephemeral art is connected 
with—an only slightly hidden link to the tradition of religiously-motivated 
prohibitions of dance—Loïe Fuller’s claim to copyright for her work was 
dismissed. The court held that:
An examination of the description of the complaint’s dance, as filed 
for copyright, shows that the end sought for and accomplished was 
solely the devising of a series of graceful movements, combined 
with an attractive arrangement of drapery, lights, and shadows, 
telling no story, portraying no character, depicting no emotion. The 
merely mechanical movements by which effects are produced on 
the stage are not subjects of copyright where they convey no ideas 
whose arrangement makes up a dramatic composition. Surely, 
those described and practiced here convey, and were devised to 
convey, to the spectator no other idea than that a comely woman 
is illustrating the poetry of motion in a singularly graceful fashion. 
Such an idea may be pleasing, but it can hardly be called dramatic.14
The long history of dance notation since the fifteenth century and the 
increased importance of capturing movement through photography, film, 
video, and computer programs demonstrates that the mere equation of 
dance with traceless evanescence lacks sufficient complexity. Clearly, it 
13  See Kraut 2016, 43–83, here 43. Rancière 2013, 101.
14  “Fuller v. Bemis, Circuit Court S. D. New York, 18 June 1892.” Federal Reporter vol. 
50, no. 989 (1892): 926. Quoted in Rancière 2013, 102. 
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is true that dance does not exist beyond the very moment of its perfor-
mance, and that any attempt to capture movement without any loss is 
prone to fail, but this does not mean that there are no techniques and 
aesthetics of copying in contemporary dance. However, these issues are 
mainly discussed under the terms of repeating and recreating movement 
rather than of copying, duplicating, or even stealing dance. Most of these 
choreographic methodologies deal with the cultural heritage of dance, and 
struggle not only with the ephemerality of movement itself but with the 
historic distance between the actual creation of a choreography and its 
recreation, often years later, with different dancers and under a different 
set of circumstances. Needless to say, these recreations, or “reconstruc-
tions” as they are called, face copyright infringement laws and claims of 
ownership for specific movements. The problem is exacerbated because 
any trained dancer can easily repeat them and will do so, inevitably and not 
on purpose, since the possibilities for bodily movement are limited; steps 
and leaps, even when under copyright, will be reproduced involuntarily.
Along with the question of how minute a movement has to be in order 
to be un-trademarked or “un-trademarkable,” the phenomenon of unin-
tentional copying applies likewise to Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker. Post-
modern dancers like Yvonne Rainer, Lucinda Childs, and Trisha Brown 
influenced De Keersmaeker in the sixties and early seventies, and she may 
very well have copied specific dance moves or movement material from 
them. But the attempt to accuse De Keersmaeker herself of plagiarism and 
plundering postmodern dance pieces would be prone to fail, since the core 
of postmodern choreography includes simple, everyday movements—like 
walking, standing, kneeling, turning, and tossing or flipping the hair—all of 
which were inevitably and involuntarily copied by De Keersmaeker, as well 
as many other dancers and choreographers.15 To make the whole nexus 
of copying and repeating, repetition and copy even more complex, De 
Keersmaeker’s choreographic work—whether stolen, duplicated, or simply 
appropriated by Beyoncé—is in itself inherently structured by reiteration 
and alteration. The dancers in Achterland or Rosas danst Rosas repeat their 
simple dance movements systematically, with minimal choreographed var-
iations that, along with involuntary slippages, amount to an inextricable 
network of highly similar yet always slightly varied movement sequences.16
Reconstructing dance
Now a major trend in contemporary dance due to increased funding, 
the reconstruction of influential works of the past tries to overcome the 
ephemerality of dance and seeks to retrieve what has inevitably been lost 
and what can be revived only to a certain degree from notations, sketches, 
15 See Cvejić 2012, 14.
16 See Laermans 2015, 84–89.
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and the bodily memory of former dancers. Perhaps the most prominent 
example is Vaslav Nijinsky’s choreography for The Rite of Spring from 1913, 
of which no notation survives, but which nevertheless was first recon-
structed by Millicent Hodson and Kenneth Archer with the Joffrey Ballet in 
Chicago, in 1987, following a seven-year study of remaining sketches and 
notes by Valerie-Gross-Hugo, Marie Rambert, and Igor Stravinsky.17 Since 
1987, Hodson’s and Archer’s attempt to reconstruct The Rite of Spring was 
restaged several times, with a climax in the hundredth anniversary of the 
piece in 2013, and performances in the Théâtre des Champs-Élysée in Paris 
and the Mariinsky Theatre in Saint Petersburg.
Interestingly, Hodson and Archer are facing massive questions of copy-
right in their reconstruction of the work, which includes not only The Rite of 
Spring, but several other major Modernist dance works. At least in the case 
of Nijinsky’s pioneering choreography, the legal status is quite clear: along 
with the composer Igor Stravinsky and the costume and stage designer 
Nicholas Roerich, Nijinsky declared the copyright for The Rite of Spring in 
1913 with the Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques (SACD). With 
this declaration, the three contributing artists were given a copyright for 
the entire piece that would last for seventy years after the last among 
them died; this happened in 1971, with the death of Igor Stravinsky. For 
this reason, not only the music, but also the choreography for The Rite of 
Spring, is still under copyright protection; each performance would neces-
sitate the payment of large royalties that Millicent Hodson and Kenneth 
Archer cannot afford.18
The case gets even more complicated; in the meantime, the French 
choreographer Dominique Brun has created another reconstruction of the 
same piece, rougher and less tamed than Hodson’s and Archer’s version, 
and therefore probably closer to the lost version from 1913 that caused 
the famous riot on 29 May, 1913. While Brun is apparently willing to pay 
the royalties—or has at least applied for the permission to perform The Rite 
of Spring—Hodson and Archer have chosen another method to deal with 
the question of copyright infringement: they do not claim to have recon-
structed Nijinsky’s epochal work, but rather speak of a “reasonable facsim-
ile” that only approximates what the first work would have looked like.19
It seems to be futile to measure how much of Nijinsky’s choreographic 
works remains in this facsimile and how authentic this legalized copy is 
or is not. The problem is more demanding: we have to keep in mind—
and particularly in the case of Hodson’s and Archer’s attempt, it is hard to 
overlook—that contemporary movement training, as well as nutrition and 
other cultural determinants, have created dancers whose bodies move and 
dance differently than those from former centuries and decades. Solely 
with regard to physique, the muscularity and the movement capacities 
17 See Hodson 1996; Hodson and Archer 2014.
18 See Hahn 2013.
19 Hahn 2013, 27.
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of contemporary dancers transform the reconstruction of an older dance 
work dramatically; hence it does not make sense to speak of an exact copy. 
This also applies to those cases when choreographers themselves re-en-
act their own works from decades ago. The problems that plagued dance 
pieces from early Modernism, such as Vaslav Nijinsky’s choreography for 
The Rite of Spring, or later works from the mid-twentieth century like Mary 
Wigman’s version of the Frühlingsopfer, set to the same musical score by 
Stravinsky, affect postmodern dance as well. A significant case is Lucinda 
Childs’s work Dance, from 1979 which, unlike the case of Nijinsky’s work, 
has been archived through film recordings. While skinny dancers flap 
their arms imprecisely in the 1979 version, the dancers in the 2009 ver-
sion move their athletic and visibly-trained bodies almost without any 
loss of control.
Childs’s attempt at self-copying is more exact than the piece that it 
approaches, yet it also lacks the fascinating tension of the earlier version 
which derived from the strong implication of a choreographic structure 
and the individual and involuntarily imprecise execution. Moreover, in the 
same manner that the physiques of the dancers have changed, so have 
the viewing habits of audiences. What was new and astonishing decades 
ago has become commonplace, or will now be analyzed in a much more 
detailed and sophisticated way. In shifting the focus from the process of 
copying in dance to the notion of a copy in dance, the question of whether 
any such copy in dance is possible or not also relies on the collaborative 
relationship between the dancers and the audience. The audience inher-
ently influences and helps to generate a dance and is thus involved in the 
creation of the copy of a dance and, most importantly, in preventing its 
exactness. For, due to the ever-changing composition of an audience, 
which is structured differently at each performance, no exact repetition of 
the same dance event can be guaranteed.
Besides the attempts to accurately reconstruct former dance pieces, 
be they the choreographer’s own or someone else’s work, another trend 
in contemporary choreography creates performances that deal self-reflec-
tively with the impossibility of restaging older works and the constrictions 
that come with wanting to quote from them. These works clearly mark the 
difference between the alleged original and the copy, often in an ironic 
way, e. g. by changing the gender of the main characters or by referring 
to looming copyright infringements in the performance itself. Josep Cabal-
lero García exemplifies this trend with his work on Pina Bausch’s legend-
ary version of The Rite of Spring, which her company still performs today, 
and from which foreign choreographers are only allowed to reproduce 
short sequences of dance movements. In his solo SACRES, from 2013, the 
male dancer Josep Caballero García incorporates iconic movements from 
Bausch’s Rite that, in her version, are only performed by female dancers, 
such as the dynamic crunching of the elbows in the stomach while the 
upper body convulses. In other parts of the performance, Josep Caballero 
García, who has himself been a dancer in Pina Bausch’s company, has his 
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head covered by a paper bag bearing a comic version of Pina Bausch’s 
face, thus ironically indicating that now, as a solo male dancer, he would 
infringe on the copyright imposed on the movements while, as one of 
Bausch’s dancers, he would not.
Responding to movement
I will now deal with the relationship between copying and dancing in a 
more general way, extending the idea of copying beyond the question 
of legally or illegally-repeated dance moves. First of all, we have to keep 
in mind that the question of copying in dance is not only related to the 
ephemerality of movement but has to deal with its corporeality as well, 
for in dancing, the process and product are indistinguishable: dancers 
expose themselves as moving bodies yet become the movement they ful-
fill. Thus the process of copying a dance move is nothing less or nothing 
more than its own product: the process of copying is the copy. In addition 
to this convergence of the repetition of a step and the repeated executed 
step, the condition of the body and its limited possibilities of movement 
always restrict the process of dancing. This constriction is much more gen-
eral than any possible copyright may be, since the law of gravity applies 
to all human bodies as does the specific combination of bones, muscles, 
joints, and tendons that predetermine any movement, making it very dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to invent a movement that no one else has ever 
executed before. Thus we can say that copying always affects dancing and 
that a copy-free dance does not exist. From this we can also question the 
idea of originality in dance, especially the premise that no movement is 
ever entirely original since it has been executed many times before. In the 
case of a strongly codified dancing style like classical ballet, the almost 
alphabetical taxonomy of movements also prevents any originality of a 
figure or position.
While ephemerality reduces the amount of copying in dance by immedi-
ately extinguishing what may eventually be copied already at the moment 
of its emergence, the constrictions of the human body radically extend 
the idea of copying to almost general understanding. Any movement will 
always be at least partially a copy of other movements because the human 
possibility to move is limited and the sheer anatomy does not allow for 
radically innovative movements that have never been made before. How-
ever, with regard to the exactitude of the repetition, the relatively limited 
possibilities for a moving body paradoxically lead to an effect very similar 
to the mere singularity caused by dance’s transience. Truthfully, these limi-
tations impose traces of copying on each movement, yet the repeated per-
formance of an already-executed movement also emphasizes its endless 
variations. Always slightly different, no movement is absolutely the same 
as another movement; it will inevitably be singular and exist in its own 
time. Each step is different from any other, and each turn is marked by the 
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conditions under which a particular body behaves in a particular place and 
time. By focusing on these differences, the complexity in the relationship 
between copying and dance suggests that, in dance, no exact copy exists 
at all. Due to the limited possibilities of movement, dancing eliminates con-
cepts of originality; the same applies to the exactitude which dancers can 
never fulfill due to the individuality of their bodies.20
Thus copying in dance can be theorized in a two-fold way by point-
ing out the universal character of copying as well as the impossibility of 
exactness in its general repetitiveness. Dancing can’t be entirely new and 
is simultaneously never the same. This dialectical approach to the relation-
ship between copying and dance becomes more complex when we take 
into account the fact that no dancer dances in a vacuum, but is conscious of 
tradition, historical context, and, mostly important, of his or her audience. 
The latter is the exposure to spectacularity, to a situation of otherness, 
when people other than the dancer watch him or her moving.21 On the one 
hand, this exposure is consistent with the singularity of movement, since 
the specific situation of the audience even stresses the particularity of each 
leap or step. That is, the various perspectives from the audience (i.e. front 
row vs. balcony) affect each audience member’s visual impression of the 
dancers; those onstage can appear as slightly or strongly contorted, or 
as twisted and clenched. In this sense, everyone sees the movement in a 
singular way. On the other hand, the exposure to an audience reinforces 
the notion of copy, for the spectators watching a dance piece, with their 
own bodily experience and their knowledge of other situations of similar 
movement, testify that no dance is completely original.
To a certain degree, even the improvised solo in which someone 
dances alone in the studio and without an audience bears aspects of copy- 
ing. Here, the dancer reacts and responds to an imaginative body and 
transfers phantasmagoric movements from the imagination to bodily 
reality. Laurence Louppe, the French dance theorist, has developed this 
idea into a theory of dance which posits that it is always a secondary and 
deduced movement, in which dancers read—or, we might also say, copy—
what is already written in their imagination.22 Understood in this general 
sense, dancing as copying is strictly relational and corresponds to others, 
whether they be imaginative or real counterparts, such as dance partners 
on stage or people in the audience.
In focusing on the reception of copying rather than on questions of sim-
ilarity or imitation, the notion of dance as copying here almost converges 
with mimesis as a non-repressive and non-violent approach to the other. 
Following Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s idea of proper mimetic behavior, 
20 Regarding the inevitable fragmentation of choreography in a plurality of spatial 
inscriptions, cf. Derrida 1985. For the idea of “originals” as “works related to and 
derived from copies,” see Elkins 1993, 120.
21 See Nancy 2008, 65.
22 See Louppe 2010. On the complex relationship between copying and writing, 
see also Sanchez-Stockhammer (this volume).
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dancing can be described as a “snuggling” adaptation meant to preserve 
the non-identical in particular.23 However, as an adaptation in that sense, 
dancing has a doubly critical character: it criticizes objectification of the 
other and is itself endangered and at risk of approaching otherness in a 
“non-snuggling” way, seeking to govern and rule the other by mimicking 
and degrading him to an object of imitative copying.
Strangely, contemporary dance theory tends to neglect the second 
aspect and is almost in denial about how dance violates the non-iden-
tical. Dance theory rather focuses on the first aspect, which sees dance 
as a powerful counter-model to oppressive social relations.24 In conse-
quence, copying in dance would lose its pejorative character entirely, 
almost to the degree that dance as copying is conceptualized as a new 
model of successful communication among individuals. This emphatic 
approach to dance comes particularly in view when we consider the cur-
rent ideas about how dancers actually embody copying in dance, or how 
the copying process is conceptualized in terms of bodily response. Pivotal 
to these questions is the notion of listening, a term coined in the context 
of contact improvisation which describes a form of both conscious and 
subconscious perception.25
Part of a relational network between two or more dancers, bodies 
practice listening when they are receptive to the movements of others in 
a multi-sensorial way, including the senses of hearing, sight, touch, per-
haps smell, and—most importantly—kinesthetic and synesthetic percep-
tion. Improvisation theories conceptualize listening as a process of mutual 
receptiveness and response that comprises approximation and alignment 
not only to another, but also to moments of bodily emulation and unin-
tentional copying. Even beyond the willful imitation of the movement of 
others, the process of listening can become a way of copying, at least when 
copying not only applies to the constitution of visual similarity, but rather 
concerns a form of embodied mimesis. Perhaps rarely realized completely 
by entire bodies over a long period of time, but always partially by some 
limbs and for a few moments, a moving body taking part in a contact 
improvisation and listening to other bodies will copy foreign movements 
by paralleling his or her body to others. And that body will then be copied 
by others who respond to the response and copy the copy.
The vertiginous thrill of inexactitude
The difference between a first and second copy can be understood in terms 
of privation, losing, even of failure, as if the second copy loses an exacti-
tude that the first copy might have had. This understanding of copying 
23 See Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 148.
24 See for example Husemann 2009. 
25 See Brandstetter 2014, 221.
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as privation, as lacking in exactitude, originality, and authenticity, coin-
cides with a melancholic view on the impossibility of repetition. It is not by 
chance that, with regard to dance as one the most ephemeral art forms, 
this melancholic reaction to the impossibility of an exact copy may escalate 
to mourning, grief, and despair, especially on the side of the audience, as 
they are prominently reported to do in Søren Kierkegaard’s reflection on 
repetition. Kierkegaard here focuses on the unrepeatability of dance and 
extends this principle to the general impossibility to regain exactly what 
has been lost:
I was at the Königstädter Theatre the next morning. The only thing 
that repeated itself was that no repetition was possible […]. The 
little dancer who had bewitched me the last time with a graceful 
manoeuvre that resembled the beginning of a leap, had made the 
leap. […] After several days’ repetition of this, I became bitter, so 
tired of repetition that I decided to return home. I made no great 
discovery, yet it was strange, because I had discovered that there 
was no such thing as repetition. I became aware of it by having it 
repeated in every possible way.26
In the field of dance in particular, we can also look at the impossibility of 
repetition in a much more welcoming and supportive manner by stressing 
the creative effect any incorrect repetition might have. For it sets free a 
whole dynamic of alteration resulting in the mere non-iterability of dance. 
In the course of repetition, and in the process of copying, physical consti-
tutions and emotional and cognitive processes will always influence and 
change the way a pose is struck, a leap is set, or a figure is enacted. Thus, 
due to the fact that each dancer dances in a slightly different way and 
is not able to repeat even one dance movement without any variation, 
copying in dance is always already affected by inexactitude that results 
in the singularity of each movement.27 It is here, in the non-interability of 
dance, or in the vertiginous thrill of inexactitude,28 that the power of the 
copy is at work. For Giorgio Agamben, such repeating processes, always 
interwoven with alteration and never identical to themselves, even carry 
out a “messianic task,”29 for they essentially involve creation as well as 
“de-creation:”
Repetition is not the return of something identical; it is not the 
same as such that returns. The force and the grace of repetition, 
26 Kierkegaard 2009, 38.
27 See Schwan 2013, 223.
28 This expression refers to William Forsythe’s ballet The Vertiginous Thrill of Exact-
itude (Premiere: 20 January 1996, Ballet Frankfurt), a dance piece exposing the 
virtuosity of dancers in their attempts to execute movements with as much pre-
cision as possible.  
29 Agamben 2002, 318.
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the novelty it brings us, is the return as the possibility of what was. 
Repetition restores the possibility of what was, renders it possible 
anew. […] But it is not a new creation after the first. One cannot con-
sider the artist’s work uniquely in terms of creation; on the contrary, 
at the heart of every creative act there is an act of de-creation […] it 
means de-creating what exists, de-creating the real, being stronger 
than the fact in front of you.30
However, with regard to the everyday character of movement, the ordi-
nariness of dance training and the exhaustion of rehearsal, it is appro-
priate to put this more prosaic understanding of copying on a level with 
Agamben’s emphatic embracement of the inevitability of difference and 
innovation. Particularly in postmodern dance, and since then in many 
forms of contemporary dance, everyday movements play a decisive role in 
choreography and mark a renunciation of singularity and exposed virtu-
osity. To frame the prosaicness of these movements theoretically, we may 
return to Kierkegaard—specifically, to the very beginning of his reflections 
on repetition, where he compares repetition with a snugly-fitting cloth 
and distinguishes it from recollection and hope. Though repetition—or 
copying—is not possible as an exact and pure reconstitution of what has 
been, it has
the blissful security of the moment. Hope is new attire, stiff and 
starched and splendid. Still, since it has not yet been tried on, one 
does not know whether it will suit one, or whether it will fit. Recol-
lection is discarded clothing which, however lovely it might be, no 
longer suits one because one has outgrown it. Repetition is clothing 
that never becomes worn, that fits snugly and comfortably.31
Thus, summarizing the theoretical approach to the role of copying in 
dance, we can state the ambivalence of an impossible identical repetition 
on one hand, with all its aspects of melancholia and prosaicness, and a 
dynamic of alteration, difference, and innovation, on the other. And we 
have to keep in mind, that we cannot separate the product of moving from 
the movement itself, so that in the particular case of dance, much unlike in 
any other form of art, copying and repeating almost converge. This leads 
us to our next section’s focus on how contemporary dance interweaves 
emulation and recreation, especially through multimedia-based publish-
ing, as Beyoncé’s appropriation demonstrates. It speaks to the power of 
the copy that, in the wake of the scandal, Beyoncé’s appropriation found 
its own imitations and that De Keersmaeker’s original choreography Rosas 
danst Rosas was creatively copied hundreds of times.
30 Agamben 2002, 316.
31 Kierkegaard 2009, 3.
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The power of re-creation
The discussion of the thin line between robbery and recreation took a com-
pletely unexpected turn when De Keersmaeker—supposedly in an attempt 
to show her support for creative responses to her work in order to prevent 
the impression that she objected to them—mounted the program Re:Ro-
sas! The fABULEUS Rosas Remix Project.32 De Keersmaeker and her company 
released an entire website for the recreation of Rosas danst Rosas aiming 
to incite school classes and groups of younger people to re-enact the piece 
in their own surroundings, film it, and upload the new version to the web-
site.33 With the possibility to download the original music for the piece, the 
website for the Re:Rosas! The fABULEUS Rosas Remix Project combines his-
toric video recordings of the piece, the 1997 version filmed in an old tech-
nical school in Leuven by Thierry De Mey, and several documentary videos. 
Yet, the main focus is set on three training videos teaching the movement 
score for Rosas danst Rosas, the work’s structure, and finally the entire cho-
reography. Of course, all the uploaded recreation videos are also available, 
and among the hundreds of versions (346 as of April 2016), one can find 
contributions not only from Belgium, but from countries worldwide:
30 years ago, dance company Rosas put itself on the map with 
the production  Rosas danst Rosas. This choreography has since 
been staged all over the world. And now it’s your turn. Dance your 
own Rosas danst Rosas, make a video film of it and post it on this 
site. In the following videos choreographer Anne Teresa De Keers-
maeker and dancer Samantha van Wissen will teach you the moves, 
step by step, from the second part of the performance. After that it 
becomes your dance: you dance Rosas. In a different setting, with a 
huge number of dancers… any way you like!34
However, the motto “any way you like” does not mean an opportunity for 
the wild plundering of a famous dance score of the 1980s. On the contrary, 
the score is rather fixed and most of the recreation videos copy it decently, 
with evident variations in to what extent they follow De Keersmaeker’s cho-
reography in the exactitude of their movements. In addition, while the age 
spectrum of the participants ranges widely from kindergarten-aged chil-
dren to university students, the recreation videos tend to be more exclu-
sive in terms of gender variety. Clearly the vast majority of the participants 
32 The word “fabuleus” is the Dutch version of the English “fabulous.” In addition 
to this, the particular spelling draws a connection to the theatre and dance com-
pany fABULEUS with its specific focus on young audience and talent develop-
ment. See “fABULEUS.” Accessed February 20, 2017. http://www.fabuleus.be. 
33 See “Re:Rosas! The fABULEUS Rosas Remix Project.” Accessed February 20, 2017. 
http://www.rosasdanstrosas.be.
34 Introduction to The fABULEUS Rosas Remix Project. Accessed February 20, 2017. 
http://www.rosasdanstrosas.be/en-home.
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are female, and in recreating De Keeersmaeker’s original flipping and 
tossing of long hair, they reinforce the ideological background of allegedly 
feminine movements symmetrically repeated as a statement of girl power. 
Only a few versions show male dancers reenacting this reputedly feminist 
score, interestingly reinforcing the sexual character of the movements by 
dancing them with bare chests and erotic, almost aggressive, dedication.35 
What began in 1983 as a statement of girl power has changed into a queer, 
voguing-like appropriation, not necessarily with a homoerotic subtext, but 
clearly transforming and transcending an all-too-narrow aesthetic equa-
tion of femininity with hair toss and sitting cross-legged.
An explicitly queer appropriation emerged with Ton Do-Nguyen’s adap-
tation of Beyoncé’s Video Countdown, which the then sixteen-year-old 
teenager from Pennsylvania uploaded to YouTube in July 2012.36 The shot-
for-shot recreation, which went viral shortly after the upload, shows Ton 
Do-Nguyen wearing a blue sleeved blanket (or “Snuggie”) instead of the 
various elaborate robes and bathing suits in which Beyoncé moves in front 
of the camera. The material derived from De Keersmaeker’s early dance 
pieces in particular appears as a grotesque deformation when danced by 
a sixteen-year-old male under a sleeved blanket. With this Snuggie, Ton 
Do-Nguyen unwittingly pays tribute to Kierkegaard’s mention of repetition 
as a cloth that “fits snugly and comfortably,” and this peculiar costume 
clearly marks the difference between his appropriation and the prefigur-
ing video. Dancing in his Snuggie and always wearing his metal-framed 
glasses, it is clear that Ton Do-Nguyen is not Beyoncé in drag and that his 
copy fails deliberately.
This failure of copying Beyoncé, along with the immense meticulous-
ness with which Ton Do-Nguyen has executed his shot-for-shot recreation, 
makes his video a distinguished example of what Judith Halberstam has 
coined the “queer art of failure.” According to Halberstam, this art of fail-
ure “dismantles the logics of success and failure with which we currently 
live. Under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmarking, 
undoing, unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more 
cooperative, more surprising ways of being in the world.”37 In this sense, 
Ton Do-Nguyen’s imperfect emulation, though a product of avid fandom, 
not only undermines Beyoncé’s exposure of wealth and sexual attractive-
ness, but even ironizes and questions the commerciality of the emulated 
“original,” which is of course itself a sample of borrowed inspiration and 
35 See for example “Cravos danst Rosas,” Vimeo video, 4:17, uploaded by “Irene 
Bandeira,” September 29, 2013, http://www.vimeo.com/75739022.
36 See for example “Countdown - Beyoncé (Snuggie Version)” Dailymotion video, 
3:33, uploaded by “Spi0n,” July 18, 2012, http://www.dailymotion.com/video/
xs8u08_countdown-beyonce-snuggie-version_fun. For queer appropriation of 
Beyoncé’s videos in general, cf. Bench 2013.
37 Halberstam 2011, 2. 
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imitation.38 His recreative appropriation, or pastiche, highlights the whole 
nexus of reference, repetition, and alteration that governs copying in 
dance, and which extends beyond a logic based on a single “original” and 
a plain “copy.”39 As a result of this, the emulation of a dance could even 
be better than the dance it emulates and can add humor to the repetition 
process. So, when Beyoncé herself finally responded to Ton Do-Nguyen’s 
video on her website, she could only affirm its dynamics of difference and 
innovation by calling Do-Nguyen’s copy “brilliant” and stating: “I think he 
did this video better than I did! Love. B.”40
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The Dawn of the Copy 
in the Bronze Age
Abstract Contemporary everyday life is dominated by industrially repro-
duced serial objects that we perceive as easily replaceable in case of dam-
age or loss. We are used to seriality, i.e. the existence of what we perceive 
as identical copies of a certain kind of object. Seen from a long-term per-
spective, humans have not been able to create visually identical copies in 
large numbers for the most part of their existence. Seriality only became 
possible to a larger extent with the invention of the bronze casting tech-
nique in the Near East in the early third millennium BCE, from where the 
technique was introduced to Central Europe in the late third millennium 
BCE. In my contribution to this volume, I want to elucidate the changes 
in the perception of the material world that were connected with the new 
technical possibility of casting large numbers of visually identical objects 
with casting moulds. I will demonstrate how the ability to produce almost 
identical copies resulted in the creation of new practices with objects and 
new ideas about the meaning and potential of objects in the world: the 
possibility to possess several identical weapons became the hallmark of 
the Early Bronze Age hero and groups of seemingly identical objects in the 
form of hoards were considered the most appropriate offering to the gods.
Keywords Early Bronze Age, technology, casting, copy, seriality
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Is the notion of the copy really relevant for prehistoric archaeologists like 
me? At first sight, the question seems to be a rhetorical one.1 However, 
if you take a look at the topics that are generally discussed in prehistoric 
archaeology, the ideas and motivations that may lie behind the presence 
of copies in the prehistoric archaeological record have not received too 
much attention so far.2 This lack of knowledge raises two obvious ques-
tions: how is the idea of the copy understood in prehistoric archaeology, 
and how relevant is the answer for us?
In the following pages, I will first discuss the particular role of the copy 
in prehistoric archaeology and compare it with other nomenclatures used 
to describe this phenomenon. This will include addressing the question 
of which characteristics are necessary for something to be described as 
a copy at all. In the second part, I will discuss secondary practices in Early 
Bronze Age Central Europe and shed light on the transformative power of 
new reproduction techniques, as well as the perception of serial objects 
that were produced with the help of these techniques.
The copy in prehistoric archaeology
One of the most basic archaeological methods is to identify objects that 
seem to be identical, or at least very similar, from a visual perspective. This 
is the major starting point for all further analysis. Our search for similar 
objects is governed by the wish to define types. A type is defined as a class 
of objects that possess at least two features in common; we regularly try 
to group together objects that are as similar as possible.3 However, even if 
we are able to collect a certain number of almost identical objects, we do 
not use the term “copy” for them, but call them “objects of the same type.”4 
This is due to the fact that speaking of a copy necessitates, as a first step, 
the definition of an original and, secondly, a diachronic approach. With 
respect to the definition of an original, we are faced with the problem of 
1 This contribution is part of my postdoctoral research at the Cluster of Excellence 
“Asia and Europe in a Global Context” financed by the Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft at Heidelberg University. I would like to thank Brigitte Röder, 
Joseph Maran, Christian Horn, Tibor Soroceanu, Bernhard Hänsel, Carola 
Metzner-Nebelsick, and Harald Meller for their stimulating discussions and cri- 
tiques.
2 A most notable exception is Tim Flohr Sørensen’s (2012) comprehensive onto-
logical study of the so-called copy of foreign objects in the Scandinavian Early 
Bronze Age. The notion of the skeuomorph has been extensively discussed by 
Carl Knappett (2002) and Catherine J. Frieman (2010; Frieman 2012; Frieman 
2013). The otherwise lack of conceptualization of the “copy” and related terms in 
prehistoric archaeology stands in contrast to the vivid discussions on this topic 
in classical archaeology, where the presence of Roman marble statues as cop-
ies of lost Greek bronze statues has resulted in the necessity to conceptualize 
“copy” and “original” since the beginning of the discipline (e.g. Bieber 1977; Ridg-
way 1985; Junker and Stähli 2008; Settis and Anguissola 2015).
3 Rouse 1960, 316; Eggert 2001, 133–134; Stockhammer 2004, 17–20.
4 Cf. Sørensen 2012, 45.
171
THE DAWN OF THE COPY IN THE BRONZE AGE
identifying prototypes within the class of objects of the same type. Consid-
ering the diachronic perspective, we are often lost from a methodological 
point of view: archaeological time only progresses when things change:5 
our archaeological clock only ticks forward when objects change in style 
throughout time. For archaeologists, the identicalness (or at least similar-
ity) of objects indicates their contemporaneity.6 This particular concept of 
time in archaeology basically impedes the identification of chronological 
difference between original and copy, especially if we define the latter as a 
“practice of the secondary,”7 or the practice of reproducing something that 
has been there before in attempts to reach at least some similarity with the 
original. Thus the dialogue between a copy and typological dating meth-
ods has the potential for contradiction. When may we, therefore, speak of 
a copy in prehistoric archaeology? For designating an object as a copy, two 
prerequisites have to be fulfilled:
First, we must be able to define a class of objects on the basis of com-
mon stylistic features and identify their place of production. The latter 
is often based on the scientific analysis of the object’s constituents and 
the geographical origins of the different sources of raw materials used 
therein, e.g. copper ores or clay deposits. Second, a copy would be quite 
similar visually, but slightly different stylistically, and found outside the 
region of production. Moreover, this object must be made of the same 
type of material, but from a different ore or clay deposit than that of the 
core region of production, e.g. Aegean-style pottery found on Cyprus or in 
the Levant, where it was made by using local clay deposits.8 If this is not 
the case, we cannot identify differences in its constituent materials. We 
would, then, call it an imported object rather than a local copy. It is also 
possible that the copy is made out of a completely different material, e.g. 
using flint instead of copper. It follows from this epistemological definition 
that we need both similarity and subtle differences to designate some-
thing as a copy.9 This distinctiveness or alterity is commonly based on the 
materiality of an object and/or its place of production. The more common 
understanding of “copy” today—as a slavish and possibly precise repro-
duction of an original—is not helpful for prehistoric archaeology, as we are 
unable to identify such kinds of copies in our material record. Therefore, 
the differentiation of “original” and “copy” poses an enormous problem for 
prehistoric archaeology, because objects that look identical were, in our 
view, produced at the same time and we are not able to introduce a dia-
chronic perspective in this case. All identical objects of the past are either 
5 Kubler 1982, 47; Eggert 2001, 146–149; Sommer 2014, 42–45.
6 Cf. also Kubler 1982, who is aware of the problem of seriality and the associated 
lack of what he calls a “prime object” with regard to the measurement of time on 
the basis of material culture.
7 Fehrmann et al. 2004; Bartsch, Becker, and Schreiter 2010.
8 D’Agata et al. 2005; Mommsen, D’Agata, and Yasur-Landau 2009; Mountjoy 
2011.
9 Sørensen 2012, 48.
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all originals and none of them is a copy or they are all copies and none of 
them is an original. Both perspectives are justifiable in our search for the 
original (see also Rune Graulund’s contribution to this volume) and will be 
addressed in the sections that follow:
Assumption 1: All prehistoric objects are originals and none are copies
All objects from the past—even if a large number of similar or identical 
objects exist from a particular space and time—are perceived as being 
authentic and original by the modern-day spectator. Over time, these 
objects become “originalized”—irrespective of whether they were per-
ceived as originals or copies by past human actors. It is the act of exca-
vating that endorses an object with authenticity (similar to the political act 
of endorsing copies with originality as discussed by Jens Schröter in this 
volume). If the same object would have been dug up by grave robbers and 
sold on the market, it would need a specialist to determine its authenticity. 
If we are identifying prehistoric objects as originals, we accept that they 
are copies and originals at the same time and thus dissolve these catego-
ries from an etic perspective.
Assumption 2: All identical prehistoric objects are copies, none of them 
is an original
One can also easily argue for the opposite point of view, namely that all 
serial (in my case, prehistoric) objects are copies in the sense of serial prod-
ucts of which none is original.10 At least since the Early Bronze Age, some-
times hundreds—and often thousands—of seemingly identical objects 
that would definitely be identified as copies if they were made in the pres-
ent day were produced throughout human (pre-)history, throughout the 
world. These objects were most likely understood as copies and their pro-
duction seen as an act of copying by the prehistoric producer. Following 
Sørensen, serial products of the Bronze Age “have no origin and no origi-
nals. Instead, they only have a beginning and that beginning is character-
ised by repetition” (italics by Sørensen).11 From an emic point of view, these 
objects are all copies—if we suppose that the differentiation of “copy” and 
“original” has always existed everywhere.
In my view, the use of the terms “copy” and “original” to explain past 
phenomena must be approached with utmost caution, and coupled with 
the insight that these categories may not have existed in the particular 
space and time under study. Nevertheless, we should determine if any 
hints point toward the act of copying as associated with a particular func-
tion and meaning in the prehistoric context.
10 Cf. Baudrillard (1981) 1994.
11 Sørensen 2012, 57.
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Another interesting phenomenon is the production of a number of very 
similar, sometimes almost identical, objects on the basis of a model or 
casting mould.12 This is the usual case for cast metal objects—mostly 
bronzes—but sometimes also for figurines or vessels made out of clay. The 
necessary models or moulds cannot be termed an original, as they are not 
copied as such but just used to produce a series of almost identical objects, 
which you may call copies without an original. They are all originals and 
copies at the same time—like the prints produced with the same printing 
plate by an artist. They are a series and at the same time the basis for our 
definition of a type. Tim Flohr Sørensen speaks of “‘seriality’ in the produc-
tion of bronzes … by which is meant a series of independent actions that 
produce individual artefacts on the basis of existing artefacts that serve as 
models, prototypes or sources of inspiration.”13 In my view, the ability to 
produce a large number of seemingly identical objects is a particular and 
most important practice of the secondary.
Technology and copying in the Early Bronze Age
Having elaborated on the notion of the type, the copy, and the series, I 
would now like to discuss the transformative power of the practices of the 
secondary in prehistory or, more precisely, in the Central European Early 
Bronze Age, which dates to ca. 2200–1700 BCE.14
The invention and spread of bronze casting technology, i.e. the cast-
ing of an alloy of copper and tin, was one of the most important steps 
in the development of the human ability to technically reproduce objects. 
This technology was invented in the Near East in the third millennium BCE 
and spread from there to Central Europe in the late third and early second 
millennia BCE. In the following section, I focus on the beginning of the 
Bronze Age in Central Europe, i.e. the time when this new technology was 
appropriated by different local actors—albeit with very different velocity 
and intensity.15
Bronze technology was the first technology devised by man that allowed 
the serial reproduction of almost visually identical objects in large num-
bers. This had not been possible with stone, clay, or wood, as the individual 
surface structure of each of these materials revealed the uniqueness of 
12 I am completely aware that even objects which were cast with one and the same 
mold can differ due to shrinking processes and forging that happen after cast-
ing (Sørensen 2012, 47). Therefore, the attributes of sameness and difference 
depend very much on the eye of the individual beholder. In order to shed light 
on past perceptions of sameness and difference, I start with my own perception 
as a heuristic basis and check its possible compliance with past perceptions in 
my analysis of archaeological contexts—being aware of the potential vicious cir-
cle in my argument.
13 Sørensen 2012, 47.
14 Stockhammer et al. 2015a; Stockhammer et al. 2015b.
15 Kienlin 2006a; Kienlin 2008.
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an object to the naked eye. Copper was cast earlier than bronze, but was 
softer, harder to handle, and not suitable for producing large numbers 
of visually identical objects. Bronze was easier to cast, harder, and more 
durable, such that—with the help of casting moulds—it was possible to 
create many objects that were almost indistinguishable from one another.
The beginning of the Bronze Age produced a phenomenon of particu-
lar interest: the sudden and dramatic increase of the practice of depositing 
objects in the ground, i.e. the deposition of hoards. Hoarding practices 
already existed during the preceding Neolithic period,16 but the quantity 
of Early Bronze Age depositions exceeded all previous hoarding practices 
by far.17 The character and number of such depositions and the recur-
rent selection of bogs as places of deposition suggest a ritual motivation 
behind these practices—or at least for a large part of the Early Bronze Age 
hoards.18 This practice of deposition seems to be closely connected with 
the introduction of novel bronze technology and requires an explanation. 
This evidence leads us to reflect on the perception and appropriation 
of novel technologies in general and of bronze technology in particular. 
Science and technology studies (STS) as well as the sociology of technol-
ogy have extensively demonstrated the constructedness of technology 
that integrates technical and social aspects. In this regard, I understand 
“technique” as, first, all artefacts that are necessary for its realization, sec-
ond, all products that are produced with its help and, third, all knowledge 
with regard to the development and application of the technique.19 Knowl-
edge that is transmitted in the framework of the appropriation of a new 
technology comprises technical and social components that are intrinsi-
cally linked with each other and cannot be differentiated.20 A crucial factor 
for successful appropriation is therefore the possibility to translate foreign 
knowledge into one’s own world.21 This depends on the compatibility of the 
world view of the local actor who aims to appropriate the technology with 
the world views that are transmitted with the technology. STS and Sociol-
ogy of Technology have analysed many cases of the delayed appropriation 
or rejection of a particular technology by particular actors or groups of 
actors.22
16 Görmer 2005.
17 von Brunn 1959; Stein 1976; Lorenz 2010.
18 Religious motivations for at least a large part of the Early Bronze Age hoards are 
also assumed by e.g. Stein 1976, 9–30; Menke 1978/79, 209–210; Krause 1998, 
172; Krause 2003, 205–206; Hansen 2013. Kienlin 2006b and others have empha-
sized that other motivations for depositing objects into the ground might also 
have played a role.
19 Volti 1995, 6; Braun-Thürmann 2005, 27.
20 Pinch and Bijker 1984; Bijker 1994; Bijker 2001; Heinrich 2001, 1008-1009; Ram-
mert 2007, 51.
21 Latour 1986; Bachmann-Medick 2009.
22 E.g. for medicine, Stern 1927; for shipping, Gilfillan 1935; for the QERTY key-
board, Rogers 1983, 9–10; for planes, Geels 2005; for the Xerox copier, Such-
mann 2005.
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These insights from STS and the sociology of technology are further 
affirmed by the work of the social anthropologist Mary Helms. In her 
study “Ulysses’ sail: An ethnographic odyssey of power, knowledge, and 
geographical distance,” she demonstrates that traditional societies per-
ceive knowledge and objects from distant lands as something supernatu-
ral, mythical, and powerful.23 This is due to the fact that the distant lands 
where these objects and this knowledge originate are also perceived as 
mythical, powerful, and potentially dangerous. In order to be able to inte-
grate these objects and this knowledge, and to make use of them, they 
first have to be managed and tamed.
To conclude, based on insights from STS, sociology, and social anthro-
pology, it is clear that the novel bronze technology must have been associ-
ated with comparable reservations when it spread over Eurasia. This calls 
for a revision of the still vivid, but much outdated narrative in archaeolo- 
gical research that assumes a linear development from the Stone Age to 
the Bronze Age and considers technological progress and the spread of 
technological innovations as inevitable processes. This linear and evolu-
tionist perception of historical developments in large parts of archaeolo- 
gical research has led to downplaying all evidence that seems to contradict 
the general notion of historic progress and does not pay attention to the 
complex process of the transfer, translation, and appropriation of tech-
nological and non-technological knowledge. Archaeologists have already 
started to incorporate these insights into their study of the spread of past 
technologies24—especially with regard to prehistoric metallurgy, where 
Tobias Kienlin in particular has repeatedly argued for a more complex, 
non-linear history of diffusion.25 I would like to expand these thoughts and 
explain hoarding practice as a ritual strategy of managing the non-techni-
cal aspects of novel technology in the process of appropriation.
I would like to suggest that hoarding can be seen as a form of inno-
vation management in which the practice of copying seems to have been 
attributed with a particular meaning. Out of the hundreds of Early Bronze 
Age hoards from Central Europe, two hoards stand out: Hoard II from 
Melz, in Mecklenburg, Western Pomerania26 (fig. 1) and the hoard from 
Kyhna, in Saxony (fig. 3).27
Hoard II from Melz contained several so-called halberds with metal 
shafting—their shape reminds us of the much later halberds of Medieval 
Europe. A Carpathian-type axe was deposited along with the halberds (fig. 
1–2). This axe was shafted like the halberds before the deposition. For a 
long time, the axe was considered to be an import from Eastern Europe. 
However, recent metal analyses clearly point to a local manufacture like 
23 Helms 1988.
24 Gramsch 2009, 20.
25 Kienlin 2006a, 115; Kienlin 2006b, 528–529; Kienlin 2008; Kienlin 2010; Kienlin 
2014, 453–454; Burmeister and Müller-Scheeßel 2013.




Figure 1: Melz (Mecklenburg, Western Pomerania, Germany), Hoard II: halberds 
and axe of Carpathian type with metal shafting.
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Figure 2: Melz (Mecklenburg, Western Pomerania, Germany), Hoard II: axe (1) and 
halberd (2) from the hoard and comparable axes (3–9) from the Carpathian basin.
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that of the halberds.28 The axe from Melz is obviously not an import, but 
a local product and the copy of a foreign shape at the same time. Without 
scientific analyses, this copy could not have been distinguished from its 
Carpathian prototypes. My second example, the hoard from Kyhna, con-
tained a slotted lance head for which the best comparisons can be found 
28 Krause 2003, 246 fig. 224; 247
Figure 3: Kyhna (Saxony, Germany), Hoard: vessel with slotted lance head, pins, 
amber beads, and other body adornments.
179
THE DAWN OF THE COPY IN THE BRONZE AGE
in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.29 Similar to the axe from 
Melz, the lance head from Kyhna was considered an import for a long time 
(fig. 3–4). Quite surprisingly, however, metal analyses were able to demon-
strate its local production in Central Germany.30 Following my aforemen-
tioned understanding of the “copy” for prehistoric archaeology, it can be 
identified as a copy of a foreign type of object. Structurally similar findings 
from other Early Bronze Age contexts in Central Europe, and especially 
Northern Europe, are also known.31 I am convinced that these and fur-
ther, structurally similar findings need a particular explanation and that 
they help to shed light on the prehistoric perception and appropriation of 
bronze technology.
As already mentioned, science and technology studies, sociology, and 
social anthropology have demonstrated that foreign knowledge, technol-
ogies, and also objects are very often perceived as powerful and danger-
ous at the same time—and not only in traditional societies. I suppose the 
novel bronze technology spreading from the Near East to Central Europe 
29 Gerloff 1993.
30 Krause 2003, 245 fig. 223; 247. Gerloff 1993, 73 assumed that this object might 
be a local imitation of a foreign form, rather than an import. 
31 Isotope ratio and trace element analyses are still missing for other seemingly 
foreign bronzes found in contexts of the Central European Early Bronze Age 
(e.g. the axe from Naumburg: Wüstemann 1995, 80 No. 134; Schwarz 2004). For 
practices of copying in the Scandinavian Early Bronze Age, see Sørensen 2012.
Figure 4: Kyhna (1) (Saxony, Germany), slotted lance head and comparisons (2–5) 
from the Eastern Mediterranean.
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would have been similarly perceived. In my view, the ability to copy a for-
eign object in a quasi-identical shape can be interpreted as the attempt 
to take possession of the foreign. Those who were able to produce the 
foreign object in an identical manner were also able to control it. The 
anthropologist Michael Taussig called this practice the “mimetic faculty.”32 
In his book, Mimesis and Alterity, he describes the practices of copying used 
by the Cuna Indians in Panama to manage the threat by Colonial powers. 
The production of objects that were understood by the Cuna Indians as 
copies of the foreign and the management of these copies played a cru-
cial role in their encounter with the dangerous “Others.” The philosopher 
Gunter Gebauer and the anthropologist Christian Wulf hold a similar opin-
ion: “In mimetic processes, the actor constitutes the already acquired as 
something of his own and it becomes available through habitualisation.”33 
Taussig, Gebauer, and Wulf give us important hints for understanding evi-
dence from the Early Bronze Age. I would, therefore, like to propose that 
the practice of copying a Hungarian axe from Melz and an Eastern Mediter-
ranean lance head from Kyhna—and their subsequent deposition—should 
be interpreted as evidence for the management and control of new and 
foreign techniques.
The transformative power of seriality in the Early Bronze Age
As mentioned before, new bronze technology suddenly enabled prehis-
toric man to produce series of almost identical objects, whereas objects 
in all previous periods of human existence were rather characterized 
by their singularity and individuality. This possibility raises the question 
whether the ability to mechanically reproduce objects changed human 
world views, which are always very much influenced by the surrounding 
material world.34 Again, Early Bronze Age hoards are of particular interest 
when exploring this question. Many of these hoards are characterized by 
the deposition of objects of the same type but in large numbers. Six almost 
identical halberds were chosen for deposition in Melz,35 while another ten 
halberds were placed in nearby Groß Schwechten.36 Similar to halberds, 
daggers and hatches were also deposited together in large numbers, e.g. 
in the hoards of Malchin, Dobra, Gau-Bickelheim, and Ingolstadt—each of 
which contained several daggers,37 or the hoard from Gröbers-Bennewitz, 
which held a large number of hatchets.38 Many Early Bronze Age hoards 
32 Taussig 1997.
33 Gebauer and Wulf 2003, 9 (“In mimetischen Prozessen wird vom Handelnden 
bereits Erworbenes als Eigenes konstituiert und durch Habitualisierung verfüg-
bar;” translation by the author).
34 Robertson 1992, 69–77; Maran 2012, 63.
35 Coblenz 1985.
36 Wüstemann 1995, 81–84 No. 139. 140. 146. 147. 153‒155. 161. 162; 89 No. 181
37 Hundt 1971; Schwenzer 2004, 271–273; 303.
38 von Brunn 1959, 57–58; pl. 31, 32. For many further examples, see Hansen 2002.
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contain more than one type of object. However, there are always several 
objects of the same type deposited together (as in Guben-Bresinchen).39
Interestingly, the same practice of selecting objects for deposition 
according to their similarity is visible in the so-called princely burials of 
the Early Bronze Age Únětice culture, in what is now eastern Germany, 
western Poland, the Czech Republic, and parts of Austria and Slovakia. The 
most prominent grave, which was constructed around 1940 BCE, was dis-
covered in Leubingen, near Halle.40 According to the descriptions by the 
excavator, almost all of the grave goods were present in multiple exam-
ples, with the hatchets and probably also the daggers placed in cross-like 
positions.41 The deposition of several, often almost identical weapons in 
Early Bronze Age hoards and graves has already been emphasized by 
Svend Hansen and defined as Überausstattung (over-endowment).42
Svend Hansen pointed to the fact that this over-endowment required a 
particular motivation, which he relates to world views transmitted by the 
Epic of Gilgamesh, from late second millennium BCE (or possibly even late 
third millennium BCE) Mesopotamia.43 Within the epic, Gilgamesh, king of 
Uruk, and his friend Enkidu are equipped with numerous heavy and obvi-
ously identical weapons.44 Following Hansen, the equipment of the con-
temporaneous burials in Ur with several identical weapons indicates that 
ideas from the Gilgamesh epic influenced Mesopotamian burial practices. 
In this line of thought, the particular status of the deceased was empha-
sized by his over-endowment with weapons upon burial. Hansen assumes 
that related or similar myths were transmitted from the Near East to Cen-
tral Europe with the knowledge transfer of bronze technology.
However, interest in serial objects had already begun before the Early 
Bronze Age in Central Europe (certainly by the early third millennium 
BCE and probably even by the second half of the fourth millennium BCE), 
as is indicated by the anthropomorphic stele from Tübingen-Weilheim 
(Baden-Württemberg) and stelae and engravings in the southern alpine 
region.45 These stelae depict the over-endowment of individuals with a 
large number of weapons—especially daggers and halberds. The earliest 
systematic depositions of serial metal objects—in this case hatchets and 
axes made out of copper—can be found in the so-called Vučedol culture 
(roughly situated in parts of present Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herce-
govina, and Serbia). This serial production of copper weapons was enabled 
by the innovative casting technologies available in these regions.46 Since 
the early third millennium BCE, local actors in different parts of Europe 
39 Breddin 1969.
40 Höfer 1906; Becker, Krause, and Kromer 1989.




45 Anati 2008; Horn 2014, 76–91. Structurally very similar are the numerous engrav-
ings of daggers in the Nucu cave in Rumania (Soroceanu and Sîrbu 2012).
46 Born and Hansen 2001; Durman 2006.
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had felt the need to possess a multitude of identical objects—or at least 
expressed the wish to possess serial objects by depicting individuals with 
many almost identical weapons. However, only the novel bronze technol-
ogy enabled the comprehensive realization of this need.
There is no doubt that the multiplicity of the identical object, i.e. the serial 
object, was considered meaningful and it was the new casting technology 
that allowed the production of such objects for the first time. I propose 
that this new ability to reproduce objects also changed man’s perception of 
the surrounding material world and—as a consequence—individual’s life 
worlds,47 even if the number of serial objects in an Early Bronze Age house-
hold was still rather low, and in stark contrast to our present-day situation 
and present-day households, which are particularly characterized by an 
enormous number of often identical objects.48 In many parts of the world 
today, we take for granted the ability to acquire and possess a large num-
ber of identical objects—and to be able to replace a broken or lost object 
with an almost identical one in many cases. In the Early Bronze Age, these 
possibilities arose for the first time and may have exerted influence on 
general perceptions of and practices with objects. The selection of visually 
identical objects for deposition in hoards and graves and for pictorial rep-
resentation shows that the identical was perceived as meaningful. A series 
of almost identical objects was considered an adequate means of honor-
ing an eminent individual, whether in the form of images on a stele or of 
physical items in a grave, or a goddess in the context of offering practices. 
The transformative power that arose from the interplay between humans 
and this new technology of reproduction resulted in a new perception of 
the world of “things.” The ability to produce almost identical copies was 
not only an expression of technological knowledge but also indicated a 
newfound competence to adorn outstanding humans and goddesses with 
something completely new: the first technically mass-produced objects.
This stands in a most interesting dialectic to Walter Benjamin’s famous 
association of the “authentic” and the “original” in the past with magic or 
religious ritual: “The unique value of the ‘authentic’ work of art has its basis 
in ritual, the location of its original use value.”49 In Benjamin’s view, “for the 
first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the work 
of art from its parasitical dependence on ritual,” because asking for the 
authentic or original object “makes no sense” any more.50 In the case of the 
serial objects of the Early Bronze Age, an industrialized state of mechanical 
reproduction had not yet been reached. Nevertheless, and maybe also due 
to the lack of an “original,” the early serial object could occupy a position 
that Benjamin has restricted to the original.
47 Schütz and Luckmann 1979; Habermas 1981; Habermas 2011.
48 Hahn 2005, 81–83.
49 Benjamin (1936) 1968, 224.
50 Benjamin (1936) 1968, 224.
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Summary
In the beginning of my contribution, I showed that it is very difficult to 
identify an object as a “copy” in the prehistoric record. Consequently, 
archaeologists have not reflected much on this issue. The identification of 
a copy in prehistoric archaeology is usually closely related to the long-dis-
tance and transcultural exchange of objects and/or technologies from an 
epistemological point of view. This has to be kept in mind when we speak 
about practices of the secondary in my discipline. Nevertheless, there are 
cases where we are able to identify practices of reproduction, and these 
practices call for an explanation. Having focused on the Early Bronze Age 
in the second part of my contribution, I set out to demonstrate the soci-
etal impact of this novel technology which, on the one hand, triggered 
social practices of innovation management and, on the other hand, en- 
abled mechanical mass production of serial objects for the first time in 
human history. Copying became a practice of innovation management as 
much as it changed human life worlds: new reproduction techniques not 
only offered new possibilities—such as the possession of visually identical 
objects and the replacement of one copy with another—but also changed 
the human perception of the material world which was now full of serial 
objects. This in turn led to the creation of new practices with and assign-
ing new meaning to objects, as well as a particular valuation of mass-pro-
duced objects that is quite different from the public perception in our 
present age.
Figures
Fig. 1: With kind permission by Landesamt für Kultur und Denkmalpflege Mecklen-
burg-Vorpommern, Landesarchäologie, A. Bötefür.
Fig. 2: After Krause 2003, 248, fig. 226.
Fig. 3: After Meller 2004, 187.
Fig. 4: After Krause 2003, 246, fig. 225.
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The Power of Material and 
Context: Large-Scale Copies 
After the Antique in the 
Late Eighteenth Century
Abstract Since the Renaissance, plaster casts of ancient statues have 
been, in a certain sense, the archetypes of artistic serial production: as 
such, they are copies par excellence. Their use and distribution underwent 
several surges in popularity over time, a fact that throws important light 
on their valuation as “copies” in the different regional and temporal con-
texts. In the short period between the middle and end of the eighteenth 
century, in the German-speaking world, a fundamental shift in the distri-
bution and accessibility of large-scale ancient sculptures took place. Plas-
ter casts, which had become available in previously unimagined quantities 
after the Seven Years’ War ended in 1763, played a central role in this shift.
To display works in the open air, durable materials—such as papier 
mâché, terracotta, iron, so-called “firm earth,” and stone, which were 
praised for being cheap and permanent—were needed. The technical 
possibilities and the materials used were the subject of a discourse which 
reflected on the effects of the industrial revolution. Through the division of 
labour, manufacturing and craft production—rather than the artist—came 
to the fore. In the evaluations during the period, the production tech-
nique itself, rather than the artistic achievement of a single person, gained 
importance. This paper is devoted to exploring these large casts and cop-
ied statues, the size of which was comparable to their ancient models, and 
to the question of how materials and production techniques, as well as the 
context of use, define both their status as “copies” and their influence on 
the reception of ancient sculpture in this era.




Since the Renaissance, plaster casts of ancient statues have been, in a 
certain sense, the archetypes of copies. Because they are created from 
moulds taken from an “original,” they should seemingly be able to faith-
fully transmit its qualities. Their use and distribution underwent real 
booms that throw important light on how they were valued as “copies” 
in the contexts of different regions and periods.1 This paper is therefore 
devoted to the question of which criteria—apart from “faithfulness”—have 
the power to push the copy beyond that of a mere effigy of an artwork that 
is considered “original.”
Shifting from the notion of plaster casts as faithful substitutes for an 
absent original to the ossuaries of dead gods, the history of plaster casts 
is full of deep breaks and changes in their appreciation. The mass produc-
tion of plaster casts in the nineteenth century, in particular, seems to be 
an almost ideal-typical illustration of Walter Benjamin’s dictum of the loss 
of the aura of the original artwork in the era of its mechanical replicability. 
This finds its connection in the desperate efforts to get rid of the casts in 
the Victoria & Albert Museum in the late nineteenth century, or of the pro-
posal, just a little later, to drop the casts of Berlin’s Neues Museum into the 
Spree river.2 These negative judgments have retrospectively cast a shadow 
over the use of plaster casts in previous eras, too.3
The history of scholarship adds further complications to the study of 
casts of ancient sculpture. In the tradition of classical archaeology, there 
is a deep-rooted idea that a copy of an artwork should be assessed above 
all for its closeness in style and motifs to the exemplary original—that is, 
for its “exactness.” This notion was at the heart of the Kopienkritik of the 
nineteenth century, which aimed to sift through the profusion of Roman 
statues to identify the Greek originals hidden behind them. The results 
seemed to confirm Winckelmann’s picture of the decadence of Roman art. 
According to Winckelmann’s neoclassical concept, Greek art of the fifth and 
fourth century B.C.E. built the core of ideal, exemplary art. This ideal had a 
strong impact on contemporary art, which had to imitate the Ancients to 
become great.4
If we can set aside these notions when we consider post-antique copies 
of ancient sculptures, we can open up new, productive ways of viewing 
copies which allow us to understand them as intentional artworks. This 
helps us to gain a deeper understanding of their transformative possibili-
ties in respective, contemporary contexts. In the introduction to the essay 
1 This essay is based on studies on the history of fabrication and the trade of 
plaster casts and copies around 1800 undertaken in the context of the Collabo-
rative Research Centre 644: Transformations of Antiquity at Humboldt Univer-
sity Berlin. Many aspects are discussed in Schreiter 2014 b, which serves as a 
point of reference. The intention of this essay is to clarify those points which 
refer to a broader understanding of the transformative power of copies after 
the Antique—in so far as Antiquity is seen as a foreign and thus distant culture.
2 Schreiter 2012, 17 with references.
3 Schreiter 2011, 105–106.
4 Bartsch, Becker, and Schreiter 2010, 3–6.
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collection Das Originale der Kopie, the authors attempted not only to ana-
lyse relations of dependence between originals and their copies, but to 
establish the conditions in which the copies were created, their materials, 
and their contexts of use. The working assumption was that such copies 
underwent a transformation through an allelopoietic process, in which the 
original is first created as such through copying.5
Using the example of plaster casts and the large-scale copies of ancient 
statues they were able to produce, this article aims to explore in detail, 
through several steps, how copying constitutes a prototype as an “origi-
nal.” These casts are an expression of a commercial and artistic boom in 
the late eighteenth century, which saw a fundamental shift in the distribu-
tion and accessibility of large-scale ancient sculpture after the Seven Years’ 
War ended in 1763. In a kind of “second use,” these works provided a stock 
of moulds that were used for creative imitations and copies in other mate-
rials such as iron, terracotta and papier mâché.6
This period was shaped by the publication of the works of Johann Joa-
chim Winckelmann, so it would be possible to approach these copies with 
a simplified explanatory model, namely as being secondary expressions of 
the appreciation of ancient art that was central to German neoclassicism. 
In this view, their cheap materials, serial production, and allegedly low 
artistic quality would preclude granting them the status of a serious sub-
ject of research. Indeed, when these works were noticed at all, they were 
regarded as the “bread and butter” commercial business of court artists, 
which enabled them to make money on the side.7 To the contrary, I wish 
to trace the development of these works’ creation, distribution, marketing, 
and buyer interest, viewing this development against the foil of classicising 
art theory and using Italy and England as two points of reference.
In the eighteenth century, the attention of collectors and antiquaries 
throughout Europe was directed primarily toward Italy, the land from 
which many antiquities originated, and in particular on Rome.8 From 1763 
to 1796, that is, the period from the end of the Seven Years’ War to the 
annexation of Italy by Napoleon, there was a sharp rise in the number of 
travellers to Italy and the frequency of their journeys. The acquisition of art 
and souvenirs was as integral to these journeys as were visits to ancient 
sites.9 It was the English aristocracy in particular that ensured the continu-
ing health of this market. Alongside the formation of larger collections, the 
acquisition of ancient art also became an element of furnishing a country 
house, where works would be adapted to the requirements of the collec-
tor’s own environment.10
5 Bartsch, Becker, and Schreiter 2010.
6 Schreiter 2014b, 261–384.
7 Schreiter 2014 b, 13–15 (Introduction).
8 Here and for the following argumentation, see Bignamini and Hornsby 2011, 1–8.
9 Wilton and Bignamini 1996, 21–30.
10 Especially Coltman 2006, 135–147, and passim.
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In order to grasp the specific use of “the Antique” in German duchies 
and princedoms, apart from Winckelmanian theorising, it is vital to answer 
the question of how available ancient sculpture—or at least large-scale 
plaster casts—was at the end of the eighteenth century. Germany was 
coming from a completely different position, as the possession of ancient 
art, especially sculpture, was less common in general. One of the few Ger-
man collections of ancient sculpture was acquired in 1728, for the King of 
Saxony, August the Strong, to be housed in Dresden.11 Alongside the few 
collections of original ancient sculptures and the combination of plaster 
casts and copies found in the setting of libraries and art collections, plaster 
cast collections became established in the last third of the eighteenth cen-
tury through the foundation of small art academies and drawing schools. 
Probably the best known of these was the Mannheim Antikensaal, which 
opened in 1767.12
In the following period, participation in the distribution of ancient art, 
which spread to ever-wider circles, became of key importance. At first, 
supply was not sufficient to meet the demands that arose from the re- 
organisation and creation of courts and residences, as well as from art 
academies, which sought to be well-equipped. Business took a decisive 
turn with the appearance of travelling Italian plaster casters, the so-called 
formatori, who could be found in towns all over Germany from the 1760s 
on. It is in this context that we find the first mention of the Fratelli Fer-
rari. With their appearance on the scene, the situation changed. Originally 
from Milan, they appeared on the German art scene more or less out of 
nowhere in the mid-1760s. The Ferraris differed from other formatori in 
that they had their own, re-usable moulds.13
The range of items on offer consisted of busts and a few complete stat-
ues that were probably moulded from bronze copies after the antiques 
that were present in Germany, such as the Kassel bronze of the Dancing 
Faun. The Ferrari very soon won a reputation for having unparalleled artis-
tic skill. Their range formed the basis for further copies, whose depend-
ence on the original source was thus merely indirect.14
The Leipzig art dealer Carl Christian Heinrich Rost had a key role in the 
dissemination of their design repertoire and also made attempts to use 
other materials profitably. When the Ferraris travelled to Leipzig in 1777, 
he bought their moulds and made a contract with them that they would 
never trade in Leipzig again. He set up his own workshop to make plaster 
casts and advertised the products throughout the country in extensive, 
annotated catalogues.15
11 Schreiter 2014 b, 394–395.
12 Schreiter 2010, 125–126; Schreiter 2014 b, 56–60. 
13 Schreiter 2010, 127–133; for more detail, see Schreiter 2014b, 108–133, with 
complete bibliography.
14 For the specific range of sculptures sold by the Ferrari, see Schreiter 2014b,119–
123 and 803–813 (Tabelle 1). 
15 Schreiter 2010, 133–134 and Schreiter 2014b, 133–142 and 816–843 (Tabelle 2).
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After setting up his plaster cast workshop, Rost began to expand the 
Fratelli Ferrari’s programme. At the beginning of the 1780s, the Elector of 
Saxony granted him permission to make moulds from the statues in the 
Dresden collection of ancient art.16
A driving force behind the popularisation of Antique art was the wide-
spread wish to adorn not only palaces and houses but, increasingly, parks 
and gardens with adequate decoration. This demand required the devel-
opment of weatherproof materials. Of course Rost was one of the first to 
establish such materials but he was soon surpassed by others. He had the 
advantage that he could draw on his stock to produce sculptures in larger 
quantities, and in a material resistant to weathering—what he called a 
feste Masse (firm mass).17
Local art manufactories and court artists seeking to make money on 
the side tested a wide range of materials such as papier mâché, terracotta, 
iron, stone and firm earths, which were praised as being both a good value 
and durable. A hierarchy among the materials became ever more strongly 
established. Around the manufactory, which with its directly-employed 
workers formed the “core” of such production, there were a number of 
more or less free-lance artists and craftworkers who took on special tasks 
such as preparing moulds or gilding. In the manufactory, the division of 
labour, and not the artist, took centre stage. An assured command of pro-
duction technique, rather than the artistic achievement of the individual, 
became important. The technical possibilities and materials used were the 
subject of a discourse of their own, which reflected on the effects of the 
industrial revolution.18
Enlarging the traditional question of the relationship to and “truthful-
ness” of a copy when confronted with its original or model, the study of 
copies becomes even more fruitful when additional aspects are consid-
ered. During the late eighteenth Century, the effects of an upcoming inter-
national art market, a growing consumer culture, technical developments 
in the art industry, and the use of “new” experimental materials shaped the 
relation to the Antique. Beyond the mere theoretic approach of art criti-
cism, these developments reveal the widespread popularisation of ancient 
art as defined by its use in public and private surroundings. Transformed 
by their adaptation to the environments of the people concerned—which 
more often meant the up and coming bourgeoisie—the “business of cop-
ies” gets an impulse to flood Europe.
Again, it was comparisons with the English market that shaped refer-
ences to taste and consumer goods. In 1787, a detailed notice appeared in 
the Journal des Luxus und der Moden, advertising architectural elements and 
sculptures made of Coade stone, a terracotta developed in the manufac-
tory of Mrs. Eleanor Coade in Lambeth, London, which could be produced 
16 Schreiter 2014b, 143–155, figs. 58–82.
17 Schreiter 2014b, 182–185.
18 Schreiter 2014b, 424–431.
196 
CHARLOTTE SCHREITER
in large formats and was resistant to weathering. Through the advertise-
ment, the Weimar businessman and editor of the journal, Friedrich Justin 
Bertuch, was attempting to establish these goods on the German mar-
ket.19 Bertuch published a complete list of the wares offered by the Coade 
Stone Manufactory, but evidently not a single item was ordered from Ger-
many. This was in part because, parallel to the appearance of the journal 
announcements, Bertuch had the Weimar court sculptor Martin Gottlieb 
Klauer develop a competitive rival product locally. By 1789, statues were 
being locally produced from “toreutica,” a hard-fired, weatherproof terra-
cotta that cost barely a quarter of the English wares.20
Although the technical qualities of “toreutica” were derived directly 
from Coade stone, the selection of ancient prototypes drew primarily on 
the product range that Rost had on offer in Leipzig, and not on the range 
offered by the English manufactory. This duality of sources—England for 
the technical requirements, and Italy, or rather Saxonian Italy with the 
Dresden casts from Rost’s art dealership for the formal prototypes—thus 
reflected how another specific development resulted in new levels of the 
established patterns and roles, ranging from Italianità to Englishness.
The various manufactories and workshops had close ties with one 
another, and not just through their shared dependence on Rost’s stock of 
prototypes. It is thus no surprise that an important comment on toreutica 
ware comes from Count Detlev Carl von Einsiedel, who in December 1790 
wrote to Bertuch: “zu der neuen gebrannten Masse habe ich ihrer Feinheit 
und Zähigkeit halber viel Vertrauen. Und ich freue mich, daß auch in dieser 
Art die alten Kunst=Stücke dauerhaft vervielfältigt werden sollen” (I have 
great confidence in the new, fired mass as regards its fineness and tough-
ness, and I am pleased that the ancient artworks should be multiplied per-
manently in this way, too).21
The Count of Einsiedel ran an ironworks in Lauchhammer, where from 
1784 he had been producing cast iron statues from models of ancient 
sculptures. He was well-travelled, but had not been to Italy. Ancient cul-
ture therefore reached him, too, only indirectly and he became one of 
Rost’s customers like everyone else. His interest in technical developments 
provided the necessary basis for producing the iron sculptures (after the 
antique) that were made by his foundry.22
It was the reproduction of an ancient prototype, its multiplication, that 
extended the force of classical antiquity and disseminated it in the regional 
context. Reproduction and copy reinforced the positive qualities of the 
classical world that inspired them, while the similarity of the reproduced 
products reassured owners and users by including them in a regional sys-
tem of references that encompassed both subjects and materials.
19 Ueber Herrn Coade’s Lithodipira, 1787 (Schreiter 2014b, 721, Dok. 30).
20 Schreiter 2014b, 338–346.
21 Weimar, Goethe-Schiller-Archiv, GSA 06/426, Brief 1 (September 1790); s.a. 
Schreiter 2014b, 344.
22 Schreiter 2014 b, 297–305.
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What is particularly intriguing about these “functional antiques,” how-
ever, is their range of uses. In the most varied contexts, different value 
was ascribed to them, but this did not cause them to be devalued or 
regarded as shop-worn in comparison to the exemplary originals on which 
they were based.23 Multiplication in broader, manufactory-like workshops 
marked the way to an exuberant creativity in remodelling items to be suit-
able for their respective use. Copying thus helped realize the potential of 
the original without cutting the connection. Because the antique remained 
present even in the most surprising reinterpretations, its transformative 
power was developed even further.
An exceptionally popular piece was the so-called “Vestal bearing the 
sacred fire,” the original of which is held in the Museo Capitolino in Rome. 
In Germany, the piece became widely known in the form of a creative 
imitation by the Gotha court sculptor Friedrich Wilhelm Doell, which he 
had created in Gotha after an imitation of the same piece by Jean-Antoine 
Houdon (fig. 1).
This item, along with other sculptures from Doell’s workshop, was 
announced in 1797 in the Buergerlicher Baumeister, with a “Verzeichnis der 
Statuen, Büsten und Vasen, welche bey dem Herrn Hof-Bildhauer Doell in 
Altenburg von weissen gebrannten Thon für die beygesetzten Preise in 
Louisd’or á fünf Thlr. zu haben sind und sowohl zur Verzierung der Zimmer, 
als zum Aufputz der Gärten gebraucht werden können” (List of the statues, 
busts, and vases that can be had from the Court Sculptor Doell in Alten-
burg in white fired clay for the noted prices in Louis d’or at five thalers, and 
which can be used both for decorating rooms and for adorning gardens). 
There is also another reference to a comment about using the statue as 
an oven decoration: “23. Eine Vestalin, welche das heilige Feuer trägt, ganz 
bekleidet, vorzüglich zu Oefen geschickt” (No. 23. A Vestal which bears the 
sacred fire, fully clothed, eminently suitable for ovens).24 By taking the bowl 
with the fire as an attribute of the vestal virgin as a guardian of the sacred 
fire and—as a priestess of Vesta—also of the domestic hearth, there is thus 
also a reference to her function. This work is a striking illustration of how 
this type of classicised new creation was accorded equal standing with the 
corresponding ancient original, and also of how well such works could be 
adapted to each context of use.
In 1791, in Wörlitz, an example was acquired from Rost in Leipzig and 
integrated into a quite different kind of context. Beneath the ‘Stein’, the 
artificial volcano, and down a spiral staircase, the visitor arrived in the 
Cabinet of the Night, which was described by August Rode in 1798 as fol-
lows (fig. 2): “Fußboden und Wände schwarz, mit rotgelblichen Figuren 
verziert: in der Mitte eine blendendweiße Bildsäule auf schwarzem Fuß-
gestelle: Das Gewölbe der Decke, gleich dem nächtlichen Himmel, durch 
23 Becker 2009, and passim.
24 Schmidt, vol. 3, 1797, 20–21 (Schreiter 2014 b, 742, Dok. 41); for the Vestal, see 
also Schreiter 2014b, 417–419, fig. 147; 629–630, Kat. 218.
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Mond und Sterne erleuchtet.” (The floor and walls are black, decorated 
with reddish-yellow figures: in the middle there is a dazzling white orna-
mented column on a black, footed stand: the vault of the ceiling, like the 
night sky, lights up with the moon and stars).25 In this example, the bowl 
was originally made separately, probably from a translucent alabaster. 
There was a candle in it which lit up the night.
The same prototype offered multiple possibilities for adapting and fit-
ting it to a required form or content, as could also be shown with many 
other examples. Large numbers of abbreviations and transformations can 
25 Rode 1798, 213–214.
Figure 1: Vestale “Carrying the holy fire,” Kabinett der 
Nacht, Wörlitz, plaster cast in Dessau (depot).
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be identified, and indeed they are one of the principal characteristics of 
mechanically replicated large-scale copies after the antique in this era and 
region. Despite the high level of recognisability of the individual piece, the 
contexts of use render the copy independent in this location and in this 
function. The copies take on a double function when they are also assigned 
functions of their own within their new context that extend beyond their 
source and their actual (or assigned) original meaning. The reference to 
the ancient prototypes is a kind of umbilical cord through which a range of 
possible interpretations can be nourished but also formulated anew in the 
context of a changed environment. This observation can be compared with 
Falser’s analysis, also in this volume, of Angkor Wat plaster casts from the 
end of the nineteenth century, which confirms the importance of consid-
ering a changed environment in order to grasp the transformative power 
of the copy.
Copies after the antique in alternative materials can be described only 
partially by the choice of prototype and its meaning. The choice of mate-
rial itself was debated, as a piece’s permanence, which was necessary for 
display in the open air, was lent to the “regional” classicism created by the 
Figure 2: Vestale “Carrying the holy fire,” Kabinett der Nacht, Wörlitz, 
after a lost drawing by Friedrich Gilly.
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establishment of local repertoires of prototypes. The fact that a material 
was available locally was often the decisive factor in the decision to attempt 
new techniques and produce objects from it. Whether the material was a 
“raw material” (e.g. iron, clay, or paper) was cheap, or at least cheaper than 
the materials hitherto used (e.g. bronze, marble, or lead), did not cause the 
end product to be regarded as being of lesser value. Materials were com-
pared with each other and these comparisons were not aimed primarily to 
excuse them in relation to materials or regions that were assumed to be 
of higher value.26
This discourse about the permanence of the material was conducted, 
above all, in the journal articles of the era.27 Copies in marble and bronze 
were rare, but manufactories offered their casts and copies in various col-
ours, each of which aimed to create the illusion of being constructed from 
these or other materials. Plaster was blackened and iron or papier-mâché 
bronzed to give the impression of bronze. A white finish was assumed to 
resemble marble. Techniques such as gilding and the white enamelling 
of cast iron to imitate porcelain were also practiced. The material of the 
sculpture itself could generally not be perceived for its own sake (fig. 3). It 
was thus possible to set in the open air a sculpture that looked like marble 
but which was also durable. In this way, the quality of the given material 
was implemented visually, though it did not necessarily correspond to the 
quality of the actual material. Through this, too, copies after the antique 
were highly adaptable to suit their use.
The decisive criteria in creating copies after the antique were the link 
to the original, the production technique, and the choice of material; each 
of these aspects might become more prominent and debated according to 
occasion and need.
Only with the effects of the Napoleonic campaigns did this develop-
ment come to an end. It was not military defeat or the explicit destruc-
tion of the manufactories that brought about this change, but rather the 
improved range of ancient prototypes that became available when the 
transport of Italian antiquities to Paris, and the moulds made in the Atelier 
de Moulage, pushed the regional range of designs into the background.28
If we move beyond considering the relationship between an original and its 
copy, our view widens to include larger repertoires of sculptures produced 
in quasi-industrial processes and modelled on ancient prototypes; we see 
that their selection, design, and production were prompted by the impulse 
to disseminate classical antiquity in a way befitting its exemplary status, or, 
in the words of the Count of Einsiedel, “die Stärken des Althertums in der 
Sculptur sich zu vervielfältigen” (to multiply the strengths of antiquity in 
sculpture),29 which means more than just classicising decorative figures to 
26 Cf. Schreiter 2014b, 424–427.
27 Schreiter 2014b, 424–427. 
28 Schreiter 2014a, 37–38.
29 Ibid. 
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Figure 3: Ganymed (Praying Boy), Lauchhammer iron cast, 
advertisement in Journal der Moden, October 1786.
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fill up a scene. Against the foil of contemporary art theory and antiquarian 
discussions, sculptures that were also understood as commercial wares 
became established in ways that had their own logic.
Figures
Fig. 1: Schreiter 2014, 418, fig. 147 c.
Fig. 2: Schreiter 2014, 418, fig. 147 a.
Fig. 3: Journal der Moden, October 1786, pl. XXX.
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Copies of Famous Pictures in 
Tadao Andōʼs “Garden of Fine Art” 
in Kyōto
Abstract The “Garden of Fine Art” is a conspicuously modernist concrete 
garden in Kyōto. Within a spectacular architectural setting designed by 
Tadao Andō, the facility displays copies of eight well-known masterpieces 
of fine art in their original size or larger, printed with extremely durable 
colours on ceramic panels. Each of the images displayed in the garden 
raises questions, as do the selection, the staging, the size and material 
properties of the copies, the relationship between the copies and their re-
spective models, the interplay of site-specific with more general features 
of the place, and the appropriation and recontextualisation of European 
and East Asian art history with the traditions of Japanese gardens. These 
traditions are reinterpreted within the framework of international modern 
architecture in a way that appears utterly transcultural and is, at the same 
time, uniquely Japanese, late twentieth century.





“Le beau exige peut-être l’imitation servile 
de ce qu’est indéfinissable dans les choses.” 1
The “Garden of Fine Art” is a conspicuously modernist concrete garden 
located in the northern part of Kyōto, Japan.2 It was designed by the archi-
tect 安藤忠雄 Andō Tadao (b. 1941) and completed in 1994. Its full Japanese 
name is 京都府立陶板名画の庭 Kyōto kenritsu tōban meiga no niwa, that is, the 
“Kyōto Prefectural Garden of Famous Pictures on Porcelain Panels.” (fig. 1).
Within a spectacular architectural setting, “the world’s first outdoor art 
garden”3 displays copies of eight well-known masterpieces of fine art in 
their original size, some even enlarged to four times their original size, 
printed with extremely durable colours on ceramic panels. Most notable—
and utterly strange in this place—are the copies of two huge devotional 
images from the Italian Renaissance, The Last Supper by Leonardo da Vinci 
and Michelangelo’s giant Last Judgment. Half of the works represented are 
garden or outdoor scenes by late nineteenth-century French post-Impres-
sionists: one of Monet’s later Water Lilies, Seurat’s bourgeois leisure scene 
A Sunday Afternoon in a French park goes along with Renoir’s two sisters 
On the Terrace and van Gogh’s rather gloomy Road with Cypress and Star. 
This sample from a late twentieth-century Western canon of fine art is 
1 Valéry 1934, 167.
2 Cf. the “Garden of Fine Arts” official staff blog. Accessed September 18, 2016 
http://toban-meiga.seesaa.net/. On the architecture, cf. Klein 2000.
3 The “Garden of Fine Arts” website. Accessed March 30, 2015. http://toban-meiga.
seesaa.net/category/1668031-1.html.
Figure 1: Tadao Andō: Garden of Fine Art, Kyoto; 
entrance on Kitayama-Street, Kyōto Kita-ku.
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complemented by two equally famous works of East Asian art: a copy of the 
panoramatic picture scroll 清明上河圖 Qingming Shanghe Tu (“On the River 
During the Qingming Festival”) attributed to the Northern-Song painter 
張擇端 Zhang Zeduan from twelfth-century China (actually, a copy of an 
eighteenth-century copy of the legendary scroll), and two of four hand-
scrolls from the 鳥獣人物戯画 Choju jinbutsu Giga (“Caricatures of Birds, 
Beasts and Persons”) series, attributed to the erudite Buddhist head priest 
鳥羽僧正 Toba Sōjō (1053–1140) from Kyōto and renowned today as the 
origin of comic drawing and animation in Japan.
Compared to the world-famous temples, palaces, gardens, and muse-
ums in Kyōto, which draw millions of tourists every year, the “Garden of 
Fine Art” might be regarded as a minor attraction, a bit off the beaten path. 
Still, thousands of people from all over the world come to see this place 
every year. Many of them now post photos of whatever caught their atten-
tion on their travel blogs or on photo sharing websites like Flickr. These 
photos, too, are copies (of copies) of famous pictures and worthy of our 
attention if we want to grasp the transformative power of the copy. The 
images illustrating this article have been copied mostly from such sources. 
The photos taken by garden visitors show not only how the ceramic copies 
of famous pictures look—or what they looked like on particular occasions 
and under particular daylight and weather conditions—but also how dif-
ferent the photographic copies of the ceramic copies actually look from 
each other, from the copies they depict and from the copied paintings.
The garden’s architecture has been quite aptly described as “a plaza 
with walls of cascading water designed by Ando Tadao in his familiar style 
of smooth concrete.”4 Note, however, that this “plaza” is not flat on the ground 
but extends over three different levels and goes two storeys underground 
(without ever feeling like a basement). The walls, up to 12 metres high from 
the bottom level eastern and western sides, separate the facility from its 
urban environment as well as from the adjacent Botanical Garden. Signifi-
cant parts of the ground on all three levels are covered by water in shallow 
pools, reflecting the sky, the architecture, and—from certain angles—the 
pictures of the exhibition (fig. 2).
As one visitor observed, “The constant sound of falling water worked 
to tune out all the sounds of the surrounding city, thus providing a sense 
of detachment; […] more than a barrier of nature Ando utilized a barrier 
of sound in his design.”5 The sounds and the interplay of the architecture 
and the artworks with the ever-changing daylight and weather conditions 
create a stimulating atmosphere of focused leisure.
With a clearly-defined path for visitors to follow, the space is designed 
as a stroll garden, even though the straight lines, right angles, concrete 





with its slopes, stairs, and underpasses are not what one would expect to 
find in a traditional Japanese garden6 (fig. 3).
“Every turn brings a different perspective. The facility itself makes you 
feel like you are inside an artwork, which makes for a much more engaging 
experience than in a typical museum.”7 Albeit not a typical art museum, 
6 Cf. Nitschke 1991, 208–240.
7 Yzzzz 2013.
Figure 3: Garden of Fine Art, Kyoto, 2013.
Figure 2: Reflection of Michelangelo’s Last Judgment on the surface of 
the water basin on the ground of B2 in the Garden of Fine Art, Kyoto.
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this little theme park8 is dedicated to enabling a particular kind of encoun-
ter with a selection of well-known works of fine art through high-quality 
reproductions.
Each of the images displayed in the garden raises questions, as do the 
selection, the staging, the size and material properties of the copies, the 
relationship between the copies and their respective models, the interplay 
of site-specific with more general features of the place, and the appro-
priation and recontextualisation of European and East Asian art history 
with the traditions of Japanese gardens. These traditions are reinterpreted 
within the framework of international modern architecture in a way that 
appears utterly transcultural and is, at the same time, uniquely Japanese, 
late twentieth century (fig. 4).
A stage for celebrating classical artworks
Occasionally, the “Garden of Fine Art” is used as a stage for musical perfor-
mances or other events.9 But mainly it is a stage for celebrating classical 
works of fine art, just as the nearby concert hall (designed by 磯崎新 Isozaki 
8 Cf. Brumann 2008, 223–224. 
9 See, for example, Kyoto Informational Circulations Co., Ltd. 2006 (documenting 
a “candle night” concert on June 22, 2006); more photos from this and other 
performances can be found at Foursquare 2015. Another major event at the 
Garden is, not surprisingly, a transformative copy of an American transform-
ative copy of a traditional Celtic ritual, blended with various other elements of 
popular and commercial culture: the annual “Kitayama Halloween” festival at 
the end of October; see Kitayama Halloween 2009–2014 (with photos from last 
year’s event and an account of the local tradition since 1998) and Marumo 2008 
(with photos from Oct 29, 2008). Since 2010, the Garden of Fine Art has regularly 
hosted the “Kitayama Craft Garden” fair on the first (or second) Sunday of the 
Figure 4: Garden of Fine Art, Kyōto. A stage for the art – 
and a space for the audience.
210 
EBERHARD ORTLAND
Arata and built almost at the same time as the Garden of Fine Art) is a stage 
for celebrating classical music. What does it mean for our understanding 
of what constitutes copies of individual works of fine art, if we assume that 
the copies exhibited in this art garden relate to the works they represent 
in a way similar to how certain musical performances present (a particular 
interpretation of) a work of classical music? What does this mean for our 
understanding of the works of fine art that are represented by these cop-
ies? And, in a more general way, what does it mean for our understanding 
of what a work of fine art is and what a copy of a work of fine art might be, 
when we assume that the copies relate to the works they represent in a way 
similar to how musical performances present (interpretations of) works of 
classical music?
At first glance, a comparison of ceramic panel pictures with musical per-
formances must seem counterintuitive. Obviously, there are important dif-
ferences, beginning with the temporality of transitory events like a musical 
performance in contrast to the durability of things like ceramic panels. But 
no one has ever claimed that things like ceramic panels resemble perfor-
mances similar to playing a musical piece. One interesting claim, however, 
is that even in cases where it is usually assumed that a particular work 
of visual art—say, a painting—is identical to one (and only one) physical 
object, so that it would cease to exist as soon as the object was destroyed 
or lost, it might indeed make sense to conceive of such a singular artwork 
in terms that most people would usually apply not to material things but 
rather to abstract entities (or “types”), allowing multiple instantiations 
(“tokens”) like, for example, the class of all piano performances that com-
ply with the score of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata No. 29 in B flat, Op. 106.10
It might sound unnecessarily sophisticated and even confusing to 
talk of a painting as one (and the only one) instantiation of some myste-
rious “abstract entity”—the type of thing that complies with criteria spec-
ified nowhere but in the very painting itself. Wouldn’t it be much more 
adequate to simply assume that, in singular artworks like painting, the 
individual work is identical to the physical thing?11 The real thing is the 
real thing; everything else is something else. One difficulty with such a 
hands-on physicalist approach is, however, that it does not account for the 
normativity implied in our assumptions about what a work of art is. This 
becomes obvious, for example, when a physical object—say, a painting 
(usually, but, as we shall see, not quite adequately, spoken of as a “work 
of fine art”)—has suffered some physical change which also affects its aes-
thetically relevant perceptual qualities to an extent that those who care 
about this irreplaceable work of art consider restoration necessary (fig. 5).
month; see the handicraft blog by Iichi, Inc. 2015 (with photos and recent news 
in Japanese), Kyoto Tedukuri ichi 2015 (with recent news in Japanese and recent 
photos), Poppins 2012 (with photos from several occasions in 2011 and 2012), 
and Ezy Cafe 2012 (showing an event on April 14, 2012).
10 Cf. Reicher 2003.
11 Cf. Kulenkampff 2003.
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Figure 5: Leonardo da Vinci, The Last Supper, ceramic copy (1990),  
420 × 910 cm, Garden of Fine Art, Kyōto, based on a photograph showing 
the state of the Milan mural in 1990, during restoration.
An example of this kind of problem can be found in the mural on the 
northern wall of the refectory of the convent of Santa Maria delle Grazie, 
in Milan, usually taken to be Leonardo da Vinci’s famous painting of “The 
Last Supper”. Due to the materials and techniques used, Leonardo’s paint-
ing—painted with tempera colours a secco onto a ground of dried plaster, 
which turned out to not be durable at all, given the micro-climate of the 
refectory hall—began to deteriorate soon after it was finished in 1498 
and has been described as being in a deplorable condition since the early 
sixteenth century.12 Nevertheless, the composition was highly-esteemed 
and the picture became was popular among art-loving circles in Europe 
from the sixteenth century through the production of numerous copies, 
engravings, prints from heavily-retouched photographs, and countless 
variations.13 Had the work indeed been identical to the configuration of 
pigments found on that medieval wall or with the remaining traces of 
the colours originally applied by Leonardo (now assumed to cover only 
about 42 % of the surface14), there would be nothing one could—or ought 
to—do about its ongoing decay. The flaking and blurring would have to 
be accepted as an integral, if not intended, part of the work process. Any 
12 Cf. Khan Academy 2014. The website has been changed in the meantime and no 
longer shows the quoted content; the URL now forwards to https://www.khan 
academy.org/test-prep/ap-art-history/early-europe-and-colonial-americas/ 
renaissance-art-Europe-AP/v/leonardo-da-vinci-last-supper-1495-98 (accessed 
March 21, 2015), where an educational video on Leonardo’s composition shows 
the restored mural in Milan, accompanied by a discussion between two erudite 
viewers, and applying several tools of digital iconographic analysis.
13 A climax, and already a reflection, of this stream of variations was the series 
of paintings and prints devoted to Leonardo’s Last Supper by Andy Warhol in 
1985/86; cf. Haden-Guest 1999; Lüthy 1995, 66–70.
14 Khan Academy 2014.
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effort to stop the deterioration or repair the damage would be an attempt 
to replace Le o nar do’s venerated work with something else—legally speak-
ing, it would be property damage (fig. 6).
Those of us who do think, however, that under certain circumstances 
a restoration effort might be necessary and legitimate in order to save or 
restore a damaged work of art, must have some idea of what the work 
ought to look like. Such normative ideas can be controversial,15 but who-
ever enters into such a debate presupposes the objective—or at least 
intersubjective—relevance and validity of his or her understanding of what 
the work requires.
Luckily, in the case of Leonardo’s ruined Last Supper, two early, large-
scale copies, presumed to be work by Leonardo’s assistants, have survived 
with a wealth of original detail still intact. These copies do not resemble 
each other in every detail, which makes things even more complicated. 
Nevertheless, they are an important source for our understanding of how 
Leonardo’s painting might have originally meant to look (fig. 7).
The copy of The Last Supper from the collection of the Royal Academy of 
Art in London on display at Magdalen College in Oxford,16 which has been 
at tri buted to Leonardo’s disciple Giampietrino (active 1495–1549), is usually 
not considered an instantiation or a version of Leonardo’s work, like there 
are several original instantiations of various versions of Rembrandt’s etching 
15 Cf. Willan 1999.
16 See the catalog of the collection of the Royal Academy of Arts (2015) and London 
University of the Arts 2015.
Figure 6: Leonardo da Vinci, The Last Supper (1495–98),  
Santa Maria delle Grazie, Milan; tempera on plaster, 422 × 904 cm; 
after the restoration was finished in 1999.
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The Three Crosses (1653).17 An accurate copy (or a copy believed to be accu-
rate) like the Giampietrino canvas of The Last Supper can inform us about 
certain features of its original, even after the original may have been dam-
aged or lost. It thus relates not only to one particular token, but to certain 
normative standards that are constitutive of the respective type of work.18
Not every instantiation of a work of art needs to be “perfect” in any 
sense in order to be regarded as an instantiation of the respective work, 
although there will obviously be, in any case, a threshold that separates 
the class of successful instantiations from an indefinite number of failed 
attempts. Perfect (or nearly-perfect) copies of instantiations of artworks 
might in some cases be accepted as instantiations themselves; think of 
cast bronze sculptures like Rodin’s Thinker.19 In other cases, authorised 
perfect or nearly-perfect copies might be demoted to mere “replica” sta-
tus, while illegitimate copies may be ruled out as “pirated,” “fakes,” or “for-
geries”—the better the copy, the worse it will be.20 Decisions about which 
of these alternatives ought to be applied to such copies depend not only 
on certain objective qualities of the copy but rather on normative assump-
tions and power relations among stakeholders.
Since it is in most cases pretty difficult to produce “perfect” copies 
(except of digital data files and artefacts produced by digitally-controlled 
processes, like CDs), most copying and most copies will inevitably differ to 
some degree from their models. Copying produces not only likenesses, but 
also differences. This is one important reason for the transformative effects 
17 Cf. Hinterding, Luijten, and Royalton-Kisch 2000.
18 This is not the place to go deeper into the philosophical discussion concerning 
the necessity and legitimacy of ontological distinctions between works of art 
and the material objects or events involved in their respective instantiation. See 
Wollheim 1980; Currie 1989; Haar 1994; Pouviet 1997; Reicher 1998; Lamarque 
2010; Schmücker 2014, ch. 5, 163–270, for further discussion.
19 For an overview of the versions, instantiations, replicas, and copies of Rodin’s 
Thinker, see Roos 2004.
20 Cf. Elkins 1973, 115.
Figure 7: Giampietrino, The Last Supper, copy after Leonardo,  
ca. 1520; oil on canvas, 298 × 770 cm, Magdalen College, Oxford.
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of copying. Less than perfect copies can, under certain circumstances, 
be regarded as particularly interesting interpretations of the works they 
represent.
Painting is normally taken to be an “autographic,” “one-stage,” or “sin-
gular” art in contrast to “two-stage” arts,21 such as printmaking or classical 
music performances, which are typically capable of multiple instantiations. 
Along these lines, one might argue that copies are not necessary for a work 
of visual art in the same way that a musical work requires performances of 
a certain kind in order to actually—audibly—exist for its audience. A paint-
ing can be experienced perfectly well without the intervention of any copy 
or other media, at least by those who have the occasion to actually see the 
real thing. A musical work, on the other hand, cannot be experienced with-
out the reproductive work of the performing musicians. A painting does 
not need to be staged in the way a drama text or a musical work needs 
a stage or a place where it can be performed for an audience. This is cer-
tainly true in a sense, but it is also misleading. Viewing individual paintings 
as self-sufficient objects ready to fulfil their function of being looked at by 
someone ready to be impressed fails to account for the role of institutions 
like museums, art galleries, art criticism, and art markets, as well as of rel-
evant contexts like educational materials and the histories and theories of 
art in bestowing essential qualities such as meaning and value to them.
Works of art have always been staged; they seem to require some kind 
of framing, some control of the way they interact with their surroundings 
and engage their audience. The way this staging may be arranged is not 
arbitrary. Still, certain variations are considered acceptable—or perhaps 
particularly exciting—at a given time, with regard to the then-known 
and accepted alternatives and technological possibilities. The staging of 
artworks in museums and exhibition spaces is subject to changing at a 
remarkable pace—much faster than most of the exhibited objects them-
selves change. Most recently, the advent of the internet and the availability 
of digital images have begun to exert tremendous influence on the ways 
originals and copies of famous pictures are staged. The “Garden of Fine 
Art” in Kyōto is but one example of this ongoing development.
One advantage of copies compared to their originals is that you can do 
things with a copy which you could never do with the original. For exam-
ple, you can touch ceramic copies,22 which is—for good reason—prohib-
ited for paintings on silk, paper, canvas, or fragile plaster. You can place a 
ceramic copy under water—a particularly fascinating option for a subject 
21 Cf. Goodman 1976, 114.
22 Cf. Cox 2014, 697–710, for a discussion of the desire for “tactile knowing” within 
the framework of “sensory vision” conceived more broadly. The display of at 
least some of the ceramic copies of artworks in the Kyōto Garden of Fine Art as 
well as in the Ōtsuka Museum of Art (see also footnote 27) encourages touch. 
Mind, however, that “the ceramic board surfaces of all the reproductions feel the 
same” (Cox 2014, 704). 
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like Mo net’s Water Lilies, which is all about the reflection of the morning sky 
in a moving water surface (fig. 8).
A copy also allows an image to be seen in another environment; hence 
it will interact with this environment. The results can, under certain cir-
cumstances, be aesthetically rewarding and/or intellectually stimulating. 
At least one might imagine the possibility. I guess this is why one might 
want to build or visit a garden of fine art in the first place.
The architecture of the place is designed to fit the works exhibited. The 
dominating aspect of water surfaces echoes the Monet painting. The stroll 
garden concept relates to the temporality of the mediaeval Chinese and 
Japanese handscrolls. The overall size—and height or depth (going two 
storeys below ground level)—of the structure was necessitated by the aim 
of allowing visitors to see the 1:1 copy of Michelangelo’s giant masterpiece, 
The Last Judgment, as well as possible. There are three levels from which 
visitors of this garden can see the top, middle, and bottom regions of the 
Figure 8: Reflections of a Japanese winter afternoon sky on a water  
surface over a copy of a painting of reflections of a French summer morning 
sky on a water surface: Claude Monet, Le bassin aux nymphéas sans saules,  
matin, ceramic copy, 1990, 200 × 1275 cm, in the Garden of Fine Art, Kyōto.
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overwhelming mural. Details of the higher areas of the composition in 
particular can be seen much better in the copy in Kyoto than any tourist 
could ever see them in their original location in the Sistine Chapel. Still, it 
is almost impossible to grasp the entire composition—which may just be 
the point of the composition. Whatever the Day of Judgment may turn out 
to be like, it is definitely going to go beyond any individual human being’s 
grasp (fig. 9). 
Size matters. In a world where digital reproductions of famous pictures 
abound, it is still an impressive experience to be able to physically relate to 
life-sized images on such a scale as that of Michelangelo’s Last Judgment.
Towards the end of the garden route, Andō designed a situation that 
most resembles an art museum exhibition space. The reproductions of 
two chamber pieces by van Gogh and Renoir are enlarged to four times 
their original size,23 so that they almost reach the height of the Seurat 
painting that dominates the group. The enlargement of the smaller panels 
allows these pictures to meet at eye level, which would be impossible with 
the originals. It also enhances the visibility of the smaller images and thus 
allows for more distance between the image and the viewer. The impres-
sion, however, in particular regarding van Gogh’s Road with Cypress and 
Star, is more like seeing a large poster than like seeing the actual paint-
ing. The people responsible for the design of the exhibition placed these 
23 The “Garden of Fine Arts” website asserts that they are “twice the original size,” 
but if you double both the length and height of a rectangle, the result will be not 
two times but four times the original size. Accessed March 30, 2015. http://toban-
meiga.seesaa.net/category/1668034-1.html.
Figure 9: Visitor standing in front of the ceramic copy of Michelangelo’s 
Last Judgment at the Garden of Fine Art, Kyōto.
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panels in steel frames partly behind a massive concrete wall with windows 
in it, thus framing them a second time. The visibility of the panels is spoiled 
to a certain degree by reflections in the glass windows, as it often is with 
the most precious originals protected behind panes of glass in museum 
exhibitions. Since the ceramic copies in the outdoor exhibition in Kyōto 
would not need such a protection, however, the reasons for installing 
these window panes cannot have been anything other than aesthetic. 
Increasing the difficulties in seeing the picture can be a way to make the 
aesthetic experience more interesting. The difference in surface qualities 
between the originals and the ceramic copies seems to matter somewhat 
less if the copies are staged in an arrangement that would not allow visi-
tors to see much of the texture of an original painting, either. As one can 
see in numerous photos posted on the internet, this framing arrangement 
entices many visitors and photographers to engage with particular details 
of these images24 (fig. 10).
Copies and their originals
Before we go on to discuss the works that have been deemed worth cel-
ebrating in the Kyōto “Garden of Fine Art,” we should acknowledge that 
the famous paintings themselves are not actually in the garden. What is 
there, instead, are ceramic boards with large-scale photographic copies 
of the paintings. What, then, is the object of celebration? The absent/rep-
resented famous works of art? The present copies with their own spectac-
ular qualities? Or rather the stage itself, the architecture by Tadao Andō 
24 Cf. Hashimoto 2008; Suryomengolo 2009; Kan 2012; Linolo 2010.
Figure 10: Nightwalkers, detail from Vincent van Gogh, 
Road with Cypress and Star, 1890, ceramic copy, 1994.
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which has been appreciated, as we have seen, by many visitors as an art-
work in its own right?25 The latter is, one could argue, the only original in 
the place.
Concerning the copies, the garden’s website explains: “A porcelain 
panel painting is a photoengraving from the positive film taken of the orig-
inal painting. The porcelain panel on which the painting was transferred 
is then fired, bringing out its brilliant hues. These panels are combined to 
create one giant painting” (fig. 11).26
Ceramic copies are waterproof and extremely durable; they will not 
be affected by heat, humidity, sunlight, or other factors leading to the 
mechanical or chemical disintegration of their material substratum. The 
company that produced these ceramic copies27 expects that they will retain 
25 “More interesting than the copies of the paintings on their own, is the combina-
tion with the award-winning architecture of Ando Tadao” (Blankestijn 2012).
26 “What is a porcelain panel painting?” For a more detailed description of the pro-
cess, see the website of the Ōtsuka Museum of Art 2010. “Garden of Fine Arts” 
website. Accessed March 26, 2015. http://toban-meiga.seesaa.net/category/176 
7603-1.html.
27 See the company’s website, Otsuka Ohmi Ceramics Co., Ltd., 2015. The Ōtsuka 
company also funded and equipped the Ōtsuka Museum of Art, 大塚国際美術館 
Ōtsuka Kokusai Bijutsukan in Naruto, Tokushima Prefecture, the largest exhibi-
tion space in Japan (and one of the largest in the world), which is entirely dedi-
cated to exhibiting ceramic boards with copies of a comprehensive canon of art 
Figure 11: Leonardo, The Last Supper, ceramic copy, 1990;  
detail: centre. The huge format is made up of large rectangular 
ceramic panels, each measuring ca. 60 × 210 cm.
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their original appearance for more than a thousand or even two thousand 
years. So there is a chance that these copies might outlive the originals 
made from ephemeral materials such as plaster, canvas, silk, or paper. 
Proudly, the garden’s website announces: “These porcelain panels neither 
fade nor erode, and so can be preserved indefinitely. Combining ceramics 
and fine art [sic] these porcelain panel paintings create a new genre.”28
Steeped in an aesthetic culture which puts tremendous value on the 
original and tends to denigrate reproductions, we might be inclined not 
to take the latter claim at face value. But maybe it points to a difference 
that could be worth further investigation. What distinguishes ceramic cop-
ies from ordinary paintings and from other kinds of copies?29 What kind 
of art-related practices might become possible to those who obtain such 
large-scale, high-quality ceramic copies? Perhaps there is a chance for the 
development of new art-related practices that no one so far has dared to 
think of, or will think of as long as we can only experience art under the 
conditions imposed upon us by the fragility of the materials in which works 
of art are typically produced. Maybe this development is already happen-
ing—and it is about time that philosophers of art take notice.
Surely, it is no news to the philosophy of art that paintings can be copied 
and that, therefore, not only paintings but also copies of paintings exist. 
But even though artistic practices, as well as the production and distribu-
tion of knowledge concerning art history could never have emerged and 
would cease to exist without the widespread use of copies, the presence 
and the relevance of these copies has been systematically marginalised in 
most contributions to the history or philosophy of art.30
Images have been copied ever since the first images were made—or 
rather the other way around: Copying came first, since representative 
images could hardly have been invented, had they not been derived from 
a mimetic behaviour originally related to objects of experience, of desire, 
awe, or fear.31 Only in a secondary step can some of the traces of such 
mimetic behaviour attain the form of fixed images that are then taken 
up by ongoing mimetic behaviour, which in turn produce further images 
more or less like those which appeared impressive enough to occupy the 
mimetic attention. So images have always been accompanied by cop-
ies, but, throughout the history of human societies, different ways and 
history, a lavish materialisation of the “musée imaginaire” once dreamed of by 
André Malraux, that was opened in 1998. C; cf. Ōtsuka Museum of Art 2010; Cox 
2014.
28 The “Garden of Fine Arts” website. Accessed March 26, 2015. http://toban-meiga.
seesaa.net/category/1767603-1.html.
29 For my present purposes, I am more interested in the differences related to 
various media technologies or materials used in copying than in conceptual 
specifications concerning replicas, counterfeits, or fakes in their respective rela-
tionships to originals and copies. For an analysis of how these concepts might 
be distinguished, see Carrara 2010.
30 Notable exceptions are Riegl 1985; Benjamin (1936) 2008; Walker 1990; Pouviet 
2003; Ullrich 2009; Bartsch et al. 2010; Augustyn and Söding 2010a.
31 Cf. Taussig 1993.
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techniques of copying were developed and produced very different kinds 
of images, be they scratches or carvings in a bone, knots in a thread, pat-
terns on a slope, drawings, paintings, tattoos, stamps, rubbings, casts, 
woodblock prints, copper engravings, etchings, mezzotint, lithographs, 
photographs, silkscreen prints, or digital images. Depending on the tech-
nical means and also on the qualities of the copied object deemed rele-
vant, copies allow for different kinds of use and may, in some way or other, 
look more or less different from their respective models.
Some copies of paintings are also paintings. They may look very much 
like their models, so that one might even get confused about which is 
which. Such confusion could hardly happen to a visitor of the “Garden of 
Fine Art.” No one would mistake a ceramic copy of a painting for an origi-
nal. Nevertheless, even if there wasn’t the slightest perceptible qualitative 
difference between a model and its copy, there would still be a significant 
ontological difference—namely that the copy is ontologically dependent 
on the model. Its relation to its model is what makes it a copy. The model, 
on the other hand, may be a copy itself (of some previous model), but it 
is not a copy of its copy, this object which resembles it so closely. For an 
artefact or a kind of behaviour to be a copy of another object, some sig-
nificant similarities between them—that are arguably present in the copy 
due to the fact that that quality was, to a remarkable degree, present in the 
model—are required.
The model may be an original if it is not itself a copy of a pre-exist-
ing model; or at least this seems to be implied in the way the concept of 
an “original” is usually understood.32 Many copies are not direct copies of 
originals in the strict sense, but are in fact copies of other copies. Some-
thing that figures as a model for one or several copies may itself be a copy 
of a previous model, and so on, in a chain of copies that can extend over 
many generations of more or less faithful reproductions.33 Not every chain 
of copies must eventually be derived from an original in the sense that it 
demands that the original must not have been a copy of any pre-existing 
model, as was assumed for example in the Platonic tradition of Western 
thought.34 There can be a great variety of copies that differ more or less 
profoundly from each other, even if they are ontologically dependent on 
a single “ancestor” model. This is the transformative power of copying 
processes.
With historical paintings like the ones reproduced in the “Garden of Fine 
Art,” matters can become even more complicated because the originals do 
not exist in the way that abstract entities like types, forms, or ideas do. In 
32 For more technical discussions, see Elgin 2002; Elkins 1993; Augustyn and 
Söding 2010b.
33 Think of iconographic traditions like the image of the crucifix, classicist, Roman-
esque or gothic sculpture, or of the way bamboo and pine trees are painted in 
Chinese ink brush painting.
34 Cf. Boon 2010, 18–22.
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one-stage arts35 like painting, the original work of art is inextricably bound 
to a historical artefact, an individual material object which, like all mate-
rial objects, is subject to change and eventual deterioration. A remarka-
ble change in the way the “original” painting looks can be observed not 
only in the case of Leonardo`s Last Supper but also in Michelangelo’s Last 
Judgement from the Sistine Chapel which was, like Leonardo’s Milan mural, 
thoroughly restored from 1980 to 1994. Here, too, the ceramic copy doc-
uments an intermediate stage of the ongoing restoration from 1990; it 
shows neither the smoky grease we can see in photos taken before the 
restoration, nor the bright colours that surprised many viewers after the 
restoration was completed in 1994 (fig. 12).36
Figure 12: Michelangelo, The Last Judgment, 1535–41, ceramic  
copy, 1990, based on a photo documenting an intermediate state 
of the ongoing restoration. Detail: Charon’s ferry.
A copy of a work of visual art may depict and preserve as accurately as pos-
sible the way the model looked (under certain measures of likeness) at the 
moment when the copying was done. Thus, as long as it exists, it will be a 
copy of the original at one particular time point of the original’s existence. 
The original may change, and the copy may change, too. No physical thing 
can remain the same forever. Whatever similarities there were between a 
copy and its model or original at the time the copy was made will sooner 
or later be eclipsed by growing discrepancies. This is one of the reasons 
why we make copies and try to keep copies of valued but fragile originals. 
35 For a discussion of “one-stage” and “two-stage arts,” see Goodman 1976, 114–115.
36 For a photographic documentation and discussion of the restoration project, 
see Vecchi and Collalucci 1996.
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Particularly famous pictures have been copied again and again over the 
centuries, so that several copies of the same picture document different 
temporal states of their original. Which one of these ought to be regarded 
as the best or “closest” to the ideal state of its intended object? Which state 
of the original, which perspective on the picture, which size of reproduc-
tion, which detail, which hue ought to be distinguished as “ideal” or best? 
By making a choice and suggesting a view on what is relevant about a 
picture, copies present interpretations, just like musical performances 
present interpretations of their respective works. There is ample space for 
competition between various copies, both old and new. The measure of 
success in these competitions cannot be restricted to technical standards 
of accuracy alone, but will inevitably include questions of aesthetic merit 
and appreciation.
Famous pictures
Each of the pictures reproduced for the “Garden of Fine Art” had already 
been copied, printed, and circulated thousands, if not millions of times, 
even before the advent of the internet and the JPEG file interchange for-
mat made digital reproductions of almost any image available to almost 
everyone, everywhere. In this sense, the selection of the works displayed 
in the garden might seem redundant. Would it not have been better to use 
the space—and the funds—to display some fresh contemporary art, either 
from Japan or anywhere else in the world?
But this is not how the economy of attention works.37 None of the works 
which have been so lavishly reproduced for this “Garden of Fine Art” would 
have been included in the collection had they not been copied extensively 
before. Never would such a sophisticated facility have been built and 
maintained for highly original, innovative works of fine art by more or less 
unknown contemporary artists.
Being copied—and being known for having been copied many times—
is an important part of what constitutes the fame of these images.38 This is 
not only true of images of works of art in the notorious “age of mechanical 
reproduction” since the nineteenth century; it was already true by the time 
of the late Roman Empire,39 and probably even since the Neolithic Era.40 
Gabriel Tarde and others have argued that, for human beings, imitation 
and being imitated, copied, or depicted, is the most important component 
of fame, influence, or power.41 Human beings pay attention to what other 
human beings pay attention to. What matters to others matters to us.42 We 
37 Cf. Franck 1998.
38 Cf. Ullrich 2009.
39 Cf. Riegl 1985.
40 Cf. Stockhammer (this volume).
41 Cf. Tarde 1903; Gebauer and Wulf 1995; Boon 2010.
42 Cf. Tomasello 2009.
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desire what is desired by others.43 We copy, photograph, or buy what was 
bought, photographed, or copied by others. We share attention, we share 
copies.44 In making, acquiring, and distributing copies we acknowledge the 
power that puts its stamp on these representations and thus try to relate 
to them; we somehow take part in the accumulation and sharing of power. 
The selection of the pictures displayed in the “Garden of Fine Art” was 
made at the heyday of Japanese economic power, later termed the “bub-
ble economy,” when everything seemed available for Japanese buyers. 
Japanese businessmen flooded the international art market and bought 
whatever canvasses they could, especially from the highly-esteemed 
late nineteenth-century French Impressionists and Post-Impressionists: 
Manet, Monet, Renoir, Seurat, and the most expensive painter of all, the 
legendary van Gogh.45 The particular appreciation of French Impressionist 
and Post-Impressionist paintings among the Japanese elite dates back to 
the Meiji-Era, in the late nineteenth century, when the long-isolated coun-
try opened itself up for contact with Europe and America and the export of 
Japanese 浮世絵 ukiyo-e woodblock prints, ink painting, lacquerware, and 
costumes triggered a wave of Japonism among the European avant-garde, 
while, in Japan (as in most European countries at the time) it was consid-
ered an asset to be familiar with the dernier cri of Paris.46
Suggestions for the artworks to be included in the “Garden of Fine Art” 
were made by the economist, successful writer, and politician, 堺屋太一 
Sakaiya Taichi from Ōsaka (b. 1935).47 Sakaiya is well-known in Japan. He 
began his career in the 1960s as an economist and bureaucrat at the Min-
istry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), but after publishing two 
best-selling novels in the 1970s, he quit his civil service job to focus on 
writing. He went on to publish over fifty books, including historical novels 
as well as 日本論 nihonron, or essays concerning the ongoing change of 
Japanese society, economy, and culture—many of which became best sell-
ers.48 From 1998 to 2000, he served as the Minister of State for Economic 
Planning of Japan. Sakaiya already had some experience with success-
fully organizing exhibitions when, in the 1980s, he approached 栢森新治 
Ka ya mo ri Shinji, CEO of ダイコク電機株式会社 Daikoku Denki Co., Ltd. from 
Nagoya, an electronics manufacturer known for its production of pachinko 
gambling machines.49 Sakaiya also knew that the 大塚オーミ陶業株式会社 
Otsuka Ohmi Co., Ltd. from Shigaraki, could produce large-scale ceramic 
boards and had recently made advances in photoengraving technology. 
He suggested that Kayamori set up a temporary “Garden of Fine Arts” as 
43 Cf. Girard 1987, 283–298.
44 Cf. Hyde 2010.
45 Cf. Kurtenbach 1990; Four 2013.
46 Cf. Rimer, Takashina and Bolas 1987; Guth, Volk and Yamanashi 2004.
47 Cf. “Garden of Fine Arts” website. Accessed March 29, 2015. http://toban-meiga.
seesaa.net/category/1668031-1.html.
48 Mahalo n.d. Only two of Sakaiya’s books have been published in English: The 
Knowledge-Value Revolution (1991), and What is Japan? (1993).
49 See Daikoku Denki Co., Ltd. n.d.
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the Daikoku Denki pavilion at the 1990 International Garden and Green-
ery Exposition (国際花と緑の博覧会 Kokusai Hana to Midori no Hakurankai) 
in Ōsaka,50 with spectacular reproductions of four large-scale paintings 
on ceramic panels: Michelangelo’s Last Judgement, Leonardo’s Last Supper, 
Monet’s Water Lilies, and Seurat’s Sunday Afternoon. The first three of these 
are unquestionably extremely prominent, canonical works that Japanese 
art enthusiasts would have to travel halfway around the world to see in 
person, because these pictures would never be loaned for an exhibition 
abroad. The popularity of the Seurat painting in Japan was probably due 
to an earlier exhibition, “The Impressionist Tradition: Masterpieces from 
the Art Institute of Chicago,” held at the Seibu Museum of Art in the fall 
of 1986. Obviously, the subject would seem fitting for an art garden at a 
garden exposition. Sakaiya’s suggestion was welcomed by Kayamori, as 
was his suggestion to ask the Ōsaka-based star architect Andō Tadao to 
design the pavilion.
After the 1990 Expo was over, Sakaiya and his collaborators began to 
look for another way to put their ceramic copies to good use. They found 
this possibility in Kyōto, the ancient capital of Japan, which is visited by 
millions of Japanese and international tourists every year and was, at that 
time, preparing celebrations for its 1200-year anniversary in 1994. Kyōto 
prefecture offered the site, a lot between the entrance of the prefectural 
Botanical Garden and the prefectural archives, in an area that was already 
affected by large-scale construction work due to the building of the Ki ta-
ya ma underground station. For the permanent instalment of the Kyōto 
“Garden of Fine Art,” Kayamori commissioned the enlarged copies of the 
other four works to complement the initial set and donated the entire col-
lection to the prefecture.51
The rearrangement of the collection for its larger and permanent facil-
ity in Kyōto is instructive. Renoir and van Gogh do not come as a surprise, 
but the inclusion of copies of Chinese and Japanese mediaeval handscrolls 
adds a remarkable accent. It is, for one, a local accent: two scrolls from the 
collection 鳥獣人物戯画絵巻 Chōjū-jinbutsu-giga emaki, “Caricature scrolls of 
birds, beasts, and persons,” that was probably painted in Kyōto during the 
Heian period, eight or nine centuries ago. The collection was traditionally 
attributed to 鳥羽僧正 Toba Sōjō (1053–1140), the forty-seventh head priest 
of 延暦寺 Enryaku-ji, the main temple of the 天台 Tendai sect of Buddhism, 
situated on the slopes of 比叡山 Mt. Hiei to the north-east of Kyōto. How-
ever, there is no evidence that the renowned cleric and astronomer actu-
ally had a hand in producing them. Modern, more critical opinion assumes 
that only the first two of the four scrolls may have been painted in the 
twelfth century at all, whereas the other two were most likely painted later, 
50 I am indebted to Professor Ōhashi Ryōsuke (Kyōto) for background information. 
51 No information concerning who paid for the construction could be obtained. 
It was probably funded by one of the Japanese Government’s massive, debt-fi-
nanced programs for job creation that were launched in Japan in the 1990s in 
order to fight the looming crisis after the crash of 1992. 
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in the thirteenth century, and by several hands.52 The scrolls belong to the 
Buddhist monastery of 高山寺 Kōzan-ji in north-western Kyōto. Since they 
are classified as National Treasures (国宝 kokuhō), the original scrolls are 
kept at the Tōkyō National Museum for security and conservation reasons, 
and for occasional exhibitions, and the Kōzan-ji holds facsimile copies that 
can be shown to visitors without exposing the originals to any risk.
The first two scrolls of the collection were enlarged to four times their 
original size and printed on ceramic plates. Many details can be seen much 
better in these enlarged copies than in the originals.53 Scroll 1 is the most 
comic and contains the most complex narrative. The drawings on it show 
monkeys, rabbits, frogs, and other animals frolicking and fighting; some 
of them seem to behave very much like Heian-era Japanese nobles or Bud-
dhist priests. The way the brush is mastered in these early manga scenes 
is absolutely fascinating (fig. 13).
Scroll 2 is more of an album, depicting the appearance and movement 
of various birds and beasts, some of them from the world the painter lived 
in, and others from mythological realms (fig. 14). The relevance of the “Gar-
den of Fine Art” as an exhibition space and as a relay station in the global 
circulation of copies of the famous pictures displayed in it is underlined by 
the fact that a considerable proportion of the digital copies of images from 
52 Wikipedia, s.v. “Chōjū-jinbutsu-giga.” Accessed March 30, 2015. https://en.wiki 
pedia.org/wiki/Ch%C5%8Dj%C5%AB-jinbutsu-giga; see also Köhn 2005, 115.
53 Cf. one critic’s claim that “You will never see the frolicking monkeys, frogs and 
rabbits as clearly as here!” (Blankestijn 2012).
Figure 13: 鳥羽 僧正 Toba Sōjō [attributed], 鳥獣人物戯画絵巻  
Chōjū-jinbutsu-giga emaki, Caricature scrolls of birds, beasts and  
persons, twelfth century; enlarged ceramic copy of the first scroll, 
showing adventures of rabbits, frogs, and monkeys.
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this twelfth century picture scroll that appear on the internet today are 
actually photos of the ceramic copies on display at the “Garden of Fine Art.”
No less popular than these early medieval Japanese manga scrolls is the 
Chinese picture scroll 清明上河圖 Qingming Shanghe Tu. Its title is usually 
translated into English as “On the River During the Qingming Festival.” This 
translation is based on the understanding that the characters 清明 refer to 
the Chinese Memorial Day, also known as “Tomb Sweeping Day,” which is 
celebrated every year at the beginning of April, on the 15th day after the 
Spring Equinox. On Qingming day, Chinese people visit the graves or burial 
grounds of their ancestors; many people go on family outings, sing, and 
dance, while peasants are expected to begin the spring ploughing. But the 
Qingming painting actually contains little that might be read as hinting to 
the particular activities related to the rituals performed at burial grounds.54 
So the usual understanding of the title might be misleading. Yale historian 
Valerie Hansen has argued that 清明 Qingming need not refer to the tomb 
sweeping festival, but can also—in a more general sense—mean some-
thing like “clear and bright,” and as a political term also refer to a “well 
ordered” government or “peace and order,” so that the title of the scroll 
could be read as something like “Peace Reigns over the River,”55 which 
would seem more fitting, given much of what can be seen in the painting.
54 Cf. Hansen 1996b, 4.
55 Ibid, 5; see also Hansen 1996a, 196n24 (crediting personal communication with 
Wu Pei-yi for suggesting this title to her in 1995).
Figure 14: 鳥羽 僧正 Toba Sōjō (attributed), 鳥獣人物戯画絵巻 Chōjū-jinbutsu-giga 
emaki; detail from the enlarged ceramic copy of the second scroll, showing a lion.
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清明上河圖 Qingming Shanghe Tu  was originally painted in the twelfth 
century by a Northern Song painter named 張擇端 Zhang Zeduan, of whom 
not much is known apart from the fact that he composed this impressive 
panorama and a couple of other landscape paintings. The painting depicts, 
in stunning detail, traffic on and along a river, usually believed to refer to 
黃河 Huáng Hé (the Yellow River), and urban life and commerce in an ideal-
ised city, usually believed to refer to the Song capital 汴梁 Biànliáng (later 
named 開封 Kaifeng). But the painter of the Qingming scroll did not bother 
to include any of the landmark buildings of the historical city of Kaifeng 
and never seems to have intended his picture to be regarded as an accu-
rate rendering of the Song capital.56 To make things even more confusing, 
a large theme park featuring over fifty ancient boats in various sizes and 
400-plus houses in the Song style, meant to be “a faithful reproduction
of the painting Riverside Scene at the Qingming Festival,” has recently been
built in Kaifeng’s Millennium City Park.57 So if you go to Kaifeng now and
see places that look similar to some of the places featured in the Qingming
scroll, this may be so not because the scroll depicts the city of Kaifeng as it
looked some 800 years ago, but because parts of the city have been turned 
into a copy of the legendary painting.
“Like the ‘Mona Lisa,’ ‘Qingming Festival’ is to some extent famous 
for being famous,” an American critic remarked.58 The painting by Zhang 
Zeduan “has been famous since the fourteenth century, when forgeries 
began to circulate.” “The original was repeatedly stolen or misappropri-
ated from the imperial collection, starting as early as the 1340s.”59 The 
painting “is famous partly for its involvement over centuries in palace 
intrigues, theft, and wars, and partly for its detailed, geometrically accu-
rate images of bridges, wine shops, sedan chairs, and boats beautifully 
juxtaposed with flowing lines for the depiction of mountains and other 
natural scenery. It is routinely covered in courses on Chinese history, art, 
and culture, across China and in the West.”60 
According to some accounts, the twelfth century original was lost long 
ago, but several copies from the 明 Ming (1368–1644) and 清 Qing eras 
(1644–1911) have survived. This is what the author of the Garden of Fine 
Art’s website seems to assume, too.61 If this is true, the painting either 
ceased to exist or is instantiated in its surviving copies. But in which of the 
copies? There are considerable differences between them. Since the Yuan 
dynasty, 清明上河圖 “has been a timeless subject in painting, with more 
than fifty works on this subject or by this title surviving today, making it 
56 Cf. Hansen 1996a, 184–190. For a defense of the traditional assumption that the 
city shown on the scroll was indeed meant to be Kaifeng, see Tsao 2003.
57 See Cultural China n.d.; Travel China Guide n.d.
58 Bradsher 2007.
59 Ibid. Hansen 1996a, 191–192, refers to Whitfield 1965, 74–75, for an overview of 
the history of the painting.
60 Bradsher 2007.




perhaps the painting with the most numerous versions extant.”62 Even so, 
new copies and new versions are still being produced. A large, comput-
er-animated 3D copy of the scroll spreading over more than 100 metres 
attracted immense crowds at the Shanghai Expo in 2010.63
What the garden’s website does not tell its readers is that the Palace 
Museum in Beijing (故宫博物院 Gùgōng Bówùyùan) holds a darkened silk 
scroll measuring 24.8  cm  ×  528.7  cm recte, painted with monochrome 
black ink (and some green and reddish hues), that is widely believed to be 
the original (or at least a major fragment of it) painted in the early twelfth 
century by the elusive Zhang Zeduan.64 An American expert quoted in a 
New York Times article in 2007 confirmed: “Art scholars agree that the Pal-
ace Museum in Beijing does indeed own the original. The style and mate-
rials of the scroll—ink on silk—are consistent with work from the twelfth 
century, and the many chops, or seals, of its owners over the years are 
accurate.”65 I am not in a position to decide this question. Certainly the 
placing of the seals would be the first thing a forger would do his best 
to copy most accurately. Because of its fragility, the scroll is seldom dis-
played, even in Beijing, and has never been lent for an overseas exhibition 
(fig. 15).66
The ceramic copy exhibited in the Kyoto Garden of Fine Art under the 
name of this famous painting is clearly a copy not of the Beijing scroll but 
of another scroll not nearly as old as the work it is said to represent. This 
scroll, painted in full colours and remarkably rich in minute details, dates 
from the Qing era in eighteenth century China and currently belongs 
to the National Palace Museum in Taipei, Taiwan (國立故宮博物院 Gúolì 
Gùgōng Bówùyùan). The Museum in Taipei hosts major parts of the former 
art collections of the imperial court from Beijing and holds no less than 
eight versions of the Qingming subject in its collection.67 These versions 
differ from each other in many respects. One of them in particular has 
long been recognised as the best version—or at least the best from the 
Ming and Qing dynasties. This particular scroll68 was the model for the 
ceramic copy displayed in Kyōto. “This version has been the subject of a 
62 National Palace Museum 2013, 142.
63 For a photo of the event on July 16, 2010, see Wikipedia 2010. More about this 
computer animated copy and a show in Taipei in the summer of 2011 can be 
found at 5pit 2011 (with a video and explanations in Chinese).
64 Cf. Hansen 1996b. A high-resolution digital copy of the Beijing scroll can be found 
at Wikimedia 2013c; another copy, apparently digitised after a printed copy, can be 
compared at http://tools.wmflabs.org/zoomviewer/?flash=no&f=Alongtheriver+ 
QingMing.jpg (accessed September 18, 2016).
65 Bradsher 2007, quoting Chinese art specialist Marc F. Wilson, the director of the 
Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art in Kansas City, MO.
66 Bradsher 2007.
67 Cf. National Palace Museum n.d.-a.
68 The painting is identified by the accession number 故畫 Guhua 1100. A high- 
resolution digital copy of this scroll can be found at National Palace Museum 
n.d.-b. Another copy of the same file is also available at Wikimedia 2013c.
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documentary film, printed in postcard and jigsaw-puzzle form, published 
in a detailed study and as a children’s book, produced as a multimedia disc, 
and even reproduced in full size.”69 In Kyōto, it is reproduced on porcelain 
panels in an even larger scale, enlarged to four times its original size—
over 24 metres, altogether. Thus it enables visitors to take a closer look at 
the painting’s details. As one visitor stated, “I’ve seen it once at the Taipei 
National Palace Museum, but this one is much easier to see clearly, for it is 
69 National Palace Museum n.d.-a.
Figure 15: 張擇端 Zhang Zeduan, 清明上河圖 Qingming Shanghe Tu,  
“On the River During the Qingming Festival”, Northern Song, twelfth 
century, Beijing Palace Museum 故宫博物院 Gùgōng Bówùyùan.  
Detail: Rainbow bridge.
Figure 16: 清明上河圖 Qingming Shanghe Tu, “On the River During  
the Qingming Festival” [National Palace Museum, Taipei], eighteenth- 
century remake by 陳枚 Chén Méi, 孫祜 Sūn Hù, 金昆 Jīn Kūn,  
戴洪 Dài Hóng and 程志道 Chéng Zhìdào of the famous scroll  
by 張擇端 Zhang Zeduan. Enlarged ceramic copy in the Garden of  
Fine Art, Kyōto, 1994; detail: Rainbow bridge.
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twice the size of the Taipei one, and you aren’t being jostled by hordes of 
tourists.” (fig. 16).70
Measuring 35.6 cm × 1,152.8 cm, the Qing court version of the legend-
ary Qingming panorama was completed in the first year of the reign of 
Emperor 乾隆 Qiánlóng (1736  CE), through the effort and collaboration 
of five artists from the Qing dynasty Painting Academy: 陳枚 Chén Méi, 
孫祜 Sūn Hù, 金昆 Jīn Kūn, 戴洪 Dài Hóng, and 程志道 Chéng Zhìdào: “begun 
under the Yongzheng emperor and completed in the early reign of the 
Qianlong Emperor, it took nine years to paint.”71
Borrowing a term from the twentieth-century movie industry, the rela-
tionship of the Qing court scroll to the Beijing scroll that is believed to be 
the original might perhaps be labelled as that of a bold “remake” of the 
subject rather than of a “copy” of the original. The Qing court version is 
more than twice as long as the Beijing scroll and covers vast areas of the 
river landscape to the east of the city and, in particular, the majestic palace 
in the west. None of these items appear in the Beijing scroll—or at least 
not in the state of the scroll as it is known today, which might be just a 
fragment after parts of the original were cut off some time ago. But even 
in those features of the composition that do maintain some parallels in 
both versions, the differences are striking and apparently not due to any 
kind of negligence.
Can a picture depicting the towing of a boat be a copy of a picture 
depicting the poling of a boat? Maybe such technical details are not what 
matters to those who are able to celebrate a copy for surpassing its original 
in brilliance and accuracy. Who are we to censure the Chinese about what 
ought to count as a “copy,” or how to label different kinds of copies, accord-
ing to the amount and kind of similarities and differences between them?
Obviously, the Qing court painters never intended to produce an exact 
copy of the historical original—or whatever might have been the model 
that represented the famous picture to them. Their understanding of their 
task was much more ambitious: they wanted not only to preserve a canoni-
cal model of an ideal state of a peaceful and well-ordered urban civilisation 
and pass on a revered masterpiece of the traditional Chinese art of ink 
brush painting, but to do their best to renew this tradition at the most 
advanced level of insight and capability available to them.
With exceptionally fine and lively brushwork … almost every aspect 
related to urban life has been rendered, ranging from tranquil 
countryside to raucous itinerant shows and the bustling rainbow 
bridge market as well as shops of every kind, crowded passageways, 
secluded mansion courtyards, and a grand imperial garden. The 
coloring throughout the scroll is spectacular, the scenery combin-
ing Chinese traditional painting methods and Western perspective 
70 Yzzzz 2013.
71 National Palace Museum 2013, 142.
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to give the space a sense of depth and volume. … Many aspects of 
traditional life are also depicted, including street shows, a country-
side banquet, and ladies going for a walk, the material for depiction 
here coming from the customs of the Qingming Festival practiced 
in Beijing at the time, thus offering a glimpse at the variety of life 
among commoners in the Qing dynasty.72
The scroll exhibits conspicuous traces—such as the use of colour and per-
spective techniques—that seem to indicate that the artists who painted 
it had encountered Western art. “Architectural elements throughout the 
handscroll were all done using the principles of Western perspective, the 
buildings and streets distinctly rendered in appropriate proportion. The 
distance between near and far has been accurately grasped, and there is 
even Western-style architecture found in the painting.”73
The painters were acquainted with European art and painting tech-
niques due to the presence of Jesuit missionaries at the Beijing court. Most 
notable among these missionaries was the Italian painter Giuseppe Casti-
glione (1688–1766), who came to China in 1715 and served as a court artist 
to the three Qing emperors 康熙 Kangxi, 雍正 Yongzheng, and 乾隆 Qián-
lóng, for 51 years.74 His blend of Western and Chinese painting styles was 
particularly in favour with Emperor Qiánlóng (1711–1799), an avid collector 
and connoisseur of fine art.
The Qing court painters’ version of the Qingming subject is a remark-
able document of cross-cultural learning from a Chinese perspective at 
the heyday of the Qing Empire. It was a deliberate attempt to present a 
synthesis of the best elements of Chinese tradition with Western achieve-
ments, a synthesis that was meant to reinforce the Chinese Empire’s claims 
of superiority.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the conspicuous differences between the Taipei Muse-
um’s Qing court version of the Qingming subject and any of its predeces-
sors, including the Song dynasty original by Zhang Zeduan (whether this 
was identical with the Beijing scroll or perhaps still another painting), for 
the author of the Kyōto Garden of Fine Art’s information website, there is 
no doubt that “the Taipei National Museum’s copy captures (the painting’s) 
original magnificence.”75 Two things are striking about this assertion: The 
author reacts to a demand to justify the choice of the copy from Taipei as 
model for the ceramic copy in Kyōto. Apparently it was not sufficient to 
72 National Palace Museum 2013, 142–143.
73 National Palace Museum n.d.-a.
74 Cf. Barnhart et al. 1997, 282–285.




praise the Taipei scroll simply for the brilliance of its colours or the pleni-
tude of scenes from everyday Qing life, or for its delicate blend of Chinese 
and Western influences. The scroll was produced as a copy of a famous 
model, so its excellence must be that of a perfect copy. But how could 
the curator from Kyōto assess the relationship between the copy in the 
Taipei collection and its original, which he has never seen and which he 
even believes was lost long ago? What are the objects of such a compar-
ison? What kind of quality or object is the “magnificence” that seems to 
be, for this curator (but maybe not for this curator alone), the essential 
point in copying famous ancient paintings—so essential, indeed, that so 
many differences in the technical particularities do not seem to matter 
very much? Is this magnificence possible to capture and transfer through 
digital photography and interfaces like ceramic prints or LCD-screens? Or 
do we have to assume that it eludes such processes of technical reproduc-
tion, as Walter Benjamin famously argued was the case for the “aura” of 
people, places, situations, or historical artefacts?
These are admittedly philosophical questions. They have been engen-
dered by the experience of occasionally strolling through the Garden of 
Fine Art, seeing what is there to be seen and reflecting on the relationships 
between various moments at this garden—the pictures that are so famous 
that it has become really hard to actually see them, the ceramic copies in 
their own materiality, the arrangement of the pictures along the garden 
route, the interplay between the pictures and moving water surfaces, jux-
tapositions of paintings which could not come so close to each other at any 
other place than this, changing weather and daylight conditions, other vis-
itors and how they behave, the aging of the concrete walls, the pavement, 
the glass railings which were all brand new just twenty years ago—and, 
furthermore, by reflecting on the complex relationships between the gar-
den and the world around it, between the copies in the garden and their 
originals in Rome, Milan, Paris, Otterlo, Chicago, Taipei, Tōkyō, and Kyōto, 
taking into account the way some of the originals have changed since their 
former look has been fixed for long-term conservation on ceramic boards, 
and so on.
Thanks to the internet, and to all the people who have posted photos or 
videos of their encounters with this place on countless websites, it is now 
possible to stroll through the garden not only if one happens to be in Kyōto, 
but also virtually, or at least to stroll through a virtual copy of this garden, 
which is of course not to be confused with the actual place in Kyōto. This 
virtual copy is at once less and more than the actual place: It is obviously 
less because most of these photos and videos are less than perfect copies 
of the pictures depicted in them, and even the best photos or videos can 
never replace the actual, multisensorial experience of being in a certain 
place, of moving freely, following your own curiosity, and taking your own 
time. But it is indeed remarkable that photos covering every square inch 
of the entire facility, including the restrooms, can now be found on the 
internet and can be studied from anywhere in the world that individuals 
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have internet access. The experience one can have in strolling through the 
virtual copy of the Garden of Fine Art on the internet, following the traces 
of the images offered by search engines upon entering different versions 
of the name of the place, also surpasses what can be experienced at the 
site in Kyōto on any given occasion. It encompasses many different times 
at once. And the painful absence of the possibility to spontaneously follow 
your own curiosity and turn your head, take a step to your left or take a 
closer look to the right at an obscure detail, is more than compensated for 
by the possibility of following the traces of so many other people’s curios-
ity and seeing what they found remarkable about the place. The chance 
to share the experience, knowledge, and thoughts of other visitors might 
change your own experience and your own thought.
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Image Enhancement Through 
Copying? Global and Local 
Strategies of Reproduction in the 
Field of World Art and Heritage
Abstract The digital and global cultural turn has created the effect that 
culture- and media-related strategies and practices of copying, as they 
have evolved and been conventionalized in the age of modernity, are sub-
ject to major transformations. Global cultures are often identified as “cul-
tures of copy” which show a pronounced disinterest, even disregard in the 
modern idea of the sovereign, untouchable, and unreproducible original. 
This essay paper focuses on new global and local strategies of reproduc-
tion in the field of world art and heritage. It studies how the relationships 
of particular cultures (here Western, Asian, and Arabic) towards the con-
cepts of original and copy, and creation and reproduction, are displaced, 
renegotiated, or even reaffirmed in the digital age of “copy and paste,” 
given that the means of digital reconstruction allow for unlimited remake. 
The issue of image empowerment through copying of world art heritage 
is discussed on the basis of a) the replication and virtual reconstruction 
of the Buddha statues of Bamiyan, and b) “remakes” of the Parisian Lou-
vre in Lens (Northern France) and Abu Dhabi. Using an individual art work 
and an art institution as objects of inquiry, the innovation potentials and 
iconoclastic conflict zones of the new “glocal” power of the copy are scru-
tinized. As a result of this case-based analysis, this study argues that, due 
to the pressure of the global cultural economy, copycatting has become a 
new cultural-economic and political strategy for image empowerment in 
the field of world art and heritage. Analogous to remediation processes in 
digital cultures, local and global copycats of world art heritage are empow-
ered to remaster the original image. Innovative imitation is found to be a 
guiding principle for globalizing the heritage market. Given that copy(cat)
ing implies geopolitical relocation, the transformative power of the copy is 
interpreted as a newly politicized right and cultural power to copy.




Global cultures are often identified as “cultures of copy.”1 This definition 
implies that the increase and reevaluation of copying practices is a conse-
quence of new reproduction technologies, in particular the digital media 
that have made the concept of the original completely obsolete. Con-
trary to the traditional stance in modern western culture and philosophy 
that the copy can never outpace the original, that it always includes the 
betrayal of authorship/creatorship as well as the infringement of intellec-
tual property, the aesthetic, social, and economic media practice in global 
cultures has proven that copying in both its old analog forms and new 
digital variants has become a creative power for innovation, if not even a 
new norm and paradigm for transformation. This digital cultural turn has 
the effect that previous historical, culture-related, and conventionalized 
definitions, strategies, and practices of copying undergo major resignifica-
tion. The research interest of this paper is guided by the question of how 
the relationship of particular cultures—here Western, Asian, and Arabic—
towards the concepts of original and copy, and creation and reproduction 
is displaced, renegotiated, or even reinforced in the digital age of “copy 
and paste,” given that the means of digital reconstruction allow for the 
unlimited remaking and resurrection of works and beings that have even 
ceased to exist in reality.
The following analysis will focus on two case studies in the domain of 
world art heritage. This field is particularly interesting for discussing global 
and local strategies of copying, because it comprises a conflict line that 
runs between the originality and the universality of world cultural heritage. 
Due to its declared uniqueness and human universality, the question of 
whether it is legitimate to reproduce and copy world art, including museum 
institutions that hold, preserve, and represent collections of world art and 
heritage, is a markedly delicate one that has stirred a heated debate over 
the last decade. This is mostly due to the fact that the globalization of cul-
ture and cultural heritage has not only revealed the diversity of cultures of 
copy, including their (in-)different views on the value relationship between 
original and copy, but it has also brought to bear the issue of who has (or 
doesn’t have) the right and power of reproduction under certain condi-
tions and in specific contexts. Besides being cultural assets, the question 
of authority on the multiplicity of the copy and the replication and repro-
duction of the original has become a political one.
Within the field of visual arts, the effect of global cultures of copy has 
become particularly evident in the form of the worldwide multiplication of 
well-established art institution formats such as the museums of modern 
1 The notion of “cultures of copy ” became a much debated and well-established 
concept in 2011, when the Edith-Russ House for Media Art in Oldenburg, Ger-
many, organized (in collaboration with the Goethe Institute of Hong Kong) an 
exhibition by this title that dealt with the phenomenon of the copy as a global 
cultural strategy. It alluded to an earlier publication by Hillel Schwartz entitled 
The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles (New York: 
Zone, 1996; revised and updated 2013).
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and contemporary art (MoMA and MoCA), the art biennial, and the art 
fair—formats that have historically originated and evolved in the West. As 
a response to this new globalizing trend, the issue of image enhancement 
through copying will not only be discussed on the basis of a) an individual 
art work, namely the Buddha statues of Bamiyan, whose potential recon-
struction in Afghanistan and “real” copy in China has sparked a hot inter-
cultural debate on the material and immaterial values of copying cultural 
heritage, but also with reference to b) an art institution: the Louvre as the 
museum of world art that has been copied and remade in a local version 
in Lens, France, and a global version in Abu Dhabi. Using these examples, 
the conflict zones and innovation potentials of the new global power of 
the copy are scrutinized by a number of questions: Where do the decisive 
fault lines between intellectual and material property run? Wherein lies 
the power of transformation and innovation, as exerted by the global cul-
tural translation of world culture symbols, their (trans-)historically shaped 
images? In what way does the copy displace and disgrace the original 
through the process of translocation? What differences between global 
and local strategies can be observed with respect to the contemporary 
remake and reactivation of world-historical art heritage, including its insti-
tutions of preservation and presentation?
Copying the lost, lost in copying: Reproductions of 
the Buddhas of Bamiyan
In this first part, the analyzed relationship between original and copy is 
defined by the physically destroyed and no longer existent original. With 
regard to the purpose of the copy, this case is distinct from a relationship 
wherein a copy can refer to an existing, material original (artefact) in its full 
grandeur and uniqueness. Each irretrievable loss of an original, aestheti-
cally and historically unique work of art evokes the human desire to recon-
stitute it by a copy. This desire is expressed even more strongly the more 
powerful the destruction of the original image has been. Arising from the 
experience of loss is the question of what forms, practices, and functions 
of reproductions are technically considered and culturally accepted as 
substitutes for the lost or smashed original and how they are conceived 
to relate to the physically non-existent original work. The destruction of 
the monumental Buddha statues of Bamiyan by the Taliban in March 
2001 is an impressive example of this image “recreation” effect. Hitherto, 
three concrete reconstruction attempts that represent culturally different 
models for rebuilding the destroyed art heritage of Bamiyan have been 
undertaken. They raise the challenging question of whether the recon-
struction or replica of an art object or cultural object destroyed through 
an iconoclastic assault can have a healing, reconciling effect of “spiritual” 
transformation, or even be transmuted into another act of iconoclasm, as 
a second-order assault on the original.
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In March 2001, the two monumental Buddha statues in the contested 
valley of Bamiyan, an important strategic point in the so-called “war against 
terror” in Afghanistan, were destroyed by Taliban militants. In addition to 
the two large Buddha figures in the center of the rock cliff, a smaller statue 
of a seated Buddha as well as another ten-meter-high Buddha statue in 
the neighboring Kakrak valley were blasted. Due to the monumentality 
of the larger Buddhas, the process of destruction dragged on for almost 
20 days. Mullah Mohammed Omar, who claimed to have commanded the 
destruction of all Buddha figures in the Bamiyan valley, justified the act of 
violence by claiming he was acting within the law of Islam: “The breaking 
of statues is an Islamic order and I have given this decision in the light of 
a fatwa of the ulema and the supreme court of Afghanistan. Islamic law is 
the only law acceptable to me.”2 This legitimization was enforced by the 
subsidiary argument that “all we are breaking are stones.”3 The UNESCO, 
commissioned by the United Nations for the protection and conservation 
of universal cultural heritage, condemned the act of destruction as “crime 
against culture,” and also spoke, in the same breath, of a “great loss of 
humanity.”4 An important, delicate point in this context is that UNESCO 
granted world heritage status to the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan only 
when they were threatened to be destroyed by the Taliban.5
As unique and unrepeatable as this act of destruction appears, due 
to its brutality being staged as a large-scale media spectacle, the icono-
clasm against the Buddha statues of Bamiyan is not an unprecedented 
act of image devastation. The Taliban were copying iconoclastic strategies 
already used throughout history for the destruction of the Bamiyan Bud-
dha images: the smashing of the face was performed in the eighth cen-
tury, as part of the Islamization of the region, and the bombardment of 
the full-body figures with canons and artillery fire also took place during 
the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, according to the wishes of the 
great Mughal emperors Shah Aurangzeb and Nair Shah, as well as Abdur 
Rahman Khan, the Emir of Afghanistan. Given this historical dimension, 
the distinctiveness of the iconoclastic destruction of 2001 lies in its extent. 
Following an escalating spiral of political events, the aim of the Taliban was 
to completely eradicate the Buddha figures, and with them the history of 
Buddhist images and beliefs, from Afghan territory.
The iconoclasm was religiously motivated by the imperative to destroy 
any false copy of God, for which any representational image qualifies. The 
Islamic prohibition of images, which does not originate in the writings of 
the Qur’an, but in the Hadith, that is the collected traditions of the prophet 
2 Archaeological Institute of America 2001.
3 Archaeological Institute of America 2001.
4 The valuations by the UNESCO Director-General Koïchiro Matsuura are repro-
duced in The World Heritage News Letter, May-June, 2001, 30.
5 The Bamiyan district was inscribed in the List of World Heritage in Danger in 
2003. This means that, as a result of the destructive iconoclastic action, the 
Ba miyan Buddhas were upgraded to world cultural heritage status.
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Mohammed, is primarily based on the aspect of figuration. The text canon 
of Hadith agrees that all visual representations possessing (or casting) a 
shadow, including the depiction of God, are prohibited. In Islamic culture, 
God alone is reserved the right to act as bâri (i.e. creator) or muçawwir 
(image maker). The total identification between God and image, creator 
and creation, negates any principle of representation and thus prevents a 
fundamental differentiation between original and copy. Because only God 
is conferred with the power to create images, any visual figuration by man 
amounts to a copy of creation. Artists are often equaled with polytheists or 
iconodules. As a consequence of this aniconism, sculptures are untruthful 
idols that must be destroyed. The logic following from this view is that Mul-
lah Mohammed Omar can state that, with the destruction of the Buddhas 
of Bamiyan, only stones have been broken, and not a monument of cultural 
significance. The iconoclastic strategy of defacement and disembodiment 
negates the idea that creation can be visually materialized and reproduced.
The focal point of this study is not to discuss the motives behind the 
destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues in the past and in the new 
millenium—this has already been done extensively6—but instead it is to 
explore the motivation for and the practices of reconstructing and copying 
the lost Bamiyan Buddhas in the aftermath of their destruction in 2001.
The material and symbolic loss of the Bamiyan Buddha images called 
for reconstitution and compensation in the Buddhist, Afghan, Asian, and 
Western world. The first step towards replicating the Bamiyan Buddha, 
undertaken in direct response to the brutal anti-Buddhist and anti-iconic 
destruction of the rock-carved originals, happened in Sri Lanka. When the 
Taliban initially threatened to destroy the Bamiyan Buddha figures, Sri 
Lanka, the seat of Theravada Buddhism, had already offered to finance 
an international operation in order to save the two monumental statues. 
After the destruction, the Colombo government expressed interest in 
buying the remains of the statues in order to rebuild substitutes. India 
partly joined this effort, assuring the Sri Lankan government that maps 
taken from a survey of the original historical site could be provided for 
the reconstruction of the statues. Because the remnants of the original 
Buddha statues were never transferred to Colombo, the Sri Lankan Bud-
dhist organization bootstrapped by building a replica of the Bamiyan Bud-
dha, financed by donations from both Sri Lanka’s Buddhist community 
and its minority Muslim community. A stone statue-carving committee 
was established for proposing plans for the recreation of the statue. It 
entrusted the renowned Indian sculptor Padma Sri M. M. Sthapathi, from 
Bharantha, with the responsibility of carving the massive Buddha statue 
on the Western boundary of the Rambadagalla temple land. The sculp-
tor decided not to reproduce one of the two standing Buddha figures of 
Bami yan, but to reconstitute an image of the smaller seated Buddha fig-
ure in the Bamiyan valley.
6 This has been accomplished by Falser 2010. 
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Originally, it was positioned between the two standing figures where it 
was also attacked by the Taliban. For maximum recuperation, the sculptor 
created the world’s tallest granite Samadhi Buddha statue (fig. 1). While 
this near-superhuman recreation effort should directly compensate for 
the loss of the Bamiyan Buddhas, the image of the Buddha substitute was 
intended as a revivification of a historical, much-admired Sri Lankan Bud-
dha figure, namely the Samadhi statue situated at Mahamevnāwa Park 
in Anuradhapura, Sri Lanka, in which Buddha is represented in the posi-
tion of the Dhyana Mudra, the posture of meditation associated with his 
first Enlightenment. It was created between the third and fourth century, 
later damaged during a landslide from a mountainous rock site, and then 
reconstructed. This adaption indicates that the original intent of reprodu-
cing the Afghan Buddha of Bamiyan was transformed into the recreation 
of a variation of a local Buddha. This act of reproduction is therefore about 
the reconstitution of the glory of Buddha, of his reawakening through relo-
cation. The hardship associated with this large-scale recreation evinces 
the strong compassion many felt with regard to the destroyed Buddhas 
of Bamiyan. The visual continuity of the genuine replica is of secondary 
importance, given that Buddha’s spiritual image is manifold, a transform-
ative power in itself.7
The second case of reconstituting the world-renowned Buddha statues 
of Bamiyan by local copying strategies relates to the Chinese culture of 
copying. It is a radical example, for the pop-cultural commercialization and 
dehistoricization of world cultural heritage as part of the media flows of 
globally circulating, openly accessible images. Commissioned by the Ori-
ental Buddha Kingdom Corporation, a thirty-seven meter high replica of 
the smaller Buddha statue of Bamiyan was erected in the mountains of the 
Buddha Theme Park in Leshan, Sichuan Province (fig. 2).8 
Significantly, the Buddha Theme Park with the Bamiyan Buddha copy 
is located in an area that was granted UNESCO world heritage status due 
to being home to the largest stone-cast Buddha statue in the world, the 
famous Buddha of Leshan.9
In addition, the renowned Mahao cave tombs dating from the Han 
dynasty are found in the same area, thus falling under the protection of 
7 On July 24, 2013 it was made public that Rajnath Singh, an Indian politician, 
had pledged to build a replica of the Bamiyan Buddha at Kushi Nagar in Uttar 
Pradesh, where Gautam Buddha attained Parinirvana after his death. This 
announcement indicated that the replication of the Bamiyan Buddha continued 
for the purpose of recompense. For further information, see “Rajnath reiterates 
pledge to build replica of Bamiyan Buddha.” The Hindu Business Line. July  24, 
2013. Accessed February 15, 2017. http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/
news/politics/rajnath-reiterates-pledge-to-build-replica-of-bamiyan-buddha/
article4948040.ece.
8 The park showcases replicas of more than 3,000 world-famous Buddha statues 
from around the world, in particular India, Thailand, and Myanmar, directly in 
the neighborhood of the giant Leshan Buddha.
9 The “Leshan Giant Buddha Scenic Area” was listed as a UNESCO world heritage 
site in 1996. It also includes the Mahao cave tombs from the Han period.
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Figure 1: Samadhi Buddha Statue in Sri Lanka, 2001.




the Leshan Giant Buddha world heritage site. In order to be able to erect 
the Bamiyan Buddha replica on the rock face of Leshan, numerous ancient, 
UNESCO-protected Mahao tombs are suspected to have been removed 
and also partly damaged by the workers of the theme park enterprise, 
Oriental Buddha Kingdom.10 By this act of violence, a new form of global 
cultural, if not touristic iconoclasm through religious “theme park-ization” 
was introduced.
When the destruction of parts of the world heritage site became known, 
local archaeologists from the Mahao museum responded with an outcry. 
How could it happen that historically valuable monuments were replaced 
by a new—and even poor—copy of another (destroyed) original monu-
ment of cultural-historical significance? Their cynicism over the disregard 
for the historical value and UNESCO status of the world cultural heritage 
site was intensified by the fact that Liang Enming, the acting director of the 
Oriental Buddha Kingdom theme park who had had the idea of building 
the Bamiyan Buddha replica, previously held the position of the vice man-
ager of the Leshan cultural office and was responsible for the protection of 
the Mahao rock tombs and their remnants. The conflict between universal 
global and local values reached a new peak in the given case. While aiming 
at preserving the original Bactrian image of the Bamiyan Buddha statues 
as a universal image of Buddhism on Chinese territory, Chinese national 
cultural heritage was sacrificed, its human universality disrespected.11 
The partial destruction of world heritage artefacts serves the purpose of 
image conservation; the act of face-saving contributes to image enhance-
ment and image distribution. This bizarre logic is proven by the respective 
arguments for legitimizing the replica of the Bamiyan statue on the cliffs 
of Leshan put forward by Liang Eming, the director of the Buddha Park, 
and Chinese copyists: “The Buddha statue at Bamiyan Valley is the com-
mon wealth of humankind. The aim of building the replica is to make it 
possible for those who have never seen the statue to look for themselves 
at its great beauty.”12 According to the stone carvers, who were commis-
sioned by the Oriental Buddha Park Corporation, the Leshan replica of 
the smaller Bamiyan Buddha statue should be better (in terms of design) 
than the original. In concrete terms, this meant that the destruction of 
certain facial parts, (supposedly) caused by Muslim invaders in the eighth 
century, was to be rescinded, thus revealing the Buddha’s original face 
with its unfeigned features. Heads and faces of surviving Afghan Buddha 
10 According to Hannah Beech’s article “The Shock of the New,” published in the 
TIME magazine on March 9, 2003, an official entry in the UNESCO World Heri-
tage list recording the destruction of some Mahao cave tombs is missing. This 
might be due to the fact that the demolition could not yet have been officially 
proven. However, it seems no coincidence that the replica of the Bamiyan Bud-
dha was hidden from the public soon after the publication of Hannah Beech’s 
article in the TIME magazine.
11 In 2003, the Oriental Buddha Capital Holding was subject to police investigation 
and was eventually charged with the destruction of world cultural heritage.
12 “China to Build Bamiyan Buddha Statue Replica” 2001. 
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statues are said to have figured as role models for the reconstitution of 
the face. Basically, the reconstruction was intended to efface the history 
of Muslim iconoclasm towards the Bamiyan Buddha figures and to recover 
their uncorrupted original image, removed from all historical battle scars. 
The material historicity und uniqueness of the original art work appears to 
be of minor significance compared to the idea of a full-body reproduction 
enabling the reconstitution—and surmounting—of the destroyed original 
image. Hence, the damage of numerous original Mahao tombs done by 
one singular copy of the Bamiyan Buddha, designed to be wholly true to 
the original, is acquiesced.
The high-aiming plan to trump the original with a copy in new splendor 
did not develop fully. The damage done to the UNESCO-protected Chinese 
Mahao tombs aroused strong anger from the side of national and inter-
national culture preservers. In response to the worldwide protests, the 
replica of the Bamiyan figure had to be hidden from the eyes of the world. 
Until today, it stands unseen in the rock cliffs, covered by a large cloth. 
Supposedly, this veiling and locking away from public sight was done for 
preventive reasons, for fear that the Buddha replica would itself become 
victimized through iconoclastic attacks motivated by the fight over the 
original historical value of the cultural heritage site. Since the Bamiyan 
Buddha replica has disappeared from sight, a kind of double-veiling has 
taken place; the damage to the Mahao tombs on the Leshan world cul-
tural heritage site has disappeared from public debate. The anti-iconic 
public strategy pursued by official Chinese cultural authorities in order 
to suppress the worldwide articulation of protest proves to be a strong 
political measurement and attack against those figures representative of 
copycat cultures, those who celebrate free copying as a legitimate strat-
egy of image appropriation and who show themselves indifferent to, if not 
disrespectful towards, the values and protection rights of intellectual and 
material property in world heritage.
The third attempt of reconstruction presented in this paper is dichot-
omous, as it concerns both the physical rebuilding and the virtual recon-
struction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues. In 2004, the rescuing of the 
remains of the blown-up Bamiyan statues began under the direction of 
ICOMOS, the International Council on Monuments and Sites, subordinate 
to the UNESCO as evaluation authority. “Because the destruction was 
unavoidable, the main goal of UNESCO was to secure and preserve the 
remaining pieces that were not destroyed by the explosion, and to study 
the potential re-setting in place of the fragments that fell to the ground.”13 
Around 9,000 pieces were recovered, the heaviest among them weighing 
up to 60 tons. The safeguarding of the original remains of the Giant Bud-
dhas of Bamiyan became a strategy for the virtual reconstruction of the 
statues.14 In 2010, Michael Jansen, a building historian from the RWTH in 
13 Margottini 2014, 1.
14 As documented in Petzet 2009.
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Aachen, presented a “Cultural Masterplan” for the rebuilding of the Bami-
yan Buddha statues using the original pieces. In archaeological terminol-
ogy, this reconstruction technique is called anastylosis. In cooperation 
with his research team, he created an elaborate 3-D computer model of 
the Bamiyan statues based on the precise geological reconstruction of 
each fragment.15 He proposed relocating each original piece at its precise 
position before the Taliban’s iconoclastic attack, noting that “the faults 
shall remain visibleˮ in the form of supplemental brick material in order 
to document the destruction “as part of the history of these ancient mas-
ter works.ˮ16 This conservatorial position is also applied to the faces of the 
Buddha figures, which shall be preserved in their iconoclastically damaged 
and effaced state. The reconstitution of the mutilated face of the original is 
carried out by the use of original pieces. It is conspicuous that many of the 
technique-oriented scientific reconstruction pictures show a faceless Bud-
dha as a destroyed image. They include the image-annihilating gesture of 
the earlier, pre-Taliban act of iconoclasm into the visualization model, but 
at the same time present the Buddha figures as colorfully painted ancient 
15 Jansen 2011.
16 Jansen, quoted in Ell 2010. English translation by the author.
Figure 3: Reconstruction of the large Bamiyan Buddha by Michael Jensen and  
Georgios Toubekis (RWTH Aachen) in cooperation with the Chair of Conserva-
tion-Restoration, Art Technology and Conservation Science at the TU Munich.
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cult statues—a paradoxical constellation which indicates basic reserva-
tions toward attempting a perfect reproduction (fig. 3).
In contrast to this partial reconstruction related to the historical con-
dition of the statues before the iconoclastic Taliban attack, a pop music 
video about the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha figures, produced by 
the Afghan Hazara singer Bisharat Bashir in 2011, and again in 2013, envis-
ages the complete reconstruction of the original Buddhist cult figures by 
full-fledged replicas.17 The music video of the new Hazaragi song shows 
the virtual resurrection of all monumental Buddha figures in the Bamiyan 
valley, including the originally existing reclining Buddha in front of the 
standing Buddhas in the rock niches, in full golden regalia. The remodeling 
is not only focused on a full-body copy, but also on the complete recreation 
of the destroyed face. From the cultural perspective of the Hazara people, 
this re-facing aims toward the reconstitution of their own Buddhist tradi-
tion and history that can also be understood as a practice of face-saving. 
The Afghan Hazara seek to reconstruct their own origin as descendants of 
the Kushara with the deep and radiating power of the Buddha copies that 
fill the void of the missing originals.
The virtual reconstruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues as a reimag-
ining of their original image in contrast to the real reconstruction by use 
of original pieces has also inspired scholars in the field of visualization. 
The most prominent attempt to virtually reconstruct the Bamiyan Buddha 
17 The version of the 2011 Hazaragi Song displaying the reconstruction of the 
Bamiyan Buddhas is available at YouTube. “Bamiyan’Hazaragi’ song 2011,” You-
Tube video, 3:26, posted by “javad Rajabi,” March 4, 2012. Accessed October 6, 
2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=soI_v6wxGic.
Figure 4: Textured Model of the Small Buddha of Bamiyan, as reconstructed 
by Armin Grün. View of the recovered camera poses of tourist images (left).  




figures was made by Armin Grün, of ETH Zurich and his team. He devel-
oped a photogrammetric reconstruction of the large Bamiyan Buddha 
with the help of new visualization techniques (fig. 4).18
A set of three different image types—internet images, tourist images, 
and metric images—was employed in order to produce a morphed com-
posite image of the large Buddha that comes authentically close to the 
original image, in both its artistic quality and cultural value. This time, the 
power of the copy lay in the digital remediation. Image reproductions were 
used to reconstitute the authentic image of the original large Buddha, 
thus reversing the traditional relationship between original and copy. The 
aniconism symbolized by the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas stands 
in stark contrast to the image multiplication applied for the virtual recon-
struction of the Buddha cult statues and their remediation. Because of the 
evidential power of photographic and scientific images, the spiritual and 
affective power of the Bamiyan Buddha image—that is, the triad of the cult 
image, the artistic image, and the world heritage image—can be reconsti-
tuted. In principle, the image-based 3-D reconstruction model of the large 
Buddha figure could serve for the physical reconstruction of the statue. 
However, the resurrection of the virtual Buddha in real space has not yet 
been conducted, most likely because of concerns that it would then be 
perceived as a “hard” copy of its virtual origin.
As demonstrated, the reconstructionists of the Bamiyan Buddha stat-
ues are subject to accusations of iconoclasm. In the case of the Chinese 
Bamiyan Buddha replica of Leshan, physical iconoclasm—that is destruc-
tion of the UNESCO-protected ancient rock tombs—is coupled with sym-
bolic iconoclasm, the effacement of original art-historical value and the 
destruction of the original scene of the Buddha figure. Arguably, the relo-
cational copying of the Bamiyan Buddha on the mountain slopes of Leshan 
took place out of pure greed and ignorance. Even the other two examples 
of reconstruction can be said to contribute to the demolition of the Bami-
yan Buddha image, albeit unintentionally. On one hand, this argument 
can be maintained because the shattered “original” image is staged in its 
brokenness (anastylosis), thus continuing to inscribe the image history of 
destruction into the collective visual memory; on the other hand, it can 
be argued that the virtual reimaging through image reproduction, multi-
plication, and morphing attacks the artistic uniqueness and autonomous 
validity of the original image. Image reconstruction always implies image 
destruction. In that sense, iconoclasm is inherent to visual cultures of copy, 
be they scientific, artistic, political, religious, or touristic.
The presented examples of how nations compensated for the physi-
cal loss of the Giant Buddha statues of Bamiyan clearly illustrate that the 
characteristics of the “remade” versions very much depend on how the 
relationship between original and copy is defined in the given cultural 
18 For detailed information about the 3D modelling of the Bamiyan Buddha stat-
ues see Grün 2004 and 2013.
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context. Regional cultures (whether Asian or Western) have the same 
share of influence as domain-specific cultures (e.g. religious culture, sci-
entific culture, art culture, or commercial culture). The line of demarcation 
contouring potential areas of conflict thus runs between reconstitution and 
reconstruction strategies. The Asian attempts at replicating the (lost) origi-
nal Buddha statues of Bamiyan—be it the religiously motivated Sri Lankan 
reproduction or the Chinese rebuilding of the Buddha figure for commer-
cial touristic purposes, or even the Afghan Hazaragi virtual reimagination 
of the Bamiyan Buddhas as part of a music video—are all characterized 
by a strategy of reconstitution aiming at compensation and reconcilia-
tion. Relatively independent in their different cultural and social contexts, 
they don’t consider authenticity as defined by the site- and area-specific 
material, artistic, spiritual, and historical value of the monument. This is 
one of the reasons why, for instance, the removal of authentic parts of a 
world heritage site (as in the Leshan case) was accepted because it made 
room for a replica of another, supposedly more attractive world her i tage 
monument. As shown, compensation can also mean amendment and 
improvement. The copy is permitted to be more perfect than the original; 
it can either completely reconstitute the damaged, destroyed, or lost orig-
inal in its full magnificence, or even enhance it. The transformative power 
of the copy lies in the survival and revivification of the original image 
beyond its site-specific location. The replicas line up to outpace the orig-
inal by a process of outsourcing. The Afghan Buddha of Bamiyan can be 
resurrected globally, in renewed splendor, without any harm done to its 
local origin. This translocational potential can be related to the Buddhist 
concept of reproduction, which is markedly different from its religious, 
aesthetic, and media-technological understanding in Western (Christian) 
culture. Buddhist strategies of reproduction follow the model of repro-
duction in nature. It is not nature itself that is copied, but its strategies of 
reproduction. Buddha can multiply without losing identity. Buddha repro-
ductions are substantially connected via the main Buddha, meaning that 
all of them are authentic incarnations of Buddha. This principle allows 
for multiple reproductions as creative acts of production. Reproducibility 
signifies diversity and abundance. At the same time, genealogical repro-
duction plays an important role for the replication of the Bamiyan Buddha 
statue.19 By appropriating the original act of production, the intangible 
heritage and artistic practice of carving a giant stone Buddha statue out 
of a steep rock slope is kept alive. The historical survival and cultural 
transmission of the carving techniques and the reproductive features of 
Buddha imaging outrank the significance of the original, destroyed, or 
dead monument. Replication amounts to compensation, even redemp-
tion for the loss of the original. In this respect, it helps avert the loss of 
authenticity.
19 See Mersmann 2004.
256 
BIRGIT MERSMANN
Contrary to this reproductive approach to the heritage value of copying, 
the described western strategies, pursued in the context of world heritage 
preservation as universal strategies, aim for reconstruction that avoids the 
notion of copying. The main goal of these reconstruction attempts con-
sists of safeguarding and rehabilitating the site-specific original image. 
The physical remains of the original Buddha statue are integrated into the 
virtual reconstruction, thereby advancing the fragmentation and virtual-
ization of the original. As the original is a historically broken image, it is not 
permitted to resurrect fully or perfectly. The concept of anastylosis,20 as 
well as the proposal for a partial physical reconstruction of only the lower 
parts of the large Buddha statue while keeping the dust and rubble of the 
smaller Buddha in the niche,21 indicate that the physical reality of the origi-
nal can only be present—or presented—in a virtual space. In terms of faith-
fulness, the virtual remodeling of the original seems to substitute, if not 
dispense with its physical reconstruction. The scientific data preservation 
of the virtual reconstruction makes the physical conservation (including 
the remnants) of the original more and more obsolete. This virtual dis-
placement of the original as a monument from material culture will likely 
have a strong transformative effect on how the authenticity, originality, 
and validity of world cultural heritage will be defined in the future of digital 
archaeology.
Coping with the copy: Offshoots of the Louvre
A new trend in the global network economy of culture is the copying of 
complete art and heritage institutions. Following Ribeiro’s argument for 
the dependence of economic life on copying in this volume, the recent 
development reaffirms how heavily cultural production relies on cultural 
reproduction and replication. The multiplication of entire cultural institu-
tions such as world art museums for consumption by remodeling existing 
templates amounts to a new institutional commodity fetishism. The Louvre 
museum in Paris, which marked the birth of the museum in Europe and 
advanced by definition to “the museum of museums” in the nineteenth 
century, is a good example among museums to demonstrate the motiva-
tions and economic power strategies connected with cultural-institutional 
replication. With the inauguration of the Louvre-Lens museum in Northern 
France in 2012, and the official opening of the Louvre Abu Dhabi in the 
20 Article 15 of the UNESCO Venice Charter states that “All reconstruction work 
should however be ruled out a priori. Only anastylosis, that is to say, the reas-
sembling of existing but dismembered parts can be permitted. The material 
used for integration should always be recognisable and its use should be the 
least that will ensure the conservation of a monument and the reinstatement of 
its form.” (International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments 
and Sites 1964). 
21 See Jensen 2011, 163.
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United Arab Emirates in 2015, the central Louvre museum has donated 
a local and global copy of itself to the world. It is obvious that the corpo-
ration of the Louvre museum is copying the “Guggenheim principle,” as 
first described by Hilmar Hoffmann in his book of the same title in 1999, in 
which he compared Guggenheim’s opening of joint-venture museums all 
over the world with the franchising principle of McDonald’s and spoke of 
a new era of hegemonic museum politics heralded by Guggenheim’s cap-
italist imperialism.22 By opening two new branches, the Louvre appears to 
have followed this cultural-economic strategy of global museum politics. 
It copies the Guggenheim model as an economic success model, hoping 
for the recurrence of the so-called Bilbao effect. The Louvre spin-off muse-
ums aim to bring the glamor associated with a world-class arts culture 
either to regions that are underdeveloped or to rising cities that aspire 
to become world cities. The production of the glamor factor is targeted 
by the group of the so-called GLAMUR museums, that is global art muse-
ums that position themselves as economic reactivators, among which are 
included the Tate, the Guggenheim, the Pompidou, and since 2012, the 
Louvre. They are able to produce an aura of glamor independent of the 
dreariness and insignificance of their location, because they bunker uni-
versal human treasures of art and cultural heritage from the distant past 
as well as contemporary times. According to Beatriz Plaza, the GLAMUR 
museum is characterized by
global media visibility and sheer presence in the communications 
environment; outstanding architecture by a superstar architect; big 
blockbuster exhibitions and a large number of visitors; being mag-
nets for tourists; requiring large capital cost investments and oper-
ating budgets; using expensive advertising and commercialization 
strategies; having a huge operative risk; [and] a hope for substantial 
impact on the local economy.23
Besides their cultural-educational objective, these museums function “to 
become an effective economic engine”24 through the creation of employ-
ment and the generation of tourism.
Given the cultural-economic ambition of image enhancement through 
copying, how, in fact, is the relationship between the Louvre in Paris and the 
Louvre-Lens defined? Is it a temporal relationship between the original his-
torical museum in Paris and the contemporary museum branch in Lens? Or 
is it a chronological relationship between “firstness” and “secondariness?” 
A genealogical relationship between progenitor and descendent, parent 
company and offspring? Or a technical and economic production relation-
ship between role model and copy? Finally, is it a spatial, geopolitically 
22 Hoffmann 1999, 14–15.
23 Plaza 2010, 155.
24 Plaza 2010, 155.
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defined relationship between center and periphery, the national and the 
transnational, the local and the global?
The Louvre offspring museum in Lens was envisaged to contribute 
to the regional development of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region.25 It was 
designed to regenerate the stagnant local economy and become a mag-
net for regional art and heritage tourism. As a branching strategy, it drew 
on the asymmetry between the French periphery and its center. Using the 
local reproduction of the Parisian Louvre as a role model for the world 
art museum, including the transfer of renowned pieces of world art her-
itage from the Louvre to the Louvre-Lens, was meant to compensate for 
the wounds of regional history. The transplantation amounts to a reha-
bilitation project, the recovery of the ruined region of Nord-Pas-De-Calais 
from a series of historical, economic, and political disasters through the 
means of GLAMUR museum culture. In terms of the relationship between 
the museum institution located in the center and the museum institution 
located in the periphery, the Louvre-Lens is officially labeled as annex of 
the Louvre Paris. Henri Loyrette, the President and Director of the Louvre 
Museum Paris, emphasizes however that it is not dependent on and sub-
ordinate to the central historical Louvre museum, but that it is the Louvre 
in all the facets of its original identity: “This ‘other’ Louvre, this museum of 
glass and light, set deftly atop a former mine works, Shaft 9-9b of Lens, is 
not simply an annex of the Louvre, it is the Louvre itself. It is the Louvre in 
all its dimensions and all its components, in its geographic and chronolog-
ical breadth, a universal museum”26 (fig. 5).
In order to prevent the Louvre-Lens from being perceived as a local 
“dependent” and unqualified museum reproduction of limited, secondary 
importance, the argument of the universal museum is put forward. The 
sovereignty and uniqueness of the local museum branch is underlined by 
conceding it the right—and even the power—to redefine the Musée du 
Louvre in Paris with regard to content, concept, and function: “The estab-
lishment of the Louvre-Lens is an opportunity for the Louvre to rethink its 
vocation, to consider its collections and to step outside of its walls and look 
at itself from a little distance. An opportunity to experiment with things 
that are not possible within the restricted envelope and organization of 
25 In 2003, the Ministry of Culture and the Louvre Directorate launched a call to the 
22 regions of France with the objective to implant a Louvre branch within one 
region. This initiative was part of a newly-introduced decentralization strategy 
of French cultural institutions that came in response to the long-lasting criticism 
that French art and culture were unfairly concentrated in Paris, and therefore 
privileging the capital’s community. Only the Nord-Pas-De-Calais region applied 
for the regional Louvre branch and proposed six cities for the museum pro-
ject. Lens was finally selected and officially announced by France’s then Prime 
Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin. Lens’s coal mining wasteland was chosen as the 
location of the new museum. The Louvre annex site was planned for the top 
of shaft 9-9b. The newly-built museum, designed by the Japanese architectural 
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the Paris location.”27 This statement highlights that the regional copy of 
the Louvre in Nord-Pas-De-Calais should help to renew and regenerate the 
original Louvre in the French capital with a fresh contemporary perspec-
tive of critical regionalism. With this goal, the process of museum repro-
duction turns into a process of creation by which difference and innovation 
are constituted at both ends of the Louvre museum’s history, its past, and 
its present. A new identity of the old historical Louvre Paris unfolds in the 
contemporary Louvre-Lens. This is why Henri Loyrette can confidently 
claim “The future of the Louvre is now in Lens.”28
The Louvre Abu Dhabi—its official opening, currently projected for late 
2016, has been delayed multiple times—is the second offspring of the 
Louvre Paris. Considering that Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) known for its highly international community, ambitiously 
strives to become a leading global player in the Arabic world, the Lou-
vre Abu Dhabi, appearing as a global reproduction of the French national 
Louvre museum in Paris, is a perfect investment to that end. Whereas 
the Louvre-Lens at the far north end of France reflects the decentraliza-
tion of museum institutions in the nation state of France, the Louvre Abu 
Dhabi points to the decentralization of the Western museum monopoly 
in a globalized art and museum world. Based on the assumption that the 
Louvre is a universal museum to be shared by all people and cultures, 
27 Loyrette n.d.-b.
28 Loyrette n.d.-b.
Figure 5: Museum Louvre-Lens.
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an inter-governmental agreement for thirty-years of collaboration was 
signed by the UAE and France in March 2007.29 One of the characteris-
tics of this treaty is that the cultural collaboration between the UAE and 
France is not restricted to the Louvre museum, but extended to a group of 
French museums that joined forces under the umbrella of Agence France-
Muséums.30 The contract prohibits the creation of any similar museum 
institution with the name of Louvre in any of the other emirates of the 
UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, 
Lebanon, Iran, or Iraq, thus protecting the French Louvre brand in the 
Arab world. The French museums will loan works for the permanent gal-
leries and temporary exhibitions for the first ten years and also assist in 
developing the national collection.
The construction of the Louvre Abu Dhabi is part of ongoing plans for 
the touristic and cultural development of Saadiyat Island, a natural island 
alongside Abu Dhabi’s coast. The cultural mega-project is supervised by 
the Abu Dhabi Tourism & Culture Authority (TCA Abu Dhabi) tasked with 
conserving and promoting the heritage and culture of the Abu Dhabi emir-
ate and the Tourism Development and Investment Company (TDIC), an 
independent company of which the TCA Abu Dhabi is the sole shareholder. 
Besides the Louvre, Saadiyat Island will host the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi 
(designed by Frank Gehry), the Zayed National Museum (Foster + Part-
ners), the Performing Arts Centre (Zaha Hadid Architects), and the Mari-
time Museum (Tadao Ando Architect & Associates). The architecture for 
the Louvre Abu Dhabi was designed by French star architect Jean Nouvel 
(fig. 6). In “combining modern architecture and inspiration drawn from the 
region’s traditions,” the design should reflect “the desire to create a univer-
sal museum in which all cultures are brought together.”31
The Louvre Abu Dhabi deal has sparked much controversy. A petition 
against the deal was signed by 4,650 museum experts, archaeologists, and 
art historians, who insisted that museums are not for sale. Therein, the 
Louvre was accused of behaving “like a corporation with a clearly-defined 
29 It was agreed upon that Abu Dhabi would pay over a period of 30 years for the 
privilege to display art works from French museums. France received 525 million 
US dollars for the use of the Louvre brand alone, as well as a gift of 33 million 
dollars to renovate a wing of the Paris Louvre in order to showcase Islamic art 
works in a newly-designed exhibit. 
30 The International Agency of French Museums comprises the following muse-
ums or cultural heritage-related institutions: Musée du Louvre, Centre Pompi-
dou, Musée d’Orsay, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Musée du quai Branly, 
Réunion des musées nationaux, Musée et Domaine national de Versailles, 
Musée Guimet, Musée Rodin, École du Louvre, Domaine national de Chambord, 
and the Établissement public de maîtrise d’ouvrage des travaux culturels.
31 Louvre Abu Dhabi 2014. The huge white dome spanning 180 meters in diameter 
and covering two thirds of the museum recalls the Arabian architecture of a 
mosque, mausoleum, and madrasa as well as the universal spherical symbol of 
the globe. The invention of a modern museum through variations of classical 
Arab forms makes clear that the “universalism of the Louvre Abu Dhabi repre-
sents a cultural mix” (Louvre Abu Dhabi 2014 a) characteristic of the hybridity of 
modern global cultures. 
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strategy: profit maximization.”32 The responses to this critique from both 
sides, the Louvre leadership in Paris and the city government of Abu 
Dhabi, draw on the mission of intercultural dialogue and the universality 
of cultural values. Renaud Donnedieu de Vabres, the Cultural Minister of 
France, argued: “We’re not selling the French legacy and heritage. We want 
this culture to radiate to parts of the world that value it. We’re proud that 
Abu Dhabi wants to bring the Louvre here. We’re not here to transform 
culture into a consumer product.”33 Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE 
President and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi countered:
This is a major achievement in Abu Dhabi’s vision to become a 
world-class destination bridging global cultures. This accord further 
strengthens international dialogue, which will embrace all cultures. 
This initiative is a unique milestone in international cooperation and 
bilateral relations and a tribute to the longstanding and friendly ties 
our two nations have enjoyed. It also creates an enriching environ-
ment to be treasured by and to educate generations to come.34
The main argumentation applied by the Parisian Louvre directorate to 
legitimate what might be called a “remake” of the Louvre in Abu Dhabi is 
32 Statement by Klaus-Dieter Lehmann, President of Germany’s Foundation for 
Prussian Culture (“Art in the Desert” 2007).
33 Krane 2007.
34 Online article from the Design Build Network: “Louvre Abu Dhabi,” n.d.
Figure 6: Museum Louvre Abu Dhabi, 3-D model.
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heavily based on the modern idea of universalism. The Louvre Abu Dhabi 
is defined as “the first universal museum founded in the Arab world.”35 Its 
creation is related to the Declaration on the Importance and Value of Uni-
versal Museums, signed in 2002 by nearly twenty museums, including the 
Louvre, in order to reaffirm, through a code of conduct, the contempo-
rary relevance of the universal museum model increasingly criticized as 
a Western hegemonic model rooted in colonial history.36 According to the 
mission statement of the Louvre Abu Dhabi, the “universal approach suits 
Abu Dhabi well, reflecting the city’s position at the crossroads of east and 
west, and its vital ancient role in the days of the Silk Route, when the region 
linked Europe and the Indian Ocean, opening up exchanges between Asia 
and Africa. The museum will reflect the region’s role as a crossroads for 
civilisations.”37 The “Birth of the Museum” in Abu Dhabi strategically copies 
the birth of the Parisian Louvre as the encyclopedic and universal museum 
in the intellectual and cultural climate of the Enlightenment. It presents 
itself as an even more universalizing museum, as it breaks with classical 
departmental divides, the categorization of art works by technique or civili-
zation, in favor of a display of the continuity of universal art as a chronolog-
ical and thematic narrative from the archaeological to the contemporary, 
enabling the visitor to form a shared universal memory of historical cul-
tural entanglement in a global perspective. This comparative historical 
approach will open up
new horizons […] underlining how much—before the effective rise 
of Westernization—the multipolar world that we see as a contempo-
rary fact is an ancient reality. The multiple perspectives introduced 
by this comparative exercise undoubtedly disrupt a certain world 
view that the West has imposed and are, of course, essential to the 
relevance of the universal ambition of the Louvre Abu Dhabi.38
Regarding this cross-cultural art-historical approach, the double-bind 
resulting from the definition of the Louvre as both universal and singular 
reveals its deeper meaning. The Arab relocation, reassembling, and rep-
resentation of original copies of world art and heritage from the Louvre 
Paris adds diverse uniqueness to their universality. The original works 
surrounded by an aura of human universalism are reconstituted and reaf-
firmed as singular originals through their museum-cultural translation into 
the Abu Dhabi context. Likewise, the reproduction of the universal museum 
at its new location in the Arab world results in a single—and singular—
museum that defies its actual origin as a multiplied or “copied” museum.
35 Des Cars 2014b, 27.
36 Des Cars 2014b, 27.
37 See the definition of the Louvre Abu Dhabi as universal museum on the website 
itself (Louvre Abu Dhabi 2014b). 
38 Des Cars 2014b, 31.
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Remastering the copy: Global and local transformations
The concept of remastering is used in this concluding part in order to assess 
the global expansion and appreciation of the copy as a new masterpiece. 
This increased valuation of the multiplied copy to the singularity of a new 
original can be related to both its capacity for technical reproduction and 
its transformative power for innovation. The practice of remastering, in 
fact, originated as a media technique of post-processing. Usually, remas-
tering techniques are used to remake and enhance older, outdated, or 
damaged audio and video recordings into newer (digital) reproductions. 
They can be applied to the full scale of reproduction techniques, from res-
toration to the remaking of original material. As proven in the discussed 
examples, the remastering of original historical works and institutions in 
the field of world art and heritage is placed in a range between recon-
struction (anastylosis, virtual remodeling of the Bamiyan Buddhas), recon-
stitution (Sri Lankan and Chinese replicas of the Bamiyan Buddhas), and 
renewal (Louvre-Lens and Louvre Abu Dhabi). In all cases, the copying of 
the material object tends to play a secondary role. The sheer materiality of 
the art object appears worthless for reproduction. The object of copying is 
of immaterial quality, encompassing the aura, image, brand, or value (i.e. 
cultural, religious, economic, or scientific) of artifacts and art institutions 
that have achieved the prestigious and distinctive status of universality in 
world art and heritage.
The favoring of strategic and conceptual “image” copying is a charac-
teristic element in so-called “copycat cultures.”39 Generally, the term copy-
cat culture is used to designate the copying of business ideas and plans for 
launching startup enterprises. Although this strategic principle of copying 
proven business models is despised by many—it is often seen as bad busi-
ness practice in violation of intellectual property principles—it has experi-
enced significant popularity growth in recent years. Oded Shenkar,40 the 
author of “Copycats: how smart companies use imitation to gain a strate-
gic edge,” unfolds a particularly positive view on the business practice of 
copycatting. He claims:
We need to lose the mind-set that imitation is an embarrassing nui-
sance residing at the margins of business life, and bring it to center 
stage strategically and operationally. Business leaders need to 
appreciate the value of imitation but also be aware of its costs and 
39 The English term “copycat” signifies “mimicry”. The term “copycat culture” arose 
in the context of genetic reproduction after the first cloned cat was born on 
December 2, 2001, at the veterinary faculty of Texas A&M University. The cloning 
was carried out by Mark Westhusin in cooperation with the Korean geneticist 
Taeyoung Shin. An alternative naming for the cloned cat was “carboned cat.”
40 Oded Shenkar holds the Ford Chair in Global Business Management at the 
Fisher College of Business at Ohio State University. 
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risks, and learn to see imitation not as an impediment to innovation 
but as a driver of innovation, if done right.41
The author even introduces a new term for the beneficial side of copycat-
ting: “imovation” or “a fusion of imitation and innovation to create a com-
petitive advantage.”42
There is no escaping the fact that, over the last decade, copycatting 
has been adopted widely as a new practice of and paradigm for the global 
cultural economy. In China, for instance, shanzhai copycatting has trans-
formed from a knockoff practice of consumer good imitation to a wider 
cultural phenomenon of reproduction since around the time of the Beijing 
Olympics, in 2008.43 Meanwhile, its use has not been restricted to the copy-
catting of brand products, but has expanded to all areas of social and cul-
tural life, including places and institutions (i.e. media formats, restaurants, 
stores, buildings, and even towns).44 Some scholars argue that shanzhai 
is a phenomenon of counterculture targeting, aiming to deconstruct the 
dominance of official Chinese culture and the global hegemony of Western 
culture.45 It is evaluated as a form of “grassroots innovation” that “takes 
place outside of government control, not within it.”46 The violation of intel-
lectual property rights is regarded as its necessary condition.47
In the light of these interpretations, the replication of the Bamiyan Bud-
dha in China and the reproduction of the Musée du Louvre in Lens and Abu 
Dhabi can be qualified as glocal strategies of copycatting. The replica of the 
Bamiyan Buddha in the Buddhist theme park of Leshan is a clear exam-
ple of shanzhai copycatting in the field of world art heritage.48 The Chinese 
Buddha copy represents what Hennessey, in his analysis of the Chinese 
41 Shenkar 2010, 4.
42 Shenkar 2010, 4. The author lists “Rules of Imovation” by which he encourages 
firms to “not reinvent the wheel,” but to “put the buzz in imitation.” He calls for 
“removing the stigma attached to imitation and making it as exciting and fash-
ionable as innovation.” 
43 Shanzhai literally means “mountain village” or “mountain stronghold.” In Chi-
nese history, it was referred to hideouts of bandits and outlaws. Its contem-
porary usage relates to the loss of official control. Shanzhai as a new cultural 
phenomenon of copycatting began with name-brand knockoffs, such as the 
copying of smartphones, laptop computers, and designer fashion. See Yao 2008, 
for further information.
44 For the broad range of Chinese shanzhai copycats, see http://www.businessin-
sider.com/things-that-china-copied-from-the world-2013-8?op=1 (accessed 
June  15, 2014), where the Bamiyan Buddha replicas in Leshan are also men-
tioned. The website documents that, besides a Florentine village copied on the 
outskirts of the Chinese city of Tanjin, the UNESCO world heritage site of the 
Austrian village of Hallstatt was also replicated in the province of Guangdong.
45 See Hennessey 2012, who gives an excellent overview on the different historical 
notions and contemporary interpretations of shanzhai.
46 Representative examples for this approach can be found in Zhu and Shi 2010.
47 In this sense, copycatting contributes to a non-hegemonic world system. Along 
the lines of Ribeiro (in this volume), it can be categorized as a strategy of “eco-
nomic globalization from below.”
48 Even though the copying happened before the official acknowledgement of the 
era of shanzhai culture, it possesses all of its characteristics.
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cultural practice of shanzhai, has interpreted as a shift from the Confucian 
“culture of emulation” to the neo-Confucian “culture of imitation.”49 The 
remastering of the original is the main aim of the laborious copying pro-
cess. Perfect imitation of the original production process shall enable the 
attainment of a new, reawakened originality. The copycat is born as a new 
masterwork—in this shift of gravity lies the supremacy of the copy, includ-
ing its power of resistance against further copying attempts. As discussed 
earlier, the Chinese copying of the Bamiyan Buddha statue is a strategic 
move of a commercial counterculture mimicking the universal values of an 
unreproducible “high culture.” It appears, unwittingly or not, as a parody of 
the contemporary trend in Chinese cultural policy to destroy national her-
itage in order to make room for innovation and economic success while, at 
the same time, subscribing to the UNESCO principles for protecting world 
cultural heritage.
The reproduction of the Louvre museum in Lens and Abu Dhabi reflects 
the imovative business strategies of copycats, as described by Shenkar. It 
happens under the assumption that the museum model of the Louvre sells 
globally, in whatever regionalized or locally-assimilated form, due to its 
legitimization as a universal museum brand. Innovation is expected from 
imitation in different local cultures and global contexts. Through reloca-
tion and remodeling, the universality of the universal museum, incor-
porated in the Louvre, is multiplied into diversity. The cultural-political 
implications and economic effects of copycatting the historical Louvre are 
as of yet inconclusive. Viewed from the perspective of French state cul-
ture and its claim to world supremacy, the imovative copying of the Louvre 
museum brand serves the purposes of a neo-colonial empowerment of 
the modern colonial art institution—the universal museum of world art 
and heritage—in the contemporary age of globalization.50 The replication 
effect of the Louvre branches in Lens and Abu Dhabi aims to exert a prof-
itable regional and global impact of the French cultural economy in the 
global world. It will empower the French Louvre (including its affiliated 
museums and exhibition market) to become a global, transnational player 
in the world of museum corporations. The historical power of the mod-
ern Parisian Louvre, threatening to vanish in an increasingly globalized art 
and museum world, is revived and reauratized through its contemporary, 
49 Hennessy 2012, 438.
50 This copying can be interpreted as a global extension and enforcement of the 
European, and in particular French, politico-cultural translation privilege as 
carved out during colonial history. Cultural-economic agents, such as the Louvre 
museum corporation, seek control of their right to copy as a transcultural trans-
lation process. They determine how the heritage of world art, including its val-
ues and aesthetic norms, is translated globally. This strategy is not far off from 
Delaporte’s temple translation of Angkor Wat for the French metropole Paris, 
as a colonial act of cultural heritage appropriation and metonymical translation 
(see Falser, in this volume). The main historical difference is that, in the case 
of the Louvre offspring museums, no copies or substitutes of artifacts are tol-
erated, such that even the “copy versions” of the Louvre museum are defined 
themselves as “original” museum sites with new, genuine identities.
266 
BIRGIT MERSMANN
local, and global variants of reenactment. In this respect, copycatting func-
tions as a compensation strategy for the loss of French world power in the 
global cultural economy of art and heritage. On the other hand, the state 
approval for franchising and copying the Louvre museum amounts to the 
betrayal of historical originality and a disregard for intellectual property 
rights, although museum representatives have claimed that these are to 
be maintained. Particularly the outsourcing and relocation of the Louvre to 
Abu Dhabi can easily be identified with cultural expropriation; this is why it 
was heavily criticized by the French establishment and public as a sellout of 
national cultural heritage. The potential of image enhancement is shifted 
from the French to the Arab museum world, whose representatives are put 
in possession of the power to remake the original. They can remaster the 
original Louvre by remaking the birth of the museum in the Arab world,51 
and thus gain the right to reinterpret the French legacy of world art history 
from their national, regional, or local point of view. It is in this vein of role 
reversal that the transformative power of the copy can produce mighty 
effects of transculturation.
Strategic image copying, characteristic of copycat cultures, has led to a 
redefinition of the copy itself. In this age of digital and genetic reproduc-
tion, where originals and original identities can be recreated and remod-
eled virtually, the ontological idea of an analogy between original and copy 
has been replaced by the post-production notion of the copy as a recon-
struction and remediation,52 or a remake of images. The moment of trans-
formation is positioned between past and present, historical master and 
contemporary remastering. Imitative innovativeness prevails over origi-
nality; authorship and interpretive sovereignty are multiplied. Enhanced 
through mobility, virtuality, and networking, copies have the power to 
reenact and redirect the original in relation to themselves. In this changed 
perspective, the local and global strategies of decentering and displacing 
the value of the original will exert the strongest impact on transforming 
culture-related concepts of original and copy.
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Fig. 1: Accessed November 23, 2016. http://www.samadhibuddhastatue.lk/. 
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267
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How to Be Authentic in the 
UNESCO World Heritage System: 
Copies, Replicas, Reconstructions, 
and Renovations in a Global 
Conservation Arena
Abstract The institutional framework of the UNESCO World Heritage 
Convention of 1972 has become a major influence on heritage institutions, 
discourses, and aspirations world-wide. This essay explores how the World 
Heritage arena has dealt with copies, replicas, and reconstructions of built 
heritage, given that the authenticity of a site has been a prerequisite for 
inclusion in the prestigious World Heritage List from the outset. Initially, 
World Heritage decisions were meant to follow the strict emphasis on orig-
inal material, fabric, and design outlined in the Venice Charter of 1964. 
For the reconstructed historical centre of Warsaw, however, compromises 
were being made early on, and the Nara Document on Authenticity adopt-
ed in 1994 significantly widened the scope of authenticity criteria. Subse-
quent World Heritage recommendations and decisions, however, have 
shown little consistency and oscillated between liberal interpretations of 
authenticity and Venice Charter purism. The essay argues that this is partly 
due to the vested national interests in the World Heritage arena, making 
many decisions dependent on political lobbying rather than principles. To 
a significant degree, authenticity continues to be underdetermined, and 
delegates act according to what feels authentic rather than on the basis of 
clear guidelines.




“L’emploi du mot ‘authenticité’, non assorti d’une spécification appropriée, 
est vide de toute signification valable. (The use of the word ‘authenti- 
city’, when not properly specified, is devoid of any valuable meaning.)” 
[Greek delegate in the 1998 session of the World Heritage Committee]1
The UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage adopted in 1972 has experienced a spectacular rise. 
With 192 participating states, it enjoys almost universal ratification. The 
inscription of a site on the World Heritage List can work wonders for tour-
ism, national and local prestige, development funds, and sometimes also 
conservation, so that nation states keep bringing in new candidates. As 
of 2016, the list comprised 1,052 sites in 165 countries. The convention is 
clearly the flagship activity of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), outshining the organisation’s offi-
cial priority in education. The annual World Heritage Committee sessions 
have grown from small gatherings of a few dozen conservationists to 
global events, with 1,200 participants from more than 150 “States Parties” 
(i.e. treaty states) assembled at the 2014 meeting in Doha, Qatar. Visibil-
ity in the mass media and on the internet has grown sharply since the 
mid-1990s, and World Heritage university programmes and training cen-
tres are opening around the world. Even war has been waged over World 
Heritage: the 2008 listing of the ancient Khmer temple of Preah Vihear on 
disputed territory provoked several bloody clashes between Cambodian 
and Thai troops. Heritage sites have also been attacked precisely for being 
on the famous list: during the 2012 Committee sessions, Islamist rebels 
then in control of northern Mali started to destroy Sufi tomb and mosque 
entrances in Timbuktu, in express defiance of a Committee decision a few 
days earlier that had placed Timbuktu on the List of World Heritage in Dan-
ger. Paradoxically, the World Heritage title guaranteed that this iconoclas-
tic act was rewarded with global media headlines.2
The World Heritage arena has become the single most important clear-
inghouse for and disseminator of conservation discourses, policies, and 
practices, particularly for cultural heritage. Given that originals and copies, 
reconstructions and authenticity have been central to conservation dis-
course from the outset, the World Heritage system also has had to come to 
terms with this aspect. In fact, it has kicked off a major conceptual revision 
of authenticity that has influenced heritage conservation policies the world 
over. My goal in this essay is to trace this development and to determine 
how much of it is due to substantive programmatic shifts, as opposed 
to the conceptual fuzziness and improvisation that characterise much of 
what happens in the World Heritage arena. My research in that arena since 
1 WHC-98/CONF.203/18, 128. Here and in the following, I cite UNESCO documents 
with their permanent identification code. These documents are all online and 
easily located when web-searching for that code, whereas their specific URLs 
may change over time.
2 Brumann 2016, 309–314.
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2009 is based on an ethnographic approach which combines participant 
observation of World Heritage meetings, interviews with key players, and 
a study of the written and audio-visual record, an approach which, in a play 
on George Marcus,3 I have termed “multilateral ethnography.”4
The emergence and institutional framework of the World 
Heritage Convention
The World Heritage Convention was dreamed up in the 1960s, when eco-
nomic growth and high modernity came to threaten the world’s cultural 
and natural wonders and UNESCO orchestrated a number of safeguard-
ing campaigns, most famously for the Nubian monuments at Abu Simbel.5 
This helped to establish the idea of a global right to, and also responsi-
bility for, humanity’s most important heritage, paralleling other attempts 
in international law to install “mankind” in its entirety as a rights-holder.6 
Since 1978, the World Heritage List has been progressively filled.
To have a site listed as World Heritage, a treaty state has to submit a 
nomination file to the secretariat of the convention, the World Heritage 
Centre, at UNESCO’s headquarters in Paris. This unit then forwards the file 
to the advisory body in charge, the International Council for Monuments 
and Sites (ICOMOS) for cultural sites, or the International Union for Con-
servation of Nature (IUCN) for natural sites, both of which are international 
NGOs. Through an evaluation based on expert opinions and an inspection 
of the site, ICOMOS and IUCN give their recommendation on whether, for 
meeting at least one of six cultural and four natural criteria, the candidate 
has the “outstanding universal value” or “OUV” stipulated by the conven-
tion for entry into the World Heritage List. The final decision, however, is 
taken by the World Heritage Committee, a body composed of 21 treaty 
states elected by the biannual General Assembly of all signatories for four-
year terms. In its annual 11-day session in changing locations, this Com-
mittee also decides on all other matters concerning the convention, such 
as conservation issues of the already listed sites, the use of the (rather lim-
ited) World Heritage Fund, and general policies. World Heritage is largely 
a title, and the nominating nation state itself remains in charge of pro-
tecting the site, with little that the Committee can impose against its will. 
The symbolic weight of inclusion in the list, however, is significant enough 
to attract a huge global interest and a corresponding amount of politi-
cal pressure and lobbying. Since 2010 in particular, the Committee and its 
nation-state representatives have asserted their independence against the 
3 Marcus 1995.
4 Brumann 2012.
5 Allais 2013; Betts 2015.
6 Wolfrum 2009; Rehling and Löhr 2014.
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expert bodies, frequently overruling their recommendations in pursuit of 
more World Heritage listings and less stringent conservation demands.7
The World Heritage Convention deals only with sites, that is, clearly 
delimited tracts of land or sea and what is found on them; movable arte-
facts are excluded, and practices, performances, and skills are treated by 
the separate UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cul-
tural Heritage of 2003.8 With sites, one could argue that there can be no 
copying in the strict sense, as even a perfect replica of what is on a given 
site cannot be in exactly the same place. A copy of the town of Hallstatt—
part of a World Heritage cultural landscape—has been built in Guangdong 
Province, China9, but as it does not occupy the original location in Austria, 
there is no confusing it with the original. Yet when parts or the entirety of 
a lost building are reconstructed on the site proper with the ambition to 
create something similar to the original building, we have the quest for 
identity that defines the copy, “a thing made to be similar or identical to 
another.”10 And just as with reconstruction, piecemeal restoration over the 
centuries too will raise the question whether the contemporary structure 
still is the original and not something else, not strictly a copy perhaps but a 
dubious hybrid whose relationship to the original is no more certain than 
that of Theseusʼs ship famously described by Plutarch.11 Originals, copies, 
restorations, and reconstructions all inhabit the same conceptual field of 
authenticity, physical identity, and physical continuity over time and it is 
this connected semantic domain—larger than just “copies” but inseparable 
from them—that I will explore in the following. I do so on the understand-
ing that, beginning with the way atoms are structured, perfect physical 
continuity over time is impossible to achieve for any empirical entity. So 
not only are two things out in the world never completely alike, accepting 
the identity of a thing with its own earlier forms, too, requires a leap of 
faith that benignly ignores the differences, however minute and impercep-
tible they may be. “Originals,” “copies,” and how these are valued, there-
fore, are not givens but products of symbolic construction, and the societal 
standards for such construction change over time, as my case study vividly 
illustrates.
7 Brumann 2011 and 2014b; Meskell 2014.
8 Smith and Akagawa 2009; Bortolotto 2010 and 2011b; Hafstein 2009.
9 Tatlow 2012.
10 Oxford Living Dictionaries, s.v. “copy.”
11 “The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty oars, 
and was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius 
Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new 
and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing 
example among the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; 
one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending 
that it was not the same” (classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/theseus.html).
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Authenticity prior to 1994
The text of the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage, as adopted by the UNESCO General Conference in 
1972, does not mention copies or authenticity in its substantive part,12 
but the first Operational Guidelines adopted in 1978—the “code of law” of 
the convention that, in contrast to the convention text itself, is regularly 
updated—already stipulated that “the property should meet the test of 
authenticity in design, materials, workmanship and setting.”13 They further 
stated that “authenticity does not limit consideration to original form and 
structure but includes all subsequent modifications and additions over the 
course of time, which in themselves possess artistic or historical values 
[sic].”14 This formulation clearly breathes the spirit of the Venice Charter 
of 1964,15 the foundational document of modern conservation adopted 
by an international conference of conservationists that also decided the 
founding of ICOMOS. When discussing restoration and archaeological 
excavations (articles 9 to 15), the Charter emphasizes the conservation of 
original materials, including any layers superimposed onto the building by 
later historical periods. For archaeological sites, it prohibits reconstruction 
entirely except by anastylosis,16 and for everything else, it allows it only in 
exceptional circumstances and when based on solid historical documenta-
tion and clearly distinguished from original materials. As Jones and Yarrow 
formulate it in a recent article, historic buildings are preserved here as 
“documents embodying evidence” rather than as aesthetic entities.17
I think we are so used to this ideal of minimum intervention as the 
mainstream of modern conservation, having it seen it implemented in 
countless monuments, that we tend to forget how new it actually is. When, 
at the end of the eighteenth century, an interest in the preservation of 
historic—mainly Medieval—buildings arose in Western Europe, this was 
often realised through what came to be called “restoration,” that is the 
realisation of the presumed intention of the original builders, both by com-
pleting unfinished parts and by removing post-Medieval additions. As one 
12 Curiously, it speaks of copies, authenticity, and truth in a technical postscript to 
the 38 articles: “Done in Paris, this twenty-third day of November 1972, in two 
authentic copies bearing the signature of the President of the seventeenth ses-
sion of the General Conference and of the Director-General of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which shall be deposited in the 
archives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
and certified true copies of which shall be delivered to all the States referred to 
in Articles 31 and 32 as well as to the United Nations” (emphases added).
13 Accessed February 16, 2017. whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide78.pdf, 4.
14 Accessed February 16, 2017. whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide78.pdf, 4.
15 Accessed February 16, 2017. www.icomos.org/charters/venice_e.pdf.
16 “Only anastylosis, that is to say, the reassembling of existing but dismembered 
parts can be permitted. The material used for integration should always be 
recognizable and its use should be the least that will ensure the conservation of 
a monument and the reinstatement of its form” (Article 15).
17 Jones and Yarrow 2013, 11.
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of the leading figures, Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, put it in a widely-cited phrase, 
“restaurer un édifice, ce n’est pas l’entretenir, le réparer ou le refaire, 
c’est le rétablir dans un état complet qui peut n’avoir jamais existé à un 
moment donné (to restore an edifice is not to maintain it, repair or rebuild 
it, but to re-establish it in a complete state that may never have existed 
at a particular moment).”18 He put this into practice in the reconstruction 
and completion of Notre Dame in Paris and the cathedral and fortifica-
tion wall of Carcassonne in southern France. Opposition arose around the 
mid-nineteenth century, led by figures such as William Morris and John 
Ruskin. No less widely cited, Ruskin claimed that “it is […] no question of 
expediency or feeling whether we shall preserve the buildings of past 
times or not. We have no right whatever to touch them. They are not ours. 
They belong partly to those who built them, and partly to all the genera-
tions of mankind who are to follow us.”19
The principal question of what to preserve—the original vision and 
visual appearance or the original material—has remained a burning one 
in conservation practice. In the detailed day-to-day decisions that conser-
vation and planning practice constantly require, it often aligns itself with 
professional sensibilities, such as those of curators who go for original 
materials, as opposed to architects and urban planners, who often side 
with visual integrity.20 Yet on a theoretical level, the emphasis on original 
materials became mainstream and was enshrined in the Venice Charter, 
finding its way from there into the World Heritage Operational Guidelines. 
Partly, this was because of personal continuity, as one of the drafters of 
the Venice Charter, the Belgian Raymond Lemaire, also chaired the expert 
meeting that drafted the first Operational Guidelines. He insisted on using 
the term “authenticity,” rather than the more open “integrity” that was 
also discussed, as some experts feared that this would legitimise nine-
teenth-century stylistic restoration.21
Almost immediately upon starting the World Heritage List in 1978, 
however, the World Heritage Committee betrayed these purist principles. 
When the Historic Centre of Warsaw was nominated, the Committee hesi-
tated at first because of the lack of authenticity of what was, in more than 
85 percent of that case, a post-war reconstruction of what the Nazis had 
deliberately laid to ashes.22 An ICOMOS expert, however, suggested the 
possibility that “a systematic 20th Century reconstruction [can] be jus-
tified for inclusion on grounds, not of Art but of History,”23 and, swayed 
18 Viollet-le-Duc 1875, 14. It is here where I see some of the transformative ambi-
tion that anthropologists have seen at the root of much mimetic action in ritual 
and other contexts: through imitating something, one actually brings it into 
being (see chapter Ladwig). Anachronistic though it is, the term “remastering” 
(see chapter Mersmann) also suggests itself for the restoration approach.
19 Ruskin (1849) 1920, 206.
20 Jones and Yarrow 2013; Brumann 2007, 229–232.
21 Gfeller, forthcoming.
22 CC-79/CONF.005/6, Annex II, 5.
23 CC-79/CONF.003/11, Annex.
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by the symbolic weight of this reconstruction, the Committee eventually 
inscribed Warsaw on the World Heritage List in 1980.24 The Bureau, a sub-
body of the Committee, however, hastened to emphasize that “there can 
be no question of inscribing in the future other cultural properties that 
have been reconstructed.”25 And indeed, the nomination of Viollet-le-Duc’s 
pet project of Carcassonne in 1985,26 and that of the Baroque ensemble in 
Dresden of 1990,27 were rejected as the reconstructed parts were found 
to lack authenticity. But Speyer Cathedral was inscribed in 1981, despite 
extensive neo-Romanesque restoration in the nineteenth century; on the 
contrary, its influence on the evolution of the principles of restoration was 
expressly acknowledged.28 For Rila Monastery in Bulgaria, in 1983, the 
Committee overruled ICOMOS’s advice against listing,29 recognising this 
nineteen to twentieth-century reconstruction as a symbol of the Bulgarian 
Renaissance and its quest for an unbroken link with the Slavic past.30 The 
church of St. Michael in Hildesheim, destroyed to a considerable extent 
in the Second World War, was rejected in 1982,31 but then inscribed in 
1985, now as a joint property with St. Mary’s Church in the same city.32 
The ICOMOS evaluation only notes, without going into detail, that ICOMOS 
changed its mind and was in full support of the inscription,33 but it can be 
surmised that reconstruction was censured at first but tolerated the sec-
ond time around. In 1988, the Committee inscribed the Medieval City of 
Rhodes,34 despite ICOMOS’s dismissal of its early-twentieth-century recon-
struction as “pseudo-medieval monuments” and “grandiose pastiches [...] 
devoid of archaeological rigor” that could only find some consolation in 
the fact that the plans to rebuild the Colossus of Rhodes had been aban-
doned.35 It should be noted that all these exceptions to the Venice Char-





28 CC-81/CONF/003/6, 4. Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/
archive/advisory_body_evaluation/168.pdf.
29 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_
evaluation/216.pdf, 2.
30 SC/83/CONF.009/8, 6.
31 CLT -82/CONF .014/6, 6.
32 SC-85/CONF.008/9, 8.
33 Cf. Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_
evaluation/187bis.pdf, 2.
34 SC-88/CONF.001/13, 17.





A full conceptual debate only arose with one of the first Japanese World 
Heritage nominations in 1993—the Hôryûji, near Nara. This temple com-
plex contains the allegedly oldest wooden buildings on earth, dating from 
the seventh and eighth century, but was extensively restored in the thir-
teenth, seventeenth, and twentieth centuries. As is possible with tradi-
tional wooden buildings in Japan, they were partly or wholly dismantled 
and then reassembled, allowing the replacement of much damaged mate-
rial,36 which led some European experts to question their authenticity. A 
fundamental reconsideration of that notion thus seemed called for, and 
Japan offered to host an international workshop in Nara, in 1994. This 
workshop resulted in the “Nara Document on Authenticity,”37 widely cited 
and praised today as the most significant conceptual contribution to this 
issue by the World Heritage institutions.
Whether the Nara Document provides clear guidance is debatable. §13 
of the document states that authenticity can manifest itself in “form and 
design, materials and substance, use and function, traditions and tech-
niques, location and setting, and spirit and feeling, and other internal and 
external factors.” This list adds quite a number of aspects, including rather 
ephemeral ones, to the “design, material, workmanship, and setting” for-
mulation of the original Operational Guidelines. Further, §11 claims that 
“it is […] not possible to base judgements of values and authenticity within 
fixed criteria. On the contrary, the respect due to all cultures requires that 
heritage properties must be considered and judged within the cultural 
contexts to which they belong.” How such cultural relativism can be recon-
ciled with the “outstanding universal value” demanded by the convention 
is an obvious question. It appears to me that, rather than pinning down 
what authenticity is, the formulations of the Nara Document broadened 
the range of what it might be taken to mean.
The main actors behind this development were not the imagined ben-
eficiaries, that is representatives of non-European countries with wooden 
or earthen architecture, but rather representatives of what, borrowing 
from Immanuel Wallerstein,38 could be called the “semi-periphery” of the 
“world system” of heritage conservation. 19 out of 23 conservationists 
who drafted the Venice Charter in 1964 were European and 16 of these 
were Western European. Thirty years later, however, the main contribu-
tors included the Japanese, of course, but also several Norwegian experts 
who likewise had wooden buildings on the World Heritage List and knew 
Japanese conservation techniques from extended visits. The Canadian 
General Secretary of ICOMOS, Herb Stovel, who was perhaps the single 
36 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_
evaluation/660.pdf, 3–4.
37 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/document/9379.
38 Wallerstein 1974.
277
HOW TO BE AUTHENTIC IN THE UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE SYSTEM
most important driver, and Australian participants also played consider-
able roles. The abovementioned Belgian Raymond Lemaire drafted the 
document together with Stovel but later claimed to have condoned what 
he did not fully support; other than him, no one from Western European 
countries, with their time-honoured conservation systems predicated on 
stone architecture, was centrally involved.39
A Japanese participant told me how the European and American partic-
ipants at the Nara Conference appeared to her as longing for something 
different—redemption from Venice Charter constraints, so to speak—and 
were almost disappointed to learn through her presentation that Japanese 
conservation practices are not so different after all. I am sure that expecta-
tions were influenced by the shikinen sengû, the ritual renewal of the most 
important Shinto shrine in Ise every twenty years, on one of two alternat-
ing plots of land; the previous buildings are dismantled in the process. This 
case is a staple when, in books on conservation, alternative philosophies to 
those of mainstream European conservation are introduced. Almost invar-
iably, the practice is exaggerated then, for example by ascribing it to Japa-
nese shrines and temples in general when, in actual fact, it applies to less 
than a dozen Shinto shrines. The conservation of the Hôryûji, by contrast, 
differs from Venice Charter ideals only in degree, not in kind, as mate-
rial replacement is kept to the necessary minimum and copying damaged 
wooden components does not even allow conjecture, given the modular 
construction and sophisticated joinery of traditional Japanese architecture 
that requires a replacement piece to fit perfectly. Whatever differences 
from the conservation practices of European cathedrals may arise here are 
almost entirely due to the building material, not to fundamentally different 
conceptions of authenticity and continuity. Accordingly, the Japanese con-
venors of the workshop would have been happy with minor modifications 
of the Operational Guidelines, as my informant said, and it was others who 
urged for a more comprehensive overhaul.
They stopped short of abolishing authenticity altogether, however; 
Gfeller emphasises how, thereby, they also guaranteed expert control over 
its application within the World Heritage framework.40 A comparative look 
at the other well-known UNESCO convention on intangible cultural her-
itage adopted in 2003 seems to prove her right: there, at the insistence 
of the involved experts, authenticity was banned both from the conven-
tion text and the Operational Directives as not applicable to living heritage 
and the incremental changes such intangible heritage undergoes in every 
performative, ritual, or practical iteration. I still think, though, that while 
39 Gfeller, forthcoming. Gfeller points to the fact, however, that a need for wid-
ening authenticity conceptions had already been acknowledged by ICOMOS 
representatives from these countries, and indeed, the abovementioned French 
ICOMOS expert who advised the World Heritage Committee on how to deal with 
the Warsaw nomination in 1980 had referred to Japanese temples and the pos-




retaining the concept, the adoption of the Nara Document has opened the 
door for all kinds of yardsticks, and whether these are innovative or simply 
interest-driven is often a matter of perspective.
Pre-Nara holdouts
The Nara Document has certainly been widely and favourably received 
throughout the world. I recall a conversation with the chief conservationist 
of a German federal state—art historian by training, in one of the heart-
lands of institutional conservation—who nonetheless told me that, to her, 
it is a valuable text that helps her in her day-to-day work. Within the World 
Heritage Committee arena, however, the Nara Document was not immedi-
ately adopted. The ICOMOS General Assembly approved it in 1999;41 later 
that year, the Committee decided to include it in the revision of the Opera-
tional Guidelines where,42 however, it only appeared in the 2005 version,43 
a full 11 years after Nara.44 In the Operational Guidelines, the formulations 
based on the Nara Document (§81–83 in the 2013 version) continue to be 
immediately tempered by the admonition that “in relation to authenti- 
city, the reconstruction of archaeological remains or historic buildings or 
districts is justifiable only in exceptional circumstances. Reconstruction 
is acceptable only on the basis of complete and detailed documentation 
and to no extent on conjecture” (§86 in the 2013 version).45 This means 
that a Venice Charter logic still applies, whatever the Guidelines say about 
authenticity residing in spirit and feeling.
Venice Charter thinking is also undeniably present when ICOMOS and/
or the World Heritage Committee admonish recent or ongoing non-stand-
ard reconstructions and “over-restoration” in World Heritage properties, 
as they have done over the past twenty years for the historic centres of 
Quito,46 Istanbul,47 Zabid (Yemen),48 Bukhara, and Samarkand (Uzbek-
istan),49 the Tabriz Bazaar complex (Iran),50 churches in Mtskheta (Geor-
gia)51 and Manila,52 mosques in the old cities of Cairo53 and Damascus,54 the 
41 WHC-99/CONF.209/22, 39.
42 WHC-99/CONF.209/22, 45.
43 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide05-en.pdf.
44 For more detail on this process, see Cameron 2008, 21–22.
45 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide13-en.pdf, 
22.
46 WHC-08/32.COM/24, 138–139.
47 WHC-94/CONF.003/16, 40, WHC-06/30.COM/INF.19, 131.
48 WHC-96/CONF.201/4, 20, WHC-97/CONF.208/4B, 27.
49 WHC-97/CONF.208/4B, 26.
50 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_
evaluation/1346.pdf, 5.
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palaces of Beijing55 and Lhasa,56 Bahla Fort (Oman),57 the reconstruction of 
archaeological remains in Abu Mena (Egypt),58 the Negev desert cities on 
the Incense Route (Israel),59 the At-Turaif District in ad-Dir’iyah (Saudi Ara-
bia),60 Samarra (Iraq),61 Al Zubarah (Qatar),62 Hampi (India),63 and Lumbini 
(Nepal).64
One of the more spectacular recent cases was the monumental recon-
struction of the half-ruined Bagrati Cathedral in Kutaisi, Georgia. The Com-
mittee placed the property on the List of World Heritage in Danger in 2010 
when the plans were announced but work was completed in 2012 nonethe-
less;65 according to the World Heritage Committee, “the Bagrati Cathedral 
has been altered to such an extent that its authenticity has been irreversi-
bly compromised.” Contrary to ICOMOS’s advice, remaining original stone 
blocks were not re-used, and new building parts of reinforced concrete 
were implanted in an irreversible manner into the historic fabric. There-
fore, Georgia is now being urged to remove the cathedral from the World 
Heritage List.66 (This is, incidentally, a serial property, with the unproblem-
atic Gelati Monastery as the other component.) One cannot help noting 
that almost all of the above-mentioned cases are non-European. One also 
cannot help noting that the reconstructions of the Bagrati Cathedral or 
those in Lumbini, Buddha Siddharta Gotama’s birthplace, have contributed 
to the appeal of these sites as pilgrimage destinations so that a Nara Docu-
ment logic might see the authentic usage as being augmented rather than 
diminished.
The rehabilitation of Romantic restorations
In comparison, ICOMOS and the World Heritage Committee have been sig-
nificantly more tolerant of reconstructions predating the World Heritage 
inscription of the given site, particularly those inspired by nineteenth-cen-
tury Romanticism. Sometimes, the issue is simply circumvented, such as 
in ICOMOS’s evaluation of the Mehmed Paša Sokolović Bridge in Višegrad, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, inscribed in 2007. The text mentions signifi-
cant reconstructions with non-authentic materials and in non-authentic 
forms after both world wars but, in a confusing turn, concludes that “the 
55 WHC-06/30.COM/19, 101.
56 WHC-96/CONF.201/21, 39, WHC-03/27.COM/INF.24, 80.













authenticity seems excellent” and that “the visible alterations to form and 
material are secondary, and can be put right by appropriate restorations.”67 
For the German limes that was added to Hadrian’s Wall in England in 2005, 
thereby producing the serial property “Frontiers of the Roman Empire,” the 
ICOMOS evaluation bemoaned that “in many cases […] the authenticity has 
been compromised by unacceptable reconstructions.” Yet as an inventive 
solution, these reconstructions were excluded from the World Heritage 
property and declared its buffer zone,68 in line with the common practice 
to designate such a zone around a site. Here, however, the buffer zone sits 
on top of the site, that is the original wall sections under the ground.
In a number of further cases, including the historical churches of Mtsk-
heta (1994),69 Wartburg Castle (1999),70 the castles and fortifications of 
Bellinzona (2000),71 Tiwanaku in Bolivia (2000),72 the upper middle Rhine 
valley with its many medieval castles restored in the nineteenth century 
(2002),73 and Kuressaare Fortress in Estonia (2004),74 the ICOMOS evalua-
tions of the candidates simply downplayed reconstruction as “typical of the 
time,” “religiously motivated,” and “not of recent date,” or by focusing on 
the entire landscape rather than single buildings (in the case of the Rhine 
valley). Dresden was brought back as a cultural landscape, too, so that ICO-
MOS could now argue that “while recognising the unfortunate losses in the 
historic city centre during the Second World War, the Dresden Elbe Valley, 
defined as a continuing cultural landscape, has retained the overall histori-
cal authenticity and integrity in its distinctive character and components.”75 
This led to its inscription in 2004, for what became a mere five years of 
World Heritage glory.76 There is even a World Heritage property that contin-
ues to be under construction today: in 2004, the famous Sagrada Familia, 
Antoni Gaudí’s cathedral in Barcelona, was added to a collection of works 
by the Catalan architect that together form a single serial World Heritage 
property. The ICOMOS evaluation notes the authenticity of the parts of the 
church completed by Gaudí and says that the ongoing construction follows 
his plans on the basis of “scientifically elaborated guidelines,”77 finding no 
67 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_
evaluation/1260.pdf, 115.
68 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_
evaluation/430ter.pdf, 165, 167.







75 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_
evaluation/1156.pdf, 88.
76 In 2009, the Dresden Elbe Valley was removed from the list due to the construc-
tion of a new bridge not approved by World Heritage authorities.
77 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_ 
evaluation/320bis.pdf, 172.
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reason for concern. One cannot help noting that this roster of tolerated 
reconstruction—or even tolerated construction—is a rather European one.
With this downplaying of Venice Charter authenticity come inscrip-
tions—all of them European too—where the Romantic restorations have 
been explicitly valued as testimonies of an important stage in the history 
of heritage conservation, thus adding to authenticity rather than dimin-
ishing it, such as with the Luther memorials in Wittenberg and Eisleben 
(1996),78 the castle of the Teutonic Order in Malbork (Marienburg), Poland 
(1996),79 and the historic centre of San Marino (2008).80 When Carcas-
sonne was resubmitted in 1997, Viollet-le-Duc’s restorations were valued 
as a landmark in conservation history, thus resulting in its inscription.81 
It is striking that the true discursive impact of the Nara Document has 
been with the Romantic restorations, since in the cases of Carcassonne,82 
Malbork Castle,83 and San Marino,84 ICOMOS evaluations and delegates’ 
comments referred to the text in order to justify inscription. And in the 
acceptance speech for Malbork Castle, the Polish delegation expressed 
satisfaction that “notre fondamentalisme ouest-européen […] qui nous a 
amenés à la définition de la notion d’authenticité, limitée exclusivement 
à la substance matérielle; une idée que nous avons voulu octroyer aux 
autres régions culturelles du monde (our West European fundamentalism 
[…] that has brought us to the definition of authenticity limited exclusively 
to the material substance; an idea that we have wanted to impose on the 
other cultural regions of the world)” was now put to rest.85 Making ref-
erence to the Nara Document for the timber and earthen structures for 
which it was originally designed, by contrast, is much rarer in the World 
Heritage records, even though authenticity-related objections to such can-
didates are no longer raised and one finds argumentations that clearly 
breathe a Nara spirit. For example, when recommending inscription of the 
Tombs of Buganda’s Kings at Kasubi, Uganda, in 2001, ICOMOS argued 
that “buildings such as these are maintained over time and their authen-
ticity lies more in the reflection of traditional material and practices that in 





82 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_
evaluation/345.pdf, 28.
83 WHC-96/CONF.201/21, Annex VI.2.
84 WHC-08/32.COM/INF.8B1, 187.





Warsaw as a case of what, in memory of Pete Seeger, one could call the 
“We Shall Overcome” type of reconstruction, also did not remain alone. In 
2003, the Committee inscribed the Bamiyan Valley on the World Heritage 
List, two years after the Taliban had blasted the two great stone Buddhas. 
Bamiyan was a major mishap of the World Heritage machinery: nominated 
by Afghanistan in 1983, the candidate had not been accepted because of 
minor technical issues and never been followed up on; so that when the 
Taliban announced their plan of destruction, there was not even the sym-
bolic weight of a World Heritage title to give them pause.87 With the Bud-
dhas gone in 2001, the ICOMOS evaluation stressed the authenticity of the 
remaining parts of the valley as a cultural landscape and pre-emptively 
expressed its support of a possible reconstruction of the statues from the 
fragments by anastylosis, obviously not seeing this as a threat to the over-
all authenticity of the site.88 So far—and not least because of the security 
situation—little actual progress has been made, but some form of recon-
struction continues to be envisioned (for more detail, see Mersmann’s con-
tribution to this volume).
In 2005, as the most intensely debated reconstruction so far, the Old 
Bridge Area of the Old City of Mostar in Bosnia was inscribed on the World 
Heritage List. The iconic bridge collapsed in 1993, after being deliberately 
shelled in the Balkan War, and was reconstructed with the support of 
UNESCO and the World Bank in 2001–2004. The Old Town was first nom-
inated in 1999, that is before reconstruction, and with the bridge being 
only a symbolic presence in the proposed name of the property, “The Old 
Mostar: A Bridge of the Worlds.”89 Due to the lack of a management plan, 
uncontrolled building activity in and near the old town, unclear nomina-
tion criteria, and the need to await completion of the bridge, the decision 
was postponed three times in 1999, 2000, and 2003,90 although ICOMOS 
had recommended inscription from the outset.91 When the Committee 
debated for several hours over the proposed inscription of a reduced sec-
tion of the Old City in 2005, some delegates complained that the ICOMOS 
evaluation had concentrated only on the bridge and its reconstruction. The 
delegate of Saint Lucia poignantly reminded everyone “that it was not only 
the Bridge and certainly not the International Community that were being 
inscribed, but the old town of Mostar.”92 Other delegates were more wel-
coming, however, pointing in unspecific ways to the Nara Document or 
87 WHC-01/CONF.208/24, 4–7.
88 Accessed February 16, 2017. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/advisory_body_
evaluation/208rev.pdf, 3.
89 WHC-99/CONF.204/15, 46.
90 WHC-99/CONF.208/8, 70-71, WHC-2000/CONF.202/17, 47, WHC-2000/
CONF.204/21, 51, WHC-03/27.COM/24, 116.
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playing with the symbolism of the structure by citing a poem about bridges 
or evoking the bridge between religious communities that had now been 
rebuilt.93 The final decision was a compromise between Venice and Nara: 
the buildings as such, which are all of 2000s vintage, were denied World 
Heritage honours in that none of the respective criteria were declared to 
be present. Also, the special features of the original architecture and the 
quality of the reconstruction—which some delegates called into question—
were not mentioned in the official justification for OUV, as originally pro-
posed, but only in a separate part of the decision text.94 Instead, inscription 
came to rest solely on criterion vi, which emphasises the symbolic value of 
a site and is usually reserved for combined use with other criteria.95 The 
short justification text for inscription transforms the reconstruction into 
the very basis of OUV, arguing that it strengthened the Old City’s value 
as a symbol of peaceful multi-ethnic and multi-religious co-existence over 
the centuries and associating it—in a somewhat nebulous phrase—with 
international peace and cooperation.96 Clearly, the mimetic act of recon-
struction is ascribed considerable transformative force here (see Ladwig’s 
contribution), aiming for the “healing, reconciling effect” that Mersmann 
(also in this volume) sees as the hope behind comparable reconstruction 
plans for the victims of iconoclasm.
Conclusion
The application of authenticity requirements within the World Heritage 
system—whether meant in its Venice Charter or Nara Document incarna-
tion—has been uneven, to say the least. By 1998, an Australian delegate 
to the Committee proposed formulating separate yardsticks for authen-
ticity for each of the six cultural criteria,97 but this was never put into prac-
tice. In 2005, it was decided to separate authenticity and integrity, which 
heretofore had been treated jointly for cultural properties. (For natural 
World Heritage properties, only integrity is considered.) In the nomina-
tion manual, integrity is defined as the completeness and intactness of 
the property, whereas authenticity is defined as the ability of the property 
to convey truthfully and genuinely the OUV for which it is inscribed.98 This 
conceptual clarification was motivated by the insight that these two aspects 
93 WHC-05/29.COM/INF.22, 183–187.
94 Cf. WHC-05/29.COM/22, 141.
95 WHC-05/29.COM/22, 140.
96 “With the “renaissance” of the Old Bridge and its surroundings, the symbolic 
power and meaning of the City of Mostar—as an exceptional and universal 
symbol of coexistence of communities from diverse cultural, ethnic and reli-
gious backgrounds—has been reinforced and strengthened, underlining the 
unlimited efforts of human solidarity for peace and powerful co-operation in 
the face of overwhelming catastrophes” (WHC-05/29.COM/22, 141).
97 WHC-98/CONF.201/9, 20–21.
98 UNESCO 2011, 61–67.
284 
CHRISTOPH BRUMANN
may not necessarily coincide: Viollet-le-Duc’s restoration of the half-ruined 
fortification walls of Carcassonne, for instance, increased its integrity but 
decreased its authenticity as a Medieval fortress. Not too much has been 
made of this new conceptual pair so far, despite its potential for reapprais-
ing reconstructions and copies.99
There is a tendency to stylise the Nara Document on Authenticity into 
a major achievement of the World Heritage institutions, a supersession of 
the restrictive Venice Charter framework for something less Eurocentric 
and more universally applicable and meaningful. I do not want to deny 
that it has been perceived as a liberating move in conservation regimes the 
world over and that the willingness to consider alternative standards of 
authenticity has increased. When looking at what the World Heritage insti-
tutions themselves have made of it, however, there is little consistency, 
and it rather seems that now, in terms of restoration, reconstruction, and 
copying, anything goes. Committee decisions and admonitions and ICO-
MOS evaluations run the gamut from unflinching Venice Charter purism 
to an extreme liberalism, with or without reference to the Nara Document. 
From my ethnographic observation of the Committee sessions, this is not 
surprising. Principal questions are rarely addressed, and whatever general 
policies arise do so only through the concrete discussion of individual sites. 
This discussion is always hurried due to severe time constraints, delegates 
often lack specialised knowledge and preparation, and many of them are 
ordinary career diplomats with no more than lay perceptions of heritage 
issues. There is also little institutional memory in place, so that even obvi-
ous precedent cases fail to be brought up. Most importantly, however, 
there is the lobbying and deal-making among Committee delegates whose 
main objective is to bring home more World Heritage inscriptions, usually 
by backing each other’s bids on a quid-pro-quo basis. When such support 
has been secured in the run-up to the decision, rather weak and impro-
vised arguments often suffice to organise majorities.100 This is why I think 
the potential of the Nara Document for justifying reconstructions and sty-
listic restorations has not been fully exploited: there is no real need to do 
so, as less demanding strategies often suffice.
Yet within the ICOMOS evaluations, there is also little consistency and 
I suspect that here as well, the final recommendations are influenced by 
lobbying and non-substantive considerations. I find confirmation here in 
the geographical grading of authenticity judgments where the abovemen-
tioned examples suggest that European violations of Venice Charter pur-
ism have been more benignly treated than the non-European ones. This 
99 Authenticity becomes even murkier when it is applied to the category of cul-
tural landscapes added in 1992, given that, due to the interaction between 
humans and nature that is emphasized here, the incremental change of the 
physical features is expected. As there is usually no copying or reconstruction 
in the narrow sense, however, I do not treat cultural landscapes in this paper.
100 Brumann 2014b.
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diagnosis squares with ICOMOS being an organisation where, to this day, 
the presence and influence of Europeans is significant.101
Anthropologists in particular have enthusiastically engaged in decon-
structing popular notions of authenticity, usually pointing out the poli- 
tical, commercial, or other interests behind what they see, in essence, as 
an arbitrary claim,102 often connecting it with elite interests and an expert 
point of view. As I have argued elsewhere,103 however, authenticity is also 
very much a popular and lay concern; Bortolotto vividly describes how it 
can creep in through the back door, even in an environment from which it 
has been officially ousted, such as among the nominations to the lists of 
the 2003 UNESCO convention on intangible cultural heritage.104 But this is 
also because authenticity is a polysemic term with which people associate 
many different things, starting with authentic experiences or personalities. 
When one scrutinises what the World Heritage institutions really look for, 
it is in fact continuity over time, be it continuity of material, form, usage, or 
some other aspect mentioned in the Venice Charter or the Nara Document. 
But this is never so clearly stated, and authenticity (as a term) stays in place. 
It would be conceivable to specify requirements for each of these differ-
ent continuities, and how to weigh deficiencies in some of them against 
the merits of others. If not that, it would at least be conceivable to define 
authenticity. Yet even the latest version of the World Heritage Operational 
Guidelines, in the 16 paragraphs it dedicates to authenticity and integri-
ty,105 has still not gotten around to saying what the word actually means. 
This conceptual void forces actors within the World Heritage arena to rely 
on their intuitions and gut feelings, and when a long and emotional debate 
about the bridge of Mostar, a symbol of peaceful multi-ethnic co-existence, 
rebuilt by the collective efforts of the international community, culminates 
in its World Heritage coronation, I suppose—and delegates confirm—that 
it is almost impossible not to have very authentic feelings, however discon-
tinuous with the past the rebuilt bridge may actually be.
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Colonial Appropriation, Physical 
Substitution, and the Metonymics 
of Translation: Plaster Casts 
of Angkor Wat for Museum 
Collections in Paris and Berlin
Abstract Tales of stolen cultural objects and their restitution regularly 
generate nationalistic and polemic headlines in newspapers worldwide. 
However, there is a related practice of colonial appropriation that is slow-
ly becoming the focus of art historical research—the technique of plaster 
casting. This paper conceptualizes the precise moment around 1900 when 
French colonial projects in Paris and German initiatives in Berlin commis-
sioned plaster casts of the Cambodian temple of Angkor Wat for display in 
national museums. This mammoth act of architectural translation includ-
ed exact copies of the temple’s bas-reliefs as well as entire hybrid building 
pastiches. Forgotten for decades, these plaster casts are now being redis-
covered as the unique transcultural products of a colonial enterprise.
Keywords Translation, plaster casts, substitution, metonymics, Angkor
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From translation to transculturality within the transfer of 
architecture 
1. In The Metonymics of Translating Marginalized Texts, Maria Tymoczko
asks how a translator can make non-canonical or marginalized litera-
ture understood by his or her audience.1 She judges that “metonymic
aspects” (the recognition of the whole by reading its associative parts)
are essential in assimilating new literal formats or variations. The trans-
lator has to “either make some decisive choices about which aspects
to translate—that is, do a partial translation of the literary informa-
tion in the text—or seek a format that allows dense information trans-
fer through a variety of commentaries on the translation.” Following
norms and aims, his work would result either in “popular or scholarly
translations,” where
the former are usually severely limited in their transfer intent 
and minimally representative of the metonymic aspects of the 
original, while the latter allow a good deal of metatranslation to 
proceed, presenting quantities of information through vehicles 
such as introductions, footnotes, appendices, parallel texts, and 
so forth. In a scholarly translation the text is embedded in a shell 
of paratextual devices that serve to explain the metonymies of 
the source text, providing a set of contexts for the translation. 
In the case of a popular translation, by contrast, the translator 
typically focuses on a few aspects of the literary text which are 
brought to a broad segment of the target audience.2
Tymoczko’s “popular or scholarly translations” mirrors what Walter 
Benjamin had defined earlier as “free or literal” translations—both 
depended on the translator’s choice of the unit of translation.3
2. Translation, however, does not only lead to new translation products,
but has concrete consequences for the original text itself: the translation
“canonizes the foreign text, validates its fame by enabling its survival,”
in fact “creates it [and] reconstitutes it” and “freezes it, shows its mobility
and its instability.”4 The source text and its translation form a dynamic
and mutual relationship, in which popular/scholarly or free/literal
translations each reconfigure the original differently. The translational
turn addresses the shift from a linguistic approach to translation toward
1 This paper is the result of a presentation during the CIHA Conference in Nurem-
berg, Germany, in 2012 and a slightly reworked version from the CIHA confer-
ence proceedings of 2013.
2 Tymoczko 1995, 11–24, 18.
3 See Benjamin’s 1923 differentiation in Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers between Treue 
(fidelity), Wörtlichkeit (literalness), and Freiheit (freedom), for an “ideal echo of the 
original,” an “interlinear version” (Benjamin 2012).
4 Venuti 1992, introduction 7, 9–11.
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a broader context that describes different power relations in cultural 
contact situations and processes of exchange and transfer between 
cultures. Both individual translators and whole institutional complexes 
alike become agents of a larger practice of knowledge production. 
Thus, source texts and their translations are placed in a transcultural 
framework to constitute each other that might comprise the whole cul-
tural complex or sections of culture within a larger translational flow, 
including social culture (institutions like museums), mental culture (cul-
tural stereotypes), and material culture (artefacts, architecture).
3. European colonialism as an “uneven power relation” is a specific “polit-
ico-cultural translation history,”5 in which the exchange and transfer
between and of cultures, as well as the conditions and aims of knowl-
edge production, are inscribed in coercive “translation memes” that
follow imposed norms and values.6 In our case, a European hegemonic
“translation privilege” not only stereotyped Asian sources as primitive,
exotic, and the “Other” (Orient),7 but also influenced the self-rep-
resentation of the Own and the Self (Occident) within a dynamic “pro-
cess of strangeness and familiarization.”8 Using power as the key term
in the colonial context implies the assertion of an asymmetry in trans-
lational flows of knowledge accumulation and partial representation
modes of the colonized source text. The dominant authority or regime
controls the translation process, which is “not simply an act of faithful
reproduction, but, rather, a deliberate and conscious act of selection,
assemblage, structuration, and fabrication—and even, in some cases,
of falsification, refusal of information, [and] counterfeiting,”9 namely,
a manipulation of the parts being translated as “orientalised” texts to
conform to the norms, values, and expectations of the occidental target 
culture. In contrast to this postcolonial critique of cultural appropria-
tion, the analysis of the mere ontological status of material translations
enable us, however, to appreciate these translational products as new
and creative texts per se, as “continuers of the [Eastern] originals.”10
4. In a typically colonial process of “code-switching,”11 original objects
from the Orient passed, by violent extraction, from their socially embed-
ded use value at their original emplacement and their transfer over
long distances and cultural political spheres and borders, into their
new “representation [as] classified artefacts” for the target culture.
Their new, institutionalized settings were often ethnographic or art or
architecture museums. In this context, they were themselves cultural
translations “by the virtue of their job in representing cultures through
5 Bhatti 1997, 5.
6 Chesterman 1997.
7 Lepenies 1993, esp. 66.
8 Carbonell 1996, 79, 84. 
9 Tymoczko and Gentzler 2002, xxi.
10 Hermans and Koller 2004, 26.
11 Hermans and Koller 2004, 24–25.
292 
MICHAEL FALSER
the medium of objects […] a translation from the originating world of 
the objects into a new network of meanings and interpretations.”12 
What has been largely overlooked in the discussion of colonial art 
history is that whole Oriental architectures were also transferred into 
the colonizer’s or Occidental collector’s museums. These monumental 
translations were not only the most spectacular modern-time opera-
tions in the field of material culture translation between the Orient and 
the Occident, but are also unique case studies with which to open up 
the classical field of architectural historiography to a truly transcultural 
and global perspective. The object of our transcultural inquiry is the 
largest religious stone monument in the world—the twelfth Hindu, and 
today Buddhist, temple of Angkor Wat in Cambodia. Our time frame 
is the era of European imperialism around 1900, which encompassed 
competition between the established colonial power of France and the 
emerging cultural power of Germany. Our investigation queries the 
processes, the concrete agency, and the varying museographical end 
products of these translational operations. Before discussing these 
details, however, we must first formulate some theoretical observa-
tions that are valid for both cases:
(Ad 2–4) Beyond the transfer of small-scale artefacts from the Orient to the 
Occident and their commodification as museum objects of Western curi-
osity, translated monumental architecture like Angkor Wat was used as 
a powerful means by which to visualize the Western image of the East as 
being made up of ancient, powerful, but lost civilizations within a power-
less and chaotic present. Whereas partial or full-scale reconstitutions of 
the once glorious architecture were represented in Occidental displays in 
an ideal or restored condition, the “original site” was depicted and can-
onized as being an “eternal ruin.” This truly transcultural narrative simul-
taneously presented one and the same architectural complex as both an 
Oriental ruin and a restored monument within its Occidental display, thus 
enabling the birth of an aesthetic concept that “reconstituted the origi-
nal and enabled its survival”—namely, cultural heritage. Following what 
James Clifford called the “salvage paradigm, reflecting the desire to res-
cue something ‘authentic’ out of destructive historical changes,”13 this con-
cept mirrored the European nation’s dual self-representation both as the 
guardian of a progressive modernity and of a civilizing mission towards 
the degenerated Orient with its forgotten cultural heritage.14 This transla-
tion of Oriental architecture also enabled the inclusion of the same in the 
colonizer’s own canon of cultural heritage. Given the original connotation 
of the term “heritage,” Angkor Wat was therefore “inherited” by the colo-
nial power through its translation, transfer, and ideal reconstitution. The 
12 Sturge 2007, 131.
13 Clifford 1989, 73.
14 For the role of cultural heritage in colonial civilizing missions, see Falser 2015.
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local stakeholders (religious communities, monks, and pilgrims) were dis-
possessed of and excluded from their own property.
(Ad 1) A crucial question concerning the “translatability” of architec-
ture relates to its size, accessibility, and ownership; architecture is, after 
all, generally defined as immobile. While single original fragments from 
architecture were appropriated for European museums, large-scale archi-
tectural translations were seen as special “transfer operations” between 
the “repetition through identical text processing, recycling, borrowing, 
copying, the compilation of various text fragments, adoptions and, finally, 
large-scale collages and pastiches ranging from a mishmash of fragments 
to the mimicking a certain style in a virtuoso manner à la manière de with 
the risk of overinterpretation.”15
As metonymic strategies of free or literal and popular or scholarly 
translations, respectively, they followed either the “principal of equiva-
lence” (similarity) or the “principle of contiguity” (referential connection).16 
However, monumental architecture translation cannot be executed by a 
mere transfer of original architectural fragments. Thus, all kind of mimetic 
operations function under the term substitution. Current definitions of sub-
stitution help to conceptualize material translation:17 from the Latin substi-
tutio, substitution means the “action of placing something or someone in 
place of another [and/or] the appointment of a person as alternative heir.” 
Applying a legal perspective, the “action or act of putting one thing in place 
of another” lets the translating (here colonial) agency “inherit” an object 
through the “transfer of any associated rights and duties.” Through the 
substitution of the original architecture in a colonial museum, “the selling 
of an inferior or cheaper product in place of the one desired by the pur-
chaser” takes place. Since the desired original large-scale monument could 
not be acquired by colonial power per se, substitution necessitated adopt-
ing a specific translational strategy—namely, plaster casts—a technique of 
making negative moulds of the original surface to produce a three-dimen-
sional copy from the original in plaster. Subsequently, a limited number of 
translated elements were reassembled in Europe as displays that repre-
sented the whole architectural structure. The heyday of this Europe-wide 
practice of material translation occurred in the second half of the nine-
teenth century; by the first half of the twentieth century, the practice was 
abolished in favour of a focus on authentic originals. In the postmodern 
1980s, plaster casts were rehabilitated as valid “substitutes in museums” 
for the purposes of public education,18 the protection of the original arte-
fact, and the democratization of the same through its display in multiple 
museum settings. However, a focus on European sculpture has meant that 
a discussion of the plaster casts of architecture has only recently begun,19 
15 Gorp 2004.
16 Gorp 2004, 62.
17 Oxford English Dictionary, s. v. “substitution.”
18 Cf. Sofka 1988 and (for a more general view) Sofka and Schärer 1985.
19 Frederiksen and Marchand 2010; Lancestremère 2016; Haak 2016.
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and the discussion of the colonial political implications of plaster casting 
Oriental architecture for Occidental museums continues to be a scholarly 
desideratum.
On the importance of imprints in relation to authenticity and power, 
Georges Didi-Huberman’s reflection that the process of “impression” 
leaves the trace of an original object in a foreign medium is a useful one 
to explore the hypothesis that plaster casts were a powerful tool in the 
translation, appropriation, and representation of architectural heritage.20 
While the original object will alter in its physical appearance over time, the 
trace might technically be fixed as a permanent, anachronic marker—an 
unchangeable imprint represented by a moulding as the basis of plaster 
casting. This moment of direct and intimate contact with the original in 
the process of translation imbues the imprint/moulding with authenticity 
and authority. Like coinage, possessing representative mouldings was the 
central key or generic code for producing authentic re-translations in the 
form of plaster casts. This rematerialization empowered the “inheritor and 
owner” to display, reuse, and even circulate licensed copies of the object in 
any desired place, context, duration, or function according to his political 
intentions.21
How did the products of the European translations of Angkor Wat 
around 1900 look when the site itself was not yet owned by a colonial 
power of Europe, but by Cambodia’s neighbouring kingdom of Siam (today 
Thailand)? As we shall see, France and Germany’s differing cultural and 
political intentions led to different results in the representation of Angkor 
Wat in museums in Paris and Berlin.22
The invention of the Angkor pavilion: The Musée Indo-chinois 
in the Palais de Trocadéro in Paris
Angkor Wat, built in the twelfth century AD, was the largest single temple 
structure in the ancient city plan of Angkor (later sacked by the Siamese in 
the fifteenth century and left by the Khmer king for a new capital). Despite 
being completely abandoned, it survived as a pilgrimage site and Buddhist 
monastery. Consequently, the narrative of a “discovery of the ruined tem-
ple in the jungle” is a French-colonial invention of the late nineteenth cen-
tury.23 The first casts of Angkor Wat were made as a byproduct of a French 
explorative mission concerning the navigability of the Mekong river into 
20 Didi-Huberman 1999.
21 For the dialectics between the authority of the copy and its replication, the issue 
of substitution, and the reciprocal dependency between the surviving original 
and its replica, see also the contribution of Birgit Mersmann in this volume (com-
pare this case study to Falser 2011a).
22 Cf. Falser 2013a.
23 This debate is part of the first part in the upcoming publication of Falser, 
forthcoming.
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China in 1866–1868. They were sent directly to France and were integrated 
into the Universal Exhibition of Paris in 1867, not as specimens of exotic 
architectural decoration, but—in their function as a substitute for origi-
nal objects in general—for the section on techniques of mechanical repro-
duction. This occurred right at that moment when the first pan-European 
translation and exchange project was initiated by the director of the South 
Kensington Museum in London and signed during the event in Paris by 
all monarchies in the form of the so-called International Convention for the 
Exchange of Reproductions of Works of Art.24
One of the mission’s members, Louis Delaporte (a naval captain and 
talented draughtsman), became fascinated with Angkor and, in 1873, 
organized a special mission to Angkor which was at that time situated a 
few kilometres north of the French protectorate of Cambodia, in Siamese 
territory. His decision to bring back either original works or mouldings 
from the site depended mostly on the translatability of the desired objects 
with respect to transportation infrastructure. Although his staff contin-
ued to take away a few heavy originals in sandstone, he assured the Sia-
mese authorities (who strongly forbade any removal) that they were only 
using the substitute technique of creating “plaster casts of sculptures and 
bas-relief”25 from the temples. What he finally brought back was an ini-
tial, massive “trans-lation“ of Angkor for the French métropole containing 
about seventy original sculptures and architectural fragments, 80 mould-
ings of the bas-reliefs of Angkor Wat and other temples, as well as plans, 
drawings, and photographs. When these translational products arrived in 
France in 1874, and were not accepted for the Louvre museum, Delaporte 
found an interim solution for his Musée Khmer in the castle of Compiègne, 
northeast of Paris. 
His first great success, however, came during the Universal Exhibi-
tion of 1878, in Paris. Within the exhibition’s overall objective to place the 
French nation at the pinnacle of world civilization, its colonial project in 
Indochina was already well represented. The colonial section continued to 
display exotic findings (with casts from Angkor), but a special section on 
scientific missions was prominently placed: Delaporte’s Angkor trip with 
plaster casts, drawings, photographs, and—originally conceived as a full-
scale version to counterbalance the gigantic British-Indian pavilion next 
door—a 1:10 scaled plaster cast model of a porte d’entrée of the ancient city 
of Angkor Thom,26 north of Angkor Wat, was featured. Delaporte’s Angkor 
project underwent a small but significant change between the 1867 and 
1878 exhibitions: during the former, it was embedded in the context of 
industrial arts in the age of mechanical reproduction and, during the lat-
ter, in the colonial-scientific propaganda which classified world civilizations 
24 Falser 2014a.
25 Delaporte 1874.
26 A depiction can be found in Soldi 1881, 269–330. For more on the first Angkor 
model in Europe, see Falser 2013b.
296 
MICHAEL FALSER
into different degrees of progress and claimed the (still Siamese) temples 
of Angkor as part of the French patrimoine culturel. 
When Delaporte, in a third setting inside the section Ethnographie des 
peuples étrangers in the Trocadero palace and next to exhibits from Egypt, 
China, and Japan, successfully staged the giant original balustrade of the 
Angkorian Preah Khan temple, he was closer than ever to his ultimate 
goal—the “installation of a permanent Khmer Museum in Paris.”27 For this 
project, Delaporte was heavily influenced by the architectural museum 
projects of France’s strongest rival in the colonial project in Asia—Great 
Britain. In 1874, the newly-built Architectural Courts of the South Kensing-
ton Museum opened: life-sized plaster cast replicas of cultural heritage 
icons manifested Great Britain’s political rhetoric in the form of a veritable 
“three-dimensional imperial archive” that stretched from Trajan’s Column 
in the western court to the gate of the ancient Buddhist site of Sanchi 
in the eastern court,28 representing Great Britain’s civilizing mission to 
inherit India’s ancient cultural heritage as part of British India. Delaporte’s 
Musée indo-chinois opened at the same time as the Parisian Universal 
Exhibition of 1889 (fig. 1). Located at the end of the southern wing of the 
Trocadero palace, his reconstitution of Angkorian temple architecture 
was also an answer to Viollet-le-Duc’s concept of the Musée de sculpture 
comparée, with its 1:1 scale plaster cast facades of (mainly) French Gothic 
sacred architecture.29 
Three other missions to Angkor before 1900 had not only brought more 
than 1,000 plaster cast elements for Delaporte’s substitute version of the 
monumental temple architecture of Angkor in front of the visitor: in front 
of and directly attached to completely black walls, which formed a neu-
tral and homogenizing background, 1:1 copies as “word-by-word trans-
lations” and original exhibits were merged into a metonymic collage of 
larger architectural temple units and stylistic entities. At both ends of the 
staircase into his Indochina Museum, Delaporte reconstituted two temples 
from Angkor as free-standing structures on the basis of several hundred 
“authentic” plaster cast elements. Whereas one pavilion-like structure was 
a literal translation in the form of a life-sized section of the lower east side 
of the central tower of Angkor Wat, the second model was a free trans-
lation that formed a veritable “pastiche à la manière” of the Bayon tem-
ple.30 Delaporte himself asked museum visitors to “virtually reconstitute 
the grandiose ensemble in their imagination” by wandering from the me -
tonymic displays on the walls to the free-standing pastiche models—only 
to conclude with the emotional and political statement that the “real but 
heavily-decayed site” could still be saved, not by the “neglecting Siamese, 
27 Delaporte 1880, 249–250.
28 Barringer 1988, 11.
29 For a study about the French and British versions of staging their own and Ori-
ental architecture in museums, cf. Falser 2013c.
30 For a detailed analysis, cf. Falser 2011b.
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but maybe by the French who did not (yet) own it.”31 Through Delaporte’s 
physical translation of the temple for the French métropole, their ideal (or 
idealized) architectural reconstitution, and their inclusion in the performa-
tive museum parcours, the visitor was familiarized with and initiated into 
the French-colonial vision. The vast archive of “authentic” plaster casts ele-
ments from Angkor, as much as Delaporte’s first free-standing reconstitu-
tions, served as a generic code and inspiration for the Angkor pavilions at 
the following universal and colonial exhibitions. The “real” site of Angkor 
was mentally converted from a living religious site to a dead archaeologi-
cal ruin and canonized as French cultural patrimoine—even before Siam’s 
retrocession of Angkor to (French) Cambodia in 1907.
Competing translations: “Not for the show but for the 
sciences”—Angkor in the Völkerkundemuseum in Berlin
“It will be a pleasure to prove to our dear friends of the Seine that a 
German museum can possess and exhibit what a French museum is 
hiding in childish and stingy pettiness.”32
With the political vacuum hanging over Angkor in around 1900, other 
European nations began to be curious about the site. Surprisingly, by that 
time, it was not Delaporte’s museum that owned the largest complete 
“facsimile” of Angkor Wat, but rather the Ethnographical Museum in Ber-
lin, which possessed altogether 300 mouldings (totalling 200 meters in 
length and up to three meters high) of its famous bas-reliefs.33 The Ger-
man Empire did not try to augment its Indian collections in Berlin with 
specimens of Hinterindien in the context of a direct colonial interest like the 
French, but rather did so for the cultural and scientific prestige befitting a 
rising European power. As a consequence of this different, and not propa-
gandistic but supposedly “scientific” reason, Berlin’s display of Angkor was 
completely different from the French one. Commissioned by the director 
of the museum, Adolf Bastian, along with the head of the Indian section, 
Albert Grünwedel, these mouldings were created in Angkor, in 1898, by 
the rather dubious adventurer Harry Thomann, and were displayed from 
1904 until the destruction of the museum during World War II (fig. 2).
From the beginning, the German argument for the Angkor mouldings 
was formulated in terms that were directed against the French project 
(see introductory quote for this sub-chapter). In March 1898, Grünwedel 
31 Delaporte 1901, 39, 40, 46.
32 Thomann, Harry. 1897. Letter to Albert Grünwedel, December 8. Files regarding 
the acquisition of ethnological artifacts by H. Thomann. Berlin, Ethnologisches 
Museum, Archiv, Pars I.B.31.
33 A 400-page file from the museum’s archive is cited in the following discussion. 
(Thomann 1897) For a detailed analysis, see the two subsequent parts of an 
article about this story in Falser 2012–2014.
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reported that “Bastian had tried several times in vain to purchase cop-
ies from the Musée Khmer, which was hidden in an artillery school at 
Compiègne, but that a unique opportunity arose to acquire maybe some 
originals, certainly paper mouldings (Abklatsche, Papiermulden) and photo-
graphs from Angkor on the Siamese territory.”
The agent for this job knew how to bypass the French port authorities 
in Saigon by using a fake name and nationality. Thomann left Genoa in 
April 1898 under his new name “A. Gillis” and, three months later, reported 
on the progress of his campaign in Angkor, where he attempted to make 
casts with two assistants and 120 “lazy natives.” He took “more than 300 
mouldings from the most famous bas-reliefs of Angkor Wat, 120 additional 
paper mouldings, and 130 photos, for a total purchase price of 110,000 
Marks.”34 In order to finance this purchase, what followed was a curious 
strategy exercised by Grünwedel that included a critique of the French 
translation technique and purpose. Arguing that “the French had moulded 
only a few parts directly from unclean stone and only from selected scenes, 
without any scientific basis and just for an instant show effect (Momentef-
fekt),” he utilized the “Maudsley procedure to get more details and larger 
areas” and suggested that the “controlled multiplication” (see Didi-Huber-
man) of the collection be “offered to other museums in England or the 
USA.” The purchase of Thomann’s Angkor collection would, according to 
34 Thomann, Harry. 1898. Letter to Albert Grünwedel, November 24. Files regard-
ing the acquisition of ethnological artifacts by H. Thomann. Berlin, Ethnologi- 
sches Museum, Archiv, Pars I.B.31.




Figure 3: The 1:1 replica of Angkor Wat during the International Colonial 
Exhibition in Paris, 1931.
Grünwedel, “help to close this intolerable gap inside the Berlin Museum 
[…] and to dwarf the French Angkor project […] an absolutely necessary 
measure of German patriotism and for the leading role of the [German] 
museum with its collection and research of the Far East.” The Thomann 
inventory of 442 entries was bought in its entirety in 1903 and displayed as 
flat, complete and 1:1 scale copies of the bas-reliefs of Angkor Wat along 
the inner gallery walls of the second, and later of the first, floor. Along with 
the Schliemann and Turfan Collection, the bas-reliefs of Angkor Wat con-
tributed to Bastian’s comparative vision of a “universal archive of human-
ity.” This completely two-dimensional and clinical display of the bas-reliefs 
from Angkor Wat in Berlin, in the form of a “scholarly 1:1-translation” (com-
pare Benjamin) with a (supposedly) purely scientific claim, couldn’t have 
been more different from Delaporte’s “free translation” within a French-co-
lonial heritage parcours in Paris.
However, both versions offered valid strategies with which to substitute 
the “Oriental text” of monumental Angkor and helped to pre-define Angkor 
Wat as a UNESCO Cultural Heritage site almost a century later.35 Tragically, 
35 For the discussion of the UNESCO nomination politics and standards of original-
ity and authenticity, see the contribution of Christoph Brumann in this volume 
(compare Falser 2010, 2015b).
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Figure 4a: Delaporte’s 1900 plaster cast replicas from Angkor next to  
the original sculptures in the same interior display in a 2013 exhibition  
in the Musée Guimet in Paris.
Figure 4b: The copies of the original plaster casts from Angkor Wat  
for the former Ethnographic Museum of Berlin, recently rediscovered and 
restored for the future Humboldt-Forum.
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both collections were almost completely lost in the first half of the twenti-
eth century, but the parts that survived are now being slowly rediscovered 
and are considered two different accounts—and rare relics of—the colonial 
translations of the Orient. The French story continued until 1937, when Ang-
kor was reconstituted in several universal and colonial exhibitions in Paris 
and Marseille. During the 1931 International Colonial Exhibition in Paris, 
Delaporte’s small-scale Angkor Wat version had developed into an ephem-
eral 1:1 replica comprising a surface area of 60 × 60 meters and a total 
height of 65 meters—the largest translation qua substitution of non-Euro-
pean architecture on the European continent ever (fig. 3). The rediscovery 
of the plaster casts from Angkor has been in full swing in recent years. The 
Musée Guimet in Paris opened an exhibition about Delaporte’s achieve-
ments in October 2013 (fig. 4a) and the former plates of the Ethnographic 
Museum in Berlin have recently undergone a restoration process, and will 
be incorporated in the future Humboldt Forum (fig. 4b).36
Figures
Fig. 1: Book cover of Le Musée indo-chinois. Antiquités Cambodgiennes, from 
around 1900, by the editor Armand Guérinet.
Fig. 2: Photo: Zentralarchiv der Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin-Preußischer 
Kulturbesitz.
Fig. 3: Photo from Livre d’or de l’Exposition coloniale internationale  
de Paris 1931. Paris, 1931, p. 121.
Fig. 4a: Photo: Author, 2013.
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The Copy of an Empire? 
Charlemagne, the Carolingian 
Renaissance, and Early Medieval 
Perceptions of Late Antiquity
Abstract The term “Carolingian Renaissance” was coined by the French 
historian Jean-Jacques Ampère in 1830, but its wide-spread use goes back 
to his Austrian colleague Erna Patzelt and her essay “Die karolingische Re-
naissance” written in 1924. Since that time, it has served as an icon for 
the cultural revival in early-medieval times and has been heavily utilized 
by historians, art historians, and archaeologists. Based on passages from 
Carolingian key authors like Alcuin and Einhard, who praised their emper-
or for his revival of antique laws, customs, and building traditions, it is 
believed that ninth-century Frankish society made large-scale investments 
in the creation of copies of antique art and architecture. A topic hitherto 
unresearched is the question of a Carolingian concept of copies. How were 
(late) antique art and architecture perceived in the ninth century? Were 
they understood as “heritage”, as a reminder of a glorious past worth copy-
ing? The Marienkirche in Aachen is often interpreted as a Frankish attempt 
to establish equality between the “old” eastern and “new” (recreated) west-
ern emperor by architectural means, its main instrument being copying 
existing imperial architecture. But how much of sixth century Ravenna was 
needed as inspiration for ninth-century Aachen?
Keywords Carolingian Renaissance, Charlemagne, late antiquity, palatial 
architecture, copies of ancient art
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Within the systematic study of the Early Middle Ages, the Carolingian 
Renaissance is one of the topics that has received extensive and widespread 
attention and has been the focus of intensive debates by historians, art 
historians, and archaeologists for more than a century. The fascination this 
particular subject holds is not only illustrated by the large scope of mono-
graphs and articles related to it, but also by grand exhibitions attended by 
a broad audience. The 2014 exhibition on Charlemagne, which was staged 
in Aachen on the occasion of the anniversary of the death of the great 
Frankish ruler, was only one of many that took place within recent dec-
ades.1 The tenor of both the scientific research and the public display of 
such exhibits is usually the same: Charlemagne is depicted as the most 
important of all early-medieval rulers, the one man who (with some help 
from the most prominent intellectuals of his time) brought back the some-
how lost chief achievements of antique art and science, thus founding the 
culture of the European Middle Ages. In a cultural—but also political—way, 
he is deemed the Pater Europae. This alone should be sufficient to justify 
another re-examination of the Carolingian Renaissance, but in the context 
of the workshop “The Transformative Power of the Copy,” upon which the 
present volume has been based, there is even more need, since “copies” 
seem to act as the basis of this particular Renaissance.
Did the Carolingians create their new Roman Empire by means of copy-
ing material objects? The use of the term “Renaissance” seems to indicate 
this—at least if that term is understood in the way Giorgio Vasari, the Ital-
ian painter, architect, and writer coined it in 1550. His definition is usually 
closely tied to the fields of art and art history, but since the term is also 
used in archaeology, the question arises whether we—that is, archaeolo-
gists—should use it in the same way, too (as we currently do). This ques-
tion is to some degree connected with different concepts of copies. These 
play a fundamental role when examining the question of what relevance 
such Renaissances—and copies—have for historical archaeology.2 Archae-
ology seldom focuses on the Renaissance other than in a chronological 
way, since archaeologists believe that Renaissance itself does not affect 
their field of research. Renaissance only happens to other people, most of 
them being art historians. When asked about the fundamental changes 
Italy experienced in the Quattrocento, for example, an archaeologist might 
reply that, since the material culture from that century does not differ much 
from that of the fourteenth century, the period could hardly be argued as 
comprising the dawning of a new age. On the contrary, he or she will use 
the term and terminology introduced by Vasari without hesitation when 
applying it to different ages and/or examples. Historical archaeology is in 
fact full of Renaissance—that is “rebirths”: there is Ottonian Renaissance, 
1 Karl der Große—Charlemagne. Macht Kunst Schätze. Aachen June 20–September 21, 
2014.
2 “Historical archaeology” in the context of this paper means the study of material 
culture of all periods of human history that have also generated written sources.
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Byzantine Renaissance, and Carolingian Renaissance. All these examples 
have a certain concept in common—the “rebirth” of an age, a culture, or 
a political system, that somehow got lost—and they all belong to a period 
that, according to Vasari, certainly could not be connected to his under-
standing of Renaissance because they belong to the dark “Middle Ages” 
that lay between the glorious epoch of antiquity and the beginning of the 
Quattrocento. Also the idea that copying certain objects, like pieces of art, 
played an important role in all these different rebirths is widely accepted 
in Archaeology. The aim of this essay is to analyze one of these examples 
and the role copies might have played in this context.
Shortly after Vasari’s term “Renaissance” was adopted by French and 
German art historians in the first half of the ninteenth century, its usage 
began to spread into neighbouring academic fields. Among the first to use 
the term in a modified way was French historian Jean-Jacques Ampère, 
who compared changes and developments in literature and fine art in the 
ninth century with those of the fifteenth and sixteenth century, thus forg-
ing the idea of a “Carolingian Renaissance.”3 Erna Patzelt’s essay “Die kar-
olingische Renaissance” (The Carolingian Renaissance) written a hundred 
years later marked the beginning of the wide-spread use of the term by 
historians and, eventually, by archaeologists despite the fact that Patzelt 
heavily criticized Ampère’s views.4
Ever since, the so-called Carolingian Renaissance has served as an icon 
for cultural revival in early-medieval times and the term has been used by 
historians, art historians, and archaeologists alike. Its broad acceptance 
is based not only on observations made by Ampère and later colleagues, 
but also on authentic Carolingian texts written by the most famous and 
well-known authors of ninth-century Europe like Alcuin, Hrabanus Maurus, 
and especially Einhard, head of the so-called Hofschule and Charlemagne’s 
biographer. These writers praised their imperial patron for reestablishing 
a Christian Roman Empire by reintroducing ancient laws and customs and 
by implementing a large-scale building program. The testimony of these 
written sources outlines a significant number of reforms Charlemagne 
imposed on his subsects and on his entire realm that culminated in a 
reenstatement of the Roman Empire with himself as the new (western) 
emperor.5 By the end of the eighth century, despite all attempts by the 
Merovingian kings and their Carolingian successors to maintain a form of 
government that was ultimately based on Roman rule, the Roman Empire 
was considered to belong to an age that was long gone—hence the oppor-
tunity to reestablish this realm.6
However, ninth-century texts never speak of rebirth but of renovation: 
Einhard calls Charlemagne’s rule renovatio romani imperii—the restoration 
3 Ampère 1839.
4 Patzelt 1924, 31.
5 Reudenbach 2009, 18–20.
6 Müller 2009, 192.
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of the Roman Empire. By establishing this term, Einhard created a power-
ful vision and image of his era not only for his contemporaries but for all 
who subsequently studied the ninth century. Among others, Einhard speci-
fies the physical means by which his imperial patron re-erected the Roman 
Empire: the building of churches, palaces, bridges, and even canals. The 
so-called Paderborn epos, composed around the year 800, goes even fur-
ther and reports on Charlemagne reconstructing Rome itself— not actu-
ally in Rome, but in his new capital Aachen, which is referred to as Roma 
Secunda, the second Rome. 
On the other hand, Einhard’s chef-d’œuvre, the Vita Karoli Magni, is 
strangely full of coincidences: Charlemagne founds his beloved Aachen 
in the wilderness near a hot spring he accidently discovers. He never 
expected to become emperor and, while praying in Rome on Christmas 
day, was taken by surprise by the pope who wished to crown him. Natu-
rally these anecdotes serve to underline Charlemagne’s modesty—a key 
virtue in any medieval ruler. But still, Einhard leaves us with an ambivalent 
picture of his beloved patron: in all his life, Charlemagne prepares himself 
to become emperor, but the title becomes his by chance. However, other 
written sources and the remaining material of his age tell a different story: 
Charlemagne spent most of his life conquering much of the territories of 
the former Western Roman Empire and beyond. By uniting them under his 
rule, he created a powerbase equally strong to that of the eastern (Byzan-
tine) emperors, who until then had successfully opposed all potential rivals 
to the title from the west. But commanding large armies and ruling vast 
territories alone was clearly not what made a “barbarian” king become a 
Roman emperor. Why indeed should he be attracted to such a position? At 
first glance, the benefits of the imperial crown may have been outweighed 
by the problems it created: the elevation above all other kings in western 
Europe stood against a confrontation with the other great empire on the 
continent. The Byzantine emperors would hardly welcome a new augus-
tus in the West. Apart from this, there was further, surprising evidence to 
be considered: despite 300 years of disruption, the very idea of western 
imperial rule had survived.7 Charlemagne did not want to become another 
“Byzantine” emperor—he instead based his legitimation as imperial ruler 
on the ancient city of Rome itself. This made him not “Roman emperor” but 
“emperor of the Romans”—a significant difference that was also stressed 
by all of his successors. This important detail should also be kept in mind 
when art and architecture of the Carolingian Renaissance are examined 
later in this paper: In terms of politcal ideology, Charlemagne’s frame 
of reference should have been ancient Rome. Thus copying Roman art 
should provide the means of transporting his new status into Carolingian 
society.8 Additionally, this new Roman Empire required an understanding 
with those who actually ruled the city of Rome, i.e. the popes. Support from 
7 Bullough 1999, 42.
8 Reudenbach 2009, 16.
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the most important religious figure in the Latin West enabled the Frankish 
king to style himself as supreme Christian ruler. 
In order to embody the idea of a western emperor, Charlemagne had 
to create objects that functioned as visible markers of his new position. 
The nature of these objects is thought to have already been predefined: 
In Roman times, the presence of imperial power was connected to certain 
places, monuments, and much circulating items that could serve as bearer 
of images and propaganda. Among these, coins were the most important. 
Coins issued by Charlemagne from 800 onwards are closely related to those 
of late antique emperors: both their images and inscriptions are very sim-
ilar, though not identical.9 Also, significant differences from contemporary 
Byzantine coins can be observed. Late antique or Byzantine coins were not 
copied, although this could have easily been done. Instead, Charlemagne’s 
coinage appears as a mixture of features taken from various examples 
from the reign of Augustus to the end of the fourth century. Apart from 
coins, we know of no other non-artistic objects that were reintroduced dur-
ing Charlemagne’s reign as a display of the renovato imperii—ninth-cen-
tury Frankish material culture differed strongly from Late Antiquity and 
no efforts were made to change this. Visualization of imperial power was 
limited to art and architecture and both seem to have been displayed only 
at his residences and partly at important monasteries.10 
As a travelling king of the Early Middle Ages, Charlemagne had no capi-
tal to rule from. Power had to be exercised in person, by the ruler or by his 
appointed representative. Taxation, revolts, wars, and political crises—but 
also ecclesiastical matters—required the presence of the king/emperor in 
various parts of his vast realm. Also nearly all existing cities or rural estates 
lacked an infrastructure that could sustain the royal court permanently. 
The Merovingian kings had already adapted a system of geographical 
mobile rule based on royal palaces (palatia) and estates that could tem-
porarily host their court. While, in the sixth century, most of these palatia 
were located in cities, the first half of the seventh century saw the rise 
of some rural places to full seats of power with architectural furnishings 
comparable to those of the city palaces.11 This system was enhanced in 
Carolingian times and led to a diversity of palatia, some of which were used 
for a single purpose, like hunting.12 Moreover, written sources show a clear 
increase in number of these sites from the middle of the eighth century 
onwards.13 Knowledge about the Carolingian palatia and their Merovingian 
predecessors was, for a long time, almost entirely based on the testimony 
of written sources. Even today, nearly all of the sites in what is today Bel-
gium and France have not been subject to archaeological research; for 
9 Reudenbach 2009, 20. 
10 Reudenbach 2009, 24; Meckseper 2014, 160.
11 Renoux 2001, 29. 
12 Zotz 1997, 100–101. 
13 Zotz 2001, 17.
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some even their exact location is still unknown.14 This includes important 
places such as Attigny—according to written sources, one of the major 
power-centers from the seventh century onwards—and most of the pala-
tia in the valleys of the Oise, Aisne, and Marne rivers. Only two exceptions 
are known: Qierzy and Samoussy were both briefly excavated by the Ger-
man art historian Georg Weise, during the First World War. Weise worked 
under very difficult conditions (both sites were close to the front and partly 
used as army camps) and his brief publication of the results of his excava-
tion is somewhat obscure and—concerning the overall layout of the pala-
tia—inconclusive.15 French archaeologists have rejected his work as being 
unscientific, but still refrain from carrying out their own fieldwork despite 
the fact that both sites (and probably many more, including Attigny) are 
easy accessible, since they were never built on after their destruction in 
the late ninth and tenth century. Only in St. Denis, a prominent monas-
tery, have modern French excavations brought to light a building complex 
that might have served as a palace. In Germany, three important palatia 
have been excavated and studied in detail during recent decades: Aachen, 
Ingelheim, and Paderborn have all yielded many insights into Carolingian 
architecture.16 In the Netherlands, the Valkhof palace in Nijmegen has 
been studied to some extent. Apart from written sources, all information 
about Frankish palaces comes from sites that were founded during the 
rule of Charlemagne. While our current understanding of these palatia is 
quite good, it remains impossible to compare their layout and architecture 
to older examples from Merovingian or early Carolingian times. As will be 
demonstrated later in this paper, the palaces of Charlemagne are often 
linked with other contemporary—and even older—residences outside the 
Frankish realm, but we know nothing about the already existing building 
traditions the ninth-century builders inherited from their predecessors of 
the sixth to eigth centuries. It is generally assumed that the Merovingian 
kings used late antique palaces that already existed in many cities in their 
kingdom, but here again, the archaeological sources are lacking. Despite 
large-scale excavations in the palaces of Cologne and Trier, very little is 
known about their early-medieval phases.17 So the question whether the 
residences of Charlemagne represent a new type of architecture or follow 
older Frankish traditions remains unanswered. The same goes for compar-
isons with later Carolingian palatia. Under the rule of Charles the Bald, Qui-
erzy, for example, is said to have been remodeled to serve as a substitute 
for Aachen (to which the western-Frankish kings no longer had access), 
and was even renamed “Caropolis,” but unfortunately we know nothing 
about the physical appearance of this “city of Charlemagne.”18 This leaves 
14 Renoux 2001, 31. 
15 Weise 1923.
16 Two more examples from Frankfurt and Zürich are known, but much less has 
been excavated from these sites. 
17 Clemens 2001, 43.
18 Renoux 2001, 32. 
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for an analysis the three palatia founded under the rule of Charlemagne 
mentioned above; among them, Aachen is the most prominent and also 
the place which is said to have contained numerous copies, which shall be 
examined below.
The prominence of the Aachen palatium is based on three pieces of 
evidence:
1. Under the reign of Charlemagne, a new palace that subsequently
served as his most favoured domicile was constructed. Towards the
end of his reign in particular, he spent more time in Aachen than in any
other palatium.
2. The resources committed to the erection of the palatium were immense; 
the new buildings had no parallels elsewhere in the Carolingian world.
3. The emperor died at Aachen and was buried in the palace church.
Einhard’s descriptions of the palace and church have for a long time dom-
inated our views about ninth-century Aachen. He and other authors write 
of a large aula and a palace church equipped with late antique spoliae 
columns that were brought from Ravenna together with a bronze statue 
showing Theoderic the Great on horseback. The presence of many dis-
tinguished objects of Roman art in Aachen even today seems to support 
Einhard’s statement that the king (and later emperor) wanted to furnish 
his residence with everything that was expected to exist in an imperial 
capital. From this many scholars have drawn the conclusion that Charle-
magne wanted Aachen, his Roma Secunda, his Rome north of the Alps to 
resemble—in a small way—Rome and Constantinople.19 This view is based 
on statements from different texts that cannot necessarily be connected. 
First, the often expressed view that Charlemagne’s residence was built 
according to some kind of predefined plan must be called into question. 
According to a letter from 787, Charlemagne asked Pope Hadrian I for per-
mission to remove valuable exempla (marble floors, mosaics, and other 
marble furnishings) from palaces in Ravenna. It is thought that most of 
these materials came from the palace of Theoderic the Great, which can 
probably be identified with as a large building complex east of the church 
of Sant’ Appollinare Nuove excavated by Corrado Ricci between 1907 and 
1911.20 It remains unclear whether these spoliae were brought to Aachen. 
Only much later did Einhard write that some columns (columnas atque mar-
mora) used in the Aachen palace church had been obtained in Ravenna 
and Rome because they could not have been found elsewhere. The statue 
of Theoderic appears first in a description of Aachen written by Walahfried 
Strabo around 829. It was said to have been transferred from Ravenna, 
were there seem to have existed two such monuments, in 801.21 Only the 
Paderborn epos calls Aachen Charlemagne’s Roma Secunda. Other texts, 
19 Jacobsen 1994.
20 Porta 2003, 103.
21 Ranaldi and Novara 2014, 116. 
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and Einhard’s vita karoli magni in particular, make no reference to the reno-
vatio in connection with Aachen.22
Surprisingly (and despite some early excavations undertaken by 
Erich Schmidt in 1910–1911 in and around the palace church), all recon-
structions of the buildings belonging to the Aachen palatium were until 
recently based on written sources and studies of the remaining architec-
ture. Recent excavations, building surveys on the palace church (which 
today serves as cathedral), the remains of the aula (later incorporated 
into the medieval town hall), and a reexamination of the results of early 
fieldwork have produced an entirely new picture of this magnificent struc-
ture, thus challenging many old views. But some older positions have also 
been confirmed: According to written sources, the palace church was built 
between 796 and 804. This dating is also attested by dendrochronological 
data from the foundations (798±5°  AD) and the ring armature beam of 
the dome (803±10° AD).23 Roman spolia columns were used for the octa-
gon of the interior; the capitals above are part Roman, part Carolingian 
copies, while the pilaster capitals from the façade are entirely works of 
the early ninth century.24 Many pieces of architectural sculpture that have 
previously been regarded as original Roman objects can now be identified 
as works of the ninth century. They were worked from the same Lorraine 
limestone as the Roman specimens and their quality is surprisingly high: 
some pieces can be distinguished from works of the second or third cen-
turies only by modern scientific analysis and the same is true for much of 
the bronze work. The five bronze doors of the palace church bear close 
resemblance to late antique works, like the door of the temple of Romulus 
on the Forum Romanum, but are also contemporary Carolingian works that 
were manufactured in Aachen, where a bronze heat was excavated close 
to the church25 (fig. 1).
Many scholars have pointed out that the layout used for the Aachen 
palace church is very similar to well-known early Byzantine churches like 
San Vitale in Ravenna, the church of Sergios and Bacchus, and the Hagia 
Sophia in Constantinople or even the Church of the Holy Sepulchre or the 
early Islamic Dome of the Rock. All these buildings are centrally planned 
and domed chapels, but only San Vitale was actually visited by Charle-
magne himself, while all other monuments were probably known only by 
accounts from embassies to foreign courts. Therefore Ravenna seems the 
most likely antetype to be copied by the Aachen palace church, but this 
view has recently been questioned. Although San Vitale and Aachen share 
many architectural features, the buildings themselves served different 
purposes.26 While the Aachen church functioned as a palatine chapel, San 
Vitale was founded by bishops and never used by the Byzantine emperors, 
22 Meckseper 2014, 165.
23 Heckner 2012, 40; Müller et al. 2013, 151. 
24 Schaab and Heckner 2012, 197–199.
25 Ristow 2012a. 
26 Ranaldi and Novara 2014, 118.
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despite the fact that emperor Justinian and his wife Theodora were pic-
tured on mosaics in the main apse. Even if Charlemagne himself admired 
the building on the occasion of one of his visits to Ravenna, he certainly 
would not have recognized the building as a palatine chapel. Also the 
question remains as to why the emperor should have aimed to imitate a 
church like San Vitale or even the Hagia Sophia that was closely connected 
to his Byzantine rivals. Other examples for centrally-planned churches 
were much closer at hand, like the late Merovingian church of St. Gereon 
at Cologne.27 This late antique building, which was probably converted 
into a church by the sixth century, resembles the palace church in many 
27 Müller et al. 2012, 233. 
Figure 1: Aachen. Carolingian Bronze Door of the Palatinate church.
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ways. The Aachen palatinate church clearly stands in the tradition of late 
antique domed buildings, but it was designed not as a copy of an existing 
church, but as an enhancement of a concept that had already existed for 
a long time.28
The second important structure within the Aachen palatium was an aula 
that very likelyprobably served as an audience and banquet hall. While we 
know nothing of its furnishings or internal construction, its overall layout 
has survived in the foundations and ground floor of the late medieval 
town hall. According to a recent building survey, the so-called Granusturm, 
a tower at the east end of the aula, served as a monumental staircase and 
likely connected three storeys. Large aulae are frequently known from late 
antique and early-medieval palaces. Indeed all other Carolingian palatia 
must have included such a building, as can be demonstrated by compar-
isons with Ingelheim and Paderborn. The palace aula of Trier, built in the 
beginning of the fourth century, has often been named as a prototype, but 
this building has much larger dimensions. Further, its condition during the 
ninth century is entirely unknown. By the eighth century, most late antique 
aulae within the Frankish realm were probably in ruins and therefore no 
longer in use.29 Another source of inspiration might have come from con-
temporary residences outside of Charlemagne’s kingdom: In Italy, the 
emperor himself visited the palaces of the newly-conquered Lombard 
kingdom shortly after 774 and—even more importantly—the residence 
of the popes in Rome. Here, he witnessed the large-scale remodeling of 
the Lateran Palace under the aegis of Leo III, including the erection of the 
famous triclinium, the appearance of which is unfortunately only conveyed 
in later descriptions.30 Since both aulae were constructed at the same time, 
the Lateran triclinium could not have been a direct model for Aachen, but 
may have inspired Charlemagne to build something even lager for him-
self. In conclusion, the Aachen palace hall very likely imitated contempo-
rary aulae instead of late Roman buildings. We know very little about other 
parts of the Aachen palace. The aula and church were connected by a cov-
ered walkway that was part of the original layout; a tower-like building 
in the middle of the walkway has, for a long time, been interpreted as a 
monumental entrance gate, but recent research has shown that it dates 
into the forth decade of the ninth century and never served as a gateway.31 
Its precise function—as well as the location of the imperial living quarters 
and other parts of the palace—remains unclear.Today, it is clear that, when 
the emperor died in 814, only the palace church and possibly the aula were 
finished, while much of the other buildings were erected later, or in some 
cases even earlier: One of the annex chapels flanking the palatine church 
28 Heckner 2014, 357.
29 Ley and Wietheger 2014, 241.
30 Luchterhandt 2014, 104. 
31 Ristow 2012b, 2014.
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seems to have been erected in the middle of the eighth century, indicating 
that Aachen was also of some importance to Charlemagne’s predecessors.
Carolingian and later written sources refer to the existence of precious 
works of ancient art that Charlemagne transferred to Aachen in order to 
underline the status of his new capital—among them the abovementioned 
statue of Theoderic which has not survived into later times. Two other 
bronze sculptures—of a bear and a pine cone—that can still be found 
in the entrance hall of the Aachen cathedral have often been attributed 
to this group of artworks. The sculpture of the bear was for a long time 
thought to depict a wolf and thus believed to have been transferred to 
Aachen on behalf of Charlemagne in order to demonstrate his claim to a 
second Rome (fig. 2). It was dated to Roman or even ancient Greek times, 
but recent stylistic analyses claim that the work belongs to the eleventh 
century.32 Similar dates have been discussed concerning the bronze pine 
cone, with its 129 perforated scales that would originally have served as a 
waterspout on a fountain (fig. 3).
32  Künzl 2002, 33; Maas 2013, 30.
Figure 2: Aachen. Bronze sculpture of a bear (?), now in atrium of the 
cathedral, third century or eleventh century. 
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Since a similar bronze pine cone is know from an atrium of the Lateran in 
Rome, it might have been placed in the atrium of the Palatine chapel in 
Carolingian times. Still it bears an inscription that can be firmly dated to 
Ottonian times, indicating that it may have been transferred to Aachen 
much later than the reign of Charlemagne.
The long-favored concept of Aachen being Charlemagne’s Roma 
Secunda, furnished with copies and originals of Roman art and copying 
ancient Roman palaces as a whole has already been questioned a decade 
ago.33 In light of new research, this claim becomes even more unlikely. 
When Constantine the Great founded his new residence in Constantinople, 
he transferred numerous examples of ancient art to his capital, where they 
were then displayed. Whether Charlemagne had similar plans for Aachen, 
however, remains unknown. At least the statue of Theoderic shows that 
he considered the presence of large bronze sculpture a necessary com-
ponent of a residence. This idea was probably not based on the assump-
tion that this was a typical attribute of a Roman imperial palace, but was 
more likely influenced by contemporary examples: In the Lateran palace in 
Rome, there stood the statue of emperor Marcus Aurelius (then mistaken 
33 Lobbedey 2003; Untermann 1999, 162; Untermann 2006, 123.
Figure 3: Aachen. Bronze pine cone, probably dating to the eleventh century. 
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for Constantine the Great) before it was transferred to the Capitoline hill 
in the sixteenth century.34 Again, this could have been an inspiration for 
Aachen, were the palatium was (in later Carolinigian written sources) also 
called “Lateran.”
In conclusion, there is little remaining evidence to support the picture 
of Aachen as a second Rome modeled after Roman palaces. But then again, 
Aachen is not the only residence to discuss in this context. The Ingelheim 
palatium is claimed to be a much more accurate copy of late antique pal-
aces, in contrast to Paderborn, which is seldom mentioned in the debate.35 
In recent times, Ingelheim has become the most widely-investigated Car-
olingian palace. Many new excavations have brought to light significant 
data that have improved the current state of research, although many 
results from older but also from most recent investigations remain unpub-
lished. The basic layout of an aula in the west and a large exedra in the east 
seems to have been already established under the rule of Charlemagne, 
but many of the buildings were probably not finished until the time of 
Louis the Pius. The reason for this may be that, during the later years of his 
rule, Charlemagne concentrated on Aachen (he visited the place after long 
stays in 787–788 and only once more in 807), while his son stayed there 
on ten different occasions between 817 and 840.36 The main difference 
between Aachen and Ingelheim is the absence of a distinguished palatine 
church. Despite the fact that Charlemagne and his successors attended 
many Easter and Christmas masses in Ingelheim, no large religious build-
ing is discernable from the interior of the palace complex. Only a small 
trikonchos in the middle of the compound can possibly be identified as 
a church, but its limited size would have made it unsuitable for offering 
mass to larger audiences. Given the fact that the Ingelheim palatium was 
a comparably large and magnificent building complex, the absence of a 
prominent church is quite surprising. In later times, under the rule of the 
Ottonian and Salian emperors, this shortcoming was adressed by the erec-
tion of a large church on the south wing of the compound. Recent exca-
vations have shown that, in Carolingian times, the church of St. Remigius 
approximately one kilometer west of the palace may have been used as 
the palatinate chapel.37
The round towers in front of the palace façade were for a long time 
interpreted as elements of defense, but today it has become clear that the 
palatium was no fortress and the turrets might have only be used for dec-
oration. Many other parts of the palace seem to bear close resemblance 
34 Ranaldi and Novara 2014, 116.
35 Despite our knowledge of this site, it is usually assumed that Paderborn was not 
built as a copy of Roman architecture, since in newly-conquered Saxony this ref-
erence could hardly be understood by Charlemagne’s new subjects. The exist-
ence of monumental stone buildings in a landscape with an abundance of such 
constructions is thought to have been sufficient to impress the unruly Saxons 
(Gai 1999, 195).
36 Grewe 1999, 151.
37 Grewe 2014, 195. 
322 
ROLAND PRIEN
to Roman palaces The aula, thought modest in its dimensions compared 
to Aachen or Trier, was furnished with an opus-sectile floor and decorated 
with wall paintings depicting biblical and Frankish kings, according to a 
description by Ermoldus Nigellus from the first half of the ninth century.38 
The exedra, with its porticus decorated with Roman spoliae columns and 
capitals and some pieces of Frankish architectural sculpture, appears to 
be a genuine copy of Roman architecture. But, then again, exedrae of this 
size in Roman palaces are unknown; the only direct comparisons can be 
found in Roman forae, notably the Traian Forum, in Rome.39 In the context 
of early medieval architecture, it is a solitairy piece. Another very “Roman” 
feature was the construction of an aqueduct as a water supply for the 
palace. Its construction is unique for the seventh to tenth century and it 
clearly stands in a Roman tradition. Compared to Aachen, the reception 
of antiquity seems to have played a much larger part in the planning of 
the Ingelheim palace. But still, it was no copy of a Roman imperial pal-
ace. The recent excavator Holger Grewe called it a palace built from “ideas 
and material from antique buildings,” that was combined with Carolingian 
innovative capacity.40 This clearly marks Ingelheim as a genuine creation 
of the Carolingian period that is also demonstrated by the choice of its 
building plot: the site was “virgin” with no older representational architec-
ture occupying that space prior and presumable only little Roman remains 
that could have used to compare the buildings of the “old” and the “new” 
Roman Empire.
In sum, it can be asserted that the palatia of Charlemagne—as we know 
them today—were not copies of Roman imperial palaces, nor were they 
meant to imitate them. As an increasing number of other scholars have 
recently detected, the builders of the Carolingian palace drew their inspira-
tion from both late antique and contemporary architecture, thus creating 
something novel.41 While the layout of single buildings may indeed have 
been inspired by older Roman architecture, the complex as a whole has 
no parallels elsewhere. Single parts of architectural sculptures are of a 
remarkably high quality that makes them nearly indistinguishable from 
older Roman works. The palaces at Ingelheim and Aachen cannot be com-
pared to older imperial residences like Rome or Constantinople because of 
their different function and size. The Great Palace in the city of Constantine 
served as a permanent seat of government, while Carolingian palatia—like 
their Merovingian predecessors—were neither permanently in use nor 
did they predominantly function as government buildings. Charlemagne’s 
main activities at these locations were bathing, hunting, and resting—in 
short: they were places of leisure. But since kings and emperors are never 
really absent from office, certain aspects of government were always 
38 Grewe 2001, 158. 
39 Grewe 2014, 191.
40 Grewe 2014, 193–194.
41 Lobbedey 2003; Slot 2009.
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included in their stays at these palaces. It also must have been clear to 
Charlemagne that he could have imitated Roman or Byzantine palaces, but 
that would never have been able to match their size.42
From the Upper Rhine Area comes another example of Carolingian 
architecture, which has for a long time served as a distinguished example 
of a ninth-century copy of classical Roman design: the so-called “Torhalle” 
(or entrance hall) of the Lorsch monastery, probalby erected under the 
reign of Charlemagne’s son Louis the Pius, has often been compared to 
Roman triumphal arches, but this view was already been questioned some 
time ago.43 The form of the basement with its three arches flanked by col-
umns crowned by composite capitals is indeed reminiscent of classical 
Roman arches, but the upper floor with a room decorated with paintings 
that evoke associations of open, pavilion-like architecture clearly demon-
strates that this building had a different meaning and served different 
functions44 (figs. 4–5).
Again, the layout of the façade is unique and can only be compared with 
Merovingian and subsequent Carolingian architecture, but not with that of 
ancient Rome.45 The primary function of this building remains unclear, but 
as its comparably low arches make it appear unsuitable for a ceremonial 
entrance monument; it may have served as a scene for judicature.46 Still, 
Carolingian artists were familiar with the concept of triumphal arches, as 
can be illustrated by the so-called “Einhardsbogen,” a now-lost silver min-
iature from the St. Servatius church treasury at Maastricht, its appearance 
conveyed in a seventeenth-century drawing. But even this small model 
arch is not a copy of a Roman monument, but rather an inventive com-
bination of an antique example of architecture with contemporary reli-
gious iconography. Like that of the Lorsch “Torhalle,” its original function 
remains unknown. Triumphal arches were hallmarks for the visualization 
of imperial power in antiquity, yet no Carolingian copy of them is known. 
The reason for this may lay in the fact that this type of monument lost its 
role in course of the sixth century. Beyond that time—with the exception 
of Byzantium—no triumphal processions including arches are known from 
written sources.
The examples of Carolingian architecture and art discussed in this 
paper are not very numerous, yet they represent ain large part of those 
buildings and objects on which the thesis of a renovatio romani imperii 
under the Rule of Charlemagne is usually based. Many of them have tra-
ditionally been understood as copies of Roman originals, but a closer look 
at these “copies” shows that neither Carolingian art nor architecture can 
be merely understood as replicas of antique examples. On the contrary, 
42 Ley and Wietheger 2014, 245.
43 Binding 1977, 289.
44 Untermann 2011, 201.
45 The earliest comparison of some details of its decoration can be found in the 
façade of the baptistery St. Jaen in Poitiers.
46 Untermann 2009, 137.
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they appear to be genuine and innovative products of a period charac-
terized by artistic traditions that were deeply rooted in Late Antiquity, but 
combined with an understanding of art and building traditions that were 
fundamentally different from those of their predecessors. In this context, 
copies played literally no role, because there was no Carolingian con-
cept of copies. They are not mentioned anywhere in ninth-century texts. 
Instead, Einhard and his fellow authors often write about buildings erected 
under the reign of Charlemagne that are worthy of or appropriate for a 
Roman emperor but never comparable to already existing architecture. If 
a comparison to ancient buildings is made at all, it only serves to illustrate 
that the newly-erected monuments were superior in size, quality, and even 
beauty.47 Likewise, we do not know if sculptures that appear to resemble 
47 Meckseper 2014, 166, 168.
Figure 4: Lorsch. Limestone composite capital on the façade of the “Torhalle”.
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older Roman art were perceived as copies in the sense that eighteenth or 
ninteenth-century art historians understood them. As stated above, most 
Carolingian objects of art and architecture were based on artistic traditions 
dating back to the Merovingian and Late Antique periods. Roman art from 
the second or fourth century was not perceived as “ancient” or even “more 
valuable” than contemporary art. It was simply part of the cultural frame-
work of the ninth century and probably seen more as a quality standard 
that Carolingian artists tried to follow. In short, Charlemagne’s renevatio 
imperii was an attempt to improve the current state of his realm by raising 
standards. It was not an attempt to revitalize the corpse of an empire fallen 
long ago by imitating its art and architecture. But such a futile undertaking 
is know from later times, when Eastern Frankish kings styled themselves 
as Roman emperors and, in turn, tried to revive the Carolingian Empire by 
copying its most prominent monument: Some eleventh century copies of 
the Aachen palace church have been identified, among them the church 
of St. Pierre et St. Paul at Ottmarsheim, which is a very accurate replica of 
Aachen, only on a slightly smaller scale.48 But this is a different story of 
different copies.
In conclusion, it must be stated that the concept of a Carolingian 
Renaissance as it is currently used by many archaeologists, historians, and 
art historians is misleading, because it is based on the idea of objects and 
48 Untermann 1999, 167.
Figure 5: Lorsch. Limestone capital on the façade of the “Torhalle”.
326 
ROLAND PRIEN
architecture that are perceived as early medieval “copies” of Roman “origi-
nals”. While the term certainly retains its usefulness when applied to Caro-
lingian literature, archaeologists for example should refrain from using it, 
because such copies are entirely missing within the material culture of the 
ninth century. Also, this case demonstrates that “copying” terms and defi-
nitions coined by authors of neighbouring disciplines introduces a variety 
of dangers: many concepts are not transferable, since the nature of the 
studied sources simply differs too much. This seems especially true for the 
subjects of archaeology and history. In short, copying Renaissances can be 
seriously misleading!
Figures
Fig. 1: Photo: Author.
Fig. 2: Photo: Author.
Fig. 3: Photo: Author.
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Copying and Competition:  
Meissen Porcelain and the Saxon 
Triumph over the Emperor of China
Abstract It was faithful copies of Japanese porcelain in the Kakiemon 
style that brought about a crucial change in the appreciation of Meissen 
porcelain around 1730, two decades after the foundation of the first porce-
lain manufactory in Europe. The fact that distinguished collectors initially 
believed them to be East Asian commanded widespread attention and ad-
miration for the Saxon copies in France. It was even stated that some con-
noisseurs preferred them to the Japanese prototypes. Their unexpected 
success in Paris, the foremost market for art of the time, also altered the 
understanding of this native product in Dresden. Convinced that his porce-
lain had finally trumped the highly-rated imports from the Far East, Augus-
tus the Strong abandoned the plans for his “porcelain palace,” the so-called 
“Japanese Palace:” Henceforth, the central throne gallery of the palace was 
to be reserved for Meissen copies in the Kakiemon style to testify the su-
periority of Saxon porcelain. By staging an imaginary public audience of a 
Far-Eastern delegation whose porcelain gifts he rejected as inferior, Augus-
tus the Strong went so far as to present the success of his unique and much- 
envied manufactory as a triumph of the Saxon Elector and King in Poland 
over the almighty Emperor of China. To this end, he eclectically copied and 
adapted the most successful patterns of absolutist representation in or-
der to emulate previously existing examples of absolutist representation. 
Being his last, most ambitious, though ultimately unfinished project, the 
designs for the Japanese Palace sum up Augustus the Strong’s constant 
quest to bolster the royal dignity and imperial aspirations of his dynasty.
Keywords Dresden, Augustus the Strong, Japanese Palace (Dresden), 




When the first Chinese porcelain arrived in Europe in the early sixteenth 
century, it soon fired in European hearts a desire to find out how to copy 
this highly-treasured exotic material. Europeans were fascinated by the 
mysterious processes that turned simple clay into gleaming white translu-
cent wares adorned with enduring and brilliant colors, very delicate and at 
the same time resistant to heat. Nothing comparable had ever been pro-
duced in Europe. When, in 1710—after two hundred years of vain exper-
imentation—Augustus the Strong proudly announced the establishment 
of Europe’s first porcelain manufactory at Meissen, it was a major triumph 
for the Elector of Saxony and King in Poland. The royal manufactory was a 
unique trump card that distinguished him from all other European princes.
For two decades after the manufactory at Meissen was founded (during 
which time the method and techniques for making porcelain were mas-
tered), East Asian porcelain remained the model against which the new 
Saxon products had to compete. Within a very short time, Augustus the 
Strong assembled the largest collection of Chinese and Japanese porcelain 
in Europe, which served his manufactory as a permanent source of inspira-
tion, stimulus, and incentive. The Saxons honed their skills and recipes by 
making copies, which made it easy for all concerned to compare the qual-
ity of the new Saxon porcelain with the much-admired East Asian wares. 
The contest between the copies and their prototypes is reflected in the 
design of the Japanese Palace, which is situated on the northern bank of 
the Elbe in Dresden’s New Town (“Neustadt”), in which Augustus the Strong 
planned to house and display his enormous collection (fig. 1). 
Figure 1: Japanese Palace in Dresden’s New Town, 1727–1733.
333
COPYING AND COMPETITION
Once his royal manufactory was finally capable of imitating not only the 
smallest and simplest, but also the biggest and most technically-demand-
ing Far Eastern pieces, the former maison de plaisance was extended to res-
idence-like proportions with four wings surrounding an inner courtyard. 
Surviving floor plans and elevations dating from 1730 reveal that the walls 
of each room were supposed to be decked out with porcelain of a certain 
type and color (fig. 2).1 Augustus the Strong was the only European ruler 
capable of designing and carrying out such an ambitious project, because 
only he was able to add to his immense yet still insufficient stock of East 
Asian porcelain by ordering the necessary complementary pieces from his 
own royal manufactory.
In March 1730, the king submitted an initial commission to Meissen for 
nearly fifteen hundred vases and dishes after East Asian examples.2 As 
can be gathered from surviving drawings and contemporary documents, 
the initial plan was to show the copies side by side with their prototypes. 
1 For a valuable outline of the Japanese Palace’s history, see Wittwer 2004, 32–58.
2 The order list is published in Wittwer 2004, 257. For additional documents 
concerning this royal commission, see Boltz 1980, 20.
Figure 2: Japanese Palace, floor plan of the upper floor, 1730. 
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For the two corner rooms on the upper floor, for instance, where vases in 
blue and gold were to be displayed, at least twenty-six so-called birdcage 
vases—easily recognizable on the elevations for their characteristic out-
lines—were needed to complete the symmetrical wall compositions (figs. 
3–4). Yet the inventory of the royal collection lists only twenty of these 
extremely rare Japanese pieces.3
In his commission, the king therefore asked for additional “birdcages” 
painted in blue and gold to compensate for the lack of originals. The pal-
ace’s castellan responsible for coordinating deliveries from Meissen would 
also have shown visitors around the Japanese Palace. When he pointed 
out to guests that these exact copies were actually produced in Meissen, 
they would have been compelled to acknowledge that the astoundingly 
deceptive Saxon porcelain was indeed the equal of the much-admired and 
hitherto unique imports from China and Japan.
3 Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden, archive of the Porzellansammlung, inven-
tory no. 234, 348–349.
Figure 3: Birdcage vase, Japan, ca. 1700.
335
COPYING AND COMPETITION
Fakes for the Parisian art market: A turning point
Even before the year 1730 was out, however, the plans for the Japanese 
Palace, then still under construction, were completely revised to mirror a 
new understanding and appreciation of Saxon porcelain that had its roots 
in a scandal derived from the practice of marketing Meissen copies as East 
Asian originals.4 Since 1729, a Parisian dealer by the name of Rodolphe 
Lemaire had been ordering exact copies of (mainly) old Japanese porcelain 
in the Kakiemon style (fig. 5).
This was then very popular in France, but since it was no longer being 
produced in Japan, it could only be bought second-hand and at high prices. 
That Lemaire’s aim was to reap large profits by selling the Meissen copies 
in Paris as Japanese originals was obvious from the beginning, because 
4 For an extensive discussion of this aspect citing all relevant archival documents 
as well as prior literature on this topic, see Weber 2013, vol. 1, 33–59.
Figure 4: Japanese Palace, elevation of one wall of the corner room in the upper 
floor for vases in gold and blue, 1729.
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he expressly asked for his pieces not to be marked on the underside with 
crossed swords.5 At first, Lemaire received Meissen porcelain with no 
marks at all or with pseudo-Chinese letters as he had requested. Not long 
afterward, however, Augustus the Strong ordered that every single piece 
had to be marked with the crossed swords, explicitly stating that the pieces 
for Lemaire were also to bear this mark, in order to prevent the French 
merchant from continuing to sell them as anything other than Saxon por-
celain. Understandably, the king was interested in promoting the products 
of his unique manufactory all over Europe. Nevertheless, Lemaire man-
aged to obtain copies with the crossed swords in blue enamel on the glaze 
and not under the glaze, as was customary (figs. 6–7). 
The suspicion that immediately springs to mind is confirmed by a 
hitherto overlooked document in the Dresden archive, the duplicate of a 
5 This mark, derived from the Saxon coat of arms, would have clearly indicated 
Saxon provenance.
Figure 5: Meissen six-sided vase copying a Japanese example in the Kakiemon 
style, Meissen porcelain manufactory, ca. 1729/1731.
337
COPYING AND COMPETITION
letter by an anonymous Frenchman and self-appointed specialist for the 
Saxon court who makes reference to the Parisian trade in Meissen cop-
ies of East Asian prototypes. The writer begins by praising Saxon porce-
lain, the standard of which had by then equalled—and in some respects 
Figure 6: Meissen cups and saucers copying Japanese examples in the Kakiemon 
style, Meissen porcelain manufactory, ca. 1729/1731.
Figure 7: Meissen crossed swords mark in blue enamel 
overglaze on one of the saucers in fig. 6.
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even outstripped—that of the Far-Eastern imports. He assures his reader 
that the Japanese originals are by no means better than the Saxon copies, 
as is shown by the fact that even the most distinguished of connoisseurs 
is wont to err when confronted with the latter. This, he continues, was 
proven by the example of a certain porcelain dealer called Plâtrier who 
had rubbed off the Saxon marks (in blue enamel on the glaze) with the 
help of a diamond and had succeeded in passing them off as originals to 
the Marquis de la Faye, the Countess de Verrue, the marshal d’Estrée, and 
the Duc de Gramont—amongst a number of other Parisian amateurs and 
merchants.6 The fact that highly-respected collectors had initially believed 
them to be East Asian attracted widespread attention and provoked even 
greater admiration for the Saxon copies in Paris. An article in the Mercure 
de France of February 1731 also states that the quality of the Meissen cop-
ies was such that the most skilful connoisseurs were often duped by them, 
even preferring them to Far Eastern originals—to the outrage of a number 
of stubborn amateurs still devoted to the East Asian wares.7
Reconception of the Japanese Palace in Dresden
The unexpected success of the Meissen copies in Paris, the foremost 
art market of the time, did not go unnoticed in Saxony, where it led to 
a new evaluation and understanding of the local product. Augustus the 
6 “Les porcelaines de Saxe sont parvenües à un dégré de perfection, qui égalle 
celle des anciennes de la Chine et du Japon et même quelquefois les èffacent 
tant pour la blancheur de la paste que par leur poid. […] L’ancienne porce-
laine de Indes á cause de sa rareté est cent fois plus chere que celle de Saxe, 
et cependant elle n’est guere plus belle, puisque les plus fins connoisseurs sy 
trompent souvent, témoin l’exemple du nommé Plátrier marchand de porce-
laine à Paris qui en a vendu plusieurs fois à M. Delafayë, à Madame de Verruë, 
à M. Le Maréchal d’Estré, à M Le Duc de Granmond, et à un nombre d’amateurs 
et de marchands de Paris. Il est vray que l’on assure qu’il en ostoit la marque de 
Saxe avec un Diamant, et que cela luy à attiré de facheuses affaires, et alterré 
sa réputation.” Sächsisches Staatsarchiv, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, 10026 
Geheimes Kabinett, Loc. 1341/4, fols. 45a–45b.
7 “Nous ne connoissions pas cette nouvelle Manufacture de Porcelaines à Vienne, 
mais pour celle qui est établie à Dresde, Capitale de l’Electorat de Saxe, nous 
osons assurer sans craindre qu’on puisse nous accuser d’exagerer, qu’elle a fait 
un tel progrés depuis deux ou trois ans, qu’on a envoyé de Paris des Modeles, 
des Desseins et des personnes intelligentes, qu’il en vient aujourd’hui quantité 
de Pieces comparables à ce qui vient de plus beau de la Chine et du Japon, et 
communément de plus belles formes, les Figures, les Animaux, les Arbres, les 
Plantes et les Fleurs, &c. mieux dessinez et plus de varieté et d’union dans les 
couleurs; les Reliefs, Broderies et Ornemens, sont traitez avec beaucoup de 
cimétrie, de précision et de goût; de telle sorte que les plus habiles Connoisseurs 
sont souvent en deffaut, prenant cette nouvelle Porcelaine pour l’ancienne, et 
souvent même lui donnent la préference, au grand scandale de divers Curieux 
d’un gout trop rafiné, ou peut-être mal sûr, et en qui abonde quelquefois plus 
d’entêtement ou d’ostentation que de justesse, et qui esclaves du préjugé, lui 
laissent exercer sans la moindre résistance, toute sa tyrannie […].” Mercure de 
France (February 1731), 329.
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Strong quickly became convinced that his porcelain not only equalled 
but also surpassed the East Asian wares. Henceforth the Saxon porcelain 
was to be displayed separately in the piano nobile of the Japanese Palace, 
as is first documented in a well-informed travel report by Johann Georg 
Keyssler dating from 23 October, 1730.8 Keyssler reports that the porce-
lain intended for the central hall of the upper floor, the throne gallery 
(fig. 8), was none other than the Meissen porcelain in the old Indian style, 
that is, the very same Meissen copies in the Kakiemon style that were so 
sought after in Paris.
Although the plans were never realised, a written concept for the intended 
iconographic programme of the throne gallery has survived.9 The concept 
was based on the imaginary idea of Augustus the Strong receiving a dele-
gation from the Far East bringing with them examples of their renowned 
porcelain as diplomatic gifts. These highly-treasured exotica were to be 
judged by Minerva, the goddess of wisdom and the patron of the arts, and 
compared with the Meissen porcelain presented by Saxonia. Minerva was 
8 The relevant passage is published in Wittwer 2004, 255–256.
9 Published in Wittwer 2004, 256–257.
Figure 8: Japanese Palace, floor plan of the upper floor, 1730.
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to give the crown to the latter, rejecting the gifts offered by the visiting 
delegation as inferior. Allegorical figures representing Jealousy and Cha-
grin were to give a sign to the Japanese to take their porcelain back home, 
as there was no longer any need for it, now that the Meissen manufactory 
could satisfy European demand. Augustus the Strong was convinced that 
Saxony was about to be enthroned as king of Europe’s lucrative porcelain 
market. The Meissen copies in the Kakiemon style that had conquered 
Paris and were to be displayed on the walls of the throne gallery were sup-
posed to serve as actual proof of the Saxon victory.
Even before entering the Japanese Palace, the visitor was to be intro-
duced to the crucial message of Saxony’s triumph. In accordance with 
the redesign of the interior, the leading court architect Jean de Bodt 
drew up a new scheme for the facade, featuring an allegorical relief in 
the entrance pediment (figs. 9–10), at the centre of which Saxonia sits 
enthroned, the palm trees casting their shadows upon her, already prom-
ising her victory. 
Saxonia looks down from her throne to the Asians on her right, humbly 
presenting their shipment of porcelain. The Saxons approach with their 
vases and vessels from the left. In contrast to the Asian kneeling opposite 
her, the personification of Dresden—bearing a mural crown—confidently 
places one foot on the first step to the throne. The facade thus anticipates 
the outcome of the competition that was supposedly carried out inside. 
The acroteria just over the depictions of the rivers Yangtze and Elbe in the 
two corners of the pediment represent Asia and Europe, thus turning the 
encounter into a contest between what were considered the two most 
developed continents of the time, with Saxony defending Europe’s pre- 
eminence. In their turn, the coat of arms and the royal crown just under-
neath the personification of Saxony were to ensure the identification of 
the land with the Saxon elector and “king in Poland.” The two small flank-
ing reliefs displaying allegories of the arts of modelling porcelain and 
Figure 9: Japanese Palace, elevation of the front side by Jean de Bodt, 1730.
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decorating the fired wares, which were likewise not executed, were to 
show that the celebrated Saxon triumph was ultimately based on the 
success of the Meissen manufactory.
A tour of the projected new interiors
Having entered the Japanese Palace, the visitor was first to marvel at the 
quality and diversity of Augustus the Strong’s Chinese and Japanese por-
celain, “which for beauty, & quantity exceed[ed] any other collection of 
Europe.”10 The East Asian works, grouped according to types and colors in 
the rooms of the ground floor, set widely-admired standards which were 
to be outrivalled by the Meissen porcelain on the piano nobile. Stepping 
out of the stairwell into the gallery of the upper floor facing Dresden’s 
New Town, the guest would have first been confronted with monumental 
Meissen figures and vases fit for demonstrating what the Saxon genius 
could—on the basis of European artistic principles—make of this exotic 
material: first and foremost, namely, the gallery was to house a complete 
menagerie of life-size porcelain animals which were without precedent 
even in China (fig. 11).11
The culmination of the circuit, however, was the grand throne gal-
lery overlooking the garden and the Elbe, which was so designed as 
10 Quotation from a travel report by the English clergyman Jeremiah Milles of 
1736; the relevant passage is published in Weber 2013, vol. 1, 127–128.
11 For a profound discussion of this menagerie of porcelain in the context of the 
Japanese Palace, see Wittwer 2004, 212–216.
Figure 10: Detail of fig. 9.
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to stand at the centre of a sequence of rooms with the layout of a state 
apartment in a princely residence.12 Before arriving there, the visitor had 
to traverse an exceptionally long enfilade of four antechambers.13 In the 
floor plan of 1730, these are inscribed with different colors in accordance 
with the Meissen porcelain to be displayed on consoles on the walls (fig. 8). 
While the vases and dishes in these rooms were painted with the ground 
color allocated to the room, the reserves on all the pieces bore decoration 
in the Kakiemon style, thus anticipating the dominant motif of the throne 
gallery (fig. 12).
In addition to the abovementioned travel report from 1730, the present 
essay will draw on two principal sources in order to reconstruct the pro-
jected interior of the throne gallery: firstly, the designs for the end walls 
from the same year by the Dresden court architect Zacharias Longuelune, 
which the king approved with a “fi[at] AR” (figs. 13–14) and secondly, 
12 See Wittwer 2004, 156–157.
13 See Pozsgai 2008. In German-speaking countries, two antechambers that could 
be preceded by a dining room were customary.
Figure 11: Saber-toothed tiger, Meissen porcelain manufactory, 
model by Gottlieb Kirchner, ca. 1733.
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Longuelune’s written “Explication de la Galerie du Palais du Japon à la Ville 
neuve,”14 which he composed a few years later, at around 1734/35, by 
which time Augustus the Strong had died without carrying out his ambi-
tious plans. Upon his death on 1 February, 1733, all that was more or less 
completed was the building structure.
For the time being, his scheme was adhered to by his son and suc-
cessor Augustus III. As Longuelune, who was commissioned with a final 
series of designs, changed his 1730 plans only in certain details, it can be 
assumed that the “explanation” of the throne gallery of 1734/35 does in 
fact still reflect Augustus the Strong’s original intentions.15
In October 1730, Keyssler noted that the visitor coming from the enfi-
lade of antechambers then entered the grand gallery, which measured 
around 74 metres in length. On entering, he was supposed to see first a 
domed canopy with a carillon of porcelain bells suspended underneath 
it. To Keyssler’s astonishment, the place underneath the canopy usually 
reserved for a chair was intended to be taken by a clock that was big 
14 See footnote 9.
15 See Wittwer 2004, 44 and 53; Baur 2014, 212–214, 243. For Longuelune’s final 
series of designs, see Sächsisches Staatsarchiv, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, 
10006 (OHMA), P, Cap. II, Nr. 15, fols. 22a, 22e, 23l, 23i, 24a, 24b, 24d, 24e, 25b. 
Individual drawings are reproduced in Franz 1953, figs. 94–96, 98, 99, 101, 104 
and Wittwer 2004, figs. 37, 39.
Figure 12: Bottles and dishes with celadon green ground color for the Japanese 
Palace, Meissen porcelain manufactory, ca. 1730/1735.
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enough to hide an organist playing the carillon.16 According to Longuelune, 
the corner room with the clock which opened onto the slightly smaller mid-
dle section of the gallery was to be dedicated to the sun as the regulator 
of day and night, so that all ornaments had to relate to Apollo. The iden-
tification of the Roman sun god with the Saxon-Polish king would have 
been ensured by the cypher “AR” on the front of the canopy, in line with 
the head of Apollo on top of it (fig. 13). For the ceiling painting, Longuelune 
16 “Hierauf folget die große Galerie von obiger Höhe und zwey hundert und 
sechszig Fuß in der Länge. Gleich beim Eintritte derselben wird sich ein großer 
Baldachin zeigen, worunter ein Glockenspiel von Porzellan hängt. Wo sonst der 
Stuhl seyn sollte, wird eine Uhr, die sechs Fuß in ihrer Höhe hat, stehen, und 
hinter derselben wird ein verborgener Platz für einen Organisten, der das Glock-
enspiel regieren kann, angeleget seyn.” Quoted in Wittwer 2004, 255.
Figure 13: Japanese Palace, elevation of the wall with the clock in one of 
the corner rooms of the upper floor, by Zacharias Longuelune, 1730.
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recommends representing the sun at its zenith, pouring out its rays and 
benefits on representatives of all the nations.17
At the far end of the gallery, exactly opposite the clock, an eight-metre-
tall throne made of porcelain was to stand under a domed canopy with a 
palm tree at its back, exactly as shown in the front pediment of the Jap-
anese Palace (fig. 14). As Longuelune states, this emblem signified that 
the benefits of wars, victories, and fortunate negotiations regarding the 
interests of states and kingdoms were due to and resulted from the just 
17 “Comme le Salon du Klocken-Spiel, ou doit être l’Orloge est /: pour ainsi dire:/ 
consacré au Soleil, qui régle les jours et les heures, tous les ornements doivent 
avoir du raport à Apollon. […] Dans le Plafond du même salon, on pourra y repre-
senter le Soleil au plus haut de sa course, répondant sa lumiere et ses benignes 
influences sur toutes les Nations; les diferents caracteres des têtes de chaque 
nation, et leurs habillements diferents, contribueront beaucoup à donner de la 
varieté au sujet, joint aux alégories qu’un habile Peintre y saura ajoûter.” Säch-
sisches Staatsarchiv, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, 10026 Geheimes Kabinett, Loc. 
895/11, fols. 1a/b, 1b/a. The quotation in Wittwer 2004, 256 is incomplete.
Figure 14: Japanese Palace, elevation of the wall with the throne in one of 
the corner rooms of the upper floor, by Zacharias Longuelune, 1730.
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resolutions and orders emanating from the throne and the royal counsel. 
The heads on the lambrequin of the dais in turn represented the different 
human affects that were subordinated to the throne as mere ornaments.18 
The king could hush them by listening to Sapientia and Prudentia, who 
would be seen sitting on either side of the throne. If one looks closely at 
Longuelune’s drawing of 1730, one can see that the throne was originally 
to be flanked by Justice and Minerva, the Roman goddess of wisdom. This 
placed emphasis on the latter, who was also to be the protagonist of the 
ceiling painting in the scheme proposed by Longuelune, who suggested 
that the dispute between Minerva and Neptune concerning the naming 
of the city Athens should be the subject of the ceiling; this would have 
allowed for the depiction of all the gods of Olympus.19
Before the eyes of all nations at one end of the gallery, and of all the 
gods at the other end, the rivalry between the Saxon and East Asian porce-
lain was to be settled once and for all: 
The ceiling of the gallery between the two cabinets will be divided 
into three sections. The middle one will represent Saxony and Japan 
in the presence of Minerva, competing for the preference and the 
perfection of their porcelain manufactories. They will be accompa-
nied by Emulation, Taste, Invention, Imitation, Painting, Sculpture 
and all that contributes to the beauty of works of this kind. The god-
dess will put the crown, or the prize of the dispute, into the hands 
of Saxony. And Jealousy and Chagrin will make a sign to suggest to 
Japan that they should put back their porcelain vases onto the ships 
that had brought them. […] The two other sections of the ceiling will 
represent the arts and manufactories set up in Saxony on the one 
side and the advantageous products of Nature born or created in 
the country on the other.20
18 “Dans le fond du Trône, on y a representé en bas relief un grand Palmier, duquel 
la Victoire vient de cueillir une branche, pour marquer les avantages qui se rem-
porte dans les Batailles, par les victoires: […]. Le sens de cette Embléme signifie, 
que les avantages des Guerres, des Victoires, et des Negociations heureuses, 
qui regardent les interrets des Etats, et des Roïaumes, sont duës, et viennent 
ordinairement des justes resolutions, et des ordres qui émanent du Trône et du 
Conseil des Rois. On a mis dans le Cartouche au dessus du Dais les Armes de 
Pologne et de Saxe, ornez de Palmes et d’Oliviers, les Têtes, qui l’enrichit, repre-
sentent les diferentes passions des hommes, pour montrer qu’elles sont assu-
jetties au Trône, qu’elles n’y servent que d’ornements, et que les Souverains en y 
montant, savent les faire taire, en n’écoutant plus que la sagesse et la prudence; 
qui sont representées par les deux statuës qui sont aux deux côtez du Trône. 
[…] On pourra peindre dans le Plafond la dispute entre Minerva et Neptune, tou-
chant la nomination de la Ville d’Athéne: C’est un grand sujet puisqu’on y peut 
representer tous les Dieux du Paganisme, et un Peintre savant, y pourra joindre 
des ornements et des alégories ingenieuses.” Quoted in Wittwer 2004, 256.
19 See footnote 18.
20 “Le Plafond de la Galerie entre les deux Salons, sera partagé en trois parties, 
celle du milieu representera la Saxe et le Japon, qui disputent ensemble, en pres-
ence de Minerve, sur la preference, et la perfection des ouvrages de leurs man-
ifactures de Porcelaines; Elles seront accompagnées de l’Émulation, du Goût, de 
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The central ceiling of the throne gallery was to maintain the theme of the 
pediment relief over the entrance. The assumed victory of the Saxon por-
celain over the imports from the Far East which, in the eyes of Augustus the 
Strong, had been achieved through the unexpected success of deceptively 
perfect Meissen copies was the core idea of the newly-conceived Japanese 
Palace that would convince all its visitors. In the following, an attempt shall 
be made to decode the complex message built around this crucial if imagi-
nary triumph. The analysis will thereby exemplify that the visual reasoning 
made use of another type of copying: the eclectic quotation of different 
successful patterns of representation which were fused in order to surpass 
previously existing examples of absolutist representation.
The example of the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles
In architectural terms, the setting of the throne at the end of a long gallery 
extending over an entire wing of the building was exceptional. This feature 
of the Japanese Palace cites a prominent example which would have been 
familiar not only to the French-trained architects at the Dresden court, but 
also to Augustus the Strong, who had been introduced to Louis XIV in the 
Hall of Mirrors at Versailles during his grand tour.21 Usually the French king 
received envoys from European rulers standing up in the state bedroom 
(fig. 15: H5) or, less frequently, in the adjacent cabinet (fig. 15: H6) of the 
Appartement du Roi surrounding the inner courtyard.22 
Non-European ambassadors, who first arrived in France during the 
reign of Louis XIV, were granted an audience in the Salon d’Apollon (fig. 
15: K3) of the Grand Appartement in the northern wing, where the King 
awaited them enthroned “en majesté.”23 On a few occasions, however, the 
Hall of Mirrors (fig. 15: K1) served as the venue for extraordinary audiences 
which attracted great public attention.24 This is why—as Hendrik Ziegler 
asserts—this Galerie des Glaces became, in the collective memory, a place 
where the highest ranking acts of state and ceremonial performances of 
the king had taken place.25
l’Invention, de l’Imitation, de la Peinture, de la Sculpture, et de tout ce qui con-
tribuë à la beauté de ces sortes d’ouvrages: La Déesse remettra entre les mains 
de la Saxe, la Couronne, ou le prix de la dispute; et la jalousie, et le depit feront 
signe, et sugéreront au Japon de faire rembarquer ses Vases de Porcelaines, sur 
les Vaisseaux qui les ont aportez. […] Les deux autres parties du Plafond, repre-
senteront d’un côté, les Arts, et les Manifactures établies en Saxe, et de l’autre 
les productions avantageuses de la Nature, qui naissent, et qui sont produite 
dans le Païs.” Quoted in Wittwer 2004, 257.
21 See Ziegler 2010, 174–175.
22 See Castelluccio 2006, 24–25.
23 See Sabatier 2009, 192, 196–200.
24 See Love 1996, 173; Castelluccio 2006, 28–33; Castelluccio 2007, 114–125.










































































On 1 September, 1686, Louis XIV was honored with an embassy from 
the remote land of Siam.26 The delegation was escorted up the Escalier des 
Ambassadeurs to the upper floor, where it had to traverse the enfilade of 
the state apartment in its entirety, as far as the Salon de la Guerre (fig. 15: 
K2) and then turn left before catching its first glimpse of the French king 
enthroned at the far end of the long gallery. A crowd of distinguished cour-
tiers formed a guard of honor for the envoys as they approached the king 
while performing the Siamese “wai”, a repeated deep bow (fig. 16).
According to a detailed analysis by Ronald S. Love, on this occasion Louis 
XIV was in many respects imitating the very sophisticated Siamese ceremo-
nial—from the sounds of trumpets and drums announcing the delegation 
and the spatial mise en scène of the ritual acts, through the courteous nods 
with which the king saluted his guests, not to mention his golden robe 
adorned with prodigiously large diamonds, which obviously resembled the 
one worn by Phra Narai, the Siamese king, during his audiences. In this 
way, Louis XIV presented himself “not as a European prince constrained by 
fundamental laws and the privileges of corporate bodies, but as an omni- 
potent Asian despot, equal to Phra Narai in power, wealth, remoteness 
from his subjects and even personal divinity.”27 The Mercure galant pub-
lished an extensive, twenty-six page description of the events that were 
26 The following paragraph draws on the most extensive account and discussion of 
this embassy, as given in Love 1996.
27 Love 1996, 173.
Figure 16: Versailles, reception of the Siamese delegation, 
drawing attributed to Charles le Brun, ca. 1686.
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then illustrated in several almanacs the following year. There can be no 
doubt that Augustus the Strong heard about this exceptional spectacle 
when visiting Versailles only a few months later, in June 1686. The staging 
of the Siamese audience was more or less copied in February 1715, when a 
delegation from Persia arrived at Versailles. This time, the magnificent cer-
emony was attended by Augustus the Strong’s son (likewise on his grand 
tour), who would certainly have reported the details about it to his father.28
Augustus the Strong actually copied this set up by adopting the same 
arrangement of rooms for the upper floor of the Japanese Palace, thus 
making his throne gallery analogous to the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, 
with its two flanking corner rooms (figs. 8 and 15). A visiting delegation 
would likewise have had to walk the long enfilade in one wing of the palace 
and turn right (rather than left) before beholding the elevated throne at 
the far end of an elongated gallery. Just like Louis XIV, Augustus the Strong 
wished to present himself as equal to an Asian absolute ruler, which is why 
he transferred the highly symbolic mise en scène from Versailles to Dresden, 
in a core idea that was actually of constitutive importance for the design of 
the Japanese Palace because the building that had formerly been no more 
than a maison de plaisance would not only feature a residence-like state 
apartment suitable for ceremonies of the highest rank, but also boasted a 
general layout with four wings surrounding an inner courtyard that gave it 
the character of a small princely residence where public audiences usually 
took place, as did its prominent position in the ideal Baroque complex of 
Dresden’s New Town, on the northern bank of the Elbe.29
Unlike Louis XIV, however, Augustus the Strong certainly could not 
hope for the arrival of a real delegation from the Far East. The ideal setting 
for the reception of such a delegation in the Japanese Palace therefore had 
to be utopian. In fact, because an imaginary audience was unaffected by 
any possible ceremonial conflicts, this made the venue a perfect platform 
on which to enact the competition between the Saxon and the Far-East-
ern porcelain as a shorthand for the more significant contest between the 
Saxon-Polish ruler and the Emperor of China. In spite of this, it was in fact 
copies of Japanese, and not Chinese, porcelain that were to prove Saxony’s 
superiority, reminding us that no great distinction was then made between 
porcelain from China and porcelain from Japan, both of which were often 
called “Indian.”30 It was, in fact, the Chinese Emperor who was considered 
the only ruler so far to have mastered the prestigious art of porcelain pro-
duction virtually at will.
28 See Castelluccio 2006, 37–44.
29 For a detailed discussion of this aspect, see Weber 2013, vol. 1, 76–78.
30 See Weber 2013, vol. 2, 44.
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Daring the Emperor of China
In order to unmistakably challenge the ruler of the “Middle Kingdom,” 
however, it was planned to also embed significant copies of exceptional 
Chinese porcelain ordered by the imperial court into the “Siamese-French” 
spatial setting. Augustus the Strong’s attempts to compete directly with 
the Chinese Emperor in the art of porcelain making had thereby started 
well before this re-conception of the Japanese Palace: in two widely-read 
letters from the province of Jao-Tcheou published in 1717, the French Jes-
uit missionary François Xavier d’Entrecolles reported in detail on the pro-
duction of porcelain in China. Amongst other things, he wrote with great 
admiration about pieces that astounded foreigners because they could 
not believe that such difficult objects could actually be made. In one exam-
ple, Entrecolles refers to a lantern made for the crown prince which was 
of such delicacy that a whole room could be lit by a single flame within it.31 
It must have been this passage that incited Augustus the Strong to order 
copies of Chinese lanterns of this kind from Meissen, which he insisted on 
doing repeatedly, even though more than forty attempts made between 
1724 and 1727 failed, the thin sides cracking again and again upon firing.32 
When, finally, a single lantern was delivered to the King, its sides were too 
thick to be translucent (fig. 17).
As Entrecolles continued, “This same [crown] prince also commissioned 
different musical instruments, amongst others a type of small organ called 
tsem that measured nearly one foot in height and was composed of four-
teen pipes […] but it was worked upon in vain.”33 Again, Augustus the Strong 
felt defiant and wanted his manufactory to succeed where the imperial 
Chinese manufactory had failed. From January 1732, the Meissen model-
lers worked on organ pipes intended for the chapel of the Japanese Pal-
ace, but failed once again, as it proved impossible to fire pipes that would 
produce just the right pitches.34 According to Entrecolles, the Chinese were 
more successful with flutes, flageolets, and a carillon made of porcelain to 
order for the same Chinese crown prince. The Jesuit also alludes to the dif-
ficulties involved in producing bells which would strike precisely the right 
31 “car il ne faut pas croire que les ouvriers puissent travailler sur tous les mod-
eles qui leur viennent des payis étrangers. Il y en a d’impraticables à la Chine, 
de mesme qu’il s’y fait des ouvrages qui surprennent les étrangers, & qu’ils ne 
croyent pas possibles. En voicy quelques exemples. J’ay vû icy un fanal ou une 
grosse lanterne de porcelaine qui estoit d’une seule piece, au travers de laquelle 
un flambeau éclairoit toute une chambre: cet ouvrage fut commandé il y a sept 
ou huit ans par le Prince heritier.” d’Entrecolles 1717, 338–339.
32 See Boltz 1995, 22–23, 32–33; Weber 2013, vol. 1, 27.
33 “Ce mesme Prince commanda aussi divers instrumens de Musique, entre autres 
une espece de petite orgue appellée tsem, qui a prés d’un pied de hauteur, & qui 
est composée de quatorze tuyaux, dont l’harmonie est assez agréable: mais ce 
fut inutilement qu’on y travailla.” d’Entrecolles 1717, 339.
34 See Weber 2013, vol. 1, 64 and 71.
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notes.35 Not surprisingly, Augustus the Strong also ordered a carillon made 
of porcelain for the Japanese Palace. As mentioned above, this was to be 
suspended from a domed canopy at the far end of the gallery from the 
throne. This arrangement also imitated a significant element known to be 
part of Chinese court ceremonials: as travel reports recorded, it was the 
sound of a bell that marked the start of an audience with the Emperor of 
35 “On réüssit mieux aux flustes douces, aux flageollets, & à un autre instrument 
qu’on nomme yun lo, qui est composé de diverses petites plaques rondes un 
peu concaves, dont chacune rend un son particulier: On en suspend neuf dans 
un quadre à divers étages qu’on touche avec des baguettes comme le tympa-
non; il se fait un petit carillon qui s’accorde avec le son des autres instrumens, 
& avec la voix des Musiciens. Il a fallu, dit on, faire beaucoup d’épreuves, afin 
de trouver l’épaisseur & le degré de cuisson convenables, pour avoir tous les 
tons necessaires à un accord. Je m’imaginois qu’on avoit le secret d’inserer un 
peu de métal dans le corps de ces porcelaines, pour varier les sons: mais on m’a 
détrompé.” d’Entrecolles 1717, 339–340.
Figure 17: Meissen lantern copying a Chinese example, 
Meissen porcelain manufactory, 1727.
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China.36 At the Japanese Palace, the intention was that the envoy would 
hear the sound of chimes secretly played by a hidden musician just as he 
caught sight of the distant throne for the first time.
Augustus the Strong’s intention of daring the Chinese Emperor is 
demonstrated by other quotations: apart from these copies of excep-
tional Chinese musical instruments which were to serve as visual ref-
erences to the court at Beijing, the clock—unusually placed under the 
canopy with the suspended carillon as a counterpoint to the throne—was 
a means of emulating the legendary ruler of China. Contemporary travel 
reports noted that chiming clocks had facilitated the Jesuit missionaries’ 
access to the Beijing residence, when they were invited to explain the 
clocks’ invisible striking mechanisms.37 So amazed were the Chinese that 
they called chiming clocks “bell ringing itself;” Emperor Wanli even had a 
tower built in his pleasure gardens especially for one of them.38 The Chi-
nese emperors were highly interested in the European science of horol-
ogy and its partner astronomy, one characteristic of European clocks 
being that they often indicated the course of the planets in addition to 
the time. When explaining his “Throne of the Great Moghul” (see the con-
tribution by Corinna Forberg in this volume), Dinglinger emphasized that 
reliable forecasts of the sun’s and moon’s orbits were crucial to the Chi-
nese,39 as they allowed the Emperor to claim and maintain the Celestial 
36 “Whilst we were beholding with admiration all the Pomp and Splendor of this 
Court, we heard the noise and jingling of a little Bell, sounding sweet and 
delightful to the Ear. Hardly had this Clock or Bell finish’d the Alarm, but we saw 
the old Tutang, with thirty of the most eminent Persons and chief Councellors of 
the Empire, in very rich Habits, go and make their Obedience in great State and 
Humility to the Emperor’s Throne.”
37 See Maurice 1980, 34–37; Nieuhof 1673, 118.
38 “Ehe die drey tag gar verlauffen / hat der König nach den Uhren gefragt/so 
man ihme alsbald gebracht. Un haben ime dermassen gefallen / das er den Ver-
schnittnen das Ampt und den Sold gebessert / welches sie den unserigen bald 
mit frewden angezeit. Unnd kommen noch heutigs tags täglich dero zwen zum 
König / das kleiner Uhrwerck zu richten / dann ers siehts im gesicht / unnd ein 
grosse frewd darmit hat. … Die grösser Uhr hat im Palast/ auß mangl gnugsa-
mer Höhe zu den Gewichten / niendert platz gefunden / derowegen der König 
bevolhen/ihr/ in einem schönen lustgarten ausserhalb der andern mawren/
darinn sonst auch vilkostliche sachen zusehen/einen Thurm zu bawen/darzu 
die unserigen die visier gemacht. Und sagt man der König komme offt dahin / 
wie auch andere fürneme Personen / welche alle ein grosse Frewd daran haben. 
[…] Es haben auch die Uhrrichter starck angehalten/die Patres dort zubehalten/
dann sie besorgt/wann die Uhr mangelhafft wurd / möchten sie in unglück 
kommen/so gar lieb war sie dem König. Welches er wol erzeigt/da sein Mut-
ter an ihne geschickt/und das Glöclin so sich selb leitte (also nennt man die 
Schlaguhrn in China) zu sehen begert. Dann demnach er besorgt sie werds gar 
behalten wollen/und er ihrs mit fugen nicht abschlagen künden / hat er bevol-
hen/man soll sie ablauffen lassen / und ihr also bringen. Weil sie sich dann nicht 
gerührt/hats die alt Königin veracht/ und dem Sohn wider geschickt.” Trigault 
1617, 331–332 and 344.
39 “Ueber der Pussa ist in der Mitten / der Globus Coelestis / mit allen seinen 
Signis, der sich zwischen denen drey Ecken der Pyramiden auf allen Seiten dre-
het, welches von dem Astronomischen Studio der Sineser ein klares Zeugnis 
giebt, sintemahl die Betrachtung des Himmels und genaue Observirung des 
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Mandate. As European methods of calculating the times of solar eclipses 
proved superior to the Chinese ones, Jesuits ascended to the highest 
offices at the imperial court.40 When Augustus the Strong dedicated the 
corner room (with its accompanying clock) to the sun, as the regulator 
of day and night, it was precisely this European scientific superiority that 
he was alluding to. While the clock referred to European supremacy with 
respect to mechanical instruments and astronomy, the porcelain carillon 
opened the contest with a discipline that had—thus far—been monopo-
lized by the Chinese.
Finally, another element that can likewise be understood as a mean-
ingful sign in the competition between the Saxon-Polish king and the Chi-
nese emperor is the empty throne. As stated above, because Augustus 
the Strong could not expect a real delegation from China to come to Dres-
den, he would never actually have used the throne—which was likewise 
to be made of porcelain—during an audience. Nevertheless, analogue to 
royal portraits (again, see Forberg), the ruler was believed to be symbol-
ically present in the empty throne which, even in his absence, had to be 
approached with appropriate respect and obeisance.41 In China, where 
the emperor hardly appeared in public at all, the reverence shown to the 
empty throne was of pivotal importance for court ceremonies. European 
observers took the fact that the Emperor of China continued to be wor-
shipped even in his absence as further evidence for his absolute and god-
like sovereignty: “They prostrate themselves not only in his presence but 
also before his armchair and his throne. They even kneel down when they 
see his clothes and his belt. His orders are sacred and his will is observed 
as if he had descended from the sky.”42 It therefore seems plausible that 
the empty throne in the Japanese Palace was similarly intended to demon-
strate the almighty power of the physically absent but symbolically present 
Saxon-Polish king, who considered himself in a position to defy even the 
Emperor of China.
Lauffs der Sonnen, Monds und Sterne diese Völker allerältester Wissenschaft 
ist, darinnen diejenigen, so durch Erbrecht dazu bestimmet, sich sehr fleissig 
exerciren, und besteht deren vornehmstes Amt darinnen, dass sie den Lauff 
der Sonnen und des Mondes wie auch der Finsternüsse sorgfältigst ausrech-
nen und den Neu-Mond und andere Mond-Aspecten ganz accurat aufzeichnen, 
nachmals ihre Observationes durchs ganze Reich ausbreiten und anzeigen, 
was bey jedweder Zeit zu thun oder zu unterlassen.” Quoted in Watzdorf 1962, 
vol. 2, 396.
40 See Klaue 1997, 109, 111 and 122; Schuster-Fox 2009, 123–127.
41 See Winkler 1993, 160–167; Sander 2004.
42 “Ils se prosternent non seulement en sa presence, mais encore devant son 
fauteüil & devant son trône; ils se mettent même à genoux à la vûë de son habit 
ou de sa ceinture; ses ordres sont sacrez, & sa volonté est écoutée comme s’il 
étoit descendu du Ciel.” Le Comte 1700, 37–38.
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The setting of an imaginary audience
Creating an idealized setting for an imaginary audience was, in fact, a bril-
liant way of staging the rivalry between two rulers. In the early modern 
period, public audiences were highly competitive ceremonial acts in the 
course of which the rank of sovereigns was visually demonstrated for those 
in attendance. Such audiences, as Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has noted, 
consisted of nothing but the exchange of carefully measured symbolic 
messages. Every reverence accorded or denied to the visiting represent-
ative of a sovereign or the receiving prince was significant.43 Exactly how 
competitive this spectacle was is indicated in the section on public audi-
ences in the second volume of Friedrich Carl Moser’s Teutsches Hof=Recht 
(German Court Law) published in 1755: “This matter belongs to the most 
common and most delicate ones at court. It is the most frequent cause of 
irritation and of loss of dignity, or, if it is managed cleverly, of increases in 
the same.”44
The imaginary audience was a perfect backdrop for a trial of strength 
with the ruler of the “Middle Kingdom,” whose absolute sovereignty 
crystalized best during receptions, as the French Jesuit Louis Le Comte 
described tellingly in his travel report of 1696: 
But the King of China never appears greater, then when he gives 
Audience to foreign Ambassadors; that prodigious number of 
Troops who are at that time in Arms, that incredible number of Man-
darins in their Formalities, distinguished according to their rank 
and quality […] the Ministers of State, the Lord Chief Justices of all 
the Sovereign Courts, the petty Kings, the Princes of the Blood, the 
Heirs of the Crown, more humbled before this Prince, then they are 
exalted above the People: The Emperor himself seated on a Throne, 
who beholds prostrate at his feet all this Crowd of Adorers; all this, 
I say, bears an Air of Sovereignty and Grandeur in it, that is to be 
found nowhere but in China.45
In China, too, public audiences were highly choreographed ceremonial acts 
that played a major role in court ceremonies; indeed, it was the reports of 
receptions in Beijing that had shaped the European image of the almighty 
Emperor of China (fig. 18).
43 See Stollberg-Rilinger 1997, 155–156; Stollberg-Rilinger 2008, 160–161.
44 “Diese Materie ist eine derjenigen, so am häuffigsten bey Hof vorkommen, 
welche die meiste Pointillen mit sich führet, wo am leichtesten angestossen 
und der Würde was vergeben, oder selbige durch klügliche Einleitung erhöhet 
werden kann.” Moser 1755, vol. 2, 550 (translation by the author).
45 Le Comte 1697, 177.
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Figure 18: The Chinese Emperor Shunzhi, frontispiece of Joan Nieuhof’s Embassy 
from the East-India Company of the United Provinces, to the Grand Tartar Cham,  
Emperor of China, first published in 1665.
The obedient deference shown towards his person during receptions, 
culminating in the three-fold kowtow, demonstrated his absolute power 
to best effect. Subjects as well as European envoys were obliged to kneel 
357
COPYING AND COMPETITION
and to touch the ground three times with their chest, in a ritual that was 
humiliating and offensive to Europeans because it reminded them of the 
prostrations that were part of the Catholic liturgy.46
What is more, the Chinese emperor did not receive European envoys 
as proxies of princes of equal status, but as delegates of his vassals, and 
he regarded their sumptuous gifts as tribute. Europeans were very acutely 
conscious of this, as is clear from Le Comte’s dedication to Louis XIV in the 
French edition of his account: 
To date, this proud and arrogant nation has not thought that it was 
dishonoring the kings by regarding all of them as subjected to their 
rule. This idea was confirmed in their minds by the fact that the 
ambassadors of the most prosperous states consistently consented 
to being received as vassals. And when all Europe flattered itself 
that it was the universal monarchy, it was in fact somehow under 
the Asian yoke.47 
The impressions that European envoys gained during their audiences in 
Bejing were therefore twofold. While, on the one hand, they were highly 
impressed by the almighty power of the emperor as shown to best advan-
tage during these ceremonies, they also felt humiliated when they were 
forced to subject themselves to the Chinese ruler.
The Saxon revenge for the Chinese hubris
This abasing experience was surely the reason why the Chinese were 
widely presumed to be arrogant. In the ‘History of the Court of the King of 
China,’ first published in Paris in 1626, the French historian Michel Baudier 
spread an anecdote that could not help but hurt Europe’s pride:
the Greatness of his Treasures, the Puissance of his Forces, the Fer-
tility of his Countrey, and the Extent of his State, have carried the 
Pride of his Spirit to that degree of Insolence, as to contemn all the 
rest of Men, and to esteem only those of China. He sayes often, and 
the same Vaunting is in the mouth of his Subjects, That the Chineses 
have two Eyes, the Europeans one, and that all the other men of the 
Earth are blind.48
46 See Demel 1992, 127–142.
47 “Jusqu’alors cette nation fiere & orgueilleuse, ne croyoit pas deshonorer les 
Rois, en les regardant tous comme soûmis à son Empire; Les Ambassadeurs des 
Estats les plus florissans, qui n’y ont jamais estés receus que comme tributaires, 
avoient par leur propre aveu establi plus fortement cette idée dans les esprits; & 
l’Europe entiere se trouvoit en quelque sorte sous le joug en Asie, lorsqu’elle se 
flatoit de la Monarchie universelle.” Le Comte 1696, vol. 1, “Epistre”.
48 Baudier 1682, 68–69 (emphasis in the original).
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This tale was told in Saxony, too, as Johann Ehrenfried Böttger, the inven-
tor of the Meissen porcelain, noted in a memorandum to Augustus the 
Strong in 1709: 
Although the Indians attribute to themselves great wisdom and 
outstanding ability in the sciences and arts in comparison with all 
other nations, and for all that they—because of this arrogance—
are not afraid to ascribe to themselves two eyes in this regard and 
only one eye to the Europeans, this assumption is not borne out by 
their porcelain manufactories when one considers the bad designs, 
the mostly clumsy shapes and the absurd painted decoration of the 
white and red Indian vessels.49
Johann Melchior Steinbrück, the first inspector of the manufactory in 
Meissen, was convinced that the Chinese were robbed of all their illusions 
of being the only men with two eyes as soon as they received the first 
examples of Saxon porcelain sent to the East Indies in the manufactory’s 
earliest days.50 Both Böttger and Steinbrück assured the king that—hav-
ing wrested the secret of porcelain-making from the Chinese—he now 
possessed a compelling argument to mock them and punish their hubris. 
Even as late as 1737, a letter from the Meissen town council states that the 
late king had proved that, with regard to porcelain, the Saxons were in no 
way inferior to the highly-clever Chinese people and the inhabitants of the 
island of Japan.51
If Augustus the Strong therefore chose the setting of an imaginary 
audience to demonstrate the triumph of Meissen porcelain, then he surely 
did so in order to take his revenge for the degradations suffered during 
receptions in Beijing. In the iconography in the Japanese Palace, contrary 
to ceremonial convention, he does not even accept the porcelain presented 
as tribute in the ceiling fresco, which surely represents a deliberate provo-
cation. As a result, the European visitors to the Japanese Palace would have 
49 “Obwohln die Indianer sich eine große Klugheit und besondere Geschicklich-
keit in Wißenschafften und Künsten vor allen andern Nationen beymeßen, und 
aus solcher Arroganz keinen Scheü tragen, sich selbst in hoc passu zwey, denen 
Europaern aber nur ein Auge zuzuschreiben: So wil doch solches aus ihren Por-
cellain-Fabriquen, wenn man die schlechten Erfindungen, die meist plumpen 
Façons, und die absurden Desseins ihrer Mahlerey an denen Indianischen 
weißen und rothen Gefäßen betrachtet, nicht erhellen.” Sächsisches Staatsar-
chiv, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden, 10036 Finanzarchiv, Rep. IXb, Loc. 41910, Nr. 
205c, fol. 17a.
50 “Es ist auch ein Ruhm vor das Land, wenn schöne Manufacturen darinnen 
aufkommen: und weiln gleich Anfangs von dem Sächßischen braunen por-
cellain etwas durch den Residenten Bertry aus Amsterdam nacher OstIndien 
geschicket worden; sowird nunmehro auch dieser Ruhm Sachßens in Indien 
erschollen seÿn, und die Chineser sich vielleicht desabusiret befinden, da sie 
geglaubet, sie wären in Wißenschafften die klügsten, und hätten diesfalls alleine 
2. Augen, dargegen die Europaeer nur eines hätten, die übrigen Nationes aber
blind wären.” Steinbrück 1982, vol. 2, 179.
51 See footnote 81.
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been compelled to acknowledge that they owed the re-establishment of 
Europe’s honor to the Saxon-Polish king. While Europe had already proven 
its superiority in the sciences of astronomy and astrology that were so 
important to the Chinese, it was Augustus the Strong alone who had been 
capable of defying the Emperor of China in the most sophisticated of all 
the arts of his land, namely the art of making porcelain.
The Meissen triumph as a prime example of mercantilism
The manufacture of porcelain, however, was not only perceived as an art, 
but as an industry that bore important yields for the sovereign prince. Just 
like “the Corn, the Mines of Gold and Silver, the precious Stones, the Pearls, 
[…] the Wool, the Cottons and the Silks,” porcelain was a product gained 
from the rich Chinese soil that brought the emperor a “great and puissant 
Revenue.”52 These sources of income were believed to form the basis of 
his boundless authority: “It is these extraordinary revenues that make this 
prince so powerful and that enable him to always have such mighty armies 
at his disposal in order to keep his people under obligation to him.”53 What 
is more, the Emperor of China could command the revenue and even levy 
new tributes as he pleased, a matter that Le Comte emphasizes, as it con-
stituted a significant difference between the Chinese and the European 
forms of absolutism.54
As for Augustus the Strong, he did not rule with absolute sovereignty. 
When he became king in Poland, it was only by election and thanks to 
military pressure. His power was restricted by the laws of the aristocratic 
republic, and his finances were controlled by the Sejm. Earnings from royal 
properties were not sufficient to keep the royal household in Warsaw and 
considerable additional funds from the Saxon budget had to be granted.55 
Similarly, in Saxony, Augustus the Strong was dependent on the approval 
of the three estates to cover the state budget. Even though he managed to 
introduce indirect consumption taxes, he urgently needed more indepen- 
dent sources of income to sustain his claim to absolute power.56 This is why 
he set his hopes on Böttger, who had initially promised to make gold before 
he finally discovered the recipe for porcelain. But even with this “white gold” 
52 Baudier 1682, 64.
53 “Ce sont ces prodigieux revenus qui rendent ce Prince si puissant, & qui luy don-
nent la facilité d’avoir toûjours sur pied de si nombreuses armées, pour contenir 
ses peuples dans le devoir.” Le Comte 1696, vol. 2, 15.
54 “Premierement toutes les charges de l’Etat sont à sa disposition, il les donne à 
qui il luy plaist, & il en est d’autant plus le maistre qu’il n’en vend aucune. […] 
Secondement, quoique chaque particulier soit maistre de ses biens, & paisible 
possesseur de ses terres, l’Empereur peut neanmoins imposer de nouveaux 
tributs, quand il le juge à propos, pour subvenir aux pressans besoins de l’Etat.” 
Le Comte 1696, vol. 2, 13–14.
55 See Lileyko 1997; Vötsch 2001, 58; Neuhaus 2004, 187.
56 See Vötsch 2001, 57–58; Neuhaus 2004, 181–182.
360 
JULIA WEBER
Augustus the Strong still counted on being able to fill up his treasury with 
sales revenue, as exemplified in the ceiling fresco of the throne gallery. 
Fueled by the unexpected success of the Meissen porcelain in Paris, he 
anticipated being able to drive the imported wares out of Europe and to 
wrest the lucrative porcelain market from the grasp of China and Japan.
In a certain sense, the secret knowledge of porcelain-making was 
indeed considered a goldmine: contemporaries were fascinated by the fact 
that it consisted of nothing else but simple clays that a mysterious chem-
ical process transmuted into gleaming white translucent luxury goods.57 
Not only were the necessary clays plentiful in Saxony, but they belonged 
directly to the king and cost him “almost nothing but the cartage.”58 Owing 
to Saxony’s advancements in the sciences, technology, and the arts, these 
intrinsically worthless raw materials could be turned into treasured arte-
facts that not only helped to avoid costly imports from the Far East, but 
could also be exported for hard cash, thereby improving the trade balance. 
This approach corresponded perfectly to the mercantilist ideal of enhanc-
ing the wealth of a country (and its regent) by fructifying previously unused 
resources.59 This is what the intended ceiling painting of the throne gallery 
was to allude to when it depicted the rich natural resources in Saxony, on 
the one hand, and its prospering arts and manufactories on the other. 
In this context, Minerva—the inventive patroness of the sciences and arts 
who teaches men craftsmanship and technical progress—was the perfect 
judge in the exemplary contest between Saxon and Far-Eastern porcelain. 
The royal porcelain manufactory was thus to serve as a model of Augustus 
the Strong’s exemplary mercantilist policies.
The Meissen triumph as a prime example of 
good government
In his chronicle of the Meissen manufactory of 1717, Steinbrück explicitly 
stresses that the new enterprise not only generated new income for the 
country but also raised the public welfare by feeding a goodly number 
of artists and workers.60 He compared its establishment directly with the 
mercantilist measures of Louis XIV and his ministers Fouquet and Colbert, 
who had promoted the sciences and commerce in every way.61 Following 
the example of Louis XIV, it belonged to the glorious duties of a regent to 
initiate new industry and to act as an entrepreneur in the best interest 
57 See Weber 2013, vol. 1, 17–18.
58 “Solche kostbaren Waaren werden aus LandesMaterialien gemachet, die bey-
nahe nichts als den Fuhrlohn erfodern [sic]; und bishero sonst zu nichts gebrau-
chet worden. Dadurch wird frembdes Geld ins Land gezogen, und in dem Lande 
mancher Künstler und Arbeither ernehret.” Steinbrück 1982, vol. 2, 178. See also 
Mücke 1990, 33.
59 See Weber 2010, 157–158.
60 See footnote 58.
61 Steinbrück 1982, vol. 2, 177.
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of the country and its inhabitants. Colbert’s most significant economic 
measures were actually incorporated in the form of allegories into the 
iconographic programme of the Grand Appartement at Versailles and thus 
praised as meritorious aspects of Louis XIV’s wise government.62 In contrast 
with the state apartment, the Hall of Mirrors laid emphasis on the conquer-
ing warlord, whose victories are allegorized in the ceiling paintings of the 
gallery. As exemplified in the adjacent Salon de la Paix, the ultimate aim of 
these military campaigns was to pacify Europe under French hegemony.63 
As Hendrik Ziegler has shown, the aggressive and triumphalist undercur-
rent of the picture cycle did not go unnoticed by contemporaries, leading 
to criticism of Louis XIV’s autocratic conduct and expansive foreign policy.64 
Steinbrück also makes reference to his minister of war as the martial Lou-
vois. According to Steinbrück, the expensive wars imposed on France by 
Louis XIV thwarted the positive effects of his mercantilist policies.65
When Augustus the Strong presented himself in the Japanese Palace 
as a pieceful ruler who mainly excelled on the diplomatic parquet, he was 
possibly consciously distinguishing himself from the belligerent Louis XIV. 
His government program was to be presented in the throne cabinet, where 
the ceiling painting was to depict the dispute between Athena/Minerva and 
Poseidon/Neptune in naming the city of Athens. The two deities were vying 
for predominance in Attica and tried to win the mortals over with gifts. 
According to popular tradition, Neptune made a spring burst forth, but its 
water was salty. A preliminary sketch by the Dresden court painter Louis 
de Silvestre (fig. 19) reveals that the artist actually drew on a less common 
version of the myth: In the sketch, Neptune is seen offering the citizens of 
the unnamed Attic town a horse, a useful gift in times of war, while Min-
erva presents them with a fertile olive tree, a symbol of peace. The gods of 
Olympus, who had to pass judgement, decided in favor of the latter.
The mythological contest was ultimately a parable of the basic strug-
gle between uncontrolled passion (symbolized by the god of the sea) and 
rationality (represented by the goddess, who was born from the head of 
Jupiter).66 At the same time, the decision between Neptune and Minerva 
was also understood as a choice between two opposing concepts of gov-
ernment. As a 1632 commentary on an English edition of Ovid’s Metamor-
phoses says: “Moreover, this fable decides, and by the sentence of the Gods, 
that a Citty is not so much renowned for riches and empire, purchased by 
62 See Milovanic 2005, 36–44.
63 See Ziegler 2010, 148.
64 Ziegler 2010, 179–180.
65 “Wenn in Franckreich ein Fouquet und ein Colbert, deren einer die Gelehr-
samkeit und guthe Künste, andere die Kaufmannschafft liebet, Directores 
dererCommercien sind, so siehet man, daß Academien derer Wißenschafften 
aufgerichtet, pensiones vor gelehrte Leüthe geordnet, und die Commercia auf 
alle weise befördert werden. So bald es aber an einen Martialischen Louvois 
kombt, so fallen die Wißenschafften wieder; dargegen erhebet sich der Kriegs-
Etat destomehr.” Steinbrück 1982, 176–177.
66 See Brumble 1998, 42.
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naval victories; as by civill arts and a peaceable government.”67 The icono-
graphic program of the throne cabinet emphasizes the benefits of just and 
wise government led by discernment and rationality rather than passion 
and allows the sciences, arts, commerce, and trade to flourish for the ben-
efit of the common good.
67 Quoted after Brumble 1998, 33.
Figure 19: Japanese Palace, preliminary sketch for the ceiling painting in  
the corner room with the throne in the upper floor by Louis de Silvestre, ca. 1735.
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The Meissen triumph as a means of legitimizing 
the claim to absolute sovereignty
Augustus the Strong thus presented the alleged Meissen triumph as a 
result of his exemplary government, which at the same time provided 
him with the necessary means for his claim to absolute power. However, 
economic strength was a prerequisite, but no guarantee for the actual 
enforcement of sovereignty. Aside from the German Emperor and King of 
Bohemia, Augustus the Strong was, in 1697, the first elector to have been 
crowned king. Although the law of nations theoretically granted him equal 
rank with the other crowned heads of Europe,68 this did not necessarily 
mean that they would pay him the respect his title was due. As mentioned 
above, he had only become king in Poland by election. His sovereignty was 
constrained by the laws of the aristocratic republic, and the royal crown 
was not linked by succession to the Saxon electorate. The established 
kings had no interest in broadening their circle “to remain even more dis-
tinguished,”69 and the Emperor insisted emphatically on the traditional 
hierarchy within the Holy Roman Empire, which was in opposition to the 
principle of the equality of all sovereigns in the law of nations. Augustus 
the Strong therefore had to assert his new position vigorously. As Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz stated prior to the coronation of the Prussian king in 1701, 
it was not until the most distinguished Christian potentates—according to 
Leibniz, most notably the German Emperor and the kings of France and 
England—accorded him the appropriate ceremonial honors that a pre-
tender effectively gained royal dignity.70 For “he is a king who is called a 
king, and who is [actually] accorded the honors traditionally associated 
with the name [of king].”71 Or, as André Krischer summed up the matter, 
68 “& quoique cette dignité & souveraineté Roïale soit plus ancienne ou plus mod-
erne l’une que l’autre, elle leur donne un même caractère, un même honneur & 
une même prérogative.” Rousset de Missy 1746, 59.
69 “je höher diese Würde, je schwerer ist es, sie zu erlangen. Die Könige, die es am 
meisten angehet eyfern auch am meisten darüber; und wollen nicht gern, um 
desto mehr unterschieden zu bleiben, die Zahl ihrer Mitgenossen vermehren, 
noch andere, die es nicht sind, zur Gemeinschafft dieses ihres Vorzuges lassen.” 
Lünig 1720, 120.
70 “Ist ein Herr frey, so kann ihm niemand wehren, wenn er sich in seinem Lande 
als ein könig oder gar als Kayser tituliren lässet, ist er aber nicht mächtig gnug, 
umb sich bey denen Auswärtigen erkennen zu machen so, wird er damit nichts 
als Spott erhalten! Dieweil es demnach mit der Königlichen Würde kein Domes-
ticum, sondern res juris Gentium, so ist nöthig, sich Anderer zu versichern. Ein 
mächtiger freyer Herr hat Potentiam proximam; aber weilen andere in Posses-
sion, gewisse Ehren von ihm zu empfangen, und gewisse Ehre ihm zu geben, 
so erscheinet, daß die Annehmung königlicher Würde nicht pure und aller- 
dings merae facultatis sey, sondern eine gewisse Autorität zu deren Erlangung 
erfordert werden.” Leibniz 1966, 308.
71 “Ein König ist, der also heißet, und dem die dem Namen, der Gewohnheit nach, 
anhängende Ehrenrechte zukommen.” Leibniz 1966, 306.
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“the essence of royalty in the eighteenth century was primarily founded on 
social esteem and only secondarily on power.”72
As there was “not a more illustrious Mark of Sovereignty than the Right 
of sending and receiving Embassadors,”73 the mutual acceptance of sover-
eignty became most clearly evident during audiences. These state events 
were the public acknowledgement of royal status. While Augustus the 
Strong could not force other European princes to honor him with an offi-
cial embassy, by staging the imaginary reception of a Chinese delegation 
he essentially claimed that the almighty Emperor of the “Middle Kingdom” 
acknowledged him as his equivalent. His purpose was surely to compel 
all European crowned heads to follow suit. The triumphal message of the 
Japanese Palace was not principally directed at the Emperor of China, who 
would hardly have taken notice of the one-sided challenge. Meissen por-
celain had in fact been sent to China to proclaim Saxony’s victory, but to 
no great effect. The real addressees were the high-ranking envoys from 
European courts who would have been guided through the palace on the 
occasion of their visits to Dresden.
Instead of maintaining his equal (if not superior) status in direct com-
parison with his potential opponents, Augustus the Strong played the 
game indirectly by defying the Emperor of China, a ruler who was consid-
ered to possess status on par with the German Emperor, as Susan Richter 
has established with reference to contemporary travel reports and legal 
treatises on princely ranks:
China was described as a centralized absolutist state with a complex 
and vigorously hierarchical administration and also with a form of 
rule legitimized by religion, at the head of which stood the ruler. […] 
European treatises on the law of nations used these descriptions as 
evidence for their arguments and thus determined China’s coequal 
status and equality as well as the highest status of the Emperor of 
China. […] From a European perspective, the Chinese Emperor was 
thus granted a legal position alongside the head of the Holy Roman 
Empire, the French and Spanish kings and also the Russian tsars.74
72 “Das Wesen des Königtums im 18. Jahrhundert gründete zuerst in sozialer 
Schätzung und dann erst in Macht.” Krischer 2009, 17.
73 Wicquefort 1716, 6.
74 “China wurde als ein absolutistisch regierter Zentralstaat mit einer komplexen 
und stark hierarchisierten Administration sowie religiös legitimierten Herrschaft 
dargestellt, an dessen Spitze der Herrscher stand. […] Diese Beschreibungen 
griffen europäische Völkerrechtstraktate als Argumente auf und fixierten somit 
die Gleichrangigkeit und Gleichwertigkeit Chinas als Staat sowie den höchsten 
Rang des chinesischen Kaisers. […] Aus europäischer Perspektive wurde damit 
dem chinesischen Kaiser eine rangrechtliche Position neben dem Kaiser des 
Heiligen Römischen Reiches, den französischen und spanischen Königen sowie 
dem russischen Zaren zuerkannt.” Richter 2010, 29.
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The fact that Augustus the Strong even dared to raise himself above 
this potent monarch might also be understood as a provocative gesture 
towards the German Emperor. Nor would it have been the only instance 
of Augustus the Strong insolently laying claim not only to absolute sover-
eignty, but also to a leading role in the Holy Roman Empire.75
Since the end of the Thirty Years War, German princes had gained more 
and more independence from the imperial court. Given, as mentioned 
above, that Augustus the Strong was the first to achieve royal dignity, he 
would have felt himself to be in a privileged enough position to step out 
of the Emperor’s shadow and to make a bid for a leading role in Europe. 
Accordingly, his main aim was to cement the Polish-Saxon union prior to his 
death and thus secure the royal crown for the house of Wettin. An attempt 
to dispense with free elections in Poland and impose a hereditary succes-
sion to the throne had failed.76 Augustus the Strong could only invoke the 
general acceptance of his royal rank and attempt to link it to his dynasty. 
On the diplomatic parquet, he actually came closer to this objective than 
in any other field, succeeding in accrediting ambassadors in Dresden who 
honored him as elector of Saxony and “King in Poland.”77 This main political 
achievement would have been corroborated and glorified in the Japanese 
Palace, at the same time raising claims that by far exceeded what Augus-
tus the Strong actually achieved. Because the iconographic program was 
concentrated not so much on his own person as on his position as Saxon 
elector and Polish king, it was also—and even principally—also applicable 
to his son and successor Frederick Augustus II, for whom he tried to pro-
cure the Polish crown against the resistance of the neighboring states. This 
is borne out by the fact that, shortly after his election by a minority of the 
Sejm in October 1733 and his coronation in January 1734, King Augustus 
III resumed the work on the Japanese Palace in close accordance with his 
father’s original design from 1730, though he did in fact gradually aban-
don it a few years later.
The public reception of the Japanese Palace
As the interiors hardly progressed beyond the planning phase, it is impos-
sible to establish whether the intended message of the Japanese Palace 
was actually understood. However, various panegyric writings published 
after Augustus the Strong’s death in February 1733 make it clear that his 
reading of the Meissen triumph soon became a topos, at least in Saxony. 
The Meissen victory over Chinese and Japanese porcelain is repeatedly 
emphasized, though not without a certain vein of mockery: it not only 
75 See Lorenz 1995, 376; Schlechte 1990, 103–104, 113–116; regarding Augustus 
the Strong’s hope of securing the imperial throne for his son and successor, see 
Schnitzer 2014, 8–10.
76 See Schnitzer 2011, 47 for more references.
77 See Staszewski 1997, 16.
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proved that the Saxons were indeed endowed with two eyes,78 but it also 
made the Chinese blush with shame.79 These eulogies also reflected the 
fact that it was the great success of Meissen porcelain on the Parisian art 
market that had finally led to the Saxons’ conviction that they had outdone 
the Asians. For example, the boastful article in the Mercure de France of 
February 1731 mentioned above is summarized and in part quoted ver-
batim in a biography of Augustus the Strong from 1733. The passage also 
explicitly points to the fact that renowned connoisseurs had been duped 
by the Meissen copies of Japanese prototypes, even finding the former 
finer than the latter.80
The importance of the French market is also acknowledged in an 
enlightening letter from the Meissen city council of August 1737, which 
reads as follows:
It is thus not to be held against the late king that at first he kept 
a thing to himself, the discovery and establishment of which had 
cost him so much, filling up his rooms and curiosity cabinets with it, 
and that by means of the porcelain gifts that he made to other high 
courts he had proved that his beloved Saxony conceded nothing to 
the highly clever Chinese and the inhabitants of the island of Japan, 
either in the wealth of materials for the porcelain or in the artistry 
and skill in the preparation of the same, but, rather, outshone them 
by far. The latter claim does not need any proof, as the Turks and 
French, who are good connoisseurs of this kind of wares, would oth-
erwise not deign to become involved in its commerce.81
78 “Denn es können die Fremden die schöne Mahlerey nicht sattsam bewundern, 
welche diejenige, so an dem Chinesischen Porcellin zu befinden, weit über-
steiget. Dahero, wenn die Europäer ein Auge haben, die Chineser aber mit 
zweyen Augen begabt seyn, so wird das doppelte Augen=Licht gewiß auch 
denen Sachsen nicht fehlen, welche die Chineser in der Mahlerey des Porcellins 
noch übertreffen.” “Von denen zehn Merckwürdigkeiten” 1732, 73.
79 “Dich wird noch Dein Meißen nennen, / Weil es läst die Erde brennen, / Die nun 
China schaamroth macht.” Henrici 1733, not paginated.
80 “Ja was noch mehr? Hat nicht Sachsen unter der weisen Regierung Augusti den 
Chinesischen Reiche den Rang abgelauffen, und es mit Verfertigung des Por-
cellains so hoch gebracht, daß andere Nationen darüber erstaunen müssen? 
Die Porcellain-Fabrique […] blühet noch jetzo in der Stadt Meissen, und werden 
daselbst die schönsten Gefässe von allerhand Gattungen verfertiget, zugleich 
aber so künstlich gemahlet und vergoldet, daß das Japanische und Chinesi- 
sche Porcellain gar schlecht gegen dasselbe aussiehet, ja auch die Mahlereyen 
auf demselben an Thieren, Bäumen, Pflantzen und Blumen viel schöner und 
die Farben besser gewechselt werden können, so daß auch die geschicktesten 
Kenner sich offtmals betrogen, indem sie das Sächsische Porcellain vor dem 
Japanischen nicht erkennen, sondern dem Meißnischen den Vorzug vor jenem 
gegeben.” Merckwürdiges Leben Ihro Königl. Maj. von Pohlen 1733, 26. Compare 
to footnote 7.
81 “so war es ja dem höchstseel. Könige gar nicht zu verargen, daß er eine Sache, 
deren Erfind- und Einrichtung ihm so kostbar gefallen war, noch zur Zeit vor sich 
behielte, seine Zimmer und Raritaeten-Kammern damit anfüllete, und durch 
seine an andere Hohe Höfe übermachte Pourcelaine-Praesente erwiesen, daß 
sein geliebtes Sachsen denen super-klugen Chinesen und Einwohnern der Insul 
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These lines not only provide further testimony of the great satisfaction 
felt in Saxony about having defeated the arrogant Asians, they specify 
the same favorable preconditions for this unique success as the intended 
ceiling painting of the throne gallery, namely, the rich natural resources 
of Saxony and the scientific and artistic expertise of its inhabitants. In so 
doing, it gives the sovereign sole credit for the establishment and glorious 
achievements of the Meissen manufactory.
Summary
The example of Augustus the Strong’s feigned triumph over the Emperor 
of China staged as an imaginary audience in the Japanese Palace deals 
with two different types of copying: the actual physical copying of East-
Asian porcelain on the one hand, and the eclectic quotation and fusion of 
existing successful patterns of representation in the Japanese Palace via 
the emulation of the cited role models on the other. The success of the first 
served to legitimate the claim raised by the latter.
The precondition for actually copying Chinese and Japanese porcelain 
was the ground-breaking reinvention of this hitherto exclusively East Asian 
luxury material. The throne gallery’s ceiling decoration was intended to 
highlight why it was that this complex technology could finally be recre-
ated in Saxony and not elsewhere: credit is given to Saxony’s ruler and his 
wisdom in showing encouragement and support for the sciences and arts, 
as well as his exploitation of the natural riches in his domain. The making 
of exact copies of the most prestigious and elaborate East Asian originals 
in the royal collection was meant to visually demonstrate this much-envied 
success. The primary idea was therefore to present the pieces side by side 
with their prototypes, in order to prove their parity.
The so-called Hoym-Lemaire-Affaire, however, gave even greater mean-
ing to the Meissen copies: the equality claimed for them was confirmed 
beyond doubt when highly-esteemed French connoisseurs were duped 
by them. The deliberate omission of the blue crossed swords mark taken 
from the Saxon coat of arms had turned the copies for the Parisian dealer 
Lemaire into deceptive fakes. The rapid uncovering of this fraud triggered 
a wide-reaching debate in France about the true rank of Meissen copies vis 
a vis East Asian originals.82 Arguments advanced by dealers and collectors 
as well as scientists and economists prove that contemporaries did not 
disdain the widespread practice of copying itself. On the contrary, copying 
Japan weder an Reichthum der Materialien zum Pourcelain noch an Kunst und 
Geschicklichkeit, in Bereitung deßelben etwas nachgäbe, wollen sagen, weit 
überträffe. Das leztere braucht keines Beweises, denn sonst würden Türcken 
und Franzosen, als gute Kenner derg. Waare sich in deßen Commerce nicht so 
weit einlaßen.” Staatliche Porzellan-Manufaktur Meissen, archive, AA I Aa 24c, 
fols. 194b, 195a.
82 See Weber 2014.
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was a respectable means by which to improve one’s reputation, particu-
larly if recognized connoisseurs were taken in. It was, however, of primary 
importance that copies be identified as such in order to understand them 
in relation to their prototypes. Only in the undisturbed economic frame-
work of a hierarchical order of goods was it convenient to value them as 
originals in their own right.83
The Meissen copies were essentially viewed as incontrovertible proof 
of technological pioneering and achievement. They were therefore 
judged for their extrinsic as well as intrinsic material qualities when pit-
ted against East Asian porcelain. As suggested in the Mercure de France 
of February 1731, the most refined Parisian connoisseurs preferred 
the Saxon copies to the East Asian originals. The transformative power 
of these copies fundamentally altered the perception and appreciation 
of Meissen porcelain not only in France, but also in Saxony itself: their 
great success on Europe’s foremost art market gave birth to a wholly new 
understanding of the native product that culminated in the reconceiving 
of the then-principle royal project—the extension and rearrangement of 
the Japanese Palace. Copies made at Meissen were no longer intended as 
proof of parity with the much admired East Asian originals. The copies of 
Japanese porcelain in the Kakiemon style apparently preferred by Parisian 
opinion makers served rather as physical evidence of the superiority of 
Saxon porcelain.
In order to turn simple success into triumph over the Emperor of China 
and thus into a claim of absolute sovereignty, Augustus the Strong had his 
Meissen copies incorporated into an architectural setting that deliberately 
quoted established patterns of representation, for instance, by copying a 
meaningful spatial setting or quoting significant elements of foreign court 
ceremonials as visual references. In cleverly merging quoted examples 
of excellence, they were appropriated to assert Augustus the Strong’s 
superiority as an absolute monarch. As demonstrated with regard to 
Dinglinger’s Great Moghul (see the contribution by Corinna Forberg in 
this volume), Augustus the Strong did not shy away from offending and 
humiliating the exemplary monarchs in a process of what could be called 
emulatory elimination.
Meinrad von Engelberg has convincingly argued that this emulative 
eclecticism is characteristic of baroque architecture in the Roman Holy 
Empire. The innovative power of eclecticism consisted of potentizing 
quotations, the sources of which always shone through and stood out as 
recognizable benchmarks. This it did by superimposing a novel and more 
ideal solution upon them. This widespread design principle relies on view-
ers who actually understand visual references and who will admit that the 
refinement with which they find themselves confronted unquestionably 
outstrips the referenced examples. Here again this practice of quoting was 
83 See Weber 2014, 136–137.
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not considered a paucity of originality, but rather—if cleverly applied—a 
demonstration of intellect, education, ambition, and aesthetic sensitivity.84
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Copying the World’s Emperor: 
Dinglinger’s Great Moghul and the 
French Model of Absolute Power
Abstract The kings and princes of late seventeenth- and early eigh- 
teenth-century Europe were steeped in the desire for absolute power. The 
most ambitious and successful ruler among them was Louis XIV. In Asia, 
Aurangzeb, the acting Great Moghul, was known as his equivalent. Both 
used the potential of courtly representations not only to illustrate, but to 
legitimize their claim to power. In order to document their grandeur and 
immortality, they let pictures of themselves be distributed; some images of 
the Great Moghul even reached Europe, where they were copied for travel 
literature. Johann Melchior Dinglinger, goldsmith at the court of the Elec-
tor of Saxony and King of Poland Augustus the Strong, used those images 
spread via print media to create his masterpiece The Throne of the Great 
Moghul. Dinglinger’s aim was not to exhibit an exact effigy of the historical 
Great Moghul Aurangzeb and his splendid court, but to depict absolute 
power. However, the absolute monarch is inimitable. This article pursues 
Dinglinger’s strategy to meet the problem of how to imitate the inimitable. 
For this, he used both formal and stylistic devices and imperial concepts of 
representation. The latter included Dinglinger’s presentation of his cabinet 
piece to the king, which became a key moment in the understanding of 
the art work. It was that moment when Augustus the Strong’s desire for 
absolute power was satisfied, comparable to the situation when the tran-
substantiation of Louis XIV in juxtaposition with his portrait took place, as 
described by Louis Marin in his thesis on the portrait of the king. Ultimate-
ly, Dinglinger applied the practice of copying in order to erase the original.





In 1701, the court jeweller Johann Melchior Dinglinger began to work on 
his masterpiece The Throne of the Great Moghul (fig. 1), which he devoted 
to Augustus the Strong, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland. In the same 
year, Hyacinthe Rigaud created what is probably the most famous portrait 
of Louis XIV, depicting him as an absolute ruler (fig. 2), and which hence-
forth substituted for the king in his absence.
At this time, Roger de Piles had seen in his writings on art theory that 
color was brought into the strict rules of the French royal academy by occa-
sionally paying tribute to the coloring of the Venetians and the qualities 
of the Dutch, in addition to the classical ideal. Before it was unanimously 
agreed upon—under the leadership of the first court painter and director of 
the Académie royale de peinture et de sculpture, Charles Le Brun, and the court 
historian and art critic, André Félibien—that Greek and Roman antiquities 
represented the only worthy model from which nature could be reproduced. 
In terms of the basic principles inherent to art—composition, expression, 
design, and color—such antiquities combined these in a harmonious way, 
and always with an emphasis on dessin over couleur. The most important 
tool of the budding artist therefore was copying, for nothing held so much 
weight as the right choice of model. Seldom were theory and practice so 
closely aligned as at the Royal Academy under the rule of Louis XIV.
As they were political enemies and never related by blood or marriage, 
the relationship between Louis XIV and Augustus the Strong remained 
always distant. Nevertheless, there was no greater model for the Saxon 
Elector-King than Louis XIV, who succeeded—by the means of his centralist 
government and his clever machinery of representation—to come closer 
to the ideal of the absolute ruler than any of the other ambitious princes 
in Europe. To realize his plans for the establishment of an absolute, con-
trolled state, Augustus the Strong risked a lot. He converted to Catholicism 
to obtain the Polish crown, became entangled in daring warfare to defend 
his territory, and spent vast sums of the national budget to win the loy-
alty of the nobility. Altogether, his political and military efforts remained—
more or less—unsuccessful in the course of this reign. In fact, he attained 
more success in a different field—art. Shortly before the end of his life, 
Augustus the Strong was able to boast to being the owner of the richest 
treasury in Europe. Dinglinger’s Throne of the Great Moghul is a mirror of 
this wealth, which is expressed not only in material categories, but also in 
its uniqueness and artistic perfection.
The treasury contained more than what we might call art in the tradi-
tional sense; Dinglinger’s cabinet piece has not really been considered to 
fall within the category of art, but as “a special genre of the virtuoso, courtly 
Kunstkammer object.”1 Dinglinger himself referred to Augustus the Strong 
1 Warncke 1988, 159: “die Sondergattung des virtuosen, höfischen Kunst kam mer- 
stückes.”
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as a Maecenas who admired and supported “all liberal arts and especially 
the art of enamellists and goldsmiths.”2 Dinglinger therefore associated 
2 J. M. Dinglinger, letter to Augustus the Strong from 11 October 1707, published 
in: Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 388: “alle freyen Künste und sonderlich gegen die 
emaillir- und Goldarbeiter Kunst.” 




Figure 2: Hyacinthe Rigaud, Louis XIV, 1701/1702, Oil on Canvas, 179 × 190 cm, 
Paris, Musée du Louvre.
379
COPYING THE WORLD’S EMPEROR: DINGLINGER’S GREAT MOGHUL
his handicraft with the liberal arts, as well as with painting, graphics, sculp-
ture, and architecture, which have helped artists to gain prestige by being 
part of the liberal arts and the academy since the Renaissance.3 Although 
goldsmiths were not trained at the academy, their discipline was closely 
related to that of graphic artists. Cutlers and goldsmiths frequently became 
professional printmakers and engravers.4 The goldsmith’s art at the Euro-
pean courts served primarily the representational purposes of the king or 
prince. Such costly and complex imperial representations were not sim-
ply meant to decorate his power, but functioned as an important tool to 
enforce power interests and legitimize claims of sovereignty. Preparations 
for lavish festivals and court ceremonies were among Dinglinger’s tasks at 
the Saxon court. Consequently, his work must always be understood in the 
context of a comprehensive ceremonial choreography.
If we approach the theme of the copy in the case of The Throne of the 
Great Moghul, we must critically examine the tools available to us as art his-
torians. My study will not provide novel or detailed insights into Dinglinger’s 
cabinet piece, but will instead demonstrate that the form-analytical com-
parison—the most common method of art history analysis—is dependent 
on today’s inadequate concept of art and needs further resources in order 
to fully appreciate how Dinglinger’s work utilized the concept of copying.
Investigating Dinglinger’s piece as an object means to consider its 
historical, social, political, and economic context in dependence on the 
categories of time and space. The object obtains a history and this his-
tory enables comparison. We compare past and present, here and there 
or, sometimes, original and copy. This is a proven method and provides 
the scholar with an important tool. However, what happens when the 
presentation of an object like Dinglinger’s cabinet piece becomes part of 
art itself? What happens to the categories of time and space, to histori-
cal comparisons in regard to performing a ceremonial act that is linked 
to its present time alone? This temporal component has also become 
apparent in analyzes of language and movement of the present volume 
(Sanchez-Stockhammer, Schwan). An original cannot be traced due to an 
indeterminate time span, so that there seem to exist only copies of copies. 
This immeasurability of time that passes between original and copy, or 
copy and copy, and the resulting assumed simultaneity result in the dele-
tion of the original. Dinglinger’s declared intention was to display absolute 
power which, a priori, excludes comparability, in the form of a unique art 
work. His goal was inimitability, what can basically be compared to the 
3 About 50 years later, the fine arts would be permanently disconnected from 
the liberal arts at the instigation of leading French intellectuals and aesthetics 
(Batteux, d’Alembert). See Pochat 1986, 351–354.
4 Dinglinger came from a family of knife makers in Biberach, but was trained to 
be a goldsmith by his maternal uncle in Ulm. Some engravings by him also sur-
vive. See Watzdorf 1962, 15: “Oft gingen aus dem Messerschmiedehandwerk 
kunsthandwerkliche Spezialisten, Eisenschneider, Kupferstecher, Medailleure 
hervor – man denke an die Sadeler! –, die engste Zusammenarbeit mit dem 
Messerschmied verband. Häufig war der Goldschmied der Dritte im Bunde.”
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non-reproducibility of ID cards, banknotes, or credit cards as described 
by Schröter in this volume. Here, non-reproducibility served purposes 
of identity protection and preserved the social and political order. With 
these aspects of time, simultaneity, and comparability (in the context of 
the copy) in mind, the present essay will analyze Dinglinger’s cabinet piece 
on the basis of representation strategies, including court ceremonies, as 
part of the art work and demonstrate the limits of object-related analyzes 
in art history. After a brief description of Dinglinger’s Throne of the Great 
Moghul, we will select some formal aspects and trace the transformation 
of a ruler figure with the help of a chain of copies and variations. This will 
be followed by an in-depth study of the representative aspect of that work 
in dependence of an exemplary paper by André Félibien, royal chronicler 
to Louis XIV. Finally, we will revert to Dinglinger’s cabinet piece and try to 
reveal his approach to copy and inimitability.
Description of Dinglinger’s Throne of the Great Moghul
It took Dinglinger seven years to complete The Throne of the Great Moghul 
and to finally give it to his royal addressee in 1708. This was only two 
years before Johann Friedrich Böttger discovered the recipe for making 
hard paste porcelain (see Weber). The elaborate masterpiece was housed 
in the electoral treasury—the Geheime Verwahrung (secret depot)—which 
was expanded into a publicly accessible museum known as the Green 
Vault in 1724. Within the latter, Dinglinger’s showpiece initially held a 
prominent place in the Pretiosensaal (precious jewellery hall), and later 
on in the even more splendid Juwelenzimmer (jewel room).5 Augustus the 
Strong had also opened his Kunst- und Wunderkammer to a select audi-
ence in the years before.
The cabinet piece by Dinglinger shows the birthday party of the Moghul 
Emperor Aurangzeb (1658–1707), a contemporary of Augustus the Strong, 
which was celebrated with the ceremonial weighing of the ruler. The 
emperor wanted his subjects to weigh him in gold, silver, and rice, which 
were distributed among the poor afterwards. On the same occasion, the 
emperor’s grandees paid homage to him with valuable presents. The 
representation of this event, which is composed of 165 tiny gold enamel 
figures (including animals, vessels, and splendor gifts) and was originally 
decorated with 5,223 diamonds, 189 rubies, 175 emeralds, 53 pearls, two 
cameos, and one sapphire,6 contains a multitude of information. Dinglinger 
fell back to various sources in order to obtain this, including reading of 
“curious travel accounts of foreign and distant countries and nations,”7 
5 Cf. Syndram 1996, 15–16.
6 See e.g. Warncke 1988, 160.
7 “curiosen Reissen-Beschreibungen frembder und weit entlägner Länder und 
Nationen.”
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as he noted in his letter to the elector-king from 11 October 1707, and of 
ancient writers,8 as he stated in his paper with a description of his cabinet 
piece.9 In the older art historical investigations on the subject, especially by 
Erna von Watzdorf and Walter Holzhausen,10 the various sources, such as 
the accounts and compendia by Athanasius Kircher, Joan Nieuhof, Olfert 
Dapper, Wouter Schouten, Arnoldus Montanus, Simon de Vries, Francois 
Bernier, and Jean-Babtiste Tavernier, were exactingly researched and cate-
gorized as travel literature.11 Olfert Dapper’s work Asia, translated into Ger-
man in 1681, proved to be Dinglinger’s main source, with which we will deal 
later. Dinglinger was able to use the well-stocked library of Augustus the 
Strong, as well as the books owned by his brother and collaborator Georg 
Christoph Dinglinger, for instance Ost- und westindische Dinge by Simon de 
Vries.12 Dinglinger obviously preferred the rich image material of the travel 
literature, since the additional information that he received in the accompa-
nying text passages helped him to create the total composition, the archi-
tectural arrangement, the individual figures, the costumes, the jewellery, 
and the vessels. It would, at least, explain why he did not use the album of 
Indian miniatures that was in Augustus’ possession since the 1690s.13
The most recent and convincing study on The Throne of the Great 
Moghul, by Carsten-Peter Warncke and published in 1988, perfectly recon-
structs the original composition of the mostly mobile objects on the 
basis of Dinglinger’s paper describing his work.14 It differs from previous 
approaches, particularly that of von Watzdorf, for which an engraving of 
the cabinet piece from 1739 by Christian Philipp Lindemann was decisive 
for the reconstruction.15 The ascending architectural ensemble—opened 
to the viewer in front of a multi-unit reflecting back panel—is arranged on 
three floors, the quality of which increase simultaneously with their close-
ness to the Moghul emperor—the main focus of the depiction. The lower 
and middle levels are of silver and the upper one is made of gold. At the 
end of the tapered stairs, one can see the magnificent Peacock Throne 
(described in detail by Bernier and Tavernier) on which the Great Moghul 
sits cross-legged in an oriental manner, holding his sceptre in his right 
hand and distantly overlooking the event. His fanciful crowned head is 
8 Watzdorf 1962, vol. I, 131 and 134.
9 Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 392–400.
10 Watzdorf 1962; Holzhausen 1939.
11 See References.
12 See Watzdorf 1962, vol. I, 134; Comp. Holzhausen 1939, 93 and esp. fn. 2: He 
maintained that all relevant books were in Georg Christoph’s library and assumed 
a comparable one was available in Johann Melchior’s house; J. M. Dinglinger was 
friends with the royal librarian Rüger.
13 Dating from 1689, it was first mentioned in the inventory of the cabinet of prints 
and drawings, Dresden, from 1738.
14 Warncke 1988; Dinglinger’s tract in Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 392–400. Syndram 
(2014, 102–113) published a transcription of the earliest copy of Dinglinger’s 
description.
15 Watzdorf 1962, vol. I, 135, fig. 153.
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framed by a big, golden sun with a halo and a majestic lion at its centre.16 
It is not the task of this paper to reconstruct the structure of the entire 
work again, so that, at this point, only the most important references to 
the involved characters and objects are provided in order to convey an 
overall impression and a basic understanding of the work, which will be 
necessary for further understanding of my investigation. By following 
Warncke’s construction, the show of the dignitaries is performed hierarchi-
cally: the most prominent dignitary moves into the parade on the lowest 
level, while the lower ranking one has already reached the final section of 
the stairs in front of the throne: the Chan Chanon (Prince of Princes) and 
the Mir Miron (Lord of Lords), with palanquin carriers and entourage on 
the lower level, the Chani Alem (Prince of the People) and the Primo Vezier 
(Imperial Chancellor), with canopy carriers on the middle level, and the 
Wasan bassi (Treasurer), on the lower stairs and the Omrahm Nabab (Gov-
ernor) on the upper stairs of the upper, golden floor.17 Servants, followers, 
and other visitors of lesser rank move between these figures, carrying gifts 
or admiring them.
Dinglinger divided his work, and correspondingly his paper, into three 
chapters, beginning with the “magnificence of the Great Moghul and his 
gorgeous throne,”18 followed by the “splendour of the solemn parade of 
the grandees and their presents,”19 and concluded by the elucidation of 
the hidden meanings of some of the presents which could only be deci-
phered after reading the ancient books. He did not fail to point out that 
such a court did not only exist in the past, but even today, particularly in 
the empire of the Great Moghul on the occasion of his birthday. The seem-
ingly mythical richness of the oriental rulers had been brought closer to 
Augustus the Strong not only in terms of time, but of space, too, with the 
aid of Dinglinger’s cabinet piece whose cost and effort were worthy of its 
model.20 According to Warncke, baroque texts required a thorough knowl-
edge of their contemporaries, such that they only reported on what was 
deemed necessary.21 For this reason, Dinglinger mentioned those events, 
characters, gifts, and their meanings that were not based on common ico-
nography, but on Oriental and antique sources.
16 See Dinglinger’s tract in Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 392, in which he describes it as a 
symbol of the Great Moghul.
17 The proper names and their meaning are taken from Dinglinger’s tract and can 
be found—with the same spelling—in Dapper, 1681, 149–150.
18 “Magnificenz des grossen Moguls und dessen prächtige[n] Thron”
19 “Splendeur des solennen Aufzugs derer Grandium nebst ihren Praesenten”
20 See the introduction of his tract in Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 392. See also his letter 
of 11 October 1707 (Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 388).
21 Warncke, 1988, 165.
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The object-related copy
Within Dinglinger’s total conception, we will focus on a single figure among 
the countless others (fig. 3).
It is located on the left margin of the balustrade on the middle level, 
seen under a canopy carried by a servant. The figure is clear enough to 
be recognized in the foreground performance, but it is apparently too 
mean to be considered closely. It is among those figures that were mar-
ginally mentioned by Dinglinger at the end of the second chapter of his 
tract: “And, finally, there are eleven figures or dignitaries who observe the 
court and the presents as spectators.”22 Holzhausen, who discovered the 
graphic models for Dinglinger’s The Throne of the Great Moghul, recognized 
the model for the entire spatial construction of the court in an engraving 
in Olfert Dapper’s Asia, engraved by J. A. Bauer.23 Beyond this, he learned 
that Dapper’s portraits of the Moghul emperors Shah Salim (Jahangir) and 
22 “Und letztlich sind noch Eilff andere Figuren oder Persohnen von Condition, als 
Spectatores, die den Etât und die Geschenke betrachten.” Dinglinger, tract in 
Watzdorf 1962, vol. II, 393.
23 Dapper, 1681, fig. 15.
Figure 3 (left): Johann Melchior Dinglinger, Audience Visitor (Detail of Fig. 1). 
Figure 4 (right): Anonymous, Aurangzeb, engraving, in Dapper, Olfert, 1672.
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Shah Orangzeb (Aurangzeb) (fig. 4) emerged again in Dinglinger’s work 
as audience members, with the latter being identical to our selected fig-
ure. Holzhausen sums his observation up as follows: “In this manner, the 
Great Moghul emerges twice at his birthday party, since he also sits on 
his throne!”24
However, this was not the case. In Dinglinger’s work, which was created 
with several layers of meaning and was meticulously thought through, not 
only was each figure (including the presents) iconographically scrutinized, 
but so was every detail.25 Consequently, if Dinglinger used the portrait of 
Aurangzeb as described by his main source, Olfert Dapper, but did not inte-
grate it into its designated place, namely the throne of the Great Moghul, it 
would have been for a special reason.
24 “Auf diese Weise kommt der Großmogul, da er ja auch auf seinem Thron sitzt, an 
seinem Geburtstagsfest zweimal vor!” Holzhausen 1939, 100.
25 We can conclude this from Dinglinger’s total concept and his paper. Cf. Warncke’s 
interpretation (Warncke 1988, 168–180). 
Figure 5: Johann Melchior Dinglinger, Aurangzeb (Detail of Fig. 1).
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Let us first look at Dinglinger’s Aurangzeb on the throne (fig. 5) in com-
parison with the figure designed after Dapper’s model (fig. 3). Apart from 
the crown, sceptre, and coat, it is especially the attitude that distinguishes 
both figures considerably. Dinglinger’s Aurangzeb followed an illustration 
in Wouter Schouten’s Ost-Indische Reyse from 1676.26 In it, the emperor 
sits cross-legged on a cushion and is supported by another from behind. 
His arms are bent, his left hand resting on his thigh and his right hold-
ing the sceptre. His robe and turban—provided that it is freed of its fancy 
crown—are definitely related to contemporary Indian pictures of the 
Moghul fashion. The manner of the sitting position—as seen here in the 
example of Aurangzeb—is only known from Indian models of rulers or 
gods, although Schouten did not revert to an Indian miniature or sculp-
ture, but to Dutch copies of them in travel literature. Dapper’s Aurangzeb, 
in contrast, poses in a swinging contrapposto, his left arm on his hip and 
his right one holding the sceptre. The side-closures of his robe (jama) and 
trousers (payjama), the rich sash, and the tightly bound turban show that 
the engraver knew Moghul fashion from having viewed Indian miniatures. 
His attitude, however, is far from the typical posture of a Moghul potentate 
in Indian paintings in which his head and legs are in profile and his body 
in a three-quarter view. In fact, the pose of Dapper’s figure resembles the 
posture which was attributed to nobles (and particularly rulers) in Euro-
pean paintings and which eventually became the epitome of an absolute 
ruler, with Hyacinthe Rigaud’s portrait of Louis XIV of 1701/02 (fig. 2).27 
Therefore, it is obvious that Dinglinger chose a model that could be easily 
distinguished from the European and especially the French repertoire of 
courtly gestures and attitudes. It has not yet become clear why Dinglinger 
copied Dapper’s figure of Aurangzeb and integrated it as a dignitary of 
inferior rank within the ceremonial act.
The history of the copy and its original
To answer the question of why Dinglinger used Dapper’s Aurangzeb in 
this fashion, it is necessary to examine earlier representations of Moghul 
emperors. As the few portraits of the Great Moghul in travel literature 
from the first half of the seventeenth century that actually followed Indian 
miniatures had never been copied by later authors,28 the circle of relevant 
publications can be limited to only one book, China illustrata, by Athanasius 
Kircher, from 1667, in which the portrait of the Moghul Emperor Akbar can 
be found (fig. 6).
26 Schouten 1676, book III, 165. See Holzhausen 1939, 100.
27 Rigaud’s portrait was often copied throughout Europe and had become famous.
28 In Laet 1631, title page; Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas 1625 (two engravings 




Figure 6: Anonymous, Akbar [Jahangir], engraving, in Athanasius Kircher‘s 
China monumentis,[…] illustrata, 1667.
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Major parts of Dinglinger’s description of the sun pyramid were based on 
Kircher’s work. Olfert Dapper also used Kircher’s book several times, both 
in his literary descriptions and for the illustrations. Consequently, we have 
to assume that Dapper as well as Dinglinger knew Kircher’s portrait of the 
Moghul emperor.
In the portrait, Akbar sits in profile on a throne of European prove-
nance, his bare feet resting on a low footstool. His head is framed by a 
radiant nimbus; his raised hand holds a large globe. At his feet are a long-
necked bottle and three drinking vessels. The figure of the Great Moghul 
is covered by a canopy. The whole throne area is on a platform, providing 
the king’s body with adequate space. The platform is surrounded by richly 
decorated room elements, carpets and an opened curtain. A dog crouches 
in front of the podium next to the sovereign. Four visitors are present in 
the audience, of which only the front man attends to the emperor with a 
deep bow. Two of the remaining three visitors look at the viewer; the last 
one turns to his neighbor.
Athanasius Kircher was not only a well-known author and polymath, 
but also an enthusiastic collector.29 His so-called Museum Kircherianum in 
Rome, where he spent most of his life at the Jesuit College, was one of the 
largest and most famous cabinets of curiosities of his time. In a collection 
catalogue,30 a portrait of Regum Tartariae that is mentioned within the chap-
ter De variis Picturis & Effigiebus could have served as a model for Kircher’s 
engraving. He himself wrote in his book, “The fathers sent to Rome a pic-
ture or likeness of him [Akbar] in the dress which he used for public audi-
ences.”31 A few decades ago, an unusual miniature (life-sized and applied to 
cotton) with the portrait of Jahangir, son of Akbar, was sold at an auction.32 
This picture (fig. 7) was undoubtedly copied by Kircher’s engraver.33 
It helps to distinguish the different models of the engraving from 
each other. Since a detailed comparison between original and copy is not 
relevant to our present study, it should suffice to refer to two key aspects: 
First, the Indian model is limited solely to the figure of the Great Moghul, 
including the throne, nimbus, globe, footstool (in the original a folded 
carpet), and the drinking vessels. Everything else—canopy, platform, 
decoration, and other figures—sprang from the imagination of the Euro-
pean engraver, or at least from European models. Second, a certain com-
munication is evident between the ruler, the audience member standing 
at the left margin and focusing on the viewer, and the viewer him or 
herself by the view coordinates. The emperor looks in the direction of the 
29 The list of recent publications on Athanasius Kircher is very long. I select only a 
few of them: Fletcher 1988; Lo Sardo 1999; Lo Sardo 2001; Findlen 2004.
30 Sepibus 1678.
31 Kircher 1987, 71.
32 Oriental Manuscripts and Miniatures 1995, 74–83. Last sold: Bonhams, Islamic 
and Indian Art London, New Bond Street, 5 April 2011, auction 18801, lot 322.
33 See Crill and Jariwala 2010, 76–77. For a detailed investigation of the portrait, see 
in Forberg 2015, 144–148 and Forberg 2016, 227–230.
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visitor, who, on the other hand, passes his gaze in an optical extension 
to the viewer. Eye contact with the viewer was a well-established icono-
graphic instrument in European art meant to highlight the authenticity of 
contemporary events, in this case the encounter with the Great Moghul. 
What is even more important for our study is the juxtaposition of the 
two figures in a clearly distinguished body language that, seemingly for 
demonstration purposes, separates two cultures from each other. Akbar, 
whom we know (thanks to the original) to be Jahangir, has his head and 
feet, following the norm, in profile and his upper body in a three-quarter 
view. These aspects of the pose belonged to the rigid rules of portraiture 
at the courts of the Moghul empire and its surrounding principalities. The 
visitor, however, displaying his whole body in a three-quarter view, has 
his right arm on his hip, while the other rests on a stick. We remember 
observing the same pose in Dinglinger’s audience visitors and Dapper’s 
portrait of Aurangzeb. The pose is repeated in courtly representations 
in European art of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as persis-
tently as the Moghul pose is repeated in portraits of Indian princes. It 
had initially been developed from discussions and descriptions of the 
nobleman, particularly after the example of Il Cortegiano, by Baldassare 
Castiglione.34 It was essential to translate the—taken literally—indescrib-
able elegance of the nobleman, which so obviously distinguished him 
from the rest of the society, into a picture. Seventeenth-century authors 
agreed on the subject, stating that it was “hard to describe” and “can-
not be imitated.”35 Castiglione himself based his work on the assump-
tion that grace “is often a gift of nature and the heavens.”36 Formulations 
of grace were soon followed by those of “civility,” which were translated 
by contemporary painters into natural movement and an elegant con-
trapposto.37 Anthonis van Dyck seems to have found the most convinc-
ing depiction at his time, when he made the Portrait of Charles I, King of 
England at the Hunt (about 1635),38 although he did not invent this pos-
ture, but was rather inspired by diverse portraits of noblemen and rulers 
by Titian, on which some portraits by Bronzino and Parmigianino might 
also have depended.39 Although this posture was generally used in place 
of the grandeur of the nobleman, it was especially established at the 
court of Louis XIV and became a symbol of absolute power as mentioned 
34 Baldassare Castiglione, Il Libro del Cortegiano, first published in 1528 (Castigli-
one 1528), later translated into numerous European languages and frequently 
edited throughout the centuries since then.
35 Roodenburg 2004, 10.
36 Roodenburg 2004, 10.
37 Roodenburg 2004, 120.
38 Schneider 1994, 128–131.
39 This posture can be traced to fifteenth-century portraits of aristocrats, partic-
ularly in pictures by Piero della Francesca, Antoniazzo Romano, Andrea Man-
tegna, and Sandro Botticelli, though not in individual portraits. An exception 




above.40 It was copied many times by the rulers of neighboring states, 
just as by Augustus the Strong.41
The pose of the nobleman was also popular and distributed in the Neth-
erlands, so that Dapper’s choice for the design of his portrait of Aurangzeb 
is comprehensible. Kircher describes his portrayal of the Great Moghul as 
follows:
In a public assembly he gleamed in his majesty. […] Few monarchs 
had dressed of similar beauty, for he exhibited himself to view 
adorned with a diadem made of gold, pearls, and precious stones 
of great price, and shining like that of a divinity. […] In his hand he 
held a sphere, through which he showed himself to be the lord of 
the world and the greatest power.42
What he is describing is the image of an absolute monarch. Dapper had 
no doubt of the Moghul emperor’s absolute power, but probably of the 
choice of the devices that Kircher used for his representation. Therefore, 
he dispensed with the Indian model (or its copy in Kircher’s book) and 
replaced it with the ruler type in European portraiture. What we observe 
in this chain of copies can therefore be called a negotiation with the for-
eign formulation and style of absolute power, rather than a translation of 
it.43 When Dinglinger designed his figure of the visitor at the court of the 
Great Moghul, he was aware of the fact that a European figure in orien-
tal costume placed within an exotic surrounding did not make an Indian 
potentate. Moreover, the awareness of a difference between the European 
and Indian type of an absolute ruler provided him with additional tools for 
the creation of his multi-layered cabinet piece. Consequently, Dinglinger 
marginalized the posture of a European potentate—at this time already 
personified by Louis XIV—in the figure of the audience visitor of inferior 
rank comparable with Kircher’s audience member. This statement is not 
meant to be a contradiction to the abovementioned portraits of Augus-
tus the Strong, where the “absolutistic contrapposto” was copied follow-
ing the French model. With his model of the regally seated Great Moghul, 
Dinglinger created a figure which could clearly be distinguished from Euro-
pean—and particularly from French—models, and which offered an alter-
native to the inflationary formulation of absolute power. For this reason, 
the well-informed viewer, like Augustus the Strong (who knew the contem-
porary travel literature), was able to relate to the transformation of Dap-
per’s original figure of the emperor Aurangzeb that lost the status of the 
absolute in favor of the rank of a minor court officer. The probable inten-
tion behind this transcultural displacement was not the conveyance of an 
40 See Schneider 1994, 132–133.
41 See the portraits by Louis de Silvestre, Augustus’s favourite painter.
42 Kircher 1987, 71.
43 Cf. the translation concept demonstrated in Michael Falser’s essay in this vol-
ume. In addition see Forberg 2015, 10–12, and ibid. 2016, 215–216.
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alternative model of the absolute monarch (this is why the term translation 
would be insufficient), but rather the substitution of a symbolic figurehead 
(including its posture) with the aid of a non-European “authentic” figure 
(including its posture). In this formal act, which is based on the compara-
bility of the Indian and the European model, or of the Indian original with 
its European copy, a political calculatio dominates.
The degradation of the European absolutist posture in Dinglinger’s 
work had, therefore, a political dimension within this complex system of 
representation. Therein, the political position of Saxony-Poland is unmis-
takably determined by symbolic references to its friends—Russia and 
Denmark—and its enemy, France. The complex structure of overlapping 
levels of meaning can only be understood with the aid of concrete knowl-
edge about coronation and welcome ceremonies at the courts of Louis XIV 
and Augustus the Strong, as would have been known to a courtier of that 
time, and which Dinglinger could quote from contemporary publications.44 
Dinglinger thus emancipated himself from the French model by develop-
ing new creative means, again and again, and confronted the French king 
with outright hostility, as revealed to the insider by the piece’s unambigu-
ous symbolism.45
Consequently, Dinglinger’s masterpiece not only caused astonishment 
and admiration among its viewers regarding the immeasurable richness of 
an Oriental sovereign, but, above this, it demonstrated the superiority of 
Augustus the Strong as absolute monarch. In the first case, it was enough 
to check the material quality; the second case required a smart compo-
sition of representation strategies. Dinglinger’s tract points out that the 
multi-level courtly representation was part of the artistic achievement of 
its creator.46 Due to this fact, the figure of the Moghul emperor, until now 
analytically considered in terms of form and its copying history only, must 
be included within an investigation that especially considers courtly rep-
resentation as a means of establishing and legitimizing absolute power.
Courtly representation as part of an art work, or, 
the idea-related copy
The most important tool of courtly representation was imitation. Based on 
the fact that France served as a (positive or negative) role model, it is worth 
learning from studies which deal with the royal representations of Louis 
XIV in order to grasp Dinglinger’s idea of copying the imperial court of the 
44 See Museum of Prints and Drawings, Bureau IX, and countless documents of 
Saxon festivals from the former Oberhofmarschallamt in Dresden, which are now 
conserved in Sächsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Archiv des Landesamtes für Denk-
malpflege, Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden, and in the Museum of Prints and 
Drawings. See Schnitzer 2000, 12–29, and Miksch 2000.
45 See Warncke 1988, 173–176.
46 Cf. Warncke 1988, 180.
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Great Moghul. Augustus stored publications on and descriptions of royal 
ceremonies at Louis’ court separately in a cabinet called Bureau IX, at the 
Museum of prints and drawings.47 He used these as a source of inspiration 
or imitation for the preparation of his own festivals.48
Historians often point to the fact that the absolute monarch in itself 
does not and cannot exist, but only the ideal of the absolute monarch 
is possible. We will first ask what the royal portrait, in this case that of 
Louis XIV, displays against the background of representations of absolute 
power. For this purpose, we will look to the famous thesis on the por-
trait of the king by Louis Marin,49 which he wrote in continuation of the 
even more famous thesis on the king’s two bodies by Ernst Kantorowicz.50 
Kantorowicz had already observed that royal representation as a political 
means had become highly important at European courts of the late Mid-
dle Ages and the Early Modern Period. His most remarkable achievement 
was the discovery of the principle of the king’s two bodies, which could be 
illustrated best with funeral rites. Amy Schmitter summarized his thesis in 
a few words:
The dead body in the coffin was no longer the King, for death did 
not dissolve the King into his two bodies, but merely created a 
corpse, while the substance of the King’s body transferred to that 
of the effigy in an act of political transubstantiation. […] As long as 
no living body bears the Dignity, the effigy seemed to display the 
real presence of the king qua King. Indeed what one saw when one 
looked even at the living King was not a natural body at all […], but 
the Majesty ordained by God appearing externally.51 
The two bodies of the king consisted consequently of a human (historical) 
body and a political body. Instead of the king’s two bodies in medieval rep-
resentational systems, the portrait of the absolute monarch, according to 
Marin, combines three bodies: a physical historical body, a juridico-political 
body, and a semiotic sacramental body.52
This is preceded by establishing that two different levels of meanings 
are hidden in the phenomenon of representation: first, representation in 
the sense of medieval effigies, as a substitute of the living; and second, 
representation in the sense of absolute power that becomes real only in its 
representation. Consequently, representation is not only an instrument of 
power, it is power.53
47 Heucher 1738, 96 and following pages. See Schnitzer 2000, 26–27.
48 More details in Schnitzer and Hölscher 2000, esp. 146–177.
49 Marin 2005.
50 Kantorowicz 1957.
51 Schmitter 2002, 413.
52 Marin 1988, 14.
53 Marin 1988, 5–6.
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This statement needs further explanation. Power, following Marin, is noth-
ing more than the ability to exert an action on something or someone. 
It is not an action per se, though. The execution of force (power in the 
most vulgar and general sense), however, is power through elimination, 
recognizable in the confrontation with another power. The essence of 
force is absolute. By means of representation, power will be transferred 
into signs and legitimized by law. Provided that power is the desire for 
the absolute of all powers, representation is consequently the imaginary 
satisfaction of this desire and, at the same time, its real deferred satis-
faction. On the basis of different examples, Marin traces the transforma-
tion of the desire for absolute power into the imaginary absolute of the 
monarch. In so doing, he meets inevitably with the theme of the Eucharist, 
simplified in the declaration “This is my body,” which was already essential 
to Kantorowicz’s thesis, where he proved the juridical and political model 
function of the catholic theology of the Corpus Mysticum for the theory of 
kingship. Marin’s main source is the logic by Port-Royal that introduces the 
contiguity between the Eucharist symbols of Christ and the political signs 
of the monarch (as in “the portrait of Caesar is Caesar” or “the portrait of 
Louis XIV is Louis XIV”), but only with the intention to trace an insuperable 
boundary between them. It is this boundary that the desire for absolute 
power crosses, with the fantastic representation of the absolute monarch. 
By crossing this boundary, the body of the king would become visible in 
three senses, as mentioned above: “as sacramental body it is really pres-
ent in the visual and written currencies, as historical body it is visible as 
represented, absence becomes presence again in ‘image;’ as political body 
it is visible as symbolic fiction signified in its name, right, and law.”54 The 
sacramental body, which is the portrait of the king as absolute monarch, 
resolves the tension between the historical and the political body of the 
king by arranging the complete exchange between the two of them. How 
can representation be the satisfaction of this highly-desired absolute 
power? As Marin stated, “The portrait of the king that the king contem-
plates offers him the icon of the absolute monarch he desires to be, to the 
point of recognizing and identifying himself through and in it at the very 
moment when the referent of the portrait absents himself from it. The king 
is only truly king, that is, monarch, in images.”55
Marin’s thesis becomes clearer in the example of the portrait of Louis 
XIV by Charles Le Brun, for whose investigation Marin draws on the writ-
ings by André Félibien. The selected portrait of Louis XIV does not exist 
anymore, but only Félibien’s description remains.56 It is actually, according 
to Marin, not a description of the portrait, but of the “real” king.57 He uses 
the same tools as the painter. He codifies the sublime characteristics of the 
54 Marin 1988, 13.
55 Marin 1988, 7–8.
56 Félibien 1671, 85–112.
57 Marin 1988, 208.
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king in signs and symbols wherein he locates the mystery of the king. Le 
Brun added the allegories of abundance, renown, and victory, which Féli-
bien transferred into the sublime features of the king: goodness, majesty, 
and power. Félibien repeatedly encountered the theme of the copy in his 
description, which was a depiction of the absolute monarch at the same 
time. The aim of his depiction was to highlight the inimitability of the king 
as a logical consequence of his quality as an absolute potentate. The for-
mulation of inimitability can be found in the countless eulogies of different 
kings and electors in baroque times, which, however, seldom amounted to 
more than an assertion. In contrast to most contemporary writers, Félibien 
succeeded in synchronizing the portrait of the king, the representation of 
the absolute, with the sacramental body of the king and, in consequence, 
to take it to the same level as the theological discourse on the Eucharist; 
he praises the real presence of the king’s body not in an allegorical, but in 
a direct sense. Its presence is believed, for it is seen the same way as in the 
case of Christ. “This is my body” is an absolute statement that has no ade-
quate translation.58 Nevertheless, Félibien dealt repeatedly with the term 
“copy” in his description of Le Brun’s portrait, obviously without recogniz-
ing any contradiction to the postulated inimitability of the king.
Louis XIV, as well as Augustus the Strong and probably the rest of the 
ambitious kings in Europe, compared themselves preferably with Alexan-
der the Great. In his description of the king, Félibien repeated the well-
known anecdote that only Lysipp and Apelles were allowed to portray 
Alexander the Great, and added afterwards that, however, others were 
allowed to copy the original portraits that were also just copies of the orig-
inal or the real king. Marin quotes Félibien as follows: “In this hierarchy of 
representations the first model, Alexander (in flesh and blood, if I may say 
so), is effaced as at the other end of the [mimetic] chain the last copies 
come dense and monumental. Alexander’s portrait is only a representa-
tion, a reminder in images and tombs of the historic body of the deceased 
prince; it is only a memory.”59 In order to surpass the boundaries of rep-
resentation as a memorandum, Félibien recognizes the king as the model 
of the great heavenly king—as the masterpiece of heavenly power. This 
comparison is beyond the purpose of legitimating power. He thus marks 
the picture of the king as the portrait of the absolute and not as the por-
trait of the royal person as in Alexander’s case. “Consequently […], to make 
the king’s portrait, that is, to make a copy of the king’s portrait, is not only 
to reproduce and multiply the links of the mimetic chain but also to cele-
brate, as officiating priest chosen by Heaven, the ritual of the royal mystery 
of the transubstantiation of the prince’s body.”60
Hence, the perfect imitation that diminishes the portrait as a replica 
of the king (as in Alexander’s case) was not the ideal of both the court 
58 Cf. Marin 1988, 11 and 209.
59 Marin 1988, 210.
60 Marin 1988, 211.
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painter and the chronicler. If resemblance played only a marginal role, 
how could the king Louis XIV be distinguished? The king could be iden-
tified by characteristics and virtues that recur in traditional depictions of 
antique demigods or, as Félibien described it, by the aid of “that bearing 
and that size, so great, noble, and at ease, with which the Ancients formed 
their demigods …”61
Marin asks the most important question at the end: Why was Félibien’s 
description of this portrait necessary, since the king was, more or less, the 
only recipient of the picture that hung in his cabinet?62 Marin’s crucial con-
clusion is that the absolute monarch who does not exist in reality exists 
only by means of his representation. Not until the king and his portrait 
were juxtaposed did the king reveal himself as absolute monarch. This is 
what Marin calls the mystery of the transubstantiation of the king’s body, 
or, in his own words: “The king’s portrait in its mystery would be this sacra-
mental body that would at once operate the political body of the kingdom 
in the historical body of the prince and lift the historical body up into the 
political body.”63 Or, as we read in his introduction, “The portrait of the 
king […] offers him the icon of the absolute monarch he desires to be, to 
the point of recognizing and identifying himself through and in it at the 
very moment when the referent of the portrait absents himself from it.” 
With the idea of a representation of the ahistorical absolute monarch, the 
question regarding the original and the copy has become irrelevant and 
the aim of inimitability has been reached.
The timelessness of the inimitable
This inimitability is exactly what Dinglinger intended to portray with The 
Throne of the Great Moghul. In his letter to Augustus the Strong on the 
occasion of the presentation of his cabinet piece on 11 October 1707, 
accompanied with a request for paying the bill, he excuses the costs of the 
production with the following words:
The size of the work as mentioned above is all of silver, but the 
throne with its figures and presents is all of pure gold, adorned 
with diamonds, emeralds, rubies, and pearls, and made in an artful 
and delicate manner, enamelled and molten with the most pleas-
ant colours, that, without praising myself, a work of this kind has 
never been made by an artist and will never be made in the future, 
since most [of the artists] do not have the capacity to achieve this, 
but even if there is one, he would have been prevented from taking 
61 Félibien 1671, 102–103 (in Marin 1988, 212).
62 Marin 1988, 212.
63 Marin 1988, 209.
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such a hazard by the great expense and the length of time, so that 
nothing similar can be found in a gentleman‘s collection.64
Dinglinger’s statement is clearly more pragmatic than Félibien’s intellec-
tual subtleness, but is also rich in information. Dinglinger highlights the 
singularity of the work, which encompasses not only the artistic skills of 
the goldsmith, but also his entrepreneurial ability and his readiness to take 
a risk. At the same time, he places his work within the representational 
system at the royal court, when he says that the cabinet piece will not be 
found in any other royal collection. The so-called Green Vault corresponded 
to former encyclopaedic collections, and it was built up and continually 
enlarged by Saxon electors from the sixteenth century on.65 It consisted of 
artificialia as well as of naturalia, scientifica, and exotica, in order to reflect 
the macrocosm in a micro form. Besides other functions, royal collections 
of that time had a strong representational character. Diverse objects of 
Dinglinger’s The Throne of the Great Moghul, especially the presents, were 
part of these encyclopaedic collections. The votive hands, for instance, 
could be found in Athanasius Kircher’s museum, whereas the miniature 
coffee set was a copy of the Golden Coffee Set made by none other than 
Dinglinger himself, which became a fresh member of the Saxon treasury 
shortly before Dinglinger began working on his new masterpiece. It was 
also the destiny of The Throne of the Great Moghul to become a part of 
the Saxon treasury. The encyclopaedic collection, as a miniaturist mirror 
of a macrocosm, underlined the king’s goal of universal learning that was 
a part of the ideal of the absolute ruler.66 The Kunstkammer had, conse-
quently, a manifest function within the ceremonial court life and was used 
as a means to demonstrate his absolutist ambition for availability of and 
control over the country, the people, and their products. The main focus 
of Dinglinger’s cabinet piece was on the courtly feasts and ceremonies in 
general that existed at the Moghul court, as well as in Saxony.67 Visiting 
the Kunstkammer or the treasury was sometimes a part of the welcome 
ceremony of local and foreign visitors. A lot of details in this work, as seen 
above, consciously address certain recipients—particularly, Saxon courti-
64 “Obbeschriebene größe des Wercks ist alles von Silber, der Thron aber mit den 
Figuren und praesenten alles von klaren Golde, mit Diamant, Schmaragd, Rubin, 
und Perlen garnisiret, auf das allerartigste und zierlichste verfertiget, mit den 
angenehmsten coloriten emaillirt und geschmeltzt, daß, ohne unzeitigen und 
eigen Ruhm zumelden, dergleichen Arbeit noch niehmaln von einen Künstler ist 
vorgestellet worden, auch nach der Zeit nicht geschehen wird, inmassen viel(e) 
die capacité nicht haben, solches zu praestiren, wo auch dieses wäre, hindert 
doch dasselbe der große Verlag und noch mehr die länge der Zeit, sothanen 
Hazard zu thun, dahero dergleichen Stück in keines großen Herrn Cabinet sich 
nirgend finden wird.”
65 See Kolb, Lupfer, and Roth 2010.
66 Cf. Warncke 1988, 170.
67 Warncke (1988, 170–171) also mentions further important aspects of Dinglinger’s 
cabinet piece as indicative of the dining ceremony or the royal hunt mirroring 
Augustus the Strong’s absolutistic ambitions.
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ers, ambassadors, friends, and enemies. The theatrical character of The 
Throne of the Great Moghul corresponds with the court ceremonial.68 Part 
of Dinglinger’s concept of the representation was the presentation of the 
cabinet piece to the king by the artist.
Dinglinger’s letter to the king would have been inappropriate if he 
had praised only his own artistic gifts. The fame that touches the artist 
also belonged to the king, who engaged singular artists and subjects like 
Dinglinger who created singular works that could not be found in other 
treasuries. It is the high quality and the unconditional devotion of his 
subjects which made the monarch unique and powerful—and therefore 
inimatable. This is what Dinglinger expressed in The Throne of the Great 
Moghul, where the grandees of the empire paid homage to the king with 
luxurious presents. Dinglinger knew this fact from Olfert Dapper’s descrip-
tion of the Moghul court, which repeatedly pointed out that there was no 
nobility by inheritance in the Moghul empire:
The Omrahen or gentlemen at the court of the Moghul are not chil-
dren or sons (as one could think) of his house or lineage comparable 
to France or elsewhere, since every country of the kingdom belongs 
to the property of the king, consequently, neither dukes nor mar-
graves nor any other house that has its own estate or patrimony can 
be found [...] All property of the entire kingdom belongs exclusively 
to the king, so that nobody possesses a foot of estate, unless he 
wins the king’s favour, for this reason they all are focused on him 
and humbly request his favour and grace. […] When a gentleman 
dies, he loses the whole estate to the king again—that what was 
presented to him by the king as well as what he himself acquired.69 
This extent of absolute control of his subjects was not possible in Europe, 
although the French king Louis XIV succeeded in controlling the aristo-
cratic layer by means of its (forced) presence at the court—a level of power 
that Augustus the Strong, despite endless and expensive efforts, never 
managed to achieve. Nevertheless, Dinglinger’s cabinet piece has to be 
regarded in this context. The artist’s “present” of The Throne of the Great 
68 An in-depth study of the theatrical aspects of the cabinet piece can be found in 
Warncke 2004 and Baader 2013.
69 Dapper 1681, 138 and 146: “Die Omrahen oder Herren am Hofe des Mogols/
sind keine Kinder oder Söhne (wie man etwan denken mögte) von seinem Hause 
oder Geschlecht / wie in Frankreich oder anderswo/ dann indem alle Länder des 
Königreichs dem König eigenthümlich zustehen/ so folget daraus/ daß allda 
keine Herzogen noch Markgrafen/ noch einig ander Geschlecht/ so mit Lände-
reyen begabet/ oder Vätterliche Erbgüter hat/ gefunden werden. […] Aller Grund 
und Boden des ganzen Königreichs gehört dem König eigenthümlich zu/ also 
daß niemand einen Fußbreit Landes besitzet/ als durch des Königs Gunst und 
Geschenk/ dannenhero sie alle auf ihn ihr Absehen haben/ und seine Wohlge-
wogenheit und Gnade demüthigst verlangen. […] Wann ein Edelmann stirbt/ so 
verfallen alle seine Güter/ sowohl diejenigen/ die er vom König überkommen/ 
als die er selbst erworben/ wieder an den König.”
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Moghul exactly corresponds with the Moghul court ritual as Dinglinger 
depicted it. That is, nobody was allowed to approach the emperor without 
a present, as Dapper explained: “This king notices a considerable increase 
of his wealth and a multiplication of his treasuries through the presents 
he receives. Because nobody—neither foreigner nor subject—is allowed 
to appear before the king without any present.”70 Based on this fact, the 
Moghul emperor had the most splendid court in the entire orient and pos-
sessed the biggest treasury.71 “He has, as it is said, seventeen Karoras of 
pure gold in his treasury, one Karoras is equivalent to 1,000 tons of gold, 
besides his jewels and other treasuries.”72 Therefore, the presentation of 
the gifts becomes a symbol for the absolute loyalty of the king’s subjects 
and, at the same time, for his wealth. In this game of giving and receiving, 
the emperor alone decided who had to give and receive what, when, and 
how much. It was an excellent metaphor of absolute control and power—
to such an extent unknown in Europe.
Dinglinger followed his own model of The Throne of the Great Moghul 
and demonstrated his loyalty to the elector-king. Dinglinger, too, was a 
favorite of Augustus; he acquired wealth and prestige during his services 
for the king, and possessed a splendid house in Dresden, where even the 
Tsar preferred to live in during his stay in Dresden, in 1711.73 Dinglinger’s 
Golden Coffee Set, valued at 50,000 thaler, and The Throne of the Great 
Moghul, valued at 60,000 were, as we saw above, not commissioned works, 
but produced at his own risk and expense, and only offered to the king 
upon their completion (though for sale). It was not until the artwork was 
sold that it was—both allegorically and financially—finished, so that the 
cabinet piece could live up to its promise.
Comparable to the portrait of Louis XIV, Dinglinger did not aim to copy 
the outward appearance or the historical person of the monarch, but to 
represent absolute power. While the transubstantiation of King Louis XIV 
took place at the moment of the juxtaposition of the king and his portrait, 
it occurred, in the case of Augustus the Strong, in the act of receiving and 
accepting the cabinet piece by the king following the model of the Moghul 
court ceremonial. In the moment Augustus accepted Dinglinger’s piece, he 
had become the absolute ruler who enjoyed the absolute loyalty of his sub-
jects, made them rich at will, and received invaluable presents that made 
him the owner of the richest treasury (at least in Europe). Dinglinger con-
sciously avoided references to the French model and chose the Moghul one.
70 Dapper 1681, 146: “Dieser König empfindet einen merklichen Wachsthum 
seines Reichthums/ und Vermehrung seiner Schätze/ durch die ihme gethane 
Geschenke und Präsenten. Dann niemand/ er sey ein Frembdling oder Unter-
than/ darf vor ihm erscheinen/ er bringe dann einig Geschenk mit.” 
71 Dapper 1681, 142.
72 Dapper 1681, 145: “er hat/ wie man vorgiebt/ in seiner Schatz-kammer am 
paarem Gelde liegen/ siebenzehen […] Karoras/ einen jeden Karoras auf 1000. 
Tonnen Goldes gerechnet/auser seinen Juwelen und andern Kostbarkeiten.”
73 Eberle 2014, 11.
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Conclusion
In consideration of space and time, of the exposition of the art work, and 
of its ceremonial framework, the figure of the Great Moghul is formally 
not comprehensible. Dinglinger’s idea of the transubstantiation of the king 
into an absolute monarch, probably inspired by Félibien, would have been 
meaningless if only the figure of the historical Great Moghul Aurangzeb 
had served as a model for Augustus the Strong. Instead, his model was 
not the figure of the Great Moghul, but of the absolute monarch. However, 
the absolute is inimitable. How did Dinglinger solve the dilemma that is 
inherent in the imitation of something inimitable? He solved it by means of 
emulation and elimination.
Dapper’s figure of Aurangzeb, with its French absolutistic posture, 
was simply marginalised and, with it, the possibility of French superiority 
denied. In the transubstantiation of Augustus the Strong, in the moment 
he accepted the “present”, the satisfaction of his desire for absolute power 
not only became true, but, in addition, provided a model he could keep 
in his hands and play with. It was no longer Aurangzeb who dominated 
the game, but Augustus the Strong. Here we find some similarities to the 
concept of the Japanese Palace in Dresden, which was introduced by Julia 
Weber in this volume, where Augustus the Strong eventually sought an 
open contest with the emperor of China. In both cases, neither the Great 
Moghul nor the Chinese emperor had been the actual addressee, but it was 
the subjects in Dinglinger’s case and the foreign visitors—ambassadors 
and potentates of neighboring states—in the case of the Japanese Palace. 
The difference between both the works is especially apparent in their use 
of the concept of the copy. Dinglinger’s intention was, from the beginning, 
to emulate the French model with the aid of an Asiatic alternative. In the 
case of the Meissen Porcelain, it was a chain of prior possibilities for copy-
ing that nursed the idea of emulation. Although the object itself did not 
change, it was its perception and meaning that changed, in the end, due 
to different assessments regarding the categories of the copy and the 
fake. Finally, the porcelain gained the status of an original that allowed 
Augustus the Strong to compete with the Chinese emperor. This is exactly 
the point where Dinglinger’s work differs from the porcelain: Dinglinger 
never sought an open contest with the Great Moghul, even if Augustus 
the Strong eventually played with the figure of Aurangzeb. Dinglinger’s 
achievement was his innovative idea to exhibit absolute power and realize 
it with the help of a ceremonial act. The latter was a single and unrepeat-
able performance that prevented imitation and thus comparability. We 
compared this phenomenon, at the beginning of this essay, with the per-
formance of choreography (Schwan).
We have dealt with a formal copy, that is, the copy of Dapper’s figure of 
Aurangzeb, and a copy of an idea. This is the idea of absolute power, which 
became manifest at the court and in the ceremony of the Great Moghul. 
Dinglinger used the power of the copy to manipulate the original until it 
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had been annihilated. Finally, there can only be one original: the absolute 
monarch, that is Augustus the Strong as absolute monarch, is unique and 
inimitable. The question of the original and the copy has become irrele-
vant. As the original can only be an original in the reflection of its copy, the 
absolute exists beyond the categories of original and copy. This meant, in 
terms of its main addressees—Augustus the Strong’s subjects—that the 
absolute was the only and legitimized instrument of power that guaran-
teed social order and wealth (in a way comparable to the necessity of the 
non-reproducibility of ID-cards and banknotes as analyzed by Schröter 
in the present volume). The transformation of Augustus the Strong into 
an absolute monarch is part of the art work, causing it to differ from art 
objects, due to it being a momentary and unrepeatable act. It extinguishes 
the historical dimension of the art work, and, as a result, its comparability 
and the existence of an original and a copy.
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